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The Interpretative Influence of International Human 
Rights Norms on Judicial Reasoning in Thailand: 
Lessons from the United Kingdom and the               
United States of America 
Chumpicha Vivitasevi 
Abstract 
This research studies and compares the interpretive influence of international 
human rights norms in Thailand, the UK and the USA. It has found that 
successive Thai Constitutions have greatly been influenced by international 
human rights norms, but Thai courts have not made use of such norms in 
interpretation. This is in contrast to the practices in the UK and the USA where 
courts have developed advanced theories of interpretation in order to permit 
influence of international human rights norms in domestic spheres. In order to 
better understand the underlying reasons for the use of international human rights 
norms or the absence of such, the research compares not only the interpretive 
influence of international human rights norms, but also political and 
constitutional backgrounds, roles of the judiciary – including  judicial review and 
interpretive approaches – and the perceived relationships between international 
and domestic laws in the three countries. Based on the results of the comparison, 
it argues that the interpretive influence of international human rights norms is 
desirable in Thailand and that the Thai legal system is actually more open to such 
norms than those of the UK and the USA. The research culminates in using 
experiences of courts in the UK and the USA to formulate a framework for Thai 
courts to consistently and legitimately use international human rights norms in 
their judicial reasoning. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
I. Background and Objectives of the Study 
This research concerns the interpretive influence on domestic judicial reasoning 
of international human rights norms. These are referred to in the research in a 
very broad sense, including not only international human rights norms that are in 
the form of international law, such as international treaties and customary 
international law, but also those that are in the form of laws and practices of 
foreign countries.  
Traditionally, the relevance of an international human rights norm in a national 
court depends on whether the norm has a legal effect on the domestic legal 
system. International human rights norms in the form of laws and practices of 
foreign nations generally do not have any legal status in a domestic legal system, 
and therefore have been considered irrelevant in domestic judicial reasoning. As 
regards international human rights norms that are international laws, their legal 
status in the domestic sphere is usually determined on the basis of the theory of 
the relationship between the international and domestic laws to which a state 
subscribes. 
On the one hand, monist theory sees international and domestic laws as parts of 
the same system and thus submits that international law should apply to a 
domestic legal system automatically. In its extreme version, formulated by 
Kelsen, international law is a higher order of law, and domestic law that conflicts 
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with international law is invalid.1 Dualist theory, on the other hand, maintains 
that international law and domestic law are two distinct systems of law. 
International law does not apply in a domestic legal system unless and until it has 
been processed according to the rules determined by the state. The question of 
which laws assume the higher status is also to be determined by the domestic 
legal system.2 It is the dualist approach to international law that has played an 
important role in preventing the influence of international human rights laws in 
domestic courts.  
Several arguments have been put forward that international human rights law has 
peculiar characteristics distinguishable from those of public international law in 
general and thus should be treated differently.3 This relates especially to the fact 
that while the former attempts to limit the powers of states regarding their own 
citizens, the latter operates under the principles of non-interference and the 
sovereignty of the states. 4  It is also argued that international human rights, 
because of their normative values, should ‘transcend national political systems’ 
and have primacy over other kinds of international and foreign laws.5 
 
                                                 
1 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introdution to International Law (7th edn, Routledge 
1997) 63–64. See also Alexander Somek, ‘Kelsen Lives’ (2007) 18 EJIL 409. 
2  Malanczuk (n 1) 63–64. In practice, states usually adopt a mixture of monist and dualist 
approaches. ibid 64–68 citing the research conducted by L Wildhaber and S Breitenmoser, ‘The 
Relationship between Customary International Law and Municipal Law in Western European 
Countries’ (1998) 48 ZaÖRV 163, 204. 
3 Michael K Addo (ed), International Law of Human Rights (Ashgate Dartmouth 2006) xxxvii; 
Lawrence Collins, ‘Foreign Relations and the Judiciary’ (2002) 51 ICLQ 485, 496; Shaheed 
Fatima, Using International Law in Domestic Courts (Hart 2005) 207–71; Murray Hunt, Using 
Human Rights Law in English Courts (Hart 1998) 26–28. 
4 Addo (ed) (n 3) 1; Malanczuk (n 1) 1–2, 209–11.  
5 Commonwealth Secretariat, ‘Annex: The Challenge of Bangalore: Making Human Rights a 
Practical Reality’ in Developing Human Rights Jurisprudence, Volume 8: Eighth Judicial 
Colloquium on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms: Bangalore, 
India, 27-30 December 1998 (2001) 267. 
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There is evidence that international human rights treaties have been treated 
differently from other kinds of treaties. The ICJ’s advisory opinion in the case of 
Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime 
of Genocide suggested that the unique characters and purposes of the Convention 
which concerned human rights may make the conditions and consequences of the 
reservations by states to this Convention differ from other kinds of international 
agreements where the integrity of the treaties and the consent of the parties play 
important roles.6 This approach was followed by the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the European 
Court of Human Rights. 7  Nevertheless, it is still accepted that international 
human rights law forms part of the wider field of public international law.8 The 
practices of states in accepting international human rights norms into domestic 
legal regime have yet to reflect special treatment for, or the primacy of, such 
norms.9 
In any case, during the last few decades, the national courts of many jurisdictions 
have been inclined to consider international human rights norms that are not 
directly enforceable in their domestic legal systems in interpreting national laws 
and deciding issues arising within national spheres. 10  This trend has been 
explicitly acknowledged in the ‘Bangalore Principles’, the concluding statement 
of the Judicial Colloquium on the Domestic Application of International Human 
 
                                                 
6 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Advisory Opinion) 1951 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/12/4283.pdf> accessed 12 July 
2011, 23–24. 
7 See Effect of Reservations on the Entry Into Force of the American Convention on Human 
Rights (Art 74–75), Advisory Opinion OC–2/82, Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A 
No 2 (24 September 1982); Hilaire v Trinidad and Tobago, Preliminary Objections, Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Series C No 80 (1 September 2001); Belilos v Switzerland 
[1988] ECHR 4 (29 April 1988). 
8 Addo (ed) (n 3) xvii; Luzius Wildhaber, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and 
International Law’ [2007] ICLQ 217, 220. 
9 Dinah Shelton, ‘Normative Hierarchy in International Law’ (2006) 100 Am J Int Law 291, 294. 
10 Melissa A Waters, ‘Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation 
of Human Rights Treaties’ (2007) 107 Colum L Rev 628. 
 
Chapter One                                                                                                          4 
 
Rights Norms and on Government under Law held in Bangalore in 1988. Para 4 
of the ‘Bangalore Principles’ provides: 
In most countries whose legal systems are based upon common 
law, international conventions are not directly enforceable in 
national courts unless their provisions have been incorporated by 
legislation into domestic law. However, there is a growing 
tendency for national courts to have regard to these international 
norms for the purpose of deciding cases where the domestic law – 
whether constitutional, statute or common law – is uncertain or 
incomplete.11 
It is submitted that instead of focusing on their legal status, national courts are 
now looking at international human rights norms as ‘persuasive authorities’.12 It 
should be noted that the term ‘persuasive authority’ may be used with different 
meanings. While McCrudden uses it to mean ‘relevant’ consideration for the 
courts as opposed to ‘binding authority’,13 Jackson refers to it as non-binding but 
more than just relevant, because it carries ‘persuasive force’ in judicial 
reasoning.14 In any case, both meanings reflect the fact that domestic courts are 
not obligated to follow international human rights norms.  
The purposes of looking at international human rights norms in domestic courts 
are also varied. Larsen has given useful typologies for the use of international 
 
                                                 
11 Concluding Statement of the Judicial Colloquium, ‘Bangalore Principles’ (Judicial Colloquim 
on the Domestic Application of International Human Rights Norms and on Government under the 
Law, Bangalore (India), from 24–26 February 1988). 
12 Karen Knop, ‘Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts’ (2000) 32 NYU J Int’l L 
& Pol 501, 512–25. Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational 
Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20 OJLS 499, 502; Vicki C Jackson, 
‘Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority, and the U.S. Court: Gender Equality’ (2003) 37 
Loy L A L Rev 271, 287–88. 
13 McCrudden (n 12) 502. 
14 Jackson (n 12) 287–88. 
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human rights norms in domestic courts: expository, empirical and substantive.15 
Expository use occurs when a court uses international norms ‘to contrast and 
thereby explain a domestic constitutional rule’.16 Empirical use occurs when the 
Court  
looks abroad to see what the effect of the proposed rule might be 
in the context of a particular legal system and to ascertain whether 
the effect of the specific ruling urged upon the Courts will comply 
with the constitutional principle the Court has derived through 
domestic sources.17  
Lastly, there is the substantive use of international norms, where courts seek 
‘guidance in defining the content’ of the domestic law.18  
Of these typologies, the first two are not controversial. In the expository use, 
international human rights norms do not directly provide the meaning and scope 
of the domestic laws under interpretation, nor do they give direction for the 
court’s decision. They simply ‘shed light on the distinctive function of one’s own 
system’.19 Similarly, the use of international human rights norms for expository 
purposes does not directly inform the meaning and scope of the domestic law. In 
this case, however, the norms may help courts decide the case by showing that 
proposed solutions work elsewhere or by showing that fear of such solutions is 
not warranted.20 By contrast, the use of international human rights norms for 
 
                                                 
15 Joan L Larsen, ‘Importing Constitutional Norms from a "Wider Civilization": Lawrence and 
the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional 
Interpretation’ (2004) 65 Ohio St LJ 1284, 1284. 
16 ibid 1288.  
17 ibid 1289. 
18 ibid 1291. 
19 Vicki C Jackson, ‘Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement’ (2005) 
119 Harv L Rev 109, 117 
20 Larsen (n 15) 1289; B Markesinis and J Fedtke, ‘The Judge as Comparatist’ (2005) 80 Tul L 
Rev 11, 97, 105. 
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substantive purposes is controversial, since it means that the meaning and scope 
of rights under domestic law are guided by international human rights norms.21 
Nevertheless, this use of international human rights norms seems to be most 
common.22  
Of many countries that use international human rights norms as persuasive 
authorities,23 the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (USA) 
are of interest to this research.24 In the UK, the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) has had an important role in the 
courts’ judicial reasoning. There has long been a legal policy that ‘both statutory 
and the common law should be interpreted in a way which does not place the 
United Kingdom in breach of (a) its international, unincorporated treaty, 
obligations nor (b) rules of international law’.25 Then, the interpretive role of the 
ECHR in domestic judicial reasoning has been magnified by the Human Rights 
Act 1998 (HRA), which requires domestic courts to apply and enforce the 
Convention Rights by statutory interpretation where possible and to take into 
account jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).26  
In the USA, there is also a canon of construction that ‘statute is to be construed 
so as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of 
the United States’. 27  Although this canon is not directly applicable to 
constitutional interpretation, the US Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, especially 
that on the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution, which prohibits ‘excessive’ or 
 
                                                 
21 Larsen (n 15) 1291.  
22 The substantive use of international human rights norms in the UK and the USA will be 
discussed in Chapters Three, IV and Four IV. The reason for this kind of use to be most common 
will be discussed in Chapter Five. 
23 See McCrudden (n 12) 507 pointing out the practice in Israel, Singapore, South Africa and the 
USA.  
24 The reasons for choosing these two countries as subjects of studies are elaborated below. 
25 Fatima (n 3) 269.  
26 Human Rights Act 1998, ss 2–3. 
27 Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, s 114 (1986). 
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‘cruel and unusual’ punishments, and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, 
which provide for ‘due process’ requirement, shows that international human 
rights norms have had some influence on the Court’s reasoning.28 
From an international perspective, this is a very effective way of upholding 
international human rights standards within national spheres.29 From a domestic 
perspective, however, it is perceived as an innovative way of using international 
and foreign norms and has been the subject of heated debates.30 The critics have 
been most vocal in the USA, where there have been allegations that the use of 
international human rights norms by the Supreme Court is undemocratic and 
replaces American values with those of foreign countries. Judges, academics and 
people’s representatives are divided on the issues.31  
Why have national courts started to refer to international human rights norms, 
and why are so many against this? Are the allegations that international human 
rights norms are undemocratic and pose a danger to national legal systems valid? 
It is profitable to understand this controversy.  
Even more interestingly, the situation seems to be totally different in Thailand. 
The country has struggled to develop itself economically and politically. In order 
to gain recognition as a democratic and rights-respecting country, it has ratified 
several international human rights treaties and has adopted a Bill of Rights 
containing basic rights recognised by international society.32 Obviously, the use 
of international human rights norms in judicial reasoning has the potential to 
 
                                                 
28 This will be discussed in Chapter Four, IV B i. 
29 Jochen A Frowein, ‘Internatinal Law in Municipal Courts (Remarks at the American Society of 
International Proceedings on Implementation, Compliance and Effectiveness, 9–12 April 1997)’ 
in Lisa Lan Chmura, ‘International Law in Domestic Legal Order: A Comparative Perspective’ 
(1997) 91 ASIL Proc 289, 294; Bernhard Schlüter, ‘The Domestic Status of the Human Rights 
Clauses of the United Nations Charter’ (1973) 61 Cal L Rev 110, 163. 
30 See McCrudden (n 12) 507.  
31 This issue will be discussed in Chapter Four, IV B ii. 
32 This issue will be discussed in Chapter Two, I B. 
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benefit Thailand, not only in fulfilling its international obligations but also in 
bringing rights protection in the country up to international standards. 
Nevertheless, unlike in the UK and USA, the interpretive influence of 
international human rights norms is scant and has yet to receive any attention 
from academics. It is intriguing to find out the reasons for the different approach 
and to evaluate whether Thai courts should also start to refer to international 
human rights norms. 
Therefore, this research intends to examine in detail not only the practices of 
courts in Thailand, the UK and the USA relating to the interpretive influence of 
international human rights norms, but also the reasons for and the debates around 
such practices. The ultimate aims are to gain insights about these practices and 
their legitimacy, to assess whether Thai courts should also allow the practice, and, 
if so, to formulate a framework for their appropriate employment of international 
human rights norms. 
It is noted here that, in fact, debates on the use of international human rights have 
revolved around issues of the universality of human rights vis-à-vis cultural 
relativism, the tenability of comparative law, and the legitimate sources of 
interpretation that may be used by the judiciary.33 The first and second of these 
issues are broader questions which have been discussed widely in academic 
literature but are still contestable. This research will focus on the last question 
which is more pragmatic, and the answer to it may depend on the characteristics 
of a legal system as well as on general legal theories.  
II. Methodology and Choice of Jurisdictions 
The comparative method has been adopted in this research, since it has been 
accepted as a valuable tool for researchers aiming to gain a better understanding 
of their own legal system, and for anyone wishing to initiate improvements in a 
 
                                                 
33  Christopher McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’ in Esin Örücü and 
David Nelken (eds) Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart 2007). 
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legal system, especially in a developing country.34 The Thai legal system has 
been selected as a targeted jurisdiction since this researcher has full background 
knowledge of it, has seen the problems associated with the use of international 
human rights norms in judicial reasoning, and has access to necessary materials 
which are written mostly in the Thai language and may not be accessible to other 
researchers in the UK, where the research has taken place.  
As regards the enlightening jurisdictions, the UK and USA have been selected 
for several reasons. The most important of these is that the use of international 
human rights norms in judicial reasoning has been practised, and has been 
subject to wide discussion, in these two jurisdictions. The materials from the UK 
and USA are among the richest and thus are able to contribute significantly to the 
content of this research. 
Secondly, although the UK and USA share certain legal traditions, especially 
their common law traditions, the legal systems of each have developed separately 
from (though not totally independently of) each other.35 The distinctions between 
the two regarding the issues of the entrenchment of rights, the judicial review, 
and the exposure of the countries to international law in general and international 
human rights in particular can help identify the factors that affect the judicial 
approaches towards international human rights norms. Further, the different 
solutions adopted by, and the debates that have occurred in, the two systems 
present a wider range of theoretical and practical considerations and of possible 
choices for future action regarding the development of the framework to be 
proposed for Thai courts in this research.  
 
                                                 
34 Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (3rd edn, OUP 1998); 
W J Kamba, ‘Comparative Law A Theoretical Framework’ (1974) 23 Int’l & Comp L Q 485, 
489–90. 
35 Zweigert and Kötz (n 34) 239–55; Louis Henkin, ‘Introduction’ in Louis Henkin and Albert J 
Rosenthal (eds) Constitutionalism and Rights: The Influence of the United States Constitution 
Abroad (Columbia University Press 1990). 
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Next, the UK and US courts seem to refer to different kinds of international 
human rights norms in their judicial reasoning. While the courts in the UK have 
concentrated on the ECHR, to which the UK is a party, courts in the USA have 
tended to refer to general propositions of the international community. This is 
very beneficial for the development of the framework for Thailand, which is to 
cover all kinds of international human rights norms.  
Lastly, both the UK and USA have adopted a dualist approach towards 
international law, similarly to Thailand. Thus, their approaches regarding the 
interpretive influence of international human rights norms can serve as valuable 
models.  
It is acknowledged that there are important differences between these three 
systems. While Thailand has declared itself to be a civil law country,36 both the 
UK and the USA have adopted a common law legal system. While the 
Constitutions of the USA and Thailand are in written form, that of the UK is not. 
Furthermore, the social and political conditions in these three countries seem to 
be very different. However, it is submitted that these differences do not render 
the comparison impossible; neither do they make the lessons to be drawn 
impractical. 
The comparative principle used here is that of functionality, a dominant 
technique in comparative legal scholarship. It is presumed that ‘as long as in law 
things fulfill the same function, then they are normally comparable’.37 What is 
indicated by this presumption is that the functionalist principle is a particularly 
flexible one and that the focus under this principle ‘is not on what the formal 
 
                                                 
36 As will be seen in Chapter Two, however, Thailand has been influenced also by common law 
tradition especially in relation to the interpretive approach.  
37  Antonios Emmanuel Platsas, ‘The Functional and the Dysfunctional in the Comparative 
Method of Law: Some Critical Remarks’ (2008) 12 EJCL 1, 2. 
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requirements of the comparable in foreign law are but rather on how foreign law 
operates in the area of law in question’.38  
In the area of public law, ‘[a]lthough there are still great differences in political 
systems and cultures, the main objectives of constitutional law have become 
more broadly similar than previously, due to the dominant international agendas 
of “good governance”, “human rights”, “international trade”, and “sustainable 
development”’. 39  Therefore, constitutional law of dissimilar political systems 
and cultures can be studied comparatively. Such comparison is still comparing 
like with like. Of course, such comparability is also clear in the area of 
constitutional adjudication. In recent years, an increasingly transnational 
constitutional discourse has developed, the result of which is that ‘constitutional 
courts around the world are confronting similar issues’.40  
 
                                                
By the same token, since the focus under the functionalist principle is on the 
operation of the law and not its formal requirements, it is submitted that the 
difference between written and unwritten constitutions does not render the 
comparison inappropriate. In arguing that ‘the constitution is the highest level 
within national law’,41 Kelsen stresses that he is referring to the constitution in a 
material sense – ‘rules which regulate the creation of the general legal norms, in 
particular the creation of statutes’. 42  This is different from the written 
constitution, or, in Kelsen’s term, the ‘formal constitution’, which is ‘a certain 
solemn document, a set of legal norms that may be changed only under the 
observation of special prescriptions, the purpose of which it is to render the 
 
38 ibid 2–3. 
39 Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland, ‘Comparative Law in Constitutional Contexts’ in Esin 
Örücü and David Nelken (eds), Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart 2007) 325. 
40 Vicki Jackson, ‘Comparative Constitutional Federalism and Transnational Judicial Discourse’ 
(2004) 2 Int’l J Const L 91, 91. For a comparative studies on the constitutional courts, see 
generally Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland (eds) Constitutional Courts: A Comparative Study 
(Wildy, Simmonds & Hill 2009). 
41 Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State (Harvard University Press 1945) 124. 
42 ibid.  
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change of these norms more difficult’.43 The material constitution is essential to 
and exists in all legal systems. In contrast, the formal constitution is created in 
order to put the material constitution in written form and is not indispensable.44 
Since the purpose of this research is to compare how the constitutions in the three 
systems operate and how they affect the use of international human rights norms 
in domestic courts, the difference in relation to the ‘formal’ constitution in the 
named systems is not an obstacle. 
Regarding the legal traditions, it should be noted that the idea of ‘legal families’, 
which is well-known among comparative legal scholars, is the subject of 
criticism. This idea suggests that the different legal systems of the world can be 
grouped in terms of those possessing sufficient similarities with each other as to 
make comparison fruitful. The considerations for grouping include central 
elements of legal doctrine within the systems, as well as styles of developing and 
presenting doctrine, and of legal reasoning and interpretation.45 According to this 
approach, three major legal traditions are identified in the modern Western world: 
common law, civil law and socialist law.46 While this idea is a ‘central theory of 
modern comparative legal studies’, 47  its usefulness has been questioned. For 
example, Örücü attacks this traditional grouping on the grounds that it is too 
Euro-centric and too much shaped by thinking only about legal rules of private 
law. She forcefully argues that all legal systems, without any exception, are 
mixed. They ‘are born of different parentage from marriages between systems 
 
                                                 
43 ibid. 
44 ibid 124–25. 
45  Roger Cotterell, 'The Concept of Legal Culture' in David Nelken (ed) Comparing Legal 
Cultures (Dartmouth 1997) 13. 
46  Mary Ann Glendon, Michael W Gordon and Christopher Osakwe, Comparative Legal 
Traditions in a Nutshell (West 1982) 5. 
47 John Bridge, ‘National Legal Tradition and Community Law: Legislative Drafting and Judicial 
Interpretation in England and the European Community’ (1981) 19 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 351, 351. 
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and sub-systems of such’.48 The legal system of Thailand is also of this nature. 
Since the modernisation that took place at the end of the 19th century, the Thai 
legal system has had ‘a real mixture of sources such as English law, German law, 
French law, Swiss law, Japanese law and American law’.49  In fact, Harding 
submits that ‘[l]egal families tell us nothing about legal systems except as to their 
general style and method, and the idea makes no sense whatsoever amid the 
nomic din of South East Asia’.50 
Moreover, in relation to judicial interpretations, which is what this research aims 
to compare, the differences between the common law and the civil law traditions 
have become less and less important. Arguably, common law judges no longer 
have wide discretion in making law, and their main task is now the interpretation 
of legislation.51 At the same time, the notion that ‘civil law judges do not make 
law’ has become folklore even in the countries where it originated. It has proved 
impossible for legislators to provide a perfect set of laws which can apply to 
every case arising. Civil law judges have to face situations where there is no 
applicable law, where the applicable law is too vague, and so on. Since they 
cannot refuse to decide the case for these reasons, they must fill the gaps in the 
legislation or decide in which ways to interpret vague provisions.52 In fact, the 
civil law legal system usually provides a general provision allowing judges to 
resort to local customs or general legal principles in cases where no provisions of 
law are applicable. Civil law judges normally hide behind this kind of provision 
 
                                                 
48 Esin Örücü, ‘A General View of “Legal Families” and of “Mixing Systems”’ in Esin Örücü 
and David Nelken (eds), Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart 2007) 184.  
49 ibid 173. This will be apparent in Chapter Two, II B i and III A of this research as well. 
50 Andrew Harding, ‘Global Doctrine and Local Knowledge: Law in South East Asia’ (2000) 51 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 35, 49. 
51 John Henry Merryman and Rogelio Pe´rez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction 
to the Legal Systems of Europe and Latin America (3rd edn, Stanford University Press 2007) 47; 
Lord Steyn, ‘Dynamic Interpretation amidst an Orgy of Statutes’ (2004) 3 EHRLR 245, 246–47. 
See also Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes (Harvard University Press 
1982). 
52 ibid 83. 
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when making law, but this does not make their function different from that of 
common law judges. The main distinction between civil law and common law 
judges, therefore, is not their approach towards interpretation or their power to 
make law, but rather how they present their interpretive process according to 
their traditions.53  Accordingly, it is submitted that the different labels on the 
legal traditions of the UK and the USA on the one hand, and on those of 
Thailand on the other, will not make the task of comparison in this research inapt. 
The last point on comparative method that needs to be addressed concerns the 
idea of legal transplants – ‘the moving of a rule or a system of law from one 
country to another’.54 It is submitted that this is the one of the most powerful 
methods in establishing a set of laws in any society.55 Its role is obvious in 
relation to the modernisation of the legal systems of the Third World. Feldman 
asserts that a fundamental assumption of jurists writing on law and development 
in the 1960s and 1970s was the idea that ‘law and legal rules are portable and 
autonomous, and can therefore be transplanted’. 56 For Alan Watson, a pioneer of 
this idea, a successful legal transplant will grow in its new body and become part 
of that body ‘just as the rule or institution would have continued to develop in its 
parent system’.57 However, this part of the concept of legal transplants has been 
criticised as failing to take into account the fact that local society plays an 
important role in shaping law.58 For the critics, the social and political contexts 
in which law operates have to be considered in order to ensure the transplants’ 
 
                                                 
53 ibid 47.  
54 The term is coined by Alan Watson. See Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law 
(1974) 21. 
55 David Nelken, ‘Legal Transplants and Beyond: of Disciplines and Metaphors’ in Andrew 
Harding and Esin Örücü (eds), Comparative Law in the 21st Century (Kluwer Law International 
2002) 25. 
56 Eric Feldman, ‘Patients' Rights, Citizen's Movements, and Japanese Legal Culture’ in David 
Nelken (ed) Comparing Legal Cultures (Dartmouth 1997) 219. 
57 Watson (n 54) 27. 
58 Nelken (n 55) 20–24. 
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success.59 The metaphor of legal transplants has also been seen as misleading as 
it tends to emphasise the imposition of law in a one-way direction. Alternative 
metaphors have been devised to describe the process of legal exchange, such as 
grafting, infiltration, infusion and cross-fertilisation, to mention only a few.60  
In relation to this research, it is submitted that the functionality approach is used 
in a contextually inclusive fashion. That is to say, it takes account of political 
science and other related disciplines to the extent that they explain the context in 
which the constitutions of the three countries operate. For instance, when looking 
at the constitutional adjudication of human rights cases in Thailand, what has to 
be kept in mind is Leyland’s observation that this country ‘does not share the 
same culture and history as European nations, and although it might be broadly 
designated as having a constitutional monarchy with a democratically elected 
government, it has a radically different political tradition’.61 
III. Structure of the Research 
The research follows a standard process for comparative studies and starts with a 
critical description of the legal systems to be compared.62 Chapters Two, Three 
and Four present an overview of the political and constitutional systems, the 
judiciary and the protection of rights, powers of judicial review, interpretive 
approaches, the legal status and interpretive influence of general international 
and foreign law and, finally, the legal status and interpretive influence of 
international human rights norms in Thailand, the UK and the USA respectively. 
The issues covered in these Chapters are crucial to the thesis since the influence 
of international human rights norms in judicial reasoning depends very much on 
 
                                                 
59 ibid 23 referring to opinion of Otto Kahn Freund. 
60 Esin Örücü, ‘Unde Venit, Quo Tendit Comparative Law?’ in Andrew Harding and Esin Örücü 
(eds), Comparative Law in the 21st Century (Kluwer Law International 2002) 7. 
61 Peter Leyland, ‘Droit Administratif Thai Style: A Comparative Analysis of the Administrative 
Courts in Thailand’ (2006) 8 Asian Law 121, 123. 
62 Kamba (n 34) 511–12. 
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a set of conventions in the legal system which prescribes ‘the materials that 
judges may cite in their opinions and that lawyers may invoke in their legal 
arguments’.63 The aim of these Chapters is not only to ascertain the extent to 
which international human rights norms influence judicial reasoning in each 
country, but also to understand the reasons underlying such influence.  
It should be noted that as regards Chapter Two, which discusses the Thai legal 
system, most of the materials referred to are written in the Thai language, and so 
have needed to be translated by this researcher. Additionally, early Thai cases are 
mainly unpublished, or, if published, lack detail on fact and on reasons for 
judgment, and so secondary materials have to be used instead of the official 
report of the cases. 
It should also be noted that although attempts have been made to ensure that the 
topics discussed in these three Chapters are parallel with each other, the nature of 
the materials prevents them from being exactly so. For example, while the 
discussions of the power of judicial review in Thailand and the USA concentrate 
on judicial review of legislation and mention only briefly review of executive 
actions, the discussion of the same subject in the UK focuses on the review of 
executive actions and the principle of legality. The influence of European Union 
law and the adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998 are also peculiar features of 
the UK. More importantly, discussion of the Thai legal system will involve more 
historical and developmental aspects than that of the UK and US systems, which 
will focus on current practices and controversies. This is simply because Thai 
courts have not engaged in using international human rights norms. The aim is to 
understand the development of the Thai legal culture, and evaluate its potential to 
accommodate international human rights norms using lessons drawn from the 
practices of the UK and USA.  
 
                                                 
63 George P Fletcher and Steve Sheppard, American Law in a Global Context: The Basics (OUP 
2005) 76. 
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Comparative analysis will take place in Chapter Five. Since the Thai legal 
system is much less developed than those of the UK and USA and the purpose of 
the research is to learn from the experiences of the latter two, instead of 
comparing three legal systems at the same time, those of the UK and USA will 
be compared first, and then these two will be compared with the Thai legal 
system. The experiences of the two judiciaries will be converted into the 
terminology of Thai legal culture. Although the research aims to address a 
specific issue, namely the interpretive influence of international human rights 
norms in judicial reasoning, ‘general institutional contexts’ in which such 
judicial approaches have developed will be taken into account. 64  The ‘legal 
concepts and techniques’ must also be compared.65 The legal cultures (i.e. the 
historical, philosophical, political and economic principles of the societies in 
which these two legal systems operate) need to be compared as well.66 This is 
because, as mentioned above, these factors play important roles in shaping a 
judicial approach.67 What will emerge from the analysis at this stage are not only 
differences and similarities regarding how domestic courts in these two worlds 
(the UK and USA on one side and Thailand on the other) have used international 
human rights norms as interpretive tools, but also reasons for such differences 
and similarities.68 Next, an evaluation of the potential interpretive influence of 
international human rights norms in Thailand, which is the targeted system, will 
 
                                                 
64 Zweigert and Kötz (n 34) 5. 
65  Mary Ann Glendon, Michael W Gordon and Christopher Osakwe, Comparative Legal 
Traditions: Text, Materials, and Cases on the Civil Law, Common Law, and Socialist Law 
Traditions, with Special Reference to French, West German, English, and Soviet law (West 1985) 
36–37.  
66 All leading literatures on comparative methods emphasise the importance of the legal cultures. 
See Peter De Cruz, Comparative Law in a Changing World (3rd edn, Routledge-Cavendish 2007) 
223; Kamba (n 34) 513–17; Pierre Legrand, ‘How to Compare Now ‘ (1996) 16 LS 232, 236; Jan 
M Smits, ‘Comparative Law and Its Influence on National Legal Systems’ in Mathias Reimann 
and Reinhard Zimmermann (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (OUP 2008) 533. 
67 H C Gutteridge (ed), Comparative Law: An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal 
Study & Research (CUP 1946) 29. 
68 Kamba (n 34) 511–12. 
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be offered on the basis of such findings. It will be argued that Thai courts should 
be influenced by international human rights norms in interpreting Thai law.  
Then, in Chapter Six, both judicial practices and legal literature in the UK and 
USA will be fully discussed in the context of the Thai legal system. This will 
culminate in a framework within which the following questions can be addressed: 
(1) what kinds of domestic laws are to be interpreted taking into account 
international human rights norms?; (2) which courts have the power and 
responsibility to do this?; (3) for what purposes may courts use international 
human rights norms?; (4) should the use of international human rights norms be 
dependent on the ambiguity or uncertainty of domestic law?; (5) what kinds of 
international human rights norms should be considered and what are the rules for 
selecting the most appropriate norms?; (6) what levels of authority or 
persuasiveness should international human rights norms of each kind have in 
Thai judicial reasoning?; (7) what are the constraints and conditions on the use of 
international human rights norms?; and (8) what are the justifications for using 
international human rights norms as proposed?  
Finally, Chapter Seven summarises the important findings from the research, 
reviews what the research has contributed to academic literature and to courts’ 
practice, and, lastly, offers recommendations for future research directions. 
 
 
 
 
  
Chapter Two: Thailand 
Since the Thai legal system is one that has been targeted by the research for the 
task of developing a framework for using international human rights norms in 
judicial reasoning, this Chapter serves two main purposes. The first is to 
ascertain whether Thai courts have already been influenced by international 
human rights norms and, if so, to what extent. The second is to appreciate the 
context in which the Thai legal system operates in order to understand the 
reasons for the practice (or lack of it). These tasks will also make it possible for 
the research to compare the Thai legal system with those of the UK and the USA, 
evaluate the potential of the Thai legal system in using international human rights 
norms, and propose an appropriate framework for Thai courts in the later 
Chapters.  
In the following section, an overview of the political and constitutional system is 
presented first, in order to provide a general outline of how the country has been 
governed and how it has struggled for democracy. Special attention is given to 
constitutional reform since 1997. This is because the 1997 Constitution 
established the current institutional framework of courts and watchdog bodies, 
and established the basis of the power of the courts in the Thai constitutional 
system, with distinctive Constitutional Court, Supreme Court and Administrative 
Court jurisdictions. This Chapter also discusses the constitutional protection of 
rights in Thailand since the inception of constitutional monarchy in 1932. Again, 
special attention is given to rights protection after the 1997 constitutional reform. 
Following this, section II discusses the power of judicial review of the 
Constitutional Court, Administrative Courts and the Courts of Justice. It also 
discusses the development of the interpretive approach of the judiciary in 
Thailand in order to discern the legal culture that has dominated Thai judges’ 
interpretation and application of law. Importantly, the research addresses the new 
interpretive rule implied by the current Constitution and the effect of this on the 
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courts’ practice. In section III, the discussion moves on to address the reception 
of general international law and foreign law in Thailand and their interpretive 
influence in Thai courts. It then, in section IV, focuses on international human 
rights norms in the Thai legal system. First, the legal status of international 
human rights norms is discussed, and this is followed by an evaluation of 
whether (and if so to what extent) Thai courts have considered international 
human rights norms in their reasoning. 
I. Overview of the Political and Constitutional System 
A.  The Political and Constitutional System and Its Development 
                                                
According to the current Constitution, which was promulgated in 2007 and is the 
country’s eighteenth, Thailand is a ‘democratic country with the King as Head of 
State’.1 Sovereign power belongs to the people, but the King exercises it through 
the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers and the Courts in accordance 
with the Constitution.2 The National Assembly, the legislative branch, consists of 
the House of Representatives and the Senate.3 Members of the former are elected, 
whereas members of the latter are partly elected and partly appointed. 4  The 
Council of Ministers, the executive branch, consists of the Prime Minister and 
other Ministers appointed by the King, but the Prime Minister must be a member 
of, and approved by, the House of Representatives.5 While there are overlaps 
between the legislative and the executive branches, the Courts are independent of 
both. Apart from the Courts of Justice, Thailand now has the Constitutional 
 
1 The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand (hereafter ‘Constitution’) 2007, s 2. 
2 Constitution 2007, s 3. 
3 Constitution 2007, s 88. 
4 Constitution 2007, ss 93, 111. 
5 Constitution 2007, ss 171–72. 
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Court and Administrative Courts, which are considered to be independent 
organisations in the constitutional system.6  
In order to appreciate the context in which the Thai Constitution operates, it is 
important to note the historical development of the Thai political and 
constitutional system. The change of regime from absolute monarchy to 
constitutional monarchy in 1932 came about as a result of a bloodless revolution 
by a group of people consisting of military personnel, bureaucrats and left-wing 
nationalists, who delivered an ultimatum to King Rama VII to give up his 
absolute power.7 However, political power did not devolve to the people: it was 
simply transferred from the monarch to military bureaucrats.8 The first general 
election was held in 1933. 9 However, the first direct election did not happen 
until 1937, and the elected representatives chosen by this election constituted 
only half of the whole National Assembly.10 Moreover, during World War II 
(1939–1945) general elections were suspended and the country was governed in 
a highly authoritarian way.11 Direct election for the entire People’s Assembly did 
not take place until 1946. Moreover, there was great political instability. Between 
                                                 
6 Constitution 2007, ch 10. 
7 Likhit Dhiravegin, Politics and Governance of Thailand (7th edn, Thammasat University Press 
2006) 383; Kittisak Prokati, The Reformation of Thai Law under European Influence (2nd edn, 
Winyuchon 2006) 43; Tom Ginsburg, ‘Constitutional Afterlife: The Continuing Impact of 
Thailand’ s Postpolitical Constitution’ (2009) 7 I·CON 83, 85.  
8 Dhiravegin (n 7) 383. 
9 The election in 1933 was an indirect election where voters (Thai nationals aged over 20) elected 
sub-district representatives who then elected members of Parliament for the province. Royal 
Decree for the Election of Sub-District Representatives and Members of Parliament Type 1, 1933. 
See also Michael H Nelson, ‘Thailand’ in Dieter Nohlen, Florian Grotz and Christof Hartmann, 
Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook: Volume II: South East Asia, East Asia, and 
the South Pacific (OUP 2001) 266. 
10 ibid. 
11  Robert B Albritton and Tahwilwadee Bureekul, ‘Developing Democracy under a New 
Constitution in Thailand’ (2004) Working Paper Series: No. 28 ASIAN Barometer: A 
Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development (Asian Barometer Project 
Office, National Taiwan University and Academia Sinica) 6. 
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1932 and 1957 there were ten rebellions, of which six were successful. 12  
Subsequently, between 1957 and 1973, although elections happened from time to 
time, in practical terms Thailand was subject to a full military authoritarian 
regime.13 
It is also important to mention the role of the monarch. The revolution marked 
the lowest point for the Thai monarchy, but since the middle of the 20th century 
the role of the institution has increased so that it is now more important than 
being simply what has been termed the ‘symbol of the nation’, thanks to the 
support of royalist military governments, especially that of General Thanarat 
who governed the country from 1957 to 1963,14 and to the personal popularity of 
King Rama IX, the current King. It appears, judging from the political incidents 
which will be discussed below, that the current King has had an influence on 
Thai politics and has successfully intervened in the political process, especially 
during periods of political turmoil. McDorman sees this unwritten power of the 
King as one of the important ‘constitutional imperatives’ which, from time to 
time, assert greater influence in Thailand than the written constitutions. 15  
Harding and Leyland also observe that there has been ‘a notion of the monarchy 
as a stabilising institution amid the vagaries of political turmoil and revolving-
door governments’.16  
A stronger demand for democracy from the people started to emerge during the 
1970s, since the economic downturn had led the people to doubt the ability, 
honesty and legitimacy of the Government. Huge disturbances aiming to 
                                                 
12 Dhiravegin (n 7) 71. 
13 There were elections, but only in form. ibid 383–84.  
14 Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland, The Constitutional System of Thailand: A Contextual 
Analysis (Hart 2011) 238. 
15 Ted L McDorman, ‘The 1991 Constitution of Thailand’ (1993–1995) 3 Pac Rim L & Pol’y J 
257, 267–68. 
16 Harding and Leyland (n 14) 15. 
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Another important turn for Thai democracy occurred in 1992, when people from 
a wide range of backgrounds gathered to protest against the former leader of the 
coup, who had served as temporary Prime Minister and had been chosen by the 
leading political parties to be Prime Minister again after the General Election. 
The dispersal of the protest resulted in several deaths and injuries. 20  The 
controversy ended with the resignation of the Prime Minister following the 
meeting, which was broadcast on television, between the King (as a mediator), 
the Prime Minister and the leader of the opposition.21  The incident led to a 
constitutional amendment to the effect that the Prime Minister must be a 
                                                 
17 Dhiravegin (n 7) 139–45. 
18 ibid 144–48.  
19 ibid 149–50. However, the trigger was the return to the country after fleeing abroad of the 
former dictator who was the target of the 1973 protest. See Marian Mallet, ‘Causes and 
Consequences of the October’ 76 Coup’ in Andrew Turton, Jonathan Fast and Malcolm Caldwell 
(eds) Thailand: Roots of Conflict (Spokesman 1978) 80–103. 
20 Dhiravegin (n 7) 165–67; Ginsburg (n 7) 90. 
21 McDorman (n 15) 260. 
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representative of the people.22 Further, the National Assembly appointed several 
committees to research the development of democracy and constitutional 
reform,23 and then passed a resolution to amend the Constitution again in order 
to allow the establishment of the ‘Constitution Drafting Assembly’ in charge of 
drafting a new Constitution.  
The non-partisan Constitution Drafting Assembly consisted of 76 persons elected 
by the people and 23 persons appointed by the National Assembly. Academics, 
lawyers and technocrats were all involved.24 Most importantly, for the first time 
in Thailand the public were encouraged to participate in the process of the 
constitutional drafting via open consultations and education sessions.25 The draft 
was completed and was promulgated, with the consent of the National Assembly, 
in 1997. In recognition that the people had been actively involved in the drafting 
process, this Constitution has been called ‘the People’s Constitution’.  
Responding to the attitude of the public that the government was ‘corrupt, 
inefficient, non-transparent and indifferent to the plight of the marginal and the 
underprivileged sectors’,26 the main ideas of the People’s Constitution were to let 
the people become more involved in the political process, ensure basic rights and 
liberties, limit the powers of government, prevent corruption, and improve 
government stability.27 The most innovative component of this Constitution was 
                                                 
22 Constitution 1992 (4th Amendment). 
23  Charnchai Sawangsagdi, The Constitutional Law: Concepts and Experience from Foreign 
Countries (Winyuchon 2009) 337–38.  
24 Ginsburg (n 7) 90. 
25 ibid 91. 
26 Kittipong Kittayarak, ‘The Thai Constitution of 1997 and Its Implication on Criminal Justice 
Reform’ (February 2003) Annaul Report for 2001 and Resource Material Seires No 60, Asia and 
Far Eas Institute for the Prevention of Crime and Treatment of Offenders (UNAFEI) Tokyo, 
Japan 107, 107. 
27 Dhiravegin (n 7) 521. It is noted that most Thai governments could not manage the country 
smoothly because most of the time the governments were coalition government. 
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the establishment of several independent organisations designed to regulate the 
political process. 28  Such organisations included an Election Commission, an 
Audit Commission, a Human Rights Commission, Ombudsmen, a Special 
Criminal Division of Persons Holding Political Office in the Supreme Court, a 
Supreme Administrative Court, a Constitutional Court, and a National Counter-
Corruption Commission.29  
However, Thai politics continued to be tumultuous. Thaksin Shinawatra, a 
former policeman and business magnate, became the first Prime Minister under 
the 1997 Constitution following an overwhelming victory in the General Election 
of 2001. In spite of notorious issues regarding his political honesty,30 his anti-
human-rights approaches towards drug dealers and the Muslim rebellion in the 
southern part of Thailand, 31  and his alleged ambition of overthrowing the 
monarchy,32 Shinawatra was the first Prime Minister who was able to maintain 
office until the end of the political term, and he was re-elected for a subsequent 
term of office starting in 2005. Not only the Cabinet and the House of the 
Representatives, but also the Senate and independent organisations were heavily 
influenced, if not controlled, by him and his party, Thai Rak Thai.33 Opposition 
to his regime became more serious during his second term, when the National 
Assembly under his control passed several laws allowing him to sell his 
telecommunications company to a foreign company for 1.9 billion USD without 
                                                 
28 Ginsburg (n 7) 91–92. 
29 Constitution 1997. 
30 In fact, after the election in 2001 but before he took the office, the National Counter-Corruption 
Commission found that he had failed to declare all of properties according to the law. However, 
the Constitutional Court ruled 8–7 that he was not guilty. Constitutional Court decision 20/2544 
(2001).  
31 Ginsburg (n 7) 97. See also Andrew Harding, ‘Buddhism, Human Rights and Constitutional 
Reform in Thailand’ (2007) 2 ASJCL 1, 9–10. The issue of human rights abuse is discussed 
further in section I B. 
32 Ginsburg (n 7) 97.  
33  Kovit Wongsurawat, Thai Politics and Administration: Multi-Dimensions (Department of 
Political Science and Public Administration, Kasetsart University 2010) 124. 
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paying taxes. There were uprisings against his administration in Bangkok. The 
Government responded by dissolving Parliament and calling for new elections in 
April 2006. However, the election was boycotted by the other main political 
parties, which refused to participate in it and encouraged people to ‘vote no’. The 
Thai Rak Thai party was the only major party to put up candidates, and was 
accused by the other main parties of hiring other, small political parties to put up 
candidates in order to meet the requirement of the Constitution that a 
representative of the people had to win votes over another candidate or, in the 
case of there being no other candidates, had to receive 20 per cent of the votes in 
the voting area.34 The Courts, which had since 1997 gradually become more 
involved in deciding issues of high political and economic importance,35 played 
an exceptionally important role in resolving this issue. In the midst of political 
uncertainty after the election, but before the result was confirmed, the King gave 
public speeches urging three courts (the Constitutional Court, the Administrative 
Courts and the Courts of Justice) to be involved in determining whether the 
election had been constitutional.36 Responding to the King’s speeches, the three 
Courts held a meeting, and the election was later annulled by the Constitutional 
Court and Administrative Courts. The main reasons given were that the election 
had allowed an unreasonably short time for campaigning, resulting in an unfair 
                                                 
34 See Luek Supasiri, History of Thai Politics in the Decade (Postbook 2010) 170. 
35 This was especially the Administrative Courts which, at this point, had already handed down 
certain high-profile cases. For an example, see Central Administrative Court decision 584/2549 
(2007) and Supreme Administrative Court decision 349/2549 (2007), holding that ITV (a Thai 
TV channel) had to comply with the original licence agreement and pay compensation to the 
government for breach of licence to the sum of approximately 9.4 billion Baht, and the Supreme 
Administrative Court decision 5/2549 (2007) revoking two royal decrees which the Government 
used as bases for privatising the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand (EGAT). For a 
commentary on the EGAT case, see Peter Leyland, ‘Droit Administratif Thai Style: A 
Comparative Analysis of the Administrative Courts in Thailand’ 8 Australian Journal of Asian 
Law 121, 142. 
36 There were two speeches. The first was delivered to the Justices of the Supreme Administrative 
Court on 25 April 2006, and the second delivered to the Justices of the Courts of Justices on the 
same day. See <http://www.kanchanapisek.or.th/speeches/2006/0425-01.th.html> and <http:// 
www.kanchanapisek.or.th/speeches/2006/0425-02.th.html>(accessed 16 April 2011) respectively.  
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election, and that the polling booths had been set up in a way that allowed the 
general public to see how voters were casting their votes.37 The Criminal Court 
also held the Election Commissioners who had arranged the election guilty of 
abusing their power.38 Some scholars endorse this role of the courts, and have 
proposed the further involvement of the judiciary in checking the political 
branches. 39  There is, however, another group of scholars who see this as 
illegitimate judicial interference in politics.40 
Another election was expected to be held in November 2006, but in September 
2006 the military seized power, bringing Thailand back to the vicious cycle – 
coup d’état, new constitution, elections, and then a coup d’état. The leader of the 
coup claimed that the intervention had been necessary because the Government 
had caused unprecedented conflict among Thais, which could have led to 
violence; management was corrupt; independent organisations had suffered 
interference; and the monarchy had been insulted.41 The Thai public was (and 
still is) strongly divided on this issue.  
The 2006 Interim Constitution provided for the process of drafting a new 
Constitution.42 This time, 100 persons of mixed backgrounds were appointed by 
the coup leaders to be members of the non-partisan Constitutional Drafting 
                                                 
37  Constitutional Court decision 9/2549 (2006); Central Administrative Court decision 607– 
608/2549 (2006) discussed further in text to n 340; Supreme Administrative Court decision 
88/2549 (2006). 
38 Decision of the Criminal Court on 25 July 2006. 
39 Theerayut Boonmee, ‘Judicial Decision for Justice in the Country: The Increasing of Statibility 
in Thai Politics: Moving Towards a Second Political Reform’ (Thailand Crisis: Capitalism Era, 
Bangkok, 31 May 2006). 
40  Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, Under the King’s Signature, the Democracy and the Judiciary 
(Openbooks 2010). See also the opinion of a group of law lecturers from Thammasat University 
in <http://www.enlightened-jurists.com> accessed 16 April 2011. 
41 Declaration of the Council for Democratic Reform under Constitutional Monarchy (CDRM). 
The CDRM later changed its English name to the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR).  
42 Constitution (Interim) 2006. 
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Assembly. Although the process of drafting did not involve the public as much as 
the previous Constitution had done, this draft Constitution was the first to be 
required to be endorsed by public referendum before coming into force. The draft 
was proposed for public referendum in April 2007 and was approved by a 
majority of 14,727,306 voters to 10,747,411.43 
The 2007 Constitution, which is the current Constitution, is the revised version of 
the People’s Constitution of 1997. Most of the main provisions are the same, but 
the drafters of the new Constitution recognised the failure of the former 
Constitution in preventing the abuse of power by the executive and provided 
mechanisms to invigilate political branches of the government strictly.44 Great 
power is given to the Courts.45 Ginsburg calls this the ‘postpolitical structure’ of 
the Constitution, meaning that politics is judicialised and the courts themselves 
are politicised, since they have the final word on political arrangements.46  
Nevertheless, the new Constitution has not resolved the political crisis in 
Thailand, since people are sharply divided regarding ideas relating to democracy 
and the political foundation of the country.47 From the time of promulgation of 
the Constitution up until now there have been a number of public demonstrations 
against the Government by different political groups, relating to the legitimacy 
                                                 
43 The number of qualified voters was 45,092,955. The number of votes cast was 25,474,747. 
Published in the Government Gazette, vol 124, pt 45 A, dated 21 August 2007 p 8. 
44 The Constitution Drafting Assembly, ‘Summary of Essential Elements’ in Draft Constitution of 
the Kingdom of Thailand for the referendum on 19 August 2007 (2007) 170. 
45 The role of the judiciary was one of the main targets of the criticisms against the current 
Constitution. Bowornsak Uwanno, Economic Crisis and Political Crisis in Thailand: Past and 
Present (King Prajadhipok’s Institutute 2009) 42.  
46 Ginsburg (n 7) 104. The restructure results in the Courts becoming involved in politics as never 
before. See, for example, Constitutional Court decisions 12–13/2551 (2008) holding that the 
Prime Minister’s personal involvement with a TV cooking programme made him unqualified to 
stay in office; and 18–20/2551 (2008) ordering the dissolution of the People’s Power party for 
abusing the 2007 election.  
47 Uwanno (n 45) 58. 
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and political stands of these governments.48 Certain of these demonstrations even 
resulted in the closure of an international airport and the burning of several 
buildings in Bangkok. The current Constitution itself is also subject to proposals 
for amendment on some important points as a result of these political 
controversies.  
B. Constitutional Guarantees of Rights 
                                                
The concept of rights is not firmly established in Thailand. Prior to the revolution 
in 1932, Thailand had been ruled by an absolute monarch for an uninterrupted 
period of almost seven hundred years. During this time the King had absolute 
and unlimited power, which was believed to be undividable.49 All people and 
lands in the country were considered to be the property of the King.50 Although it 
was assumed that the King ruled for the good of his subjects, people were not 
considered as having rights or liberties.51 
Soon after the People’s Party (Khana Ratsadon) seized power from the King, it 
was declared, in the first permanent Constitution of Thailand52 for example, that 
 
 
48 ibid 49. 
49 Examination of the ‘Three Seals Law’, the codification of Thai traditional law undertaken by 
King Rama I in 1804, shows that there was no provision stating rights of the people. On the 
contrary: there were many provisions giving absolute powers to the King to make and enforce 
law and adjudicate cases according to such law. See Krisda Boonyasmith, The Three Seals Law: 
Reflection of Thai Society No. 2 (Damnern Lekadul Foundation BE 2547) 46–66. Additionally, 
see David Streckfuss, Truth on Trial in Thailand: Defamation, Treason and Lèse Majesté 
(Routledge 2011) 59, submitting that the King ‘would have the prerogative to decide who should 
live and who should die’ in the old Siam. 
50 Kanok Wongtrangan, ‘Executive Power and Constitutionalism in Thailand’ in Carmelo V 
Sison and Roshan T Jose (eds) Constitutional and Legal systems of ASEAN Countries (Academy 
of ASEAN Law and Jurisprudence, University of the Philippines, Law Complex 1990) 290. 
51 Pokin Polakul, ‘The Constitution of Thailand and the Guarantee of Rights and Liberties to Life 
and Body’ (1984) 14(1) Thammasat Law Journal 97, 97–98; Wongtrangan (n 50) 290. 
52 This is the Constitution of the Kingdom of Siam BE 2475 (1932). Before this Constitution, 
there was the Temporary Charter for the Administration of Siam Act 1932 promulgated by the 
People Group immediately after the seizure of power from the King in 1932. Nevertheless, the 
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persons of any social status shall be deemed equal before the law; that a person 
shall enjoy full liberty to profess a religion or creed and observe religious 
precepts or commandments or exercise a form of worship in accordance with his 
or her belief; and that a person shall enjoy full liberties in his or her body, 
dwelling, property, speech, writing, communication, education, public meeting, 
associations, and occupation. 
Nevertheless, political instability has affected constitutional rights, not only in 
terms of provisions in the Constitutions, but also in terms of the enforcement of 
such provisions.53 It can generally be said that guarantees of rights did not exist, 
or existed with extremely wide exemptions, in the Constitutions enforced during 
authoritarian regimes. For example, the Charter for Administration of the 
Kingdom 1959 contained no rights provision and gave extremely broad power to 
the Prime Minister. One provision stated: 
… in the case that the Prime Minister considers it appropriate in 
order to maintain national security, the Prime Minister by Cabinet 
resolution shall have power to order or to act whatsoever. Such 
order or act shall be deemed legal.54 
                                                                                                                                    
Act’s main task was to establish (gradually) a democratic form of government, so its provisions 
were devoted to the issue of institutions such as the King, Parliament and the executive. Apart 
from the rights to vote for the representatives in Parliament, there was no rights protection 
provision. 
53 It is noted that apart from the political instability, issues that impacted on rights in Thailand 
since before the change of regime in 1932 included problems relating to human trafficking, 
public health and the international drug trade. This was despite the fact that certain actions were 
taken by the Government as part of the country’s attempt to become a member of the League of 
Nations. Stefen Hell, Siam and the League of Nations: Modernisation, Sovereignty and 
Multilateral Diplomacy, 1920–1940 (River 2010). 
54 The Charter for Administration of the Kingdom of Thailand (hereafter ‘Charter’) 1959, s 17. 
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The Charter was enforced in Thailand for as long as nine years and five 
months. 55  Similar provisions reappeared in the Charters/Constitutions 
promulgated in 1972,56 1976,57 197758 and 1991.59 
At this point, it is important to observe that there were no fierce objections or 
strong demands for rights from the people. This might have been the result of the 
attitudes generally accepted in Thai society. Thailand had for a long time been 
governed by absolute monarchs. Buddhism plays an important role in 
legitimising rulers, since it furnishes the notion that a ruler has obtained his status 
because of his exceptional merit.60 Those who are governed are not encouraged 
to act against their rulers, but are encouraged to accept their given status and 
make merit – doing good works according to Buddhist principles – in order to 
gain better status in the next life.61 Hierarchicalism – the notion that older people 
deserve the utmost respect62 – contributes towards a high degree of trust in the 
Government as well.63 Therefore, the main political tradition in Thailand is that 
the governed would try to establish a patron–client relationship with the rulers 
rather than oppose them.64 
                                                 
55 From 28 January 1959 to 19 June 1968. 
56 Charter 1972, s17. 
57 Constitution 1976, s 21. 
58 Charter 1977, s 27. 
59 Charter 1991, s 27. 
60 Harding, ‘Buddhism, Human Rights and Constitutional Reform in Thailand’ (n 31) 2–3. For 
more discussion of the roles of Buddhism in Thai politics, see C F Keyes, ‘The Power of Merit’ 
in Visaka Puja (Buddhist Association of Thailand 1973); P A Jackson, Buddhism, Legitimation 
and Conflict: The Political Functions of Urban Thai Buddhism (ISEAS 1989). 
61 Dhiravegin (n 7) 160. 
62 ibid 85–86. 
63 Albritton and Bureekul (n 11) 27. 
64 Dhiravegin (n 7) 45–46; Ake Tangsupvattana, ‘Driving the Juggernaut: From Economic Crisis 
to Global Governance in Pacific Asia’ in Simon S C Tay (ed) Pacific Asia 2022: Sketching 
Futures of a Region (Japan Center for International Exchange 2005) 158. 
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In any case, except for during the periods of time mentioned above, the Thai 
Constitutions have usually included provisions guaranteeing individual rights.65 
A noteworthy aspect of this is that the 1949 Constitution enacted rights specified 
in the United Nation Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which Thailand 
had voted in favour of in 1948.66 The same set of rights reappeared in the 1978 
Constitution, which was enforced for approximately thirteen years, longer than 
most Thai Constitutions,67 and in the 1991 Constitution.68 It should be noted, 
however, that the protection of rights according to the above Constitutions was 
subject to wide exemptions specified in the Constitutions themselves. The most 
common exemption was a clause stating that constitutional rights were 
recognised, but must be exercised in accordance with the law, which meant that 
the legislative branch may enact the law to limit such rights freely.69 Certain 
rights were also qualified by vague concepts such as ‘public order’ or ‘good 
morals’.70 Moreover, the Constitutions usually had a provision enabling blanket 
limitation of rights, such as ‘No person shall exercise the rights and liberties 
according to the Constitution against the Nation, religions, the King and the 
Constitution’. 71  Although the above restrictions were supposedly justified 
because they had been imposed for appreciable reasons, the terms used in these 
                                                 
65 These were the Constitutions of 1952, 1968, 1974, 1978 and 1991. 
66 Constitution 1949, ss 26–45. However, this did not appear on the face of the Constitution. 
Polakul (n 51) 100 fn 2 citing Yud Sang-Uthai, The Explanation for The Constitution of Thailand 
(Prachaniti 1950) 884. 
67 Constitution 1978, ss 22–45. 
68 Constitution 1991, ss 24–49. 
69  See also McDorman (n 15) 29 discussing the enforceability of rights under the 1991 
Constitution. 
70 For example, see Constitution 1991, s 27, on the freedom to profess a religion. 
71 Constitution 1991, s 48. 
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provisions were open to a wide range of interpretations and could have been used, 
so it was felt, to limit the rights of the people more than is necessary.72  
Greater protection of rights has been one of the core objectives that both the 1997 
and the 2007 Constitutions attempted to achieve.This has partly stemmed from 
the recognition that the protection of rights is an essential ingredient of 
democracy, and partly from an acknowledgment of the human rights abuses that 
took place in the past. 73 It should be noted, however, that the extent of the 
protection, and enforcement mechanisms, were intensely debated in Parliament.74 
In terms of their substantive nature, current Thai constitutional rights include not 
only civil and political rights such as the right to equality, rights to life and body, 
freedom of expression for both individuals and the media, and freedom to profess 
a religion and observe a religious principle, but also social and economic rights, 
such as the right to own a property, freedom to engage in an occupation, and the 
right to safety and welfare at work. Moreover, third-generation rights which are 
complex composition rights,75such as communication rights, rights in connection 
with information and complaints, and community rights in protecting local 
customs and the environment, are included.76 It is important to point out that 
Thai constitutional rights are more or less the same as those found in the UDHR 
and other major international human rights instruments. This is because the 
drafters intended to comply with international human rights norms. According to 
the official record made by the Committee for Recording Objectives of the 
Constitution, Recording Comments and Checking Minutes of the Constitutional 
                                                 
72 Viboon Engkagul, ‘Recognition of Human Rights under Thai laws’ in Harry M Scoble and 
Laurie S Wiseberg (eds) Access to Justice: The Struggle for Human Rights in Southeast Asia 
(Zen Books 1985) 99. 
73 The Constitution Drafting Assembly (n 44) 174.  
74 Harding and Leyland (n 14) 222. 
75 Christian Tomuschat, Human Rights Between Idealism and Realism (OUP 2003) 24–25. 
76 See Constitution 2007, ss 26–69. 
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Drafting Assembly, provisions in the international human rights documents, 
particularly the UDHR, were cited in relation to the consideration of most 
provisions concerning rights.77 
Thai constitutional rights can be divided into two categories: absolute rights and 
qualified rights. Absolute rights are those rights that cannot be derogated by 
legislation.78 Rights in this category include the right of Thai nationals not to be 
deported and not to be prohibited from entering the Kingdom,79 and the rights of 
a person to profess a religion, observe religious principles or religious precepts, 
and exercise a form of worship in accordance with his or her belief.80 
Opposite to absolute rights are qualified rights which are rights that can be 
limited by laws. Almost all Thai constitutional rights fall into this category. In 
the case of some qualified rights, the Constitution requires that legislative 
restrictions must be made only for the objectives determined by the Constitution 
itself. For example, while the Constitution requires that a restriction on freedom 
of expression shall not be imposed, it provides exemptions in cases where such 
restriction is imposed by laws ‘specifically enacted for the purpose of 
maintaining the security of the State, safeguarding the rights, liberties, dignity, 
reputation, family or privacy rights of other persons, maintaining public order or 
                                                 
77 Specifically, ss 26, 32–39, 41, 52 were recorded as consistent with the UDHR; s 32 was 
recorded as consistent with the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from 
Enforced Disappearance 2006; ss 38–40 were recorded as consistent with the ICCPR; s 52 was 
recorded as consistent with the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989. Spirit of the 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand BE 2550 (The Secretariat of the House of 
Representatives 2007) 18–63. 
78 In any case, it is noted that rights may be removed by a constitutional amendment which, in 
Thailand, requires only a simple majority vote (3 times) in the National Assembly. Constitution 
2007, s 291. It should also be noted that the exercise of these rights may be subject to the rights 
and liberties of others, core principles of the Constitution, and the good morals of the people. 
Constitution 2007, s 28. 
79 Constitution 2007, s 34 para 3. 
80 Constitution 2007, s 14. It is noted, however, that a person may not exercise these rights 
contrary to his or her civic duties, public order or good morals. 
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good morals or preventing the deterioration of the mind or health of the 
public.’81 Other rights that can be restricted for specific purposes include: the 
right to equal protection;82 the rights of members of the armed forces or the 
police force, Government officials, other State officials and officials or 
employees of State agencies to enjoy the same rights and liberties under the 
Constitution as those enjoyed by other persons;83 freedom in terms of dwelling;84 
freedom to travel and in choice of residence within the Kingdom;85 rights to 
counter the public assertion of a statement or circulation of a picture, in any 
manner whatsoever, which violates or affects a person’s family rights, dignity, 
reputation or right to privacy,86 liberty in communication;87 the right not to be 
subjected to forced labour; 88  rights and freedoms in relation to choice of 
occupation;89 freedom of expression of individuals and the mass media;90 rights 
against the nationalisation of land;91 the right to know and have access to public 
data or information in the possession of a Government agency;92 and the freedom 
to assemble peacefully, to form an association, or to form a political party.93  
There are also qualified rights that the Constitution allows to be restricted by law 
without specifying the objectives that can justify such restriction. The result of 
                                                 
81 Constitution 2007, s 45. 
82 Constitution 2007, s 30. 
83 Constitution 2007, s 32. 
84 Constitution 2007, s 33. 
85 Constitution 2007, s 34 para 2. 
86 Constitution 2007, s 35 para 2. 
87 Constitution 2007, s 36. 
88 Constitution 2007, s 38. 
89 Constitution 2007, s 43. 
90 Constitution 2007, s 45. 
91 Constitution 2007, s 42. 
92 Constitution 2007, s 56. 
93 Constitution 2007, 63–65. 
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this is that the legislative branch may pass laws restricting rights for any purpose 
it deems appropriate. The rights in this category are: right and liberty in life and 
person;94 rights in respect of the undue exploitation of personal data;95 rights in 
the administration of justice; 96  rights in respect of property; 97  academic 
freedom;98 and the rights of communities to preserve their local customs, natural 
resources and environment.99  
Lastly, there are rights that the Constitution provides in broad language without 
defining the scope and extent of protection. Thus, the executive and legislative 
branches may come up with measures in which these rights can be exercised. The 
rights in this category are: people’s rights to health and education services;100 
rights to welfare at work;101 the rights of disadvantage groups such as children, 
senior citizens and disabled persons to receive support; 102  and rights in 
connection with information and complaints.103  
Importantly, in respect of all kinds of qualified rights, the Constitution requires 
that the restriction on rights must not be greater than is necessary to achieve the 
purposes for which the restriction is being made; must not affect the essential 
                                                 
94 Constitution 2007, s 32. 
95 Constitution 2007, s 35 para 3. 
96 Constitution 2007, s 39–40. 
97 Constitution 2007, s 41–42. 
98 Constitution 2007, s 50. 
99 Constitution 2007, 66–67. 
100 Constitution 2007, ss 49, 51. 
101 Constitution 2007, 44. 
102 Constitution 2007, ss 52–55. 
103 Constitution 2007, 56–62. 
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substance of rights and liberties; and must not be intended to apply to a particular 
group.104 
The 2007 Constitution seeks to address further the problem concerning the 
enforceability of rights, which was one of the main problems with rights 
protection according to the previous Constitutions, including the 1997 
Constitution. The new Constitution states that it intends to provide immediate 
effect to most constitutional rights, which means that rights can be enforced 
directly in the courts of appropriate jurisdiction without the need to enact a 
statute to implement them. 105  Moreover, the National Human Rights 
Commission, which has been established since the Constitution of 1997 to 
investigate the actions of governmental agencies, has been entrusted with a more 
pervasive power. 106  The Commission now has the power not only to make 
recommendations to government agencies and to report the actions of these 
agencies to Parliament, but also to submit cases to the Constitutional Court or 
Administrative Court when it considers that laws or executive actions are 
detrimental to human rights and beg the question of constitutionality.107 It may 
also bring cases to the Court of Justice on behalf of the injured person.108 The 
Ombudsmen may also bring cases to the Constitutional Court or the 
Administrative Courts when they consider a statute, rule, order or action of a 
public body inconsistent with constitutional rights. 109 Most prominently, an 
                                                 
104 Constitution 2007, s 29. 
105 Constitution 2007, s 28 para 3. The clause that rights ‘shall be exercised according to the law’, 
which the Constitutional Court interpreted to mean that rights do not have effect until the law has 
been passed to implement such rights, was cut from many provisions of rights, such as those 
concerning rights of community, consumer rights, and rights to receive health care from the state. 
See Constitution 2007, ss 51–54, 57–61, 66–67. See also the Constitution Drafting Assembly (n 
44) 174.  
106 Constitution 2007, s 257(1). 
107 Constitution 2007, s 257(2)(3). 
108 Constitution 2007, s 257(4). 
109 Constitution 2007, s 245. 
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individual person whose rights according to the Constitution are violated by law 
may now bring a claim to the Constitutional Court for a decision as to whether 
such law is constitutional.110 The community, as a group, may take legal action 
against a government agency in cases where the community’s rights are violated 
as well. 111  Remedies available in cases of violation of constitutional rights 
include: declaration that legislation is invalid as being inconsistent with the 
Constitution (exclusively from the Constitutional Court); revocation of 
administrative actions (either prospective or retrospective); ordering of 
administrative agencies to perform, or refrain from, actions; declaration of rights 
and duties; and compensation.112  
It can be seen that Thai constitutional provisions have evolved towards a greater 
protection of rights. Nevertheless, it is important to note that actual protection of 
rights in Thailand is yet to be at the same level. There still exist laws that pose a 
great threat to human rights by conferring broad power and immunity on the 
executive and the military in dealing with national security or public safety.113 
The Emergency Decree on Public Administration in Emergency Situation 
2005114 allows the Prime Minister, after declaring a state of emergency, to order 
a curfew, impose censorship on the media, limit transportation routes and 
prohibit the assembly of persons.115 In some situations, such as those involving 
terrorism or the use of force or those affecting the security of the state, the Prime 
                                                 
110 Constitution 2007, s 212.  
111 Constitution 2007, s 67 para 3. 
112 Constitution 2007, ss 6 and 211; Act on the Establishment of the Administrative Court and 
Administrative Courts Procedure 1999, s 72. 
113 See Andrew Harding, ‘Emergency Powers with a Moustache: Special Powers, Military Rule 
and Evolving Constitutionalism in Thailand’ in Victor V Ramraj and Arun K Thiruvengadam 
Emergency powers in Asia: Exploring the Limits of Legality (CUP 2009).  
114 In respect of the current Constitution 2007, this power of the executive to pass this kind of law 
can be found in section 184. 
115 s 9. 
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Minister may also order the military to terminate or control the situation.116  
Furthermore, the executive and the military may also exercise special powers 
according to martial law 117  and a newly promulgated Internal Security Act 
2007.118 Special powers according to these laws have been invoked repeatedly in 
relation to the conflict in the southern parts of Thailand,119 and in dealing with 
anti-government groups.120 Moreover, it has been reported that many people, 
including bystanders, were killed during the ‘War against Drugs’ campaign.121 
The media have been under the control of the Government, the military, and 
people who have possessed a conflict of interest.122 Freedom of expression has 
                                                 
116 s 11. 
117 Constitution 2007, s 188; Martial Law Act 1914. 
118 See discussion in Harding ‘Emergency Powers’ (n 113) 306–11. 
119 Excessive torture and extra-judicial killings were reported in relation to the southern conflicts. 
The most publicised incidents were Kru Se, where 107 people involved in Muslim insurgencies 
were killed by the Army, and Tak Bai, where Muslim protesters and bystanders were arrested and 
put in cramped trucks, resulting in 78 of them being suffocated to death. For further discussion, 
see Vitit Muntarbhorn, ‘Human Rights in the Era of “Thailand Inc.”’, in Randall Peerenboom, 
Carole J Petersen and Albert H Y Chen (eds), Human Rights in Asia: A Comparative Legal Study 
of Twelve Asian Jurisdictions, France, and the United States (Routledge 2006) 326; Harding and 
Leyland (n 14) 229–32. 
120 The recent, and most criticized, case was the declaration of a state of emergency by Prime 
Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva in April–May 2010 which empowered the Center for the Resolution of 
the Emergency Situation to set out the ‘live fire zone’ in Bangkok, resulting in the deaths of at 
least 89 people and in widespread censorship of TV and radio stations that had connections with 
the anti-government group. Human Rights Watch, ‘Thailand: Repeal Emergency Decree’, 24 
November 2010 <http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/24/thailand-repeal-emergency-decree> 
accessed 28 January 2012; Human Rights Watch, ‘Thailand: Lift Emergency Decree’, 23 
September 2010 <http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/09/22/thailand-lift-emergency-decree> 
accessed 28 January 2012. 
121 Muntarbhorn, (n 119) 325–26. 
122 ibid 329–30; Harding and Leyland (n 14) 232–37; Peter Leyland, ‘The Struggle for Freedom 
of Expression in Thailand: Media Moguls, the King, Citizen Politics and the Law’ (2010) 2 
Journal of Media Law 115, 118–21. It is noted that the current Constitution attempts to correct 
this by, among other things, introducing an independent agency that is in charge of distributing 
broadcasting frequencies and supervising the media, and by prohibiting a person holding a 
political position from having ownership or control over the media. Nevertheless, the problems, 
especially those relating to the military’s control over the media, still remain.  
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also been limited by the application of several laws and regulations.123 It should 
also be noted that, in these situations, the NHRC has not played an outstanding 
role in advising the Government, bringing cases to the appropriate courts or 
proposing remedies. 124  Its actual role has been limited to investigating and 
reporting the rights abuses in cases where the public had shown an interest.125 It 
is therefore a great challenge for Thailand to make constitutional aspiration 
become a reality. 
II. The Judiciary and the Protection of Rights 
Actual rights protection depends not only on the constitutional provisions, but 
also on the performance of institutions that are entrusted with the duty to enforce 
constitutional rights. As was discussed in the section above, these institutions 
include, but are not limited to, the executive, the legislature, the judiciary, the 
Ombudsmen and the NHRC. This research, however, will focus on the role of the 
judiciary in protecting rights. The following subsections discuss first the power 
of judicial review exercised by different courts, and then the interpretive 
approaches adopted by those courts. 
                                                 
123 Leyland points to the lèse-majesté law according to section 112 of the Criminal Code and 
Computer Crime Act 2007 which facilitates rigorous (and perhaps politically driven) enforcement. 
Leyland, ‘The Struggle for Freedom of Expression’ (n 122) 122–37. See also Harding and 
Leyland (n 14) 237–47. 
124 The powers and duties of the NHRC have been set out in section 257 of the 2007 Constitution 
and the National Human Rights Commission Act 1999. 
125 Andrew Harding, ‘Thailand’s Reforms: Human Rights and the National Commission’ 1 JCL 
88; Harding and Leyland (n 14) 229. During the incident in 2010 cited in n 120, some even 
complained that the NHRC’s priority was to justify the Government’s action based on the 
Emergency Decree, and not to find accountable authorities. The Nation Online Newspapers, 
‘Yukthi Mukdavijiv: Letter to Amara Pongsapich’ 31 May 2010 
<http://www.matichon.co.th/news_detail.php?newsid=1275309862&grpid=01&catid=01> 28 
January 2012. 
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A.  Power of Judicial Review 
Thai Courts have long enjoyed the power of judicial review of legislative and 
executive acts. Currently, the power to review legislative acts is exercised by the 
Constitutional Court, and the power to review executive acts is exercised mainly 
by the Administrative Courts. However, in order to gain important insights into 
the role of the judiciary in Thailand, this section discusses first the development 
of judicial review as exercised by Courts of Justice, before continuing with an 
examination of the power of judicial review of the Constitutional Court and 
Administrative Courts after the 1997 constitutional reform. 
i. Before the 1997 Constitutional Reform 
The judicial branch in Thailand was by no means strong in relation to the 
executive and legislative branches. Early Thai Constitutions did not directly 
confer the power of judicial review of legislation to the court. The first landmark 
case in which the Supreme Court of Thailand declared the law unconstitutional 
was the ‘War Criminal Act’ case in 1946. This concerned the constitutionality of 
the War Criminal Act which was issued soon after the end of the World War II 
with the purpose of punishing people who had joined or helped the Japanese 
military during the War. The preliminary issue to be determined was whether the 
Court had the authority to decide the constitutionality of the Act. The Supreme 
Court unequivocally claimed that the constitutional provision conferring the 
power to interpret the Constitution to Parliament did not affect the power of 
courts to interpret the Constitution, which was a task associated with the 
adjudication of cases. It then went on to hold that the Act constituted a 
retroactive criminalisation of conduct and could not be applied because it 
interfered with a liberty protected by the Constitution.126  
                                                 
126 Supreme Court decision 1/2489 (1946). 
 
Chapter Two                                                                                                       42 
 
This decision can be compared to that of the Supreme Court of the USA in 
Marbury v Madison, 127  where the Court first claimed the power of judicial 
review of legislative acts in the USA. Unlike the situation in the USA where the 
other two branches accepted such power, however, the Thai Government 
responded to the decision by amending the Constitution in order to establish the 
Judicial Committee for the Constitution.128 It was reasoned that the legislative 
branch had already considered the constitutionality of statutes before enactment; 
therefore allowing the judiciary to void such law without consulting it 
beforehand was unreasonable. 129  The practices of other civil law countries, 
which tended to establish independent administrative and constitutional tribunals 
in order to prevent the judiciary from interfering with functions of the executive 
and legislative branches, might also influence this movement.130 
From then on, only the Judicial Committee (whose staff were nominated by the 
executive and confirmed by the National Assembly) might declare laws 
unconstitutional.131 The 1991 Constitution replaced the Judicial Committee with 
the Constitutional Tribunal, but the composition and operation of the 
Constitutional Tribunal continued to be under the control of the executive.132  
                                                 
127 Marbury v Madison 5 US 137 (1803). See discussion in Chapter Four, II n 33. 
128 Sathiya Lengthaisong, ‘Judicial Review’ (1973) 3(3) Thammasat Law Journal 122, 126–28. 
129 Ibid 128. 
130 For the issues regarding the concept of separation of powers in civil law tradition and the 
establishment of administrative and constitutional tribunals, see John Henry Merryman and 
Rogelio Pe’rez-Perdomo, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of 
Europe and Latin America (3rd edn, Stanford University Press 2007) 86–90. 
131  James R Klein, ‘The Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 1997: A Blueprint for 
Participatory Democracy’ (1998) The Asia Foundation Working Paper Series # 8, 18. It is noted 
that the legislative branch had once attempted to reserve the power of constitutional interpretation 
by having a constitutional provision saying that ‘absolute right to interpret this Constitution is 
vested in Parliament’, meaning that Parliament may overrule the interpretation made by the 
Judicial Committee. However, the provision was later abolished. Constitution 1946, s 86. 
132 ibid 18. 
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However, the Courts of Justice did not lose all power relating to the review of 
legislation. Before forwarding the issue to the Judicial Committee or the Tribunal, 
courts that handled the cases would have to give an interim judgment on whether 
the provision was constitutional. If the courts found it constitutional, they would 
apply the law notwithstanding objections from the parties. Only when the courts 
found the law unconstitutional would they refer the issue to the Committee or the 
Tribunal.133 Moreover, the Judicial Committee and the Constitutional Tribunal 
only existed during ordinary times.134 When the country was ruled by coups or 
temporary governments such that the temporary Constitutions did not provide for 
the establishment of a special institution for constitutional matters, the Courts of 
Justice took back the power of judicial review of legislation.135  
The power of the judiciary to review executive acts was less controversial. 
Before the establishment of the Administrative Courts following the 1997 
Constitution, although several administrative processes had to be enacted before 
claims against administrative acts could be heard in the Courts of Justice, it was 
accepted (it has been so since 1932) that it is the task of the judiciary to decide 
whether the executive has acted according to the law.136 
In any case, the role of both the Courts of Justice and the Judicial Committee or 
Constitutional Tribunals in checking the executive and legislative acts was 
limited. This was especially so during the authoritarian periods. After 
successfully seizing power, the agents of the coup usually cancelled the existing 
                                                 
133 Supreme Court decisions 21/2492 (1949), 1212/2497 (1954) and 1260/2497 (1954). See also 
Prakob Hutasingh, ‘Judicial Power’ (1970) 1(1) Thammasat Law Journal 4, 6. 
134 An exception was the Charter 2006, which required that all powers of the Constitutional Court 
shall be exercised by a Constitutional Tribunal comprising the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Administrative Court, five Justices of the Supreme Court 
and five Justices of the Supreme Administrative Court. Constitution (Interim) 2006, s 35. 
135 Supreme Court decisions 766/2505 (1962), 222/2506 (1963) and 913/2536 (1993). 
136 Pintip Sujaritkul, ‘The Decisions Relating to Administrative Acts in the Courts of Thailand’ 
(1990) 37 Dulapaha 4. 
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Constitution and promulgated a temporary one in order to justify their own 
power to govern the country. Thai Courts had never been able to resist this. The 
ideas of absolute sovereign power and positivism were used as tools to justify 
those who held powers. 137  The Supreme Court consistently held that the 
temporary Constitutions promulgated by the coups were valid and enforceable 
even though they had not been issued by the King with the consent of Parliament 
because the agents of the coup had, in fact, successfully seized power.138 
The subservient role of the judiciary (and, obviously, of the Judicial Committee 
for the Constitution and the Constitutional Tribunal) was most apparent in 
respect of the cases relating to the constitutional provisions which conferred 
broad powers on the Prime Minister to act whatsoever in order to maintain 
national security. 139  The Supreme Court held in several cases that power to 
decide whether there was a threat to national security rested exclusively with the 
Prime Minister himself. The courts did not have to consider whether there 
actually was a threat or whether other people thought so.140  The Court even 
endorsed the view that such power on the part of the Prime Minister included the 
power to imprison a person, and that the order of the Prime Minister according to 
the provision was final and not subject to judicial review.141 
                                                 
137 Prokati (n 7) 69–70. 
138 Supreme Court decisions 1153–1154/2495 (1952), 45/2496 (1953), 1512–1515/2487 (1944) 
and 1662/2505 (1962). 
139 See text to n 54. 
140 Supreme Court decision 494/2510 (1967) (en banc). This point of the decision was also 
supported by later decisions such as 1792/2512 (1969), 2291/2519 (1976), 2573/2519 (1976) 
found in Pokin Polakul, ‘The Constitution of Thailand and the Guarantee of Rights and Liberties 
to Life and Body (2)’ (1984) 14(2) Thammasat Law Journal 91, 107–08. 
141 Supreme Court decision 1758/2513 (1970) found in ibid 108. 
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ii. After the 1997 Constitutional Reform  
a. Review of Legislation 
Since the 1997 Constitution, the review of legislative acts has become the 
exclusive power of the Constitutional Court,142 whose decisions ‘shall be deemed 
final and binding on the National Assembly, Council of Ministers, Courts and 
other State organs’.143  
The operation of the Constitutional Court was disrupted during the period 
following the coup d’état in September 2006. 144  However, the Court was 
resurrected by the promulgation of the current Constitution in 2007. Its 
composition is quite remote from politics. The Court consists of nine judges: 
three elected at the general meeting of the Supreme Court of Justice from 
qualified justices of the Supreme Court; two elected at the general meeting of the 
Supreme Administrative Court from qualified justices of the Supreme 
Administrative Court; two selected by the Selective Committee and approved by 
the Senate from the list of qualified persons in law; and two selected by the 
Selective Committee and approved by the Senate from the list of qualified 
persons in political science.145 The Selective Committee just mentioned consists 
of the President of the Supreme Court of Justice, the President of the Supreme 
Administrative Court, the President of the House of Representatives, the Leader 
of the Opposition in the House of Representatives, and, lastly, the Presidents of 
the Constitutional Independent Organs elected among themselves to be one in 
                                                 
142 Constitution 2007, s 264. 
143 Constitution 2007, s 216 para 5. 
144 Constitution (Interim) 2006, s 35 provided for the Constitutional Tribunal. See text to n 134 
for the Tribunal’s composition. 
145 Constitution 2007, ss 204, 206. 
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number.146 Each judge of the Constitutional Court is to hold office for nine years, 
and is allowed only one term in office.147 
Issues of constitutionality may be referred to the Constitutional Court by the 
courts of justice or administrative courts, either when they are of the opinion that 
the laws are unconstitutional or when parties to the case raise the issue. As 
regards the latter, it is important to note that courts deciding the cases no longer 
have discretion as to whether to refer the constitutional issue. They must stay the 
trials and submit the issue to the Constitutional Court, as long as no decision of 
the Constitutional Court on the same provision has taken place previously.148 
Issues concerning the constitutionality of law may also be referred to the Court 
by the Ombudsmen, NHRC or affected persons (the latter two only when 
constitutional rights are involved).149  
Furthermore, the Constitutional Court is entrusted with the power of abstract 
review of legislative acts. The new Constitution is designed to invigilate the 
enactment of laws strictly. It requires that all organic bills – those bills which are 
required to be passed by the Constitution itself for the purpose of giving more 
detail to constitutional provisions – be referred to the Constitutional Court for a 
determination of constitutionality.150 With other bills, the Prime Minister or a 
group made up of certain members of the House of Representatives and senators 
may refer constitutional issues to the Constitutional Court before sending such 
bills to the King for his signature.151 After the law has been passed, Ombudsmen 
                                                 
146 Constitution 2007, s 206. 
147 Constitution 2007, s 208. 
148 Constitution 2007, s 211. 
149 Discussed previously in section I B text to nn 106–110. 
150 Constitution 2007, ss 138, 141 para 1. 
151 Constitution 2007, s 154. 
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and the NHRC may raise the claim of constitutionality to the Constitutional 
Court even if there is no concrete case.152 
Given these great powers, it might be expected that the Constitutional Court 
would play an important role in protecting constitutional rights against 
interference by the legislative branch. During the previous 14 years since its 
establishment, however, most of the cases that have come to the Court’s attention 
have been those related to political process: for example, the qualification of a 
member of the national assembly and the legitimacy of a political party.153 Cases 
in which the Court was required to consider constitutional rights constitute only a 
minority of all cases decided by the Constitutional Court so far.154 The reasons 
for this could be that the concept of rights has yet to be established in Thailand, 
as discussed in section I A above; and that, in the midst of political turmoil, 
political parties and other interest groups attempt to use judicial decisions as 
tools for their political advantage. Furthermore, the small number of 
constitutional rights cases in the Constitutional Court could be the result of the 
competition between different courts over jurisdiction. It should not be forgotten 
that all courts in Thailand may be involved in interpreting constitutional rights. 
The Courts of Justice have the power to interpret laws they are applying in light 
of constitutional rights. Cases shall not be referred to the Constitutional Court 
unless there is a question of the constitutionality of legislation. The 
Administrative Courts have the power to decide whether an administrative action 
                                                 
152 Constitution 2007, ss 245(1) and 257 (2). 
153 Some of these cases have been mentioned in section I A, n 46. 
154 Between May 1998 and June 2012, 421 cases were rendered by the Constitutional Court and 
the Constitutional Tribunal (the latter operated during the 2006 Interim Constitution), in 116 of 
which the Court/Tribunal considered the issue of constitutional rights on merit. There were only 
eight cases in which the Court/Tribunal held the laws/draft laws/actions in question 
unconstitutional as being inconsistent with constitutional rights. This statistic derives from a scan 
of all central decisions published on the website of the Constitutional Court of Thailand < 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.or.th/index.php?option=com_docman&Itemid=210&lang=thindex
.php> accessed 30 June 2012. 
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is constitutional. This includes the issue of whether an action of a public body 
violates constitutional rights. Decisions of the Administrative Courts on this 
issue are not appealable to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court 
would have an opportunity to decide the case only when the public body in 
question acted according to legislation, and there was an issue of the 
constitutionality of that legislation.155  
b. Review of Administrative Actions 
As well as the change in the body that has the power of legislative review, the 
1997 constitutional reform results in a change in the body that has the power to 
review administrative acts. The review of administrative acts, except those 
relating to criminal law, labour law and tax law, was transferred from the Courts 
of Justice to Administrative Courts in 2001.  
Justices of the Supreme Administrative Courts are selected by the Judicial 
Commission of the Administrative Court from persons qualified in law or in 
government administration. 156  The Administrative Courts have the power to 
decide the constitutionality and legality of administrative acts, which include the 
questions as to whether a public body acts unlawfully, acts beyond its power, 
acts inconsistently with laws or procedures required for such actions, acts in bad 
faith or in a discriminatory manner or causes unnecessary process, or acts in a 
way that amounts to an undue exercise of discretion.157 The Courts are able to 
give a wide range of remedies, including revocation of administrative actions, 
                                                 
155 Andrew Harding, ‘The Constitutional Court of Thailand, 1998–2006: A Turbulent Innovation’ 
in Andrew Harding and Penelope (Pip) Nicholson (eds), New Courts in Asia (Routledge 2010) 
125. 
156 Constitution 2007, s 224. 
157 It should be noted that the Courts also have the power to decide issues relating to the wrongful 
acts of administrative bodies and those relating administrative contracts. Constitution 2007, s 223; 
Act on the Establishment and Procedure of the Administrative Court 1999, s 9. 
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ordering an administrative body to act or cease acting, and granting 
compensation.158 
In addition to the affected persons, Ombudsmen may submit a case to an 
Administrative Court if they are of the opinion that any administrative rule or 
action begs the question of constitutionality or legality.159 This can be done even 
in cases where controversial issues have not yet arisen. So far, the Courts have 
played an important role in ensuring that the government agencies act within the 
scope of the law.160  
B. Interpretive Approaches  
Apart from the power of judicial review, the roles of the Courts in protecting 
rights are also dependent on the interpretive approaches adopted in the legal 
system. Traditionally, the Thai legal system had been influenced by traditional 
Thai and Indian cultures. The core idea was that the law should be consistent 
with dharma – Buddhist teaching, nature, law of nature, virtue, righteousness, 
rule, truth or principle.161 In the late 19th century, however, in order to avoid 
colonisation the country undertook modernisation of its legal system, and since 
                                                 
1
158 ibid s 72. For commentaries see Leyland ‘Droit Administratif’ (n 35) and ‘The Genealogy of 
the Administrative Courts and the Consolidation of Administrative Justice in Thailand’ in 
Andrew Harding and Penelope (Pip) Nicholson (eds), New Courts in Asia (Routledge 2010). 
159 Constitution 2007, s 254 (2). 
160 As of July 2009, there have been 17,031 closed cases in the Central Administrative Court and 
8,884 in the Supreme Administrative Court. The Administrative Court, ‘The Case Statistics of the 
Central Administrative Court’ 2009 <http://www.admincourt.go.th/amc_eng/02-KADEE/ 2552 
/a03case0.htm> accessed 18 January 2010; The Administrative Court, ‘The Case Statistics of the 
Supreme Administrative Court’ 2009 <http://www.admincourt.go.th/amc_eng/02-KADEE/ 
2552/a02case.htm> accessed 18 January 2010. 
161 The SE-ED’s Modern Thai – English Dictionary. Dharma may sometimes be referred to as 
‘religious law’ as well. Harding ‘Buddhism’ (n 3 ) 1. For further traditional Thai legal culture see 
Prokati (n 7) 49–52; Somyot Chuathai, The Basic Knowlege on the Philosophy of Law 
(Winyuchon 1993) 100–01. 
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then it has been influenced by Western common law and civil law legal 
traditions.162 
i. The Influences from the Common Law and Civil Law Legal 
Traditions: The Strict Literal Approach 
At the beginning of the process of modernisation, English common law was 
proposed as a model to be used for the Thai legal system. This was because 
Prince Rabi Badhanasakdi, a graduate of Oxford University and later known as 
the ‘father of the law’ of Thailand, had established the first law school in the 
country – the Law School of the Ministry of Justice – which was inspired by the 
Inns of Court in London. Generations of Thai judges who graduated from the 
Law School had been trained not only in English law, but also in common law 
methods.163 Literal interpretation and the idea of legal positivism, which insisted 
that law and justice were separated, had a significant influence on Thai judges.164  
However, the later process of the reformation of the legal system law was 
significantly influenced by experts from European countries, especially Belgium 
and France. King Rama V was also of the opinion that the written style of law 
was closer to the traditional Thai legal system and could expedite the process of 
reform. Therefore, by the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the civil law model 
was adopted as an official model for the Thai legal system instead of the 
common law model.165  
                                                 
162 Prokati (n 7) 35–39. 
163 ibid (n 7) 112–14; The Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court (ed), The 
Judicial System in Thailand: An Outlook for a New Century (IDE-JETRO 2001) 7, 64– 66; 
Charnchai Sawangsagdi, The Development of Public Law in Thailand and other Countries 
(Winyuchon 1995) 126–31.  
164 Chuathai (n 161) 195–96; Arun Panupong, ‘Interpretation of Law’ (1996) 26(3) Thammasat 
Law Journal 546.  
165 Sawangsagdi The Development of Public Law in Thailand and other Countries (n 163) 126–
30; Prokati (n 7) 111–15. 
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It is important to note that, although the origins of the civil law system can be 
traced back to the Romans’ 12 Tables of law 166 and the interpretive role of 
judges has fluctuated from era to era,167 the civil law tradition that influenced the 
Thai legal system was that operating in Europe, particularly France and Germany, 
during the 19th and early 20th centuries, since it was during this period that the 
legal system was modernised and many Thai elites were sent to Europe to 
study.168 The interpretive role of judges in Europe at that time was very limited. 
After ecclesiastical rule had started to diminish in the 17th century, 169  the 
‘intellectual revolution’ changed the way people thought about individuals, 
government and law. Importantly, the idea of the separation of governmental 
powers was advanced by Montesquieu in order to isolate the judiciary from the 
law-making and executive functions.170 This was particularly the case in France, 
where the judiciary had a history of abusing their powers either by refusing to 
apply the new law or by interpreting the law against the legislature’s intention.171 
Judges were not allowed to use external factors to decide the case and the 
reliance on precedent was prohibited. In an extreme version, it was even held that 
judges should not interpret incomplete or unclear legislation and should instead 
refer it back to the legislators.172  This idea was also reinforced by the legal 
positivism which was widespread in Europe during the 19th century.173  
                                                 
166 Kittisak Prokati, Legal Methods (3rd edn, Winyuchon 2008) 22–24. 
167 For example, while civil law judges in Roman times had very limited discretion and had to 
apply the Emperor’s will strictly, those in the medieval period (12th–13th centuries) creatively 
interpreted the law, structured a set of judge-made laws, and created something similar to the 
stare decisis principle. Merryman and Pe’rez-Perdomo (n 130) 8–9, 35–36; Prokati Legal 
Methods (n 166) 25. 
168 Sawangsagdi The Development of Public Law in Thailand and other Countries (n 163) 131. 
169 Prokati Legal Methods (n 166) 27. 
170 Merryman and Pe’rez-Perdomo (n 130) 16–17. Τhis is different from the separation of powers 
in the USA, which will be discussed in Chapter Four, I and II. 
171 ibid 17. 
172 ibid 36. 
173 ibid 24. 
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Therefore, it was (and, to some extent, still is) widely believed in Thailand that 
civil law judges cannot make law and that their duty is simply to interpret the 
law.174 In fact, the role of judges in interpreting and applying laws seemed to be 
even more limited in Thailand than in other civil law countries because of the 
residual influence of the literal interpretation approach stemming from the 
English common law, which was also influenced by the legal positivism. The 
Thai legal system combined a limited role for judges in making law and the idea 
that written law should be sacred from the civil law tradition with the English 
literal rule of interpretation. The result was that Thai judges did not have the 
power to ‘make’ law as English judges do. At the same time, codified laws, 
which according to the civil law tradition should be treated as principles rather 
than concrete rules, were interpreted literally and strictly.175  
The Supreme Court held that judges were persons who ‘applied’ but did not 
‘create’ the law; therefore, they could explain or interpret the law, but could 
never ‘change’176 or ‘broaden’ the law.177 Moreover, values such as justice or 
equality, which at first were inseparable from traditional Thai law, were 
disregarded for the task of interpretation. The Court held that justice meant 
righteousness according to the law. Individuals’ opinions always varied and 
could not be taken to account.178 There was also the notion that in interpreting 
written law, judges should consider the letter first, and only if the letter could not 
provide clear meaning might they turn to the intention of the law.179  
                                                 
174 Prokati Legal Methods (n 166) 37; Prakob Hutasingh, ‘Interpretation of Statutes’ (1970) 1(3) 
Thammasat Law Journal 67, 74. 
175 Chuathai (n 161) 195. 
176 Supreme Court decision 209/129 (1910). 
177 Supreme Court decision 1041/2466 (1932). 
178 Supreme Court decision 144/2459 (1916) (emphasis added). See also Supreme Court decision 
211/2473 (1930). 
179 Chuathai (n 161) 195–96. 
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Therefore, it later became a tradition that Thai judges applied written laws 
literally and mechanically.180 Criticisms were directed towards Thai lawyers on 
the following grounds:  
They are narrow-minded and have a strong tendency to be strict 
on the letter of the law, to the extent that the realities, the changes 
in society and the ideology of law are altogether disregarded.181  
Nevertheless, it should be noted that there were some exceptional cases in which 
the Supreme Court and the Judicial Committee for the Constitution interpreted 
written law less strictly in order to protect people’s rights, especially those 
relating to the principle of nullum crimen, nulla poena sine praevia lege 
poenali182 and the rights to be tried in the courts.183 
                                                 
180 For example, see Supreme Court decision 837/2483 (1940) holding, according to the literal 
method of interpretation, that although the statute in question required a police officer to make a 
record of everything he found at the time of finding, it did not stipulate any consequence for the 
officer failing to do this. Consequently, the defendant’s objection to the use of the record, in 
which discovered items had been added later, as evidence in the court had to be denied. 
181 Chuathai (n 161), introduction page (author’s translation). See also Alexander Shytov, ‘Abuse 
of Judicial Powers in Thai Folktales’ in Thai Folktales and Law (ACTSCO) para 12 saying: ‘In 
Thailand for example, there is a danger of a prejudice that a judge must apply law strictly in a 
machine-like manner without taking seriously the merits of the case.’ 
182 See for example the War Criminal Act case where the Court held that the Act aiming to punish 
people who became involved with Japanese soldiers during World War II was unconstitutional 
because it provided for a retroactive criminal punishment. Supreme Court decision 1/2489 (1946) 
discussed previously in n 126. See also decisions of the Judicial Committee for the Constitution 
and the Supreme Courts, which invalidated a provision of law allowing officers to seize all 
properties involved in the illegal transferring of rice, whether the owners of such properties were 
involved in such illegal acts or not. Judicial Committee for the Constitution decision 3/2494 
(1951); Supreme Court decisions 222/2494 (1951) and 225/2506 (1953). 
183 See Judicial Committee for the Constitution’s decision on 18 February 1958 and Supreme 
Court decision 222/2506 (1963), which held that the provisions provided for the ouster of the 
courts’ jurisdiction in the disputes between citizens relating to ownership of the land were 
unconstitutional. These two cases are comparable to the UK’s House of Lords decision in 
Anisminic Ltd v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147 (HL), which will be 
discussed in Chapter Three, II B ii.  
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Furthermore, strict literal rule applied only when there were provisions of law to 
be interpreted. In cases where codified law could not be applied, Thai judges, 
especially at the beginning of the modernisation of the legal system, were 
engaged extensively in judicial law-making. For example, in area of tort, judges 
had to lay down legal principles in order to decide whether an act constitutes tort; 
whether an act can be called negligence; and what should be an appropriate 
amount of compensation in cases of contributory negligence.184 This is what has 
been happening, despite the cliché that civil law judges cannot make law, and 
Supreme Court decisions can at most serve as examples of how to interpret law, 
or as persuasive authorities. In fact, the trend towards treating Supreme Court 
decisions as law is obvious from the practice of judges themselves. Lower courts 
usually, if not always, follow the Supreme Court decisions. Furthermore, in the 
Supreme Court itself there is a practice that a principle set by its previous 
decisions can be overruled only when all judges in the Supreme Court judges sit 
en banc.185  
ii. The Development of the Interpretive Approaches: The Departure 
from the Literal Rule  
Since the modernisation of the law, jurisprudence has developed very slowly. 
New schools of legal thought that have been flourishing in the Western world 
since the decline of legal positivism, such as legal realism, legal pragmatism and 
the sociological school of law, are known only by a few Thai legal scholars. As a 
result, the formalist approach towards interpretation has been able to dominate 
the Thai legal landscape for a long time.  
                                                 
184 For example, see the Supreme Court decisions 713/2469 (1926) and 933/2472 (1929). 
185 A normal quorum of the Supreme Court consists of three judges. Prakob Hutasingh, ‘The 
Supreme court of Thailand’ (1971) 2(3) Thammasat Law Journal 136 (n 133) 137–38. See also 
The Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court (ed) (n 163) 45. 
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During the last three decades, however, there have been movements, originating 
in academia, to move away from the strict formalist interpretation. The education 
systems of certain law schools which used to focus only on the codes and 
decisions of the Supreme Court have been changed. Subjects that provide general 
understanding about systems of law and the roles of lawyers in society, such as 
philosophy of law, juristic methods, comparative law and the legal profession, 
have been added.186 New generations of law students have a better understanding 
of the differences between common law and civil law systems, and learn that 
legal positivism is only one among several theories and not necessary appropriate 
in all circumstances.187 Importantly, the question as to what are the correct ways 
to interpret laws is subject to re-evaluation.  
The literal rule has faced strong challenges. There seems to be a consensus 
among legal scholars in Thailand that both the letter and the spirit (intention) of 
law should be considered simultaneously when interpreting the law in a civil law 
system like that of Thailand. 188  The meaning of ‘intention’ has proven 
controversial. Some scholars have argued that the intention to be used must be 
that of the drafters and not that of the law itself. They have maintained that the 
intention of the law itself does not exist and that judges simply cite their own 
opinions as the intention of the law. Therefore, allowing judges to use the 
intention of the law is equivalent to allowing them to interpret the law without 
any restraint. 189  Others, however, have argued, on the basis of the civil law 
tradition where the law itself rather than the drafters’ opinions is sacred, that the 
intention of the law should be accorded great importance, while the intention of 
                                                 
186 Chuathai (n 161) the introduction page. 
187 Prokati The Reformation of Thai Law under European Influence (n 7) 74–76. 
188 Chinda Chairat, ‘Interpretation of Thai Law’ (1970) 1(2) Thammasat Law Journal 11 30; 
Chuathai (n 161) 195–96; Hutasingh, ‘Interpretation of Statutes’ (n 174) 70; Preedee Kasemsap, 
‘The Application and Interpretation of Law’ (1985) 15 (1) Thammasat Law Journal 65, 73, 79–80; 
Prokati Legal Methods (n 166) 46. 
189 Hutasingh, ‘Interpretation of Statutes’ (n 174) 74–75. 
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the drafters might sometimes be disregarded. 190 Nevertheless, most now seem to 
accept that both kinds of intention are relevant for the task of interpretation. Any 
materials that can reflect either kind of intention, including but not limited to 
history of law, travaux préparatoires, logic of provisions, and context, are 
deemed acceptable for the task of interpretation.191  
Moreover, several scholars are arguing for an interpretation of law that takes into 
account factors such as ‘justice’, ‘contemporary social context’ and ‘the 
consequence of the interpretation’. Kasemsap argues that Thai courts may 
consider a wide range of sources in interpreting and applying law, pointing to 
section 4 of the Civil and Commercial Code, which provides: 
Where no provision is applicable, the case shall be decided in 
accordance with the local custom. If the said local custom is 
unapparent, the case shall be decided by analogy to the provision 
most nearly applicable, and, in default of such provision, by the 
general legal principle.192 
According to Kasemsap, this section reflects the fact that Thailand has actually 
adopted the ‘Mature Legal System’ as used in Switzerland. This system occupies 
a mid-way position between the ‘Classic Theory’ of interpretation developed by 
Montesquieu – which holds that law is complete in itself and that judges simply 
apply it mechanically – and the ‘Free Law Theory’, which argues that courts 
should be free to interpret the law and may disregard positive law if it is not just. 
It holds that interpretation must be based on the letter of law, but that at the same 
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time judges may use several interpretive methods to ensure that the result is just. 
Therefore, moral factors can and should be used in interpretation.193  
Chuathai shares a similar idea. He submits that the concepts of law and of 
morality at first evolved from being the same to being totally distinct. 
Subsequently, the legal system developed to reach the present stage, in which 
law and morality are considered to be different concepts, but based on the same 
idea. At this stage, it is natural that the idea of justice may be used to interpret the 
law to make sure that the law is not too strict and not too uncertain.194  
Prokati, another scholar who supports the reference to social contexts and general 
legal principles in interpreting laws, suggests that courts need not follow the 
language of the law strictly. Rather, they should interpret the provisions of law in 
the light of their underlying reasons provided that the result of the interpretation 
does not contradict the language of such law.195 He also asserts that civil law 
lawyers recognise that the law is the standard of behaviour for people in a society; 
therefore, the most effective way to use the law is to use it with an understanding 
of the social context.196 Even Hutasingh, a former Supreme Court Chief Justice 
who values the certainty of law highly, expresses the view that in cases of doubt, 
the law must be interpreted according to the needs of the society and the 
development of national cultures as much as possible.197  
However, it should not be forgotten that the above movement can be perceived 
more as a reaction against over-strict judicial reasoning than as a direct approval 
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of the extensive judicial law-making. Some of the above-mentioned scholars note 
that judges should not be allowed to interpret law in a way that departs too far 
from the plain meaning of statutes.198 
Judicial practice seems to follow academic discussion as decisions taking into 
account justice and current social situations in interpreting and applying the law 
have become more apparent. For example, a provision in the Cheque Abuse Act 
1954 provided for a punishment of those who issued personal cheques without 
having enough money in their bank accounts. The Supreme Court read into such 
provision the condition that only those who issued cheques for the purpose of 
paying off debt (and not for giving security to a loan) would be punishable 
according to the provision.199 This was because the Court considered that it was 
unfair for the debtors to be forced to repay their debt, or otherwise face a penal 
punishment. This interpretation went far beyond the text of the statute, but the 
legislature later enacted a new Act endorsing the Court’s decision.200 
Another case worth mentioning is the Supreme Court’s decision regarding an 
order issued by the National Peace Keeping Council (NPKC). The NPKC had 
successfully overthrown the Government in 1991 and set up a Commission in 
charge of investigating and deciding whether properties belonging to the 
members of the previous Government had been obtained legally. If the 
commission decided that the properties had been obtained illegally, they would 
be nationalised. According to the order, a person whose properties were thought 
to be illegally obtained might file a petition with a court of justice, which would 
forward it to the Supreme Court directly. The Supreme Court could either 
confirm or revoke the order of the Commission. The Commission later found that 
eight persons had obtained their properties illegally. Apart from the petitions 
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against the discretion of the Commission, the petitions on the constitutionality of 
the order under the Charter were filed with the Supreme Court. Instead of 
adopting a positivist view regarding the law of the military junta as in the 
previous cases,201 the Court held that such an order was unconstitutional since it 
aimed to constitute a retroactive criminal law and had conferred on the 
Commission the power of adjudication which, according to the ‘customs of Thai 
democratic governance’, must be exclusively exercised by courts.202 
It can be said that the Thai legal system has started to move away from strict 
literal interpretation and formalism. Courts have now considered a wide range of 
materials that may help in interpreting written law, including the contemporary 
concepts of justice and fundamental rights. Nevertheless, the cases discussed 
above are only parts of the whole system in which literal interpretation still has 
strong influence. A consistent theory of interpretation has yet to be established. 
iii. The Effects of the 1997 Constitutional Reform on the Interpretive 
Approaches: Moving Towards a Rights Based Interpretation? 
One of the main aspirations of the constitutional reform was to enhance the 
protection of rights. Apart from including an extensive list of rights that are 
protected constitutionally and improving the rights-enforcement mechanism, 203 
section 27 of the current Constitution provides a rule of interpretation: 
Rights and liberties recognised by this Constitution explicitly, by 
implication or by decisions of the Constitutional Court shall be 
                                                 
201 Discussed previously in section II A i of this chapter. 
202  Supreme Court orders 912/2536, 913/2536, 920/2536, 921/2536, 1131/2536, 1132/2536, 
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Charter for Administration of the Kingdom 1991 itself that ‘If the issue cannot be decided by 
provisions in this Charter, considerations shall be given to the customs of Thai democratic 
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protected and directly binding on the National Assembly, the 
Council of Ministers, the Courts, Constitutional organisations and 
State agencies with respect to the enactment, application and 
interpretation of all laws.204 
Two important points relating to the roles of the courts can be made from this 
provision. The first concerns the interpretation of the meaning and scope of the 
constitutional rights; the second concerns the interpretation of lower laws in the 
light of the constitutional rights. 
Section 27 reflects the fact that the rights that are constitutionally protected in 
Thailand are not only those clearly and explicitly stated in the Constitution, but 
also those that can be implied from the text of the Constitution and those that are 
recognised by the interpretation of the Constitutional Court. The broad language 
of the constitutional provisions concerning rights protection, and exemptions 
from it, 205  shows that the Constitutional Court is clearly entrusted with a 
significant judicial law-making function in defining the meaning and scope of 
constitutional rights. Its decisions have the same status as the Constitution itself 
and are ranked higher than Parliamentary Acts and other laws. In fact, it is 
observed that in some circumstances the interpretation of the Constitutional 
Court may result in the amendment of the Constitution itself.206  
It is argued that section 27 can also be seen as an explicit mandate from the 
Constitution for a rights-based interpretation of all laws. All courts are to 
interpret and apply laws with respect to constitutional rights. Although the 
requirement looks simple, what the Courts may do in order to implement such a 
requirement is not. This requirement surely means that courts must not positively 
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violate constitutional rights by means of interpretation and adjudication. It can 
also mean that courts must consider the issue of constitutional rights when 
reviewing acts of the executive and the legislature to make sure that the latter two 
branches do not act in violation of the rights. Alternatively, it can be taken to 
mean that courts should attempt to limit the violation of constitutional rights by 
trying to read down the provisions of law which on the face of it may be 
inconsistent with such rights. As regards the last point, however, it is arguable 
that the better way might be to have such law declared unconstitutional, rather 
than to have its words and intention distorted.207 Despite these interesting points, 
neither the interpretation of the constitutional rights provisions themselves, nor 
the interpretation of lower laws in the light of constitutional rights has received 
much attention in Thailand. 
In fact, very little literature is available regarding the interpretation of the 
Constitution in general. The matter seems to have gained attention only recently, 
after the last coup in 2006 and the promulgation of the 2007 Constitution, since 
when the Constitutional Court has adopted a controversial role in Thai politics. 
Pakirat suggests that, in general, interpretive methods for ordinary law can be 
applied with special considerations regarding the unity and integrity of the 
Constitution, the enforceability and the immediate effect of the constitutional 
provisions, and the separation of powers.208 A variety of sources of interpretation, 
including not only text but also the history of the adoption, the underlying 
reasons for the provisions, general principles and conventions, can be used.209 
Singhanethi also supports the use of those unwritten principles that are the 
                                                 
207 This issue is discussed widely in the UK in relation to the ‘principle of legality’ and ss 3 and 4 
of the Human Rights Act 1998. However, the same discussion does not appear in Thailand. The 
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underlying principles of the Constitution, particularly the rule of law principle. 
He bases his argument on section 3 para 2 of the Constitution, which provides 
that all government agencies shall perform their duty ‘in accordance with the rule 
of law’.210 Nevertheless, these proposed principles of constitutional interpretation 
are rather abstract, and do not answer the more practical question of to what 
extent the Constitutional Court or other courts that are also involved in 
interpreting the Constitution may use judicial creativity.  
The lack of consistent interpretive principles in the Thai legal system is reflected 
clearly in the reasoning of the Courts. Although it is not a straightforward task 
(since judgments of Thai Courts are not usually presented in the style of common 
law judgments, with discursive analogy of general context), the following 
subsections attempt to identify the interpretive approaches, especially in relation 
to constitutional rights used by the Constitutional Court, the Administrative 
Courts and the Courts of Justice respectively.  
a. Approaches of the Constitutional Court 
Early jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court seemed to reflect the attachment 
to literal interpretation. This is likely to result from the fact that a majority of the 
justices had previously served as professional judges in the courts of justice and 
tended to make decisions based on points of law or rule by law.211 
The Constitutional Court did not show a willingness to enforce constitutional 
rights actively. In the 1997 Constitution, it appeared that several constitutional 
rights provisions stated that the exercise of the rights shall be ‘in accordance with 
the provisions of law’ or ‘as provided by law’. The Court interpreted them to 
mean that the rights could not be enforced until a law had been passed to regulate 
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the exercise of these rights.212 This constituted what Continental lawyers call 
‘programmatic rights’ – rights that were not immediately and directly 
enforceable until they were implemented by laws or executive actions or 
budgetary appropriations.213  
Even for other provisions that do not contain the above conditions, the Court did 
The Court started by repeating the equal protection clause in section 30 of the 
                                                
not interpret them in favour of rights. One of the most criticised decisions of the 
Court was the decision that will be referred to here as the Case of the Disabled 
Judicial Applicants.214 In this case, two persons with physical disabilities caused 
by polio had applied for assistant judge positions and were disqualified by the 
Qualification-Examination Committee owing to their physical conditions. They 
appealed to the Judicial Commission, which later confirmed the Committee’s 
decision. The decisions of both were based on a provision in the Act regulating 
the application to be a judge in the Courts of Justice which provided that an 
applicant must not have ‘a body which is inappropriate for a judge’.215 
1997 Constitution which provided, in essence, that unjust discrimination against 
a person on the grounds of physical condition or state of health shall not be 
permitted.216 It then went on to qualify such provision by stating that regarding 
employment, it was acceptable that an organisation considered whether such a 
 
212 See Constitutional Court decisions 62/2545 (2002) and 6/2546 (2003) concerning rights of 
communities in preserving their local traditions. 
213 Mary Ann Glendon, ‘Rights in Twentieth-Century Constitutions’ (1992) 59 U Chi L Rev 519, 
528. 
214 16/2545 (2002). For commentaries see Harding, ‘The Constitutional Court of Thailand’ (n 155) 
130–31. Harding also comments, on the Court’s decision relating to freedom of religion 44/2542 
(1999), that the Court tended to use Buddhist regulations rather than constitutional human rights 
principles in reaching its decision. 
215 Regulation of the Judicial Service Act 2000, s 26(10). 
216 Constitution 1997, s 30 para 3. 
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person had the knowledge, ability and suitability to work in the specific position. 
More importantly, it commented: 
For a position of judge which is highly regarded, the 
considerations may include not only knowledge and ability, but 
also proper physical and emotional health and appropriate 
characteristics and appearance of the applicants. The work of 
judges is to be done both in court rooms and outside. They may be 
required to investigate places and give hearing to witnesses who 
are not able to come to courts. The rules for accepting applicants 
for this position are, therefore, somewhat stricter than those for 
other positions. 217 
The Court went on to hold that the provision in question was issued according to 
necessity and suitability. It fell into an exception to the equal protection clause 
according to section 29 of the Constitution, which allowed restriction of 
constitutional rights that were ‘to the extent of necessity’ and did not affect ‘the 
essential substances of such rights’ by a provision of law which was ‘not 
intended to apply to any particular case or person’.218 
The decision provoked strong and widespread criticism in Thailand. Sinnghaneti, 
among many, submits that the Court did not carefully consider all the elements 
set by section 29 of the Constitution, particularly the principle of ‘necessity’.219 
Moreover, the Court did not explain why the provision did not affect the 
substance of the rights.220 Sinnghaneti concludes that the Court simply applied 
the Constitution literally without considering its role in protecting constitutional 
                                                 
217 Constitutional Court decision 16/2545 (2002) 163 (author’s translation). 
218 ibid 163–64. The quotes were from Constitution 1997, s 29 paras 1, 2. 
219 Banjerd Singhaneti, ‘Consideration Points Regarding Rights and Liberties According to the 
Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540’ (2002) 32 Thammasat Law Journal 520, 535. 
220 ibid 535–36. 
 
Chapter Two                                                                                                       65 
 
rights.221 The same conclusion was also reached by Klein, who comments that 
the Court has been very conservative and that ‘it will serve as neither a force for 
social change [n]or legal reform’ in the area of rights protection.222 
To be fair to the Court, it may be arguable that the rule in question was not 
unconstitutional in itself as physical fitness and mental fitness were arguably 
reasonable considerations. The injustice came rather from the standard of fitness 
used by the Judicial Commission, which was somehow not reviewable either by 
the Constitutional Court or the Administrative Courts. 223  However, if the 
Constitutional Court wishes to protect the rights of a person, it may hold, as one 
dissenting judge did,224 that the provision allowed too wide a discretion for the 
Judicial Commission and thus was unconstitutional. In any case, that the central 
decision endorsed the argument made by the Judicial Commission relating to the 
‘appropriate characteristics and appearance to work in a highly regarded position’ 
of an applicant does reflect conservative thinking on the issue of disability 
rights.225 
A similar issue was raised before the Constitutional Court again that same year. 
In a case which will be called here the case of the Disabled Public Prosecutor 
Applicant, one of the claimants in the above case also applied to be a public 
prosecutor and was refused application according to a provision in the 
Regulation of the Public Prosecutors Act 2000, which also required the applicant 
to have an appropriate physical condition. The claimant first submitted his case 
to an Administrative Court, but the Court stayed the case and referred the 
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constitutionality issue to the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court 
confirmed its reasoning from the previous decision and upheld the provision.226  
Another case worth noting is the Nationality case concerning sex equality. At 
issue was a provision in the Nationality Act which provided that an alien woman 
who married a Thai man might apply to be granted Thai nationality and that the 
Minister of Interior would have discretion regarding whether to grant this. It was 
argued that such a provision discriminated against alien men who married Thai 
women, who must meet additional requirements in order to be eligible to apply 
for Thai nationality. Among other requirements, these men must have continuing 
residency in Thailand for at least five years. The Court held that it was in the 
sovereign power of the country to set the criteria for granting nationality. It went 
on to hold that the provision in question was not unconstitutional since it 
represented the criteria set according to the social situation and national security. 
Such provision was not against international law. Moreover, the provision did 
not totally prohibit men who married Thai women from applying for 
nationality.227 
This was another case that reflected the Court’s formalist approach to rights. 
Instead of considering the issues of gender equality in the granting of nationality 
(which was the issue raised by the claimant) or the rights of non-citizens 
according to the Constitution, the Court focused on the issue of whether the 
provision violated international law relating to the exercise of state sovereignty 
in granting nationality. It even endorsed the view that the provision was enacted 
according to the social situation and national security, without taking into 
account the fact that the Act had been in force since 1955 and that national 
security was not likely to be involved in circumstances where alien women have 
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already been allowed to apply for nationality without meeting the residency 
requirement.  
In any event, there were some decisions that can be taken as signs that the 
Court’s approach may develop so as to be less formalist. The Court’s decision in 
the Name Act case concerned a provision of the Name Act 1961 which required 
that married women must use their husbands’ surname. In fact, the Constitution 
merely stated that ‘men and women have equal rights’, without further details.228 
Nevertheless, the Court considered the right to use a surname to constitute a 
personal right to identify one’s lineage, which for all persons should be equally 
protected, and held that the provision discriminatively forced only women to 
change their surnames and thus was unconstitutional.229 
This case represented an example of the Constitutional Court laying down the 
new principle binding all government agencies and courts. More importantly, the 
decision showed that, in interpreting the provision, the Constitutional Court took 
into account not only the current social situation, where women and men were 
more equal than they had been before, but also its obligation to protect people’s 
rights.230 
At this point, discussion should be offered regarding an outstanding decision of 
the Court which, although not related to the issue of rights, may be taken as a 
sign that the Constitutional Court has prepared to depart from the literal approach. 
The Joint Communiqué case was another case that arose during the political 
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controversies in Thailand. The issue was whether the Joint Communiqué 
between Thailand and Cambodia stating that Thailand supported Cambodia in 
registering Kao Pravihan as a world heritage site was a treaty that required public 
consultation and approval by the National Assembly before being concluded. 
Section 190 para 2 of the Constitution provides a list of treaties that need to 
undergo this process:  
A treaty which provides for a change in the Thai territories or the 
Thai external territories that Thailand has sovereign right or 
jurisdiction over under any treaty or under international law, or a 
treaty which requires the enactment of an Act for its 
implementation, or has wide-scale effects on the economic or 
social security of the country, or results in a significant obligation 
being placed on the trade, investment or budget of the 
country …231  
The controversial part of this case derived from the long-term disputes between 
Thailand and Cambodia regarding their borders and the ownership of Kao 
Pravihan. In 1962, the ICJ ruled that Kao Pravihan was in Cambodian territory, 
and so Thailand removed its soldiers from there, but at the same time officially 
protested against the Court’s ruling and reserved the right to claim it back when 
new evidence became available. The ICJ did not rule on the issue regarding the 
ownership of the land around the castle, which was still a matter of dispute 
between the two countries. 
The claimants in this case, 77 senators and 151 members of the House of 
Representatives, argued that the instrument in question would result in giving up 
the rights of Thailand against Cambodia regarding both Kao Pravihan itself and 
the land around it. The Government responded that the instrument did not result 
in a change to Thailand’s territories because Kao Pravihan was in Cambodia’s 
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territory according to the ICJ’s decision. A part of the land around it also 
belonged to Cambodia according to the Thai Cabinet resolution in 1962 ordering 
the removal of soldiers from the area. As to the other parts of the land around 
Kao Pravihan which was under dispute, it was specified in the instrument itself 
that the Joint Communiqué would not affect the territorial issues. 
The Constitutional Court ruled 8 to 1 that the instrument fell under section 190 
para 2. In its main opinion, the Court explained that although it seemed that the 
provision would regulate only the treaty that ‘provides for a change’ in the Thai 
territories, such an interpretation would not be consistent with the intent of the 
Constitution, which aimed to invigilate treaty-making process in order to prevent 
damage to the country. Therefore, the correct interpretation should include the 
treaty that ‘might result in a change’ of the territories.232 Since the instrument 
did not make clear the delicate issue relating to the rights of each country 
regarding the areas around Kao Pravihan, it posed a risk to Thailand’s territories. 
Thus, the conclusion of such an instrument could be reached only after public 
consultation and with the approval of the National Assembly.233  Further, the 
instrument related to an issue which has long been sensitive for the people of 
Thailand and Cambodia. Concluding this kind of instrument without careful 
deliberation would cause wide-scale effects on the social security of the 
country.234  
It can be seen that a literal rule of interpretation was not applied in this case. The 
Court considered the constitutional intention behind the provision, the historical 
development of the problem between Thailand and Cambodia, the current 
political situation, and the consequences that might follow its decision. It went so 
far as to read the word ‘might result in’ into the constitutional provision. 
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While the progressive interpretation in this case may raise a concern over the 
legitimacy of judicial interpretation, since section 190 para 2 concerns the 
powers of the executive to make treaties vis-à-vis the power of the legislative 
branch and the courts to check on the executive acts, it is argued that the same 
interpretive approach may be better justified in the context of constitutional 
rights which the courts have a duty to uphold.235 
b. Approaches of the Administrative Courts and the Courts of 
Justice 
In the areas of rights, the Administrative Courts and the Courts of Justice have 
shown a faster and more obvious response to the 1997 constitutional reform than 
the Constitutional Court. In the case of the Courts of Justice, it is generally 
reported that human rights in the field of criminal justice have been much 
improved after the promulgation of the People’s Constitution of 1997. In 
particular, it has been reported that the courts have favoured individuals’ rights 
over the ‘traditional strict appliance of [the] “law and order” approach’.236 For 
example, in 2003, Songkla Provincial Court interpreted a criminal law in the 
light of constitutional rights by holding that the association of people to protest 
against a government project did not constitute the ‘group violence’ described by 
the Criminal Code, but rather the exercise of the freedom to assemble peacefully 
and without arms according to the Constitution.237  
The most outstanding case in which the Supreme Court interpreted the law 
broadly in order to accommodate rights was the Arrest decision rendered in 2007. 
The legislation in question was section 7 of the Act for Establishing and Setting 
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Criminal Procedure in the Magistrate Courts 1956, which provided that the 
police must send an ‘arrested’ suspect to the public prosecution office and the 
prosecutor must file a case to a court within 48 hours from the time the suspect 
was arrested. The prosecutor in this case did not submit the defendant’s case to 
the court in time, but argued that section 7 was not applicable as the defendant 
was not ‘arrested’ but had ‘submitted himself’ to the police. The Court stated that 
section 7 was enacted with the aim of avoiding a delay in the prosecution process 
and protecting the suspect from being confined for a long time. It then held that 
‘arrested suspect’ in section 7 included those suspects who have submitted 
themselves.238  
The case reflected the change in the Court’s approach. The textual meaning of 
‘arrested’ itself would not go so far as to include ‘submitting himself to the 
police’. Nevertheless, the Court interpreted it as being within section 7, because 
it took into account the purpose of the legislation and individuals’ rights.  
The Administrative Courts appear to respond to their constitutional task in 
protecting rights as well. Khon Kaen Administrative Court upheld the rights of a 
community protected by the People’s Constitution of 1997, holding that an action 
of a government agency in issuing a concession which affected the environment 
and living standards of people in a community, without giving an opportunity to 
the people in the area to know the details and offer their opinions, was illegal.239 
The rights of the community to be consulted before the commencement of any 
project that substantially affects the environment in its vicinity was confirmed 
recently in the highly publicised Maptapud case. Before reaching its decision on 
merit, the Central Administrative Court ordered an injunction suspending the 
operation of 76 projects which were alleged to affect the environment. The 
Supreme Administrative Court revoked the injunction relating to 11 projects, but 
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confirmed the rest. Both Courts reasoned that such suspension was necessary in 
order to ensure that rights of community according to the Constitution enjoy 
direct effect. 240  Later, the Central Administrative Court held that the 
administrative decisions allowing all the projects were illegal, as the 
administrative bodies involved consulted neither the affected people nor experts 
from non-government organisations and universities as required by the 
Constitution.241  
Further, in the case relating to the rejection of the Disabled Public Prosecutor 
Applicant in which the Constitutional Court refused to hold the relevant statute 
unconstitutional,242 the Supreme Administrative Court nevertheless revoked the 
decision of the Application Committee, reasoning that the physical conditions of 
the claimant were not likely to affect his ability to work as an assistant public 
prosecutor. Therefore, the decision of the Committee unreasonably discriminated 
against the disabled applicant.243 
Other rights upheld by the Administrative Courts include rights to citizenship 
and to fair administrative procedure,244 rights to a secret vote,245 and consumer 
rights.246 
                                                 
240 Supreme Administrative Court order 592/2552 (2009). 
241 Nevertheless, the Court did not invalidate the projects, reasoning that it had to consider the 
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revoke the citizenship of 1,243 people from an area in the northern part of Thailand since the 
administrative agency did not give the affected persons an opportunity to explain or give 
evidence against the decisions. 
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It can be concluded that rights-based interpretation has started to influence the 
interpretative approaches of all courts, although consistent theory and practice 
have yet to be established.  
III. International and Foreign Law in Thailand 
Thailand currently adopts a mix of monist and dualist approaches in determining 
the legal effect that international and foreign law has in the legal system.247  
Although it might be adequate simply to discuss the current approach and its 
impact on the legal status and effect of international human rights norms, this 
research nevertheless opts to provide a brief historical background to the issue in 
order to show that the country has had unique experience regarding the use of 
international and foreign law, and that such experience might affect attitudes 
towards international and foreign law in general, and international human rights 
norms in particular. 
A. Historical Background 
Thailand started to be involved extensively with international and foreign law 
during the time of King Rama IV (1851–68).248  The country was forced by 
England and other Western countries to make treaties to the effect that it had lost 
part of its sovereignty in enforcing Thai law against people under the control of 
                                                                                                                                    
245 Central Administrative Court decision 607–608/2549 (2006), also known as the Election Case, 
which will be discussed further in text to n 340. 
246  Supreme Administrative Court decision 5/2549 (2007), also known as the EGAT case, 
discussed in n 35. 
247 Wissanu Krea-ngam, Research Report: The Application of International Law in the Domestic 
Legal System of Thailand (Chulalongkorn University 1978) 37. 
248 Note, however, that international and foreign laws in Thailand can be traced back to around 
the 16th century. Nophanidhi Suriya, International Law: Lecture Notes 1 (Winyuchon 2004) 
134–36. 
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these countries in its own territories.249 The consequence of those treaties was 
difficult to accept for Thailand, especially when the people who claimed the 
privilege in question were not only nationals of those countries with which 
Thailand had made agreements, but also those people who applied to be under 
the control of such countries merely in order to avoid Thai jurisdiction. There 
were renegotiations, which resulted in the establishment of the ‘Foreign Court’ 
where Thai judges and foreign consuls sat together to adjudicate a case, although 
the consuls had the right to withdraw the case before the decision had been made. 
The Foreign Court became one of the courts of first instance in the Courts of 
Justice in 1972.250 The applicable laws were the treaties of friendship and Thai 
law. For the latter, it was under the condition that the Thai law was not 
inconsistent with the laws of the foreign countries involved.251  
Because of these, the use of international and foreign laws was not unusual in 
early Thai courts. They usually referred, applied and interpreted Friendship 
Treaties as if they were Thai law. Although some Thai academics argue that the 
‘Promulgation of Treaty’ by the King in an absolute monarchy represents a form 
of transforming international agreement into domestic law, in practice the courts 
did not refer to such promulgation as an authority in deciding the case, but 
jumped to the treaties directly.252 The reason for this could be that Thailand at 
that time did not have any theory or consistent practice regarding the relationship 
                                                 
249 ibid 136. Those countries are for example, the USA, France, Denmark, Portugal, Holland, 
Germany, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Italy, Russia and Japan. See also Krea-ngam (n 247) 80. 
250 Krea-ngam (n 247) 79. Further, another court, the ‘Foreign Cases Court’, was established in 
order to adjudicate matters relating to the treaties of friendship. The issues were also decided by 
Thai judges and foreign legal consultants sitting together. 
251 See, for example, Supreme Court decisions 530/2468 (1925), 532/2470 (1927), 568/2470 
(1927) and 40/2471 (1928), 631/2475 (1932). 
252 Lukana Pobromyen, ‘Rights of Individuals under Treaties in Thai Court’ (Master of Law 
thesis, Thammasat University 2003) 35–36. At present, the practice is still that the executive 
issues the King’s promulgations of treaties and publishes them in the Royal Gazette for all 
international treaties, including those that do not require parliamentary approval. The testimony 
of the Government in the Constitutional Court’s decision 11/2542 (1999) 6.  
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between Thai law and international or foreign laws.253 Another possible reason is 
that, in the time of absolute monarchy, the notion of the separation of powers was 
not known. Therefore, as soon as the King made international agreements, Thai 
courts would honour and apply them. 
Customary international law (CIL) was also relied on in early Thai judicial 
reasoning. For example, the Supreme Court in 1918 was faced with the question 
of whether Thai courts could enforce the civil judgment of a Vietnamese court. It 
held that the judgments of a foreign court were simply evidence of the debt 
between parties and could not be enforced directly. 254  The Court did not 
expressly admit that it used international law, but it was explained by 
Lengthaisong that Thai law was not available to decide such an issue, and the 
Court in this case held according to the CIL which most countries adopted in 
their practices.255 Then, in 1951, the Supreme Court adopted the CIL relating to 
‘hot pursuit’ and ‘high seas’. It held that the action of the Thai Government in 
pursuing and catching the defendant’s ship which had been used for illegal 
activities in Thai territory was not illegal even though the seizure had happened 
in the high seas, because the action was a ‘hot pursuit’.256  
It was not only treaties and CIL that were influential, but also foreign law. Before 
the modernisation of the legal system, the most influential source was perhaps 
English law, especially in the areas of private law. 257  This was due to the 
                                                 
253 See Pobromyen (n 252) 16. 
254 Supreme Court decision 585/2461(1918) found in Sathiya Lengthaisong, ‘The Enforcement of 
Foreign Courts’ Judgements According to Thai Law’ (1973) 4 Thammasat Law Journal 76, 78–
79. 
255 ibid 80. 
256 Supreme Court decision 1142/2494 (1951). There was comment at the end of the Supreme 
Court decision by Professor Yud Sang-Utai pointing out that the concept of ‘hot pursuit’ was an 
international law concept. 
257 Prokati The Reformation of Thai Law under European Influence (n 7) 112–15; Sawangsagdi 
The Development of Public Law in Thailand and other Countries (n 163) 130–31. 
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penetration of English common law during the reign of King Rama V258 and the 
agreement between Thailand and England in which the latter demanded that 
English law should be taught and applied in cases where no Thai laws were 
applicable.259 For example, the Supreme Court in 1922 recognised the English 
concept of ‘nuisance’ in its tort jurisprudence and actually used the English term 
in its decision, without translation. 260  Further, in 1938, the Court held that 
although Siam did not have specific legislation concerning trust, the term ‘trust’ 
was mentioned in a provision of the Land Certificate Act 1916. Therefore, 
English law on trust was part of Siamese law so long as the principle was not 
contrary to public order and the good morals of people in Siam.261 
Foreign law from other sources was also important. Foreign legal experts (e.g. 
George Padoux, Gustave Rolin-Jaquemyn, René Guyon and Tokichi Masao, 
among others) assisted in the process of drafting the Criminal Code and the Civil 
and Commercial Code of Thailand.262 The Criminal Code was influence by the 
criminal law of France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Egypt and Japan,263 and the 
Civil and Commercial Code was influenced by the law of France, England, 
Switzerland, Japan, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Holland and some states of the 
USA.264 Later, some legal experts even served as judges.265 Naturally, foreign 
law from different sources had played important roles in Thai Courts in filling 
                                                 
258 Discussed in section II B i. 
259 In fact, as well as English law, French law was also a part of early Thai legal education, as 
Thailand also made an agreement with France to the effect that French law should be in the 
curriculum of the law school and that a French lawyer would serve as a director of the school. 
Central Intellectual Property and International Trade Court (ed) (n 163) 61. 
260 Supreme Court decision 168/2465 (1922). 
261 Supreme Court decision 163/2481 (1938).  
262 Sawang Boonchalermvipas, The Thai Legal History (Winyuchon 2009) 209–18, 233–34. 
263 ibid 217. 
264 ibid 232, 236. 
265 Prokati The Reformation of Thai Law under European Influence (n 7) 114; Sawangsagdi The 
Development of Public Law in Thailand and Other Countries (n 163) 127–30. 
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gaps in, and in giving guidance in, interpretation of Thai law for some time after 
the modernisation of the legal system, when the country had still lacked 
developed legal principles. 
B. Modern Approaches 
i. Treaties 
The treatment of treaties changed after the country adopted a system of 
constitutional monarchy in 1932. The first Permanent Constitution provided, in 
essence, that international affairs were to be the responsibility of the executive 
branch, but that certain kinds of international agreements must be approved by 
the legislative branch. 266  This kind of provision has been included in all 
subsequent Constitutions establishing the parliamentary model of governance, 
including the current one. An example is Section 190 para 2 of the 2007 
Constitution, which provides for 5 categories of treaties that requires approval of 
the legislative branch: (1) a treaty which provides for a change in the Thai 
territories; (2) a treaty which provides for a change in the Thai external territories 
that Thailand has sovereign right or jurisdiction over under any treaty or under 
international law; (3) a treaty which requires the enactment of an Act for its 
implementation; (4) a treaty which has wide-scale effects on the economic or 
social security of the country; and (5) a treaty which results in a significant 
obligation being placed on the trade, investment or budget of the country.267  
It has been explained that treaties that require the enactment of Acts for their 
implementation are those that may change existing domestic law268 and those 
                                                 
266 Constitution 1932, s 54. 
267 Constitution 2007, s 190 para 2. See the quotation in text to n 231. 
268 Pobromyen (n 252) introduction (10); Prajit Rojanaphruk, ‘Treaties and Thai Law’ (1980) 30 
Saranrom 85, 87; Nipa Suebkinorn, ‘Application of International Customary Law in Thailand: A 
Case Study on The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963’ (Master of Law thesis, 
Chulalongkorn University 1996) 1. 
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that may change the existing rights and obligations of the people. 269  The 
requirement reflects the respect for separation of powers. It ensures that the 
executive branch may not create a new law or change an existing law, which are 
the tasks of the legislative branch, simply by concluding a treaty.  
The latter two broad categories of treaties in section 190 para 2 above are new 
additions to the current Constitution and represent direct responses to the 
controversial issues arising before the last coup d’état in 2006, when the 
Government attempted to make several international agreements which might 
require legislative implementation or have wide-ranging effects on economic or 
social security without consulting the legislative branches or the public.270 In fact, 
apart from adding very broad kinds of treaties that must be approved by the 
National Assembly, the Constitution of 2007 also adds the procedure 
requirement. In the case of those treaties specified in section 190 para 2, the 
Government not only has to ask for legislative approval in order to implement 
the treaties, but must also conduct public consultation and obtain approval from 
the National Assembly on the scope of negotiation before commencing the 
process of making agreements.271 
The power of the executive to conclude a treaty is now subject to rigid oversight. 
The most interesting consequence of this is that the judiciary has become more 
involved in the process of making treaties. The Constitution expressly confers the 
power to decide whether a specific treaty falls into one of the categories 
described by section 190 para 2 above on the Constitutional Court, provided that 
either the Prime Minister or a group containing certain numbers of the members 
                                                 
269 See Suriya (n 248) 168. 
270 Several governments had been trying to avoid this process, but strong protests and public 
criticism occurred when Shinawatra’s government attempted to conclude series of the Free Trade 
Agreements with many countries, especially developed ones such as the USA and Japan. Uwanno 
Economic Crisis and Political Crisis in Thailand (n 45) 18–19. See also the Constitutional Court 
decision 6–7/2551 (2008) 2 discussing the background of section 190 of the current Constitution.  
271 Constitution 2007, s 190 para 3. 
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of the National Assembly initiates the case.272 The Constitutional Court recently 
exercised this power in its decision concerning the controversial Joint 
Communiqué between Thailand and Cambodia discussed previously.273 
The implication from section 190 of the Constitution is that Thailand has adopted 
a dualist approach towards international law, at least regarding international law 
in the form of treaties. Treaties that affect existing Thai domestic law do not have 
any legal status in the Thai legal system unless and until they have passed the 
required process and the legislative branch has enacted necessary law to give 
effect to them.274 
In any case, it should be noted that the dualist approach towards treaties had not 
been obvious in Thai courts for some time after the adoption of the constitutional 
monarchy with a written-style constitution. At the beginning of the period of 
constitutional monarchy, Thai courts still applied treaties as if they were part of 
Thai law, although most of the time the treaties applied were those made during 
the period of absolute monarchy, which it was natural for modern Thai courts to 
continue to honour.275  
One Supreme Court decision which created doubt over the country’s attachment 
to dualism was the UN case, in 1955. After the War had ended, the Thai 
Government made an agreement with the UN allowing the English army to enter 
the country in order to disarm Japanese soldiers and manage their properties. The 
National Assembly enacted the Detaining and Managing People and Properties 
of the United Nations’ Enemies Act 1945, establishing a Commission in charge 
                                                 
272 Constitution 2007, s 190 para 6. 
273 Constitutional Court decision 6–7/2551 (2008) discussed in text to n 232. 
274 See a comment of the Council of State in the Constitutional Court decision 33/2543 (2000) 
164 confirming this view. However, see the discussion on the effect of the customary 
international law in Thailand below.  
275 See Supreme Court decisions 1315/2479 (1936); 326/2481 (1938).  
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of managing the people and properties of the Japanese army. The building in 
question fell under the jurisdiction of the Commission; however, the UN had 
seized and sold this building. It was argued that the buyer did not have rights to 
the building because the UN did not have rights to seize and sell the property. 
The Court referred extensively to the international agreement and held that the 
UN had the right to do so.276  
Many scholars conclude that the Court departed from dualism, since it 
considered the international agreement as if it were Thai law.277 Nevertheless, it 
should be noted that the witness in the case, Seni Pramoj, the former Prime 
Minister, testified that the 1945 Act was enacted in order to facilitate the process 
of disarming and selling Japan’s properties. Further, the Court might perceive the 
power of the UN to seize the properties of the loser of the War as customary 
international law, and concentrate on such grounds rather than on the legal effect 
of the treaty. This was evident from the fact that the Court took into account the 
testimony of the former Prime Minister that ‘the winner of the War may do more 
or less than what the law provided’.278 
The dualist approach towards international treaties has become more apparent 
since 1957. The courts have consistently applied international agreements only 
when implementing Acts exist, and have usually relied on such Acts rather than 
on international agreements themselves.279  
An instance of the Supreme Court explicitly confirming the dualist approach can 
be found in the decision of 1980 which will be referred to here as the 
                                                 
276 Supreme Court decision 739/2498 (1955). 
277 This case is discussed in several textbooks on international law as an example of when Thai 
courts have departed from dualism. See eg Suriya (n 248) 174; Jumpot Saisoontorn, International 
Law Volume 1 (Winyuchon 2000) 157–58. 
278 Supreme Court decision 739/2498 (1955). The effect of customary international law in the 
Thai legal system will be discussed below. 
279 Pobromyen (n 252) 17, 63–64. 
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Immigration case. The defendant was a Vietnamese born in Thailand who had 
stayed in Thailand illegally. The executive practice in Thailand at that time was 
that so long as illegal immigrants from Vietnam did not carry out certain illegal 
activities, there would be no legal proceeding against them. This was because 
those illegal immigrants, including the defendant’s parents, were refugees from 
Vietnam as a result of the Dien Bien Phu War. However, the defendant 
committed a prescribed illegal activity, so the police detained her and proceeded 
to expel her from the country according to the Immigrant Act 1950. The 
defendant argued that she was a refugee according to the international law in the 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 1951, and was born in Thailand; 
therefore, she was not an illegal immigrant and should not be deported according 
to the Act. The court held that the Convention could not exempt the application 
of Thai law; neither did the Government’s policy.280 Thus, the Court confirmed 
that an international agreement to which Thailand was not a party and for which 
it did not have an implementing legislation did not have any legal effect in the 
Thai legal system.  
In any case, it is observed that it is more likely that the courts, in adopting the 
dualist approach, simply followed the text of the Constitution rather than 
considering the sovereignty of the country and the exclusive powers of 
Parliament to enact the law. This is because they have never explained in detail 
why they have or have not used international agreement in their decisions. 
Judges in Thailand have been attached to strict literal interpretation and 
formalism. Moreover, Thai legal jurisprudence, in both international law and 
separation of powers, are not well developed.  
                                                 
280 Supreme Court decision 873/2523 (1980). 
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ii.  Customary International Law 
Although countries in the civil law system usually specify the effect of the CIL in 
the domestic legal systems in their Constitutions,281 the Constitutions of Thailand 
have never mentioned this issue. This has led to divided opinions on the legal 
status of CIL in the Thai legal system. On the one hand, there is an argument that 
CIL is not part of Thai law.282 The corollary is that Thai courts, as civil law 
courts which have no authority to make law, may not use CIL.283 The majority of 
academics, however, agree that Thai courts may apply CIL as part of Thai law on 
condition that such CIL is not inconsistent with existing Thai laws. This is 
because CIL is a principle that has been accepted by the international community 
and the country has an international obligation to comply with it.284  
Alternatively, it has been argued that CIL has a role in the Thai legal system 
through section 4 of the Civil and Commercial Code, which provides that when 
the written laws, local customs and analogous provisions are not applicable to the 
case in hand, courts may decide such cases ‘by the general legal principle’.285 
While some scholars assert that the general legal principle mentioned in this 
section means only ‘Thai’ general legal principle,286 most seem to believe that it 
has wider meaning. Not long after the modernisation of Thai law, it was 
explained that a general legal principle may derive from the teaching of law 
                                                 
281 Saisoontorn (n 277) 138; Suebkinorn (n 256) 42. 
282 See the explanation made by Preedee Panomyong, the founder of the first Constitution, in 
1929 found in Krea-ngam (n 247) 119–20. 
283 Saisoontorn (n 277) 139. 
284 Krea-ngam (n 247) 121; Pobromyen (n 252) 69; Suebkinorn (n 256) 48; Suriya (n 248) 139–
150; Jaturon Thirawat, ‘The Processes of Treaties Making and Treaties Enforcement in the 
Practice of Thailand’ (1996) 26 Thammasat Law Journal 608, 609. 
285 See Civil and Commercial Code, s 4 para 2, discussed previously in n 192. 
286 Sompong Sujaritkul, ‘Initial Thought on International Law’ (1952) 20 Botbandit (first page 
not available) 76–77, quoted in Krea-ngam (n 247) 125. 
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lecturers and foreign textbooks.287 More recently, Punyapan submits that general 
principle of law according to this provision may come from foreign countries.288 
Krea-ngam also argues that the expression refers to any general principle of law 
that has been accepted widely. This could be legal proverbs, widely accepted 
foreign laws, or CIL. In fact, Krea-ngam expresses the view that customary CIL 
is inherently more general than other kinds of law.289 
Although no explanations have been given, Thai courts have allowed CIL to 
have influence on the Thai legal system since before the adoption of the first 
written Constitution. Recent Constitutional Court decisions concerning the 
definition of the term ‘treaties’ appearing in the Constitution seem to confirm this 
as well. 
In the IMF case, the issue was whether the ‘Letters of Intent’ which Thailand 
submitted to the IMF in order to receive financial and academic assistance were 
‘treaties’ according to section 224 of the 1997 Constitution. The Constitutional 
Court held that the Constitution did not provide the definition of the ‘treaties’, 
but it could be implied from the context of the provision that the term must refer 
to ‘international agreements under the control of international law’. The Court 
went on to consult provisions from the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty 
1969 and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties between States and 
International Organizations or between International Organizations 1986. 
Thailand was not a party to these Conventions, but the Court expressed that they 
provided codifications of the long-accepted custom and practice of many 
                                                 
287 Opinion of Praya Tepvitulpahulsarutabodi, found in Krea-ngam (n 247) 124.  
288 Paijit Punyapan, ‘General Legal Principles’ (1954) 11 (4) Dulapaha 2, 6. 
289 Krea-ngam (n 247) 126–27. 
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countries.290 One of the Justices also referred to the decision of the ICJ relating 
to the meaning of treaties.291 
The 1969 Convention was used again in the Constitutional Court’s decisions in 
2000 292  and 2008. In the latter decision, the Court provided that although 
Thailand is not a party to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty 1969, 
such a Convention has an effect of CIL which is binding on a non-party.293  
In any case, it should be noted that the issues relating to treaties are international 
in nature. There have not been circumstances where modern Thai courts 
explicitly held CIL to be part of Thai law when the issues were purely domestic, 
such as the issue of constitutional rights.  
iii. Interpretive Influence of International and Foreign Law 
The dualist approach resulting from the adoption of the constitutional monarchy 
with three branches of government and the formalist interpretation have 
gradually led Thai courts to totally ignore international and foreign laws that are 
not considered as parts of the legal system.  
Beginning in 1995, however, there were some cases that courts referred to 
international agreements to which Thailand was not a party. In a decision which 
will be referred to as the Extradition case, the Court of Appeal was faced with 
the task of interpreting two related documents. One was the Extradition Treaty 
between Thailand and the USA, which appeared as an annexe in the Act on 
Extradition between Thailand and the United States 1990, an implementing 
legislation. The related provision in this Treaty provided that Thai officers may 
                                                 
290 Constitutional Court decision 11/2542 (1999) 8. 
291 ibid 93 (Justice Sratrun). 
292 Constitutional Court decision 33/2543 (2000). 
293 Constitutional Court decision 6–7/2551 (2008).  
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send Thai suspects to the USA, ‘unless prohibited to do so’. Another was the 
Extradition Act 1929, which laid down the general principle concerning 
extradition in Thailand that Thai nationals shall not be extradited.  
The issue to be determined was whether the 1929 Act prohibited the extradition 
of a Thai person according to the Treaty and the 1990 Act. In order to determine 
this issue, the Court referred to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaty 
1969, which provided general principle that a treaty shall be interpreted in good 
faith. The Court stated that although Thailand is not a party of this Convention, 
its provisions are related to the conclusion and interpretation of the treaty which 
can be taken into account.294 It then held that the Thai Government, in good faith, 
intended to be committed to extradite Thai nationals to the USA. Thus, the 
general provision in the 1929 Act did not apply.295 
This case can be seen as an instance of a Thai court using a treaty that did not 
have legal effect to interpret another treaty that had been implemented by Thai 
law. However, Saisoontorn comments that the court in this case actually 
interpreted ‘Thai law’, not a ‘treaty’, because such a treaty had already been 
transformed into Thai law by the Act. And since it was the interpretation of Thai 
law, it was not appropriate to rely on a provision in an international agreement to 
which Thailand was not even a party.296  Saisoontorn further argues that the 
Court’s approach was inconsistent with the principle specified in the Constitution 
that the Thai courts had to adjudicate ‘in accordance with the Constitution and 
the law’.297 In his opinion, such ‘law’ must be Thai law only.298 
                                                 
 
294 Court of Appeal decision 2965/2538 (1995).  
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296 Jumpot Saisoontorn, ‘The Acceptance and Enforcement of Treaties According to the States’ 
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Another case was the Supreme Court’s decision which will be referred to here as 
the Trade Mark case. A government agency withdrew the rights of the plaintiff 
relating to the trademarks he had registered. It did so according to the Trade 
Mark Act 1991 prohibiting the registration of a trade mark ‘identical with a well-
known mark, or so similar thereto that the public might be confused as to the 
owner or origin of the goods’. 299  The issue before the Court was what was 
considered to be a ‘well-known mark’ according to this Act. Since the Act itself 
did not provided a definition, the Court referred to the definition provided in the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights including 
Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPs Agreement) to which Thailand was a party. 
Further, because the TRIPs Agreement referred to the Paris Convention 1967, the 
court also looked at the definition from the point of view of this Convention, 
although Thailand was not a party to it.300 
The important point arising from this case was that the Trade Mark Act was 
enacted in 1991, before the TRIPs Agreement came into force in 1995, so the Act 
was definitely not the implementing law for such Agreement. The Paris 
Convention was even more distant from Thai law. From the traditional 
perspective, this could be considered as an instance of a court violating the 
dualist principle. However, it is submitted that this was the case that indicated the 
emergence of the practice of Thai courts of using international law as a tool in 
interpreting Thai law. Vichai Ariyanuntaka, a judge in the Intellectual Property 
Court, gave a personal interview with Lukana Pobromyen in which he stated that 
the court did so in order to make sure that its decision is in line with those of 
                                                                                                                                    
relied on in the Constitutional Court decisions two years later, although the case was not 
criticised on this point because the Court seemed to refer to the Convention as a ‘codified 
customary international law’ rather than as a ‘ treaty’. These cases are discussed above in section 
III B ii. 
299 Trade Mark Act 1991, s 8 (11). 
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other countries since international commercial law should be certain and 
harmonised.301 
Apart from treaties, foreign law has also started to be mentioned in Thai judicial 
reasoning. In a decision of the Constitutional Court in 2000 concerning the 
interpretation of a provision in the 1997 Constitution which required that certain 
kinds of treaties must be approved by the National Assembly, Justice Mongkon 
Sratrun explained that the constitutional provision in question was intended to 
provide a checks-and-balances process. In order to support this statement, he 
submitted that the Constitutions of several other countries such as Germany, 
France and Spain also had the same kind of provisions, and even the UK, which 
adopted the common law system, had a principle that treaties affecting domestic 
law must be approved by Parliament.302 
However, there was also another case in which the same Justice expressed an 
opinion against the consideration of laws and practices of other countries. In the 
IMF case discussed previously,303 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attempted to 
convince the Court that the letters of intent which Thailand sent to the IMF were 
not ‘international treaties’ according to the Constitution of 1997. It argued that 
governments of Mexico, South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia had also 
submitted the same kind of letters to the IMF without asking approval from their 
Parliaments. The Justice addressed this argument, stating first that it was unclear 
whether the named countries had the same constitutional law as Thailand. Then, 
in a rather offensive statement, he declared that  
Thailand is an independent country and has never been a colony 
of any powerful nation. Therefore, it should have its own policy 
                                                 
301 Pobromyen (n 252) 43, fn 146. The interview was given on 14 November 2001 (author’s 
translation). 
302 Constitutional Court decision 33/2543 (2000) 141 (Justice Sratrun). 
303 See text to n 290–291. 
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conventions regarding foreign affairs, and should not rely on other 
countries which do not have pride in their nations’ history.304  
This statement reflects very well strong nationalism and concern over the 
comparability of foreign legal systems with the Thai system. 
It can be said that Thai courts have started to look at international and foreign 
norms as useful interpretational resources in matters relevant to international law. 
However, the practice has not been firmly established, and international and 
foreign laws have been used only by a small number of judges, without a 
consistent principle governing such use. 
IV. International Human Rights Norms in Thailand  
International human rights norms have had a significant influence on the Thai 
Bills of Rights. It was mentioned earlier that several Thai Constitutions enacted 
rights specified in the UDHR.305 Unfortunately, the motive for doing so was not 
the Government’s commitment to the rights stipulated in the Declaration, but 
rather Thailand’s need to be considered as an active member of the United 
Nations, which could ensure the county’s independence.306 Therefore, apart from 
putting the list of rights from the UDHR into the Constitutions, successive 
Governments did not take any other measure to enforce those rights in practice. 
Legal scholarship on the field was also underdeveloped. It was reported that 
international human rights were not known in Thailand until 1985 when Thailand 
started to join more international human rights conventions.307  
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305 See section I B. 
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However, Thailand has recently been much more enthusiastic about international 
human rights. The country has committed to several main international human 
rights instruments.308 Several rights contained in these treaties have been put into 
the current Thai Bill of Rights.309 As will be discussed further below, however, 
their legal status and effect in the Thai legal system may not be as significant as 
expected.  
A. Legal Status of International Human Rights Norms in the Legal 
System and Their Effect upon It 
i. Constitutional Implications 
International human rights treaties were mentioned expressly in the Constitutions 
for the first time in the Interim Constitution promulgated in 2006 after the coup 
had successfully seized political power. In section 3 it provided: 
Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, human dignity, 
rights, liberties and equality enjoyed by the Thai people under 
conventions pursuant to a democratic form of government with 
the King as Head of State and Thailand’s existing international 
obligations shall be protected under this Constitution.310 
This provision was of particular interest since it seemed to imply that the rights 
in the international human rights treaties that Thailand had ratified had the same 
status as other rights expressly specified in the Constitution. Moreover, it 
appeared in the Constitution promulgated by a military junta which, as discussed 
previously, usually mentioned no rights and gave substantial power to the Prime 
                                                 
308 The list of treaties ratified is provided in Chapter Six, text to n 40. 
309  Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Thailand, ‘Human Rights Promotion in 
Thailand’ <http://www.mfa.go.th/web/24.php> accessed 11 February 2010. 
310 Constitution (Interim) 2006, s 3.  
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Minister. 311  It reflected the increasing importance of rights in general and 
international human rights in particular in Thailand.  
Nevertheless, the Interim Constitution of 2006 was replaced by the Constitution 
of 2007 in which international human rights continued to be mentioned explicitly, 
but within a different context which results in a different legal status of 
international human rights. Under the heading ‘The Directive Principle of 
Fundamental State Policies’, section 82 states: 
The State shall promote friendly relations with other countries and 
adopt the principle of non-discrimination and shall comply with 
human rights conventions in which Thailand is a party thereto as 
well as international obligations concluded with other countries 
and international organisations.312 (emphasis added) 
The actual impact of this section is still uncertain and has yet to be discussed in 
any academic literature or judicial decision in Thailand. It is arguable that this 
provision allows human rights conventions in which Thailand is a party to have 
‘direct effect’ in the domestic sphere without the need for implementing 
legislations. This view is reinforced by the fact that section 82 is described as 
containing the rights and liberties added to rights/liberties under the previous 
Constitutions in the ‘Summary of Essential Elements’ distributed together with 
the draft Constitution to all Thais for referendum purposes by the Constitution 
Drafting Assembly. The Assembly even explains that the Draft Constitution 
required in the Directive Principle of Fundamental State Policies that rights and 
liberties according to Thailand’s international obligation have the same effect as 
rights and liberties specified in the Constitution.313  
                                                 
311 Discussed previously in Section I.B. 
312 Constitution 2007, s 82. 
313 The Constitution Drafting Assembly (n 44) 171. 
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However, it should be noted that the document distributed by the Constitution 
Drafting Assembly discussed above was intended for the general public, who 
might or might not have knowledge in law, and was made with the motive of 
persuading them to adopt the Draft. Therefore, certain statements can be 
oversimplified.  
The Constitution provides a list of substantive rights in Chapter III: Rights and 
Liberties of the Thai People. However, section 82 is located within Chapter V: 
Directive Principle of Fundamental State Policies. Therefore, it is more likely 
that section 82 simply provides a guideline for the Government, and does not 
result in importing human rights conventions or other international agreements 
into the Thai domestic legal system. At most, the provision can be seen as 
requiring the Government to take necessary steps to enact the law in order to 
comply with international obligations, particularly those in the international 
human rights conventions, to which Thailand is a party. In fact, the 
Constitutional Court decided in 1999 regarding another directive principle 
requiring the State to promote the employment and the protection of children and 
women labour that such principle did not constitute a constitutional right.314 
Furthermore, this interpretation is more consistent with section 190 of the 
Constitution, which provides a dualist solution regarding the issue of how 
international treaties have effects in the Thai legal system.315  It is also more 
consistent with the provisions concerning the duty of the National Human Rights 
Commission (NHRC). Section 257(1) of the Constitution 2007 requires the 
NHRC to ‘examine and report the commission or omission of acts which … do 
not comply with obligations under international treaties to which Thailand is a 
party.316 However, the Constitution does not specify that the NHRC may submit 
                                                 
 
314 Constitutional Court decision 37/2542 (1999). 
315 This issue is discussed previously in section III B i. 
316 Constitution 2007, s 257(1). In fact, these duties have existed since 1999 when the National 
Human Rights Commission Act 1999 was enacted in order to establish the NHRC according to 
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claims regarding the commission or omission of acts which are inconsistent with 
international treaties to the courts. This is in contrast to the claims regarding the 
law or administrative acts that violate human rights and beg the question of 
constitutionality or legality. In these cases, sections 257(2) and (3) confer power 
to the NHRC to file the cases for the Constitutional Court or the Administrative 
Courts as appropriate.317 The fact that the Commission may not bring the claims 
relating to the violations of international human rights obligations to the courts 
implies that such obligations are not directly enforceable in the Thai legal system.  
Therefore, it is concluded that, although inspired heavily by international human 
rights norms, the Constitution does not give special legal status to those 
international human rights norms. Apart from norms that have already become 
constitutional rights, the determination of whether an international human rights 
norm has any legal effect in Thailand has to depend on the perceived relationship 
between international law and domestic law in general. 
ii. Relationship between International and Foreign Law and 
Domestic Law: Its Implications for the Legal Status and Effect of 
International Human rights Norms  
The dualist approaches towards treaties applied to international human rights 
treaties as well as to other treaties. Thus, if an international human rights 
convention provides for a right which has never been recognised in the Thai legal 
system either explicitly or implicitly, such a right will not have any direct legal 
effect in Thailand. In other words, although Thailand has acceded to several 
international human rights treaties, such treaties will not have any further direct 
legal effect on the Thai legal system apart from what is already stated in the 
Constitution or statutes. International human rights norms that are customary 
                                                                                                                                    
the Constitution 1997. Although the Constitution 1997 was terminated, the Act is still in force 
pending the amendment becoming more consistent with the Constitution 2007. 
317 See Constitution 2007, s 257 (2)(3). 
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international laws may form part of Thai law; however, this is true only to the 
extent that they are not in conflict with existing Thai law. Moreover, it is difficult, 
in practice, to argue that a human rights norm is CIL and that such CIL has the 
same effect as constitutional rights. Lastly, the dualism also prevents 
international human rights norms in the form of foreign law from being part of 
the legal system.  
B. Interpretive Influence of International Human Rights Norms  
It will be seen in the next two Chapters that courts in the UK and USA have 
established the principles for using international human rights norms in their 
judicial reasoning regardless of the legal status of such norms in the legal 
systems. Nevertheless, the same has yet to be developed in Thailand. 
In assessing Thailand’s performance relating to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2005, the Human Rights Committee 
observed that the Covenant’s provisions ‘are not in practice invoked in courts of 
law unless they have been specifically incorporated by legislation’.318 A Thai 
delegate argued that ‘in interpreting the provisions of domestic legislation, Thai 
courts took into account the intent and purport of the relevant articles of the 
Covenant’.319 She said so in the context of the death penalty for young offenders, 
where such a penalty was automatically commuted to 50 years’ imprisonment 
and the average sentence actually imposed on young offenders was between 12 
and 17 years’ imprisonment.320 However, it should be noted that exemption from 
                                                 
318 Human Rights Committee (Eighty-Fourth Session) ‘Consideration of Reports Submitted by 
States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee: Thailand’ (8 July 2005) UN Doc CCPR/CO/84/THA, para 8. 
319 Human Rights Committee (Eighty-Fourth Session) ‘Summary Record of the 2294th Meeting, 
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant and of 
Country Situations: Initial Report of Thailand (continued)’ (25 July 2005) UN Doc 
CCPR/C/SR.2294, para 7. 
320 ibid para 8. 
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the death penalty for a person younger than 18 was provided by the Thai 
Criminal Code, 321  and there were no cases in which the courts explicitly 
mentioned the Covenant when using their discretion to reduce the penalty.  
In any case, recent court decisions have referred to international human rights 
norms explicitly, and these deserve detailed discussion here.322 The first case was 
the Constitutional Court’s Case of the Disabled Judicial Applicants. It was 
discussed previously that the Court upheld the provision of law barring an 
applicant with an inappropriate physical condition from taking the examination 
to be an assistant judge.323 Although the collective opinion in this decision did 
not mention international human rights, two of the Justices in the case addressed 
them in their personal opinions.  
Justice Preecha Chalermvanich discussed the background of, and rights protected 
in, the UDHR and the ICCPR in detail, spending seven pages on his opinion.324 
He also acknowledged that, while the UDHR did not have binding effect, the 
ICCPR did and the Constitution of 1997 had provisions implementing it. 325  
Nevertheless, the rest of his opinion regarding the relationship between 
international human rights and constitutional rights was confusing.  
                                                 
321 Thai Criminal Code 1956 as amended by the Amendment of the Thai Criminal Code Act (no 
16) 2003, s 18 para 2– 3. It is noted that the amendment on the Thai Criminal Code was made so 
that Thai law on this issue is consistent with the ICCPR and CRC, but Thai courts did not 
mention these two Conventions in their judgments. 
322 It is noted that, apart from the cases discussed in detail below, there were the Constitutional 
Court decision 34/2554 (2011), where the NHRC referred to the ICESCR, ICCPR and ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work in its complaint but the Court did not 
consider it in its central decision, and the Constitutional Court decision 12/2555 (2012), where 
the Court referred to the UDHR and ICCPR as sources of Thai constitutional principle on the 
presumption of innocence, although these international documents did not play an important role 
in the decision. 
323 See text to n 215–218. 
324 Constitutional Court decision 16/2545 (2002) 210–17 (Justice Chalermvanich). 
325 ibid 212. 
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Firstly, he considered section 26 of the ICCPR. He stated that this provision did 
not cover the rights of the disabled or people with a body ‘inappropriate’ for 
work. Thus, he stated generally that ‘no one can claim that the law in question is 
inconsistent with the UDHR and the ICCPR’.326  
Then, in an inconsistent manner, the Justice changed the focus of his opinion, 
moving on to compare the UDHR and the ICCPR with the 1997 Constitution 
which provided for the equal protection. He found that while the former two did 
not allow exemption, the Constitution did.327 This was because section 30 para 4 
of the Constitution stated: 
Measures determined by the State in order to eliminate an obstacle 
to or to promote persons’ ability to exercise rights and liberties on 
the same basis as other persons shall not be deemed as unjust 
discrimination …328 
The Justice was of the opinion that the provision of law which required the 
physical and mental examination of applicants for the position of assistant judge 
was actually a measure that could ‘help’ people with disability, because if they 
passed the examinations they could be qualified to apply. Thus, it fell into 
section 30 para 4, which provided an exemption to the equal protection 
principle.329 He submitted that this exemption was inconsistent with the UDHR 
and the ICCPR and with his own opinion of what should be; nevertheless, the 
issue must be decided according to Thai law. Therefore, it was held that the law 
in question was not unconstitutional.330  
                                                 
326 ibid 213–15. 
327 ibid 215–17. 
328 Constitution 1997, s 30 para 4. 
329 Constitutional Court decision 16/2545 (2002) 220. 
330 ibid 217, 220. 
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Several comments can be made about this judgment. It can be seen that the 
Justice was at an ambivalent point. He was enthusiastic to address at length the 
international human rights standards and compare them to the related law of 
Thailand. However, perhaps for dualist reason, he was not willing to allow the 
interpretive influence from such international standards when he felt that Thai 
law was not consistent with them. This was so even though the country had 
international obligations.  
It can also be seen that the Justice tended to interpret not only the international 
documents but also the Constitution using a strict literal approach, without 
considering the intention behind the provisions or the protection of rights. It 
should be observed that the grounds of discrimination listed in the ICCPR were 
not exclusive. In fact, it was obvious from the language of the provision itself, 
which requires protection against discrimination ‘on any ground such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, 
property, birth or other status’.331 However, the Justice interpreted this provision 
to not include protection against discrimination on the ground of disability, 
simply because the provision does not explicitly mention it.  
Similarly, section 30 para 4 of the Constitution was interpreted literally without 
reference to the intention of the provision or consideration of the consequence of 
the interpretation. The provision intended to allow an affirmative action, or in 
other words, allow the State to help people who were likely not to be able to 
exercise rights at the same level as others, which was not inconsistent with 
international principles. However, the Justice interpreted this as allowing unfair 
discrimination towards the disabled. Not only the constitutional intention, but 
also international human rights norms were neglected. 
                                                 
331 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into 
force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 26. 
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The other Justice who mentioned international human rights in the decision was 
Justice Amorn Raksasut. He voted for the minority opinion, holding that the law 
barring a person with an inappropriate body to apply for the position of assistant 
judge was unconstitutional. 332  The bases for his decision were constitutional 
provisions, but he also considered three international human rights instruments: 
the ICCPR, the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESC), and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Person (DRDP). The 
first two instruments were treaties ratified by Thailand, and the last was a 
resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations suggesting its 
members should comply. The Justice listed these international documents under 
the heading ‘Related Laws’. He then provided the text of the related provisions 
of such documents and emphasised the rights of the disabled to have equal 
protection and to work.333 He also stated:  
Thailand has signed several international instruments with the 
approval of the National Assembly, and thus is bound by them. 
Therefore, it should comply with its obligations; all state’s organs 
especially the Courts of Justice should strictly act according to the 
obligation.334 (emphasis added) 
This statement reflects a dualist approach towards international treaties. While 
the Justice accepted that international treaties bound the country, he did not hold 
that the state’s organs had to comply with such obligations. Also, in the final part 
of the opinion when the decision was made, the justice based his opinion on the 
constitutional provisions and did not use international instruments as authority. 
However, the statement also shows that the international instruments may at least 
serve as resources from which courts may draw inspiration or as additional 
arguments supporting their interpretation of the Constitution.  
                                                 
332 Constitutional Court decision 16/2545 (2002) 260–68. 
333 ibid 264–65. 
334 ibid 267 (author’s translation).  
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Apart from international instruments, the same Justice also referred to foreign 
laws. Relying on section 7 of the 1997 Constitution, which directed that when 
there was no provision applicable the issue had to be decided in accordance with 
the constitutional conventions of the democratic regime of government with the 
King as Head of State,335 he referred to a provision from Germany’s Constitution 
which explicitly recognised the right of the disabled to equal protection as an 
example.336 It is quite obvious here that the justice welcomed the consideration 
of foreign laws in interpreting the Constitution and also used them to support his 
argument.337 
Last but not least, regarding the case of the Disabled Judicial Applicants, it is 
observed that the two justices mentioned here had very different opinions 
towards the interpretation of both international instruments and the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, neither of them discussed the other’s opinion at all. They tended to 
have totally separated decisions. Neither were the differences mentioned in the 
main opinion. This is one of the weakest points in the style of judicial reasoning 
in Thailand which may result from Thai social culture which encourages people 
to avoid confrontation.338 
Another case in which international human rights norms were involved was the 
Central Intellectual Properties and International Trades Court’s decision in 2002. 
The case here was that an American company had applied for a patent on DDI, 
which was the medicine for those living with HIV. In its original application, 
which was published according to the patent law of Thailand, the company 
sought to have a patent covering medicines containing between 5 and 100 mg of 
DDI. However, the company later amended its application, deleting the condition 
                                                 
335 Constitution 1997, s 7. 
336 Constitutional Court decision 16/2545 (2002) pp 266–67. 
337 The issue of referring to foreign laws has not been debated in Thailand, but has been subjected 
to strong criticism in the USA, as will be seen in Chapter Four, IV B ii. 
338 This issue will be discussed further in Chapter Six. 
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relating to the quantities of DDI. The Department of Intellectual Property (DIP) 
approved this amendment and issued the patent accordingly. The claimants in 
this case, HIV patients and non-governmental organisations established for the 
purpose of assisting those living with HIV, sued both the company and the DIP. 
They claimed that the amendment of the patent condition to cover dosages 
beyond those originally applied for was illegal because the dosages constituted 
‘substantial changes’ to the rights according to the patent.  
One of the issues that had to be decided was whether the claimants had the 
standing to sue, as the defendants argued that the claimants were not the 
producers of the medicine and thus were not affected by the exclusive rights to 
produce the medicine containing DDI conferred on the company by the patent in 
question. The Court disagreed. Referring to the Doha Declaration on the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement) and Public Health, which expressed the view that ‘the TRIPS 
Agreement does not and should not prevent Members from taking measures to 
protect public health’, the Court held that the HIV patients had standing because 
the right to health was more important than property rights and medicine-related 
patents were different from other kinds of patents, on the point that not only the 
producers of the medicine but also those who needed to be treated by such 
medicine were affected by the patent. The NGO claimants also had standing, 
because they had a duty to facilitate HIV patients’ access to the medicine. The 
Court then went on to hold that the amendment of the condition of the patent was 
the substantial amendment, and therefore illegal.339  
It can be seen that the Court in this case not only interpreted the patent law in the 
light of fundamental rights, but also made use of international human rights 
norms in order to support its conclusion. 
                                                 
339 Central Intellectual Property and International Trades Court decision 93/2545 (2002). 
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The last case in which international human rights norms had interpretive 
influence was the Central Administrative Court’s decision in the Election Case, 
where the Central Administrative Court invalidated the General Election in 2006. 
The main issue of the case was the rearrangement of the voting booths by the 
Election Commission (EC). Traditionally, polling booths were arranged to the 
effect that the voters faced towards the public and EC staff, but 50 cm tall boards 
were set at the front and sides of each booth to prevent the public from seeing 
how voters were casting their votes. In 2006, the EC changed the arrangement to 
the opposite, letting voters turn back to face EC staff and the public. The 
Commission claimed that this new arrangement could prevent certain kinds of 
fraud, including the use of cameras to take pictures of the ballots in order to 
claim money from candidates. However, the Court agreed with the claimant, a 
political party, that such an arrangement allowed EC staffs and the public to see 
how voters cast their votes. The Court ruled that a proper election must reflect 
the true will of the people expressed without undue influences. It also expressed 
the view that one of the widely accepted conditions for a proper election was that 
the voters must be able to vote secretly. Such a condition was prescribed in 
section 21 (3) of the UN’s Declaration of Human Rights, which Thailand has 
accepted, and in section 104 of the Constitution of Thailand. Therefore, the order 
of the EC was unconstitutional, and as a result the whole election was also 
unconstitutional.340  
Looking carefully at the opinion, it can be seen that the Court did not need to 
mention the UDHR in order to reach its conclusion. The constitutional provision 
(which may be influenced by the UDHR itself) was very clear, in that the vote 
must be in secret. However, it did so either because it acknowledged the 
importance of the UDHR or because it attempted to add more weight to the 
holding – showing that the concept in the Constitution which it used was 
universally accepted. In any case, it should also be noted that the court was 
                                                 
340 Central Administrative Court decision 607–608/2549 (2006) 25. 
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careful to add that the Declaration had already been accepted by Thailand. This 
reflects the fact that it felt the need to justify the use of international standards in 
its judicial reasoning. 
V. Conclusion 
It can be seen that Thai courts have recently shown their willingness to refer to 
international human rights norms, especially those from treaties or international 
declarations that the country has accepted. Most of the time, international human 
rights norms serve either as guidance or as supports for the courts’ reasoning – 
‘substantive use’, in Larsen’s typology. 341  Nevertheless, it is obvious that 
international human rights norms have yet to have a significant interpretive 
influence in Thai courts. The cases discussed in the last section are very much a 
minority of cases decided, and they reflected the uncertainty relating to the 
legitimacy and methodology of the use of international human rights norms. 
These considerations all lead to the important questions to which this research 
aims to provide answers drawing on the lessons to be learnt from the UK and 
USA: whether Thai courts should allow the interpretive influence of international 
human rights norms in their judicial reasoning; whether the Thai legal system, as 
discussed above, is appropriate for the use of international human rights norms; 
and, if the answers to these questions are positive, what the best methodologies 
would be for the use of international human rights norms in Thai courts. 
 
341 See Chapter One, text to n 18.  
 Chapter Three: The United Kingdom 
The main purposes of this Chapter are to discover whether courts in the UK have 
made use of international human rights norms in their judicial reasoning and if so 
to what extent, and also to understand the forms such usage takes, and the 
reasons underlying it. In order to achieve the above objectives, the Chapter 
follows, as much as possible, the structure presented in Chapter Two. An 
overview of the political and constitutional system is presented first, to give a 
general idea of the UK constitutionalism. Then, the research focuses on the role 
of the judiciary in relating to the protection of rights, which depends on the 
power of judicial review of executive act and interpretation of legislation. The 
Chapter moves next to address the legal status and interpretive influence of 
general international and foreign law in the UK, before focusing on the same 
issues in relation to international human rights norms. In the latter case, the 
research gives special attention to the ECHR, which is the main source of 
international human rights norms in the UK and which receives different 
treatments in the UK courts following the enforcement of the HRA 1998. 
Additionally, the research discusses the use of non-ECHR international human 
rights norms in the UK courts.  
I. Overview of the Political and Constitutional System 
The UK does not have a single written document called ‘the Constitution’. 
Rather, the Constitution which governs the country comes from a variety of 
sources, including statutes, the common law, European Union law, the European 
Convention on Human Rights, legal treatises, the law and customs of Parliament, 
and the Royal Prerogative.1 
                                                 
1 Peter Leyland, The Constitution of the United Kingdom: A Contextual Analysis (Hart 2007) 20–
24; Adam Tomkins, Public law (OUP 2003) 7–10. 
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The UK adopts a system of parliamentary democracy with a constitutional 
monarch.2 Parliament, the legislative branch in the UK, consists of the House of 
Commons, whose members are directly elected, and the House of Lords, whose 
members are primarily appointed.3 The Prime Minister, the head of the executive, 
is, according to the UK constitutional convention, the leader of the political party 
that gains a majority of seats in the House of Commons. The Prime Minister has 
power to appoint all other Ministers, but the Ministers must be members of one 
of the Houses of Parliament.4 The executive branch has to govern through and is 
responsible to Parliament, which has the power to approve or reject the 
Government’s budgets and bills.5  
While the executive and the legislative branches are clearly fused, the judiciary 
has long been recognised for its independence in adjudicating cases.6 Since the 
enforcement of the Act of Settlement in 1701, judges have enjoyed security of 
tenure as they are guaranteed to be in office given good behaviour and have their 
salaries fixed. 7  Nevertheless, it was not until recently that the functions and 
personnel of the judiciary were clearly separated from those of the other two 
branches. Before the Constitutional Reform Act (CRA) 2005, the Head of the 
Judiciary was the Lord Chancellor, who was also a member of the Cabinet and 
speaker of the House of Lords. The highest court in the UK was the Appellate 
Committee of the House of Lords in Parliament. Law Lords who served as 
 
                                                 
2 The monarch has prerogative powers to appoint the Prime Minister, dismiss the government and 
grant assent to legislation. However, such powers are limited by constitutional conventions to the 
extent that the monarch’s roles are principally ceremonial. Other prerogatives belonging to the 
monarch such as the power to make treaties and to defend the realm are exercised by her 
Ministers or the executive rather than by her herself. Tomkins (n 1) 62–72. 
3 ibid 99. 
4 ibid 64. 
5 ibid 90–92. 
6  Roger Masterman, The Separation of Powers in the Contemporary Constitution: Judicial 
Competence and Independence in the United Kingdom (CUP 2010) 27. 
7 Act of Settlement 1701; Supreme Court Act 1981, s 11(3); Appellate Jurisdiction Act 1876, s 6; 
Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s 33. 
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judges in the Committee might also take part in the process of legislation as 
members of the House.8 It was following the CRA 2005 that the Lord Chief 
Justice replaced the Lord Chancellor as Head of the judiciary and the Supreme 
Court of the UK was established separately from the executive and the legislative 
branches. The new Supreme Court started its work in October 2009. In addition 
to the former Law Lords who have become the Justices of the Supreme Court,9 it 
contains new Justices who are appointed by the monarch upon recommendation 
by the Prime Minister. Importantly, the Prime Minister is not allowed to 
recommend a person other than the one notified to him by the Lord Chancellor 
following the report from the Selection Commission.10  
Traditionally, the most prominent characteristic of the UK Constitution was the 
unqualified nature of the Parliamentary sovereignty doctrine. This first gained 
recognition as a result of the 1688 Glorious Revolution and the Bill of Rights, 
which subordinated the powers of the Crown, including not only executive 
powers but also common law powers, to Parliament. 11  The doctrine was 
explained by Dicey as a legal fact having positive and negative aspects.12 The 
positive aspect meant that ‘Parliament has the right to make or unmake any law 
whatsoever’, 13  and the negative aspect meant that ‘no person or body is 
recognised by the law of England as having a right to override or set aside the 
 
                                                 
8  However, the practice before the Constitutional Reform Act was that Law Lords were 
attempting to avoid the legislative function. Lord Hope, ‘Voices from the Past – the Law Lords’ 
Contribution to the Legislative Process’ (2007) 123 LQR 547.  
9 Constitutional Reform Act 2005, s 24. 
10 ibid, s 26(2)(3). 
11 For discussions about sources of the parliamentary sovereignty doctrine see Helen Fenwick and 
Gavin Phillipson, Text, Cases & Materials on Public Law & Human Rights (2nd edn, Cavendish 
2003) 132–33; Ian Loveland, Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Human Rights: A 
Critical Introduction (OUP 2006) 24–31; Tomkins (n 1) 103–04.  
12 A V Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (10th edn, Macmillan 1959) 
68–70. 
13  ibid 39–41. See also Mortensen v Peters (1906) 14 SLT 227 endorsing the view that 
Parliament’s power was not limited even by geographic factors. 
 
Chapter Three   105 
 
legislation of Parliament’. 14  On this basis, it followed that courts had no 
authority to doubt the validity of Acts of Parliament and could never hold such 
Acts unconstitutional.15  
Since Parliamentary sovereignty could not be qualified, no rights were 
entrenched. 16  Judicial protection of substantive rights against Parliament’s 
encroachment was seen as anti-democratic, since it allowed an unelected group 
of judges to place limitations on what people (through Parliament) thought 
should have been the laws of society.17 It was also argued that reasonable people 
could have different opinions on rights, 18 and that it was difficult to identify 
which rights were basic and which had priority over others.19 Therefore, rights 
were best settled by political process.20 Consequently, liberties of people were 
regarded as ‘residual’; individuals were free to act as they please, as long as their 
conduct was not prohibited by statute.21  
However, this did not mean that Parliament’s legislative power operated without 
any restraint. If Parliament enacted a law that pervasively contradicted the shared 
norms of the society, it had to deal with strong political pressure and democratic 
control.22 Moreover, as will be seen below, the UK courts adopted the principle 
 
                                                 
14 Dicey (n 12) 39–41. The absolutism of Parliamentary sovereignty was supported by the formal 
conception of the rule of law which does not concern the substance of the law. ibid 202–03. 
15 Madzimbamuto v Lardner [1969] 1 AC 645 (PC) 723. 
16 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, ‘Human Rights and the British Constitution’ in Jeffrey Jowell and 
Dawn Oliver (eds), The Changing Constitution (7th edn, OUP 2011) 71–73. 
17  Mark Elliott, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty and the New Constitutional Order: Legislative 
Freedom, Political Reality and Convention’ (2002) 22 Legal Stud 340, 343. 
18 Jeremy Waldron, ‘A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights’ (1993) 13 OJLS 18, 32. 
19 James Allan, ‘Bill of Rights and Judicial Power – A Liberal’s Quandary’ (1996) 16 OJLS 337, 
345. 
20 J A G Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 MLR 1, 17. 
21 Fenwick and Phillipson (n 11) 840. 
22 Elliott (n 17) 341–42; Anthony Lester, ‘Fundamental Rights in the United Kingdom: the Law 
and the British Constitution’ (1976) 125 U Pa L Rev 337, 339. 
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of legality which, although it could not trump the sovereignty of Parliament, 
might limit the effect of a statute in cases where Parliament did not explicitly 
express its intention to limit fundamental rights.23  
Notwithstanding the above discussion, recent decades have seen great changes in 
the UK constitutional system. The supremacy of the EU law, 24 the devolution 
statutes granting legislative and administrative powers to Northern Ireland, 
Wales and Scotland,25 and the Human Rights Act 199826 have undermined the 
absolutism of Parliament sovereignty. At the same time, the separation of powers, 
which has not been an underlying principle of the UK Constitution27and which 
has been employed by courts as a tool for emphasising the sovereignty of 
Parliament and limiting the courts’ powers in controversial cases rather than 
improving checks and balances across government as a whole,28 plays important 
 
                                                 
23 See section II B ii. 
24 This is especially after Factortame (No. 2), where the House of Lords disapplied a statute in 
favour of the European Community – now European Union – law. R v Secretary of State for 
Transport ex p Factortame (No 2) [1991] 1 AC 603 (HL). This issue will be discussed further in 
Section III B. 
25 See Scotland Act 1998; Government of Wales Act 1998; Northern Ireland Act 1998. Although 
Westminster still reserves the concurrent rights to legislate in devolved issues, a constitutional 
convention has emerged that it would not do so without consent of the local governments. Mark 
Elliot, ‘United Kingdom: Parliamentary Sovereignty under Pressure’ (2004) 2 Int’l J Const L 545, 
554. See also Stephen Tierney, Constitutional Law and National Pluralism (OUP 2004). 
26 The impact of the HRA on the UK constitutionalism is discussed further below. 
27 This is because the personnel and functions of the executive and legislative branches overlap 
with each other extensively and the judiciary has only recently been separated from the other two 
Tomkins (n 1) 37. Moreover, Parliament is controlled by the executive to the extent that the 
executive may make Parliament pass whatever laws it wishes. Lord Hailsham, The Dilemma of 
Democracy (Collins 1978) 125–32. See also G Ganz, ‘Delegated Legislation: A Necessary Evil 
or a Constitutional Outrage?’ in Peter Leyland and T Woods (eds), Administrative Law Facing 
the Future: Old Constraints and New Horizons (Blackstone 1997).  
28 This can be seen in Duport Steels Ltd v Sirs [1980] 1 All ER 529 (HL) 541; R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, ex p Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513 (HL) 567 (Lord 
Mustill). For commentaries, see Masterman (n 6) 31; Adam Tomkins, ‘Of Constitutional 
Spectres’ [1999] PL 525, 531. 
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roles in the development of the Constitution.29 This can be seen most obviously 
in Jackson.30 Apart from considering the validity of the Act, which was unusual 
for the UK courts,31 several Justices explicitly expressed a willingness to revisit 
the Parliamentary sovereignty doctrine. The doctrine was still regarded as the 
bedrock of the British constitution,32 however, Lord Steyn stated: 
We do not in the United Kingdom have an uncontrolled 
constitution … The classic account given by Dicey of the doctrine 
of the supremacy of Parliament, pure and absolute as it was, can 
now be seen to be out of place in the modern United Kingdom … 
It is a construct of the common law. The judge created this 
principle. If that is so, it is not unthinkable that circumstance 
could arise where the courts may have to qualify a principle 
established on a different hypothesis of constitutionalism. 33  
(emphasis added) 
Consistently, Lord Hope remarked, obiter, that ‘Parliamentary sovereignty is no 
longer, if it ever was, absolute … Step by step, gradually but surely, the English 
principle of the absolute legislative sovereignty of Parliament which Dicey 
derived from Coke and Blackstone is being qualified.’34  
In the issue of rights in particular, while Parliament is still able to pass whatever 
laws it likes, the HRA requires that it faces stronger political challenge as the 
Minister has to provide a statement on whether the Bill is compatible with 
 
                                                 
29 Masterman (n 6) 19, 22. 
30 R (Jackson) v A-G [2005] UKHL 56, [2006] 1 AC 262. 
31 However, one should make a distinction, as Lord Steyn did, between judicial review over the 
substance of Acts of Parliament, which is barred under the Parliamentary sovereignty doctrine, 
and judicial review over ‘what the constituent elements of Parliament must do to legislate’, which 
is not in the scope of Parliamentary sovereignty. ibid [73]. 
32 ibid [27] (Lord Bingham). 
33 ibid [102]. 
34 ibid [104]. See also Baroness Hale’s observation that other qualifications on Parliamentary 
sovereignty ‘may emerge in due course’. ibid [159]. 
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conventional rights.35 Judges have also had a more important role in upholding 
substantive rights in the UK constitutional system since the Act has made 
Convention rights the standards which Parliament has to observe and courts have 
to use in interpreting statutes.36 This will be discussed further below. 
II. The Judiciary and the Protection of Rights 
The judiciary in the UK plays its part in protecting rights mainly through the 
processes of judicial review of the executive acts and interpretation of law. 
A. Power of Judicial Review 
The judiciary in the UK may intervene in the executive’s business by quashing 
executive orders, demanding the executive to act or stop acting, declaring what 
the law is or what the rights of parties are, and providing damages for human 
rights violations. 37  The traditional grounds of judicial review in the UK are 
illegality, procedural impropriety, and irrationality.38 After the enforcement of 
the HRA 1998, the Convention rights that have been given effect by the Act have 
become new heads of judicial review.39 The power of judicial review now covers 
not only the exercise of statutory powers but also the exercise of prerogative.40 It 
also covers questions of acute political controversy such as the ban on the 
broadcast of speeches by terrorist supporters 41  and the disposal of nuclear 
 
                                                 
35 Human Rights Act 1998, s 19. 
36 See Jeffery Jowell, The Rule of Law and Its Underlying Values (6th edn, OUP 2007) 16. 
37 Fenwick and Phillipson (n 11) 705; Tomkins, Public law (n 1)170–72. 
38 CCSU v Minister for Civil Service (the GCHQ case) [1985] AC 374, 410 (Lord Diplock). 
39 HRA 1998, s 6. 
40 The court has confirmed that the justiciability depended on the ‘nature’ rather than the ‘source’ 
of powers. CCSU (n 38). See now R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
(No 2), ex p Bancoult [2008] UKHL 61. 
41 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Brind [1991]1 AC 696 (HL).  
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waste.42 This is although courts have to decide these issues on legal and not 
political grounds.43 
The traditional model of justification for judicial review of executive acts is 
based on the concept of ultra vires – literally meaning ‘beyond granted power’. 
Originating from respect for Parliamentary sovereignty, the concept holds that 
the executive cannot act beyond what Parliament intends it to do, and the courts 
have the power to review the executive’s actions because this enforces 
Parliament’s intention.44 However, the ultra vires doctrine has been attacked for 
being ‘indeterminate, unrealistic, beset by internal tensions and unable to explain 
the application of public law principles to those bodies which did not derive their 
power from statutes’. 45 An alternative model of justification is based on the 
common law power of the courts. Laws and Craig forcefully argue that 
fundamental principles for judicial review, such as the duty to hear the other side, 
the purposive implementation of statutes, legitimate expectations, and the 
irrationality test, are more readily described as being court-made principles than 
as being underpinned by Parliamentary intent.46  
 
                                                
For the purpose of this research, it is pointed out that the divided opinions over 
the models of justification of judicial review reflect the disagreement regarding 
the proper role of the judiciary which, in turn, may affect the sources to which 
courts may refer in interpreting legislation. The common law model of 
justification, which emphasises the wider power of the courts to uphold the rule 
of law, not only in the formal but also in the substantive sense, seems to allow 
 
42 R v Inspectorate of Pollution, ex p Greenpeace Ltd (No 1) [1994] 1 WLR 570 (CA). 
43 See eg Lord Reid, ‘The Judge as Law Maker’ (1972–1973) 12 Society of Public Teachers of 
Law 22, 23 submitting that judges ‘must not take sides on political issues’. 
44 Christopher Forsyth and Mark Elliott, ‘The Legitimacy of Judicial Review’ [2003] PL 286, 
119–20. 
45 Paul Craig, ‘Competing Models of Judicial Review’ [1999] PL 428, 429. See also Dawn Oliver, 
‘Is the Ultra Vires Rule Basis of Judicial Review?’ [1987] PL 543. 
46 John Laws, ‘Law and Democracy’ [1995] PL 72, 77–79; Craig, ‘Competing Models of Judicial 
Review’ (n 45) 435. 
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wider extrinsic sources of interpretation, whereas the ultra vires model would 
limit the sources of interpretation to those that can reflect Parliament’s 
intention. 47  Since Parliamentary sovereignty has become less absolute than 
before, it is argued that the movement is towards the common law model. In fact, 
those who advocate the ultra vires model seem to acknowledge this and so offer a 
modified concept. While acceding that in most circumstances the ‘specific’ 
intention of Parliament for limitation of executive actions cannot be found, they 
provide that ‘Parliament has a general intent in granting discretionary powers, 
that they should be exercised in accordance with the rule of law; and that the 
judges in ensuring that powers are so exercised are acting in accordance with that 
general intent’.48  
The next and perhaps the most important issue that should be discussed under 
this heading is the standard of review. Traditionally, in reviewing the rationality 
of the executive acts, the courts adopted the Wednesbury standard which holds 
that irrationality occurs when an administrative action is ‘so unreasonable that no 
reasonable authority could ever have come to it’.49 The Wednesbury standard 
comes from the notion that judicial review does not confer on courts the power to 
review the ‘merits’ of the decisions of public authorities. Courts are not 
concerned whether the right decisions have been made; instead, they are 
concerned whether in making such decisions public authorities have actually 
acted unlawfully. 50  It has been argued that judges should defer to the 
Government when the issue involves a decision based on policy. It is reasoned, 
on the basis of separation of powers, that by enacting a statute Parliament 
 
                                                 
47 Issues relating to the interpretative approaches are discussed further in section II B i. 
48  Forsyth and Elliott (n 44) 287. See also Mark Elliott, ‘The Demise of Parliamentary 
Sovereignty? The Implications for Justifying Judicial Review’ (1999) 115 LQR 119; Christopher 
Forsyth, ‘Of Fig Leaves and Fairy Tales: the Ultra Vires Doctrine, the Sovereignty of Parliament 
and Judicial Review’ (1996) 55 CLJ 122. 
49 Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corp [1948] 1 KB 223 (CA) 230. 
50 A Horne and G Berman, ‘Judicial Review: A Short Guide to Claims in the Administrative 
Court’ (HC Library Research Papers 06/44, 2006) <http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/ 
research/rp2006/rp06-044.pdf> accessed 19 April 2008 
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entrusts specific powers to a public authority and not to courts. Courts lack the 
expertise to make decisions that Parliament intends public authorities to make. 
Moreover, public authorities are elected according to the democratic process and 
so are accountable to the people, while judges are not. 51 Nevertheless, the 
standard of irrationality has been widely criticised as giving too wide a freedom 
of discretion to the executive, especially in the areas that affect fundamental 
rights.52 Arguably, it was not right to give the final power to limit individual 
rights to the state or majority when such individual rights are rights against the 
state or majority itself.53  
Before the HRA 1998, the courts, being influenced by the then unincorporated 
ECHR, had shown a certain degree of willingness to subject executive actions to 
a more ‘anxious’ scrutiny depending on the importance of the rights in question 
in a series of cases.54 Now that the HRA has been in force and it has become 
‘unlawful for a public authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a 
Convention right’, 55  the proportionality standard, which requires a balance 
between the interest of the government and the protection of an individual’s 
rights, seems to be used in place of the Wednesbury standard in cases relating to 
a Convention right. 56  This issue will be discussed further in the section 
concerning the interpretive effect of the ECHR after the HRA below.57 
 
                                                 
51 Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘Judges and Decision Makers: The Theory and Practice of Wednesbury 
Review’ [1996] PL 59, 60–61; Richard Clayton, ‘Judicial Deference and “Democratic Dialogue”: 
The Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention under the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2004] PL 33, 40–41. 
52 Tomkins, Public law (n 1) 177. 
53 Martin Norris, ‘Ex Parte Smith: Irrationality and Human Rights’ [1996] PL 590, 598–99. 
54 Bugdaycay v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1987] AC 514 (HL); R v Secretary 
of State for the Home Department ex p Brind [1991]1 AC 696 (HL); R v Ministry of Defence, ex 
p Smith [1996] QB 517 (CA). This will be discussed further in the text to nn 190–193. 
55 HRA 1998, s 6. 
56 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Daly [2001] UKHL 26, [2001] 2 AC 532, 
543, 547; Tomkins, Public law (n 1) 198. It is noted, however, that the proportionality standard is 
not so apparent in those cases where Convention issues are not raised.  
57 See text to n 226 onward.  
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It is important to note, however, that the courts still exercise only a secondary 
review. 58  The courts have recognised ‘an area of discretionary judgment 
belonging to decision-making bodies’,59 which is different from a ‘normative 
question of proportionality’, the question for the courts to decide.60 In Kebeline, 
Lord Hope endorsed the point made by Lord Lester of Herne Hill and Mr 
Pannick that deference to the other two branches ought to be more likely in those 
cases in which a balance needs to be struck between individuals’ rights and the 
needs of the society, or in those cases which involve social, economic or political 
factors, than in cases in which rights are of high constitutional importance.61 A 
similar approach was also advanced by Law LJ in International Transport Roth 
Gmbh. Four flexible principles were offered. Firstly, ‘greater deference is to be 
paid to an Act of Parliament than to a decision of the executive or subordinate 
measure’. 62  Secondly, there would be ‘more scope for deference “where the 
Convention itself requires a balance to be struck, much less so where the right is 
stated in terms which are unqualified”’.63 Thirdly, ‘greater deference will be due 
to the democratic powers where the subject-matter in hand is peculiarly within 
 
58 See Daly (n 56) 548 (Lord Steyn). 
59 Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, Media Freedom under the Human Rights Act (OUP 2006) 
149. 
60 ibid 153. See also Gavin Phillipson, ‘Deference, Discretion and Democracy in the Human 
Rights Act Era’ (2007) 60 Current Legal Problems 40, 72. The example can be seen in the case of 
A v Secretary of state for the Home Department [2005] AC 68 where the question of the 
existence of ‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’ had to be decided by the 
Government but the question of the proportionality of the Government’s measure had to be 
decided by the court.  
61 R v DPP, ex p Kebeline [2000] 2 AC 326 (HL) 381. 
62 International Transport Roth Gmbh v Secretary of State for the Home Office [2002] 3 WLR 
344, [83]. However, the cogency of this principle has been criticised by Kavanagh and Hunt, and 
seems to be disavowed by Laws himself. See Aileen Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the 
UK Human Rights Act (CUP 2009) 196, 204–205; Murray Hunt, ‘Sovereignty’s Blight: Why 
Contemporary Pubic Law Needs the Concept of “Due Deference”’ in Nicholas Bamforth 
and Peter Leyland, Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Hart 2003) 357 fn 55; Huang v 
SSHD [2005] 3 WLR 488 (CA) [58] (Laws LJ). 
63 ibid [84] internal quotation was from Lord Hope in Kebilene. The plausibility of this second 
principle is subject to criticism by Kavanagh based on the distinction between qualified and 
unqualified rights. Kavanagh, Constitutional Review (n 62) 204–05. 
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their constitutional responsibility, and less when it lies more particularly within 
the constitutional responsibility of the courts’.64 And lastly, ‘greater or lesser 
deference will be due according to whether the subject matter lies more readily 
within the actual or potential expertise of the democratic powers or the courts’.65 
However, deference based on an ‘area’ of discretionary judgment has been 
widely criticised.66 Hunt and Kavanagh argue that since the subject-matter of 
cases often overlap, it is difficult to classify them into particulars areas. 
Moreover, it is argued that the idea practically discourages judges from inquiring 
into the justifications underlying actions of the other two branches and results in 
abdication of judicial duty imposed by the HRA.67 Instead of looking at the areas 
in which the subject-matters of the case fall, Hunt argues, courts should look at 
the ‘specific issue’ regarding which the primary decision maker has made a 
decision. The degree of deference to be shown depends on different factors 
including but not limited to those identified by Laws such as the nature of the 
rights in question and the relative expertise and degree of democratic 
accountability of the primary decision makers.68 
In Huang, the House of Lords seemed to abandon the doctrinal approach and 
adopt what has been called a non-doctrinal approach,69 stating: 
 
                                                 
64 ibid [85].  
65 ibid [86]. 
66 It is noted that although Laws LJ’s principles seem to suggest that the degree of deference shall 
be varied from cases to cases, Hunt and Kavanagh still categorise them as ‘spatial’ approaches. 
Hunt ‘Sovereignty’s Blight’ (n 62) 360; Kavanagh, Constitutional Review (n 62) 204. 
67 Hunt ‘Sovereignty’s Blight’ (n 62) 346–47. Kavanagh, Constitutional Review (n 62) 202–03. 
68 Hunt ‘Sovereignty’s Blight’ (n 62) 353–54. 
69 Jeffery King describes the non-doctrinal approach as the one suggesting that ‘there should be 
no doctrine articulated in advance, and that judges should decide upon the appropriate degree of 
restraint on a case-by-case basis’. Jeff A King, ‘Institutional Approaches to Judicial Restraint’ 
(2008) 28 OJLS 409, 411. 
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The giving of weight to factors such as these is not, in our opinion, 
aptly described as deference: it is performance of the ordinary 
judicial task of weighing up the competing considerations on each 
side and according appropriate weight to the judgment of a 
person with responsibility for a given subject matter and access to 
special sources of knowledge and advice.70 
Therefore, judges are to use discretion as to whether to restrain, and if so to what 
degree, on a case-by-case basis. In this respect, Phillipson argues that account 
should be taken of the fact that several layers of deference to majoritarian or 
democratic governance have already been built into the provisions of the ECHR, 
the judgments of the ECtHR (especially those relying on the doctrine of margin 
of appreciation), and the HRA itself. Therefore, the courts should decide the 
proportionality issues on the basis of law, except in respect of factual issues in 
which the decision-makers have expertise.71 
The issues of proportionality and judicial deference have been discussed widely, 
especially in the context of the Human Rights Act.72 For the purpose of this 
research, it should be pointed out that these issues could affect the courts’ ability 
and willingness to refer to international human rights norms. To be more specific, 
it is submitted that courts may be more able and willing to refer to international 
human rights norms in issues that are within their jurisdiction and expertise than 
in issues where substantial weight should be given to decisions of the elected 
branches. However, there are other factors that affect the use of international 
human rights norms in domestic courts. These will be discussed further below.  
 
                                                 
70 Huang v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 11, [16]. 
71 Phillipson (n 60) 68–72. See also Francesco Klug, ‘Judicial Deference under the Human Rights 
Act 1998’ [2003] EHRLR 125 arguing that there should not be any issues that are always 
shielded from judicial review and that there is no need to develop complicated doctrines of 
judicial review. The issue of deference is closely related to the current controversy on the use of 
sections 3 and 4 of the HRA, which will be discussed in section IV B ii a of this Chapter.  
72 For further discussion about judicial deference see, for example, King (n 69); Jeffery Jowell, 
‘Judicial Deference: Servility, Civility or Institutional Capacity’ [2003] PL 592; Alison L Young, 
‘In Defence of Due Defernce’ (2009) 72 MLR 554. 
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B. Interpretive Approaches 
i. General Interpretive Approaches 
There are no systematic and coherent jurisprudences on rules of statutory 
interpretation in general. 73  It can be said, however, that Parliamentary 
sovereignty has had a significant influence on the interpretive approach of the 
UK courts. Traditionally, the literal rule of interpretation, which held that judges 
were supposed to ‘faithfully and strictly’ enforce the will of Parliament as 
reflected in the ‘plain meaning’ of statutes, was adopted. 74 The courts used to 
follow the literal approach strictly to the extent that, apart from the words, other 
sources of interpretation outside the statute book itself were disregarded. Even 
the legislative history of the statute or Hansard was not allowed to be used in 
interpreting law.75 
However, the impracticality of the literal rule itself has led English judges to turn 
to a purposive technique of interpretation. In cases where literal interpretation 
would bring about an absurdity, judges have been willing to consider the 
consequences of an interpretation and the purposes of statutes as factors that are 
relevant in interpretation. 76  The penetration of European Community – now 
European Union – law has also made purposive interpretation more prominent in 
the UK. The European Communities Act (ECA) 1972 instructs courts to interpret 
domestic law to be consistent with principles laid down by the European Court of 
 
                                                 
73  Ian McLeod, Legal Method (Palgrave Macmillan 2002) 259–60. There were attempts by 
Parliament to regulate the courts’ interpretation, the most notable being the Interpretation Act 
1978. However, it has been generally accepted that interpretation is the task of the Judiciary, with 
which other branches should not interfere. William Twining and David Miers, How to Do Things 
with Rules (CUP 2010) 239. 
74 John Bridge, ‘National Legal Tradition and Community Law: Legislative Drafting and Judicial 
Interpretation in England and the European Community’ (1981) 19 JCMS 351, 363; Lord Lester 
of Herne Hill (n 16) 72. 
75 Bridge (n 74) 364. 
76 ibid 364–65. 
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Justice,77 whose interpretive approach is mainly teleological thanks to the text of 
the treaties, which generally lack precision and provide only general principles.78 
The House of Lords admitted that the English literal rule may not be suitable for 
dealing with Community law.79 Later decisions from the House itself and the 
Court of Appeal further showed the trend towards purposive interpretation.80 
More recently, the HRA 1998 also instructs judges to adopt purposive 
interpretation by requiring them to interpret domestic law so as to give effect to 
the Convention rights.81 In fact, the interpretive obligation under the Act may be 
taken as allowing judges to strain the meaning of the words used in a statute.82  
The consequence of a more purposive approach is that sources outside the text 
may play a role in statutory interpretation. The House of Lords qualified the 
prohibition regarding the use of Hansard, holding that courts could refer to 
statements made in Parliament where legislation was ambiguous or obscure or 
would lead to an absurdity.83 Reports of several commissions in relation to the 
enactment of legislation and international treaties which are incorporated into 
domestic law may also be referred to in order to ascertain the meaning and 
purpose of legislation.84 
Moreover, the UK courts have now accepted that a statute is to be interpreted 
taking into account the current meaning of the text.85 For example, the House of 
Lords, in R v Ireland, took into account contemporary scientific knowledge and 
 
                                                 
77 European Communities Act 1972, s 3(1). 
78 Bridge (n 74) 366–69. 
79 See Lord Diplock’s opinion in R v Henn (Maurice Donald) [1981] AC 850 (HL) [14]. 
80 See, for example, HP Bulmer Ltd v J Bollinger SA (No 2) [1974] Ch 401 (CA) 426. 
81 HRA, s 3(1). 
82 For example see R v A (No 2) [2001] UKHL 25, [2002] 1 AC 45 [44]–[46] (Lord Steyn). This 
issue will be discussed further in section IV ii a.  
83 Pepper v Hart [1992] UKHL 3. 
84 Twining and Miers (n 73) 260–61. 
85 Rupert Cross, Statutory Interpretation (3rd edn, 1995) 51–52. 
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interpreted the phrase ‘bodily harm’ to include ‘psychiatric harm’, despite the 
fact that the latter concept was not known at the time the statute containing the 
former phrase was enacted.86 The dynamic interpretation applied especially in 
the areas of fundamental rights. In Times Newspapers Ltd, regarding the issue of 
freedom of expression, the Court interpreted ‘a public meeting’ to include ‘a 
press conference’, something which did not exist at the time the relevant statute 
was passed. In so doing, it recognised not only the invention of the press 
conference, but also the contemporary law of freedom of expression.87 More 
obviously, Lord Hoffmann stated, in a case relating to the interpretation of a 
written Constitution of an overseas territory: 
The fundamental rights provisions … are expressed in general and 
abstract terms which invite the participation of the judiciary in 
giving them sufficient flesh to answer concrete questions … The 
judges, in giving body and substance to fundamental rights, will 
naturally be guided by what are thought to be the requirements of 
a just society in their own time … The text is a ‘living instrument’ 
when the terms in which it is expressed in their constitutional 
context invite and require periodic re-examination of its 
application to contemporary life.88 (emphasis added) 
Given the purposive and dynamic interpretive approaches, it can be envisaged 
that materials such as academic writings, international laws and foreign 
jurisprudences can be useful for the task of interpretation, although their 
relevance will vary considerably from case to case. 
At this point, it should be acknowledged that the judiciary is to enjoy greater 
interpretative power. Some may argue that this is illegitimate since judges are 
unelected and lack of proper experience.89 Some may also argued that judicial 
 
                                                 
86 R v Ireland [1998] AC 147 (HL). 
87 McCartan Turkington Breen v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 2 AC 277 (HL). 
88 Boyce v The Queen [2004] UKPC 32, [2005] 1 AC 400 (PC) [28]. 
89 J A G Griffith, ‘The Common Law and the Political Constitution’ (2001) 42 LQR 42, 64–65. 
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decisions are affected by individual judges’ ideology, intuition and emotion.90 
However, others argue that judges are well trained to not let their personal 
viewpoints affect their decisions,91 and more importantly, it is to be remembered 
that such judicial powers are neither unlimited nor unconstrained.92 Parliament 
may make whatever law it deems appropriate, but judges are limited by the 
existing legal framework, the text of statutes93 and identification of the issues by 
parties before they reach the courts. 94 Moreover, judges have a duty to provide 
reasons for their interpretation, and such reasons are subject to public criticism.95 
The constraints ensure that judicial interpretation is not arbitrary even in cases 
where judges are allowed a wide leeway for interpretation. 
ii. The Principle of Legality 
Since Dicey’s time, the courts have helped to protect individuals’ rights by 
defining the meaning and scope of legislation.96 This task has been performed as 
part of the process of judicial review of executive acts aimed at ensuring that the 
executive branch does not act beyond its power. It is true that Parliament may 
enact whatever law it wishes, but it is also true that individuals are able to do 
everything not forbidden by law.97 Although the literal rule of interpretation had 
 
                                                 
90 Richard A Posner, How Judges Think (Harvard University Press 2008); J A G Griffith, ‘The 
Common Law and the Political Constitution’ (n 89) 64–65 arguing that judges must be judged by 
their policies.  
91 ibid; Thomas Bingham, ‘The European Convention on Human Rights: Time to Incorporate’ 
(1993) 109 LQR 390, 398.  
92 Twining and Miers (n 73) 145–47; Anthony Lester, ‘English Judges as Law Makers’ [1993] PL 
269, 290. 
93  Aileen Kavanagh, ‘The Elusive Divide between Interpretation and Legislation under the 
Human Rights Act 1998’ (2004) 24 OJLS 259, 271. 
94 Twining and Miers (n 73) 145–47. See also Karl Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition 
(1960). 
95 P S Atiyah, Law and Modern Society (2nd edn, OUP 1995) 28–29. 
96 Dicey (n 12) 197. 
97 Fenwick and Phillipson, Text, Cases & Materials (n 11) 840. 
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dominated the general statutory approach of courts in the UK, when it came to 
legislation that limited fundamental rights courts have adopted the ‘principle of 
legality’ – a court-made assumption that Parliament could not have intended to 
interfere with fundamental rights recognised by common law. Relying on such an 
assumption, if the violation of rights is not expressed clearly in specific language, 
courts will not interpret legislation to the effect that rights are limited.98 
A precursor to this tool of judicial reasoning can be found in Anisminic Ltd 
Appellant v Foreign Compensation Commission.99 The issue concerned section 
4(4) of the Foreign Compensation Act 1950, which said: ‘… the determination 
by the commission of any application made to them under this Act shall not be 
called in question in any court of law.’ This was a rather clear ouster of courts’ 
jurisdiction, but the House of Lords managed to construe the word 
‘determination’ narrowly and allowed itself the jurisdiction to review the 
Commission’s action. Lord Reid reasoned: 
If the draftsman or Parliament had intended to introduce a new 
kind of ouster clause so as to prevent any inquiry even as to 
whether the document relied on was a forgery, I would have 
expected to find something much more specific than the bald 
statement that a determination shall not be called in question in 
any court of law. 100 (emphasis added) 
Wade and Forsyth comments that this interpretation adopted by the Court shows 
that it did not cling to literal interpretation when such would result in the courts 
being disarmed and subordinate authorities having uncontrollable power.101 
The principle of legality applies also to the interpretation of legislation which 
confers certain powers on the executive. In Witham, the Lord Chancellor decided, 
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according to the power conferred on him by legislation, to prescribe the fees to 
be taken in the Supreme Court, and to cancel the provision excusing litigants 
who received income support from paying court fees and the provision allowing 
the Lord Chancellor to reduce or waive court fees in cases of financial hardship. 
The litigant in this case depended on those cancelled provisions in order to be 
able to exercise his right to access to a court; consequently, the Lord 
Chancellor’s decision resulted in removal of such rights. Therefore, it was held 
that the decision was ultra vires because the legislation did not specifically confer 
such power on the Lord Chancellor.102  
 
ess words’.104  
                                                
Also, in Wheeler v Leicester City Council, the issue was whether the council 
properly exercised its powers under the Race Relations Act in banning a rugby 
club from using its recreation ground because it had failed to observe the 
council’s policy against sporting links with apartheid countries. The House of 
Lords held that although the Act imposed on the council the duty to discourage 
unlawful racial discrimination, the club did not violate any law. The council, thus, 
abused its statutory power. Its decision was unreasonable, in breach of its duty to 
act fairly, which amounted to procedural impropriety. 103  The approach of 
Brown-Wilkinson LJ in his dissenting judgment in the Court of Appeal for the 
same case was of importance. He expressed the view that ‘Parliament (being 
sovereign) can legislate so as to do so; but it cannot be taken to have conferred 
such a right on others save by expr
More recently, in Simms, the House of Lords employed the same principle in 
upholding freedom of expression. Lord Hoffmann explained that the blanket ban 
 
102 R v Lord Chancellor, ex p Witham [1998] QB 575 (QB). 
103 [1985] AC 1054 (HL).  
104 Wheeler v Leicester City Council [1985] AC 1054 (HL) 1065 (emphasis added). See also R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Leech (No 2) [1994] QB 198 (CA) where the 
Court of Appeal interpreted a power of a prison governor according to a statute narrowly in order 
to uphold a prisoner’s right to a solicitor. 
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on prisoner interviews with journalists exceeded the powers of the statute which 
conferred power on the Government, because 
the principle of legality means that Parliament must squarely 
confront what it is doing and accept the political cost. 
Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or 
ambiguous words. This is because there is too great a risk that the 
full implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed 
unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of express 
language or necessary implication to the contrary, the courts 
therefore presume that even the most general words were intended 
to be subject to the basic rights of the individual. 105  
Following the HRA, UK citizens have positive rights in the sense that they may 
bring cases to the courts if public authorities fail to respect their convention 
rights.106 More importantly for the purpose of this research, in cases where the 
violations of convention rights rely on power conferred by legislation, the 
judiciary seems to have an increased interpretive power against Acts of 
Parliament. Section 3 of the Act specifically instructs that all legislation is to be 
read in the light of certain rights specified in the ECHR.107 Convention rights 
have become more or less like standards for a principle of legality in place of 
common law fundamental rights. This issue will be discussed further in section 
IV B ii. 
III. International and Foreign Law in the United Kingdom 
It can already be seen from the previous two sections that international sources of 
law, especially EU law and the ECHR, have had a powerful influence on the 
UK’s legal system. This section seeks to identify the approach of the UK in 
 
                                                 
105 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115 (HL) 131. 
106 HRA, s 6 (1). 
107 These are rights according to Articles 2–12, 14 of the Convention, Articles 1–3 of the First 
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accepting international and foreign norms, including these two, into its legal 
system. 
A. Legal Status of International and Foreign Law in the Legal System 
and their Effect upon it 
In the UK, the dualist view that international and foreign law is a set of norms 
separate from domestic law, and thus cannot be automatically enforced in 
domestic courts, is accepted. This view is imposed on the UK by its own 
constitutional imperatives. Parliamentary sovereignty requires that only 
Parliament can make law and that its law is supreme. Therefore, international law 
made by an international community outside the knowledge of Parliament cannot 
have the same effect as law made in the UK. It also follows from the separation 
of powers doctrine that the judiciary must restrain itself from giving domestic 
effect to such international law, otherwise it intervenes with the function of 
Parliament.108 
The contradiction between international law and domestic law resulting from the 
dualist approach is said to be ‘the price which is paid for the benefits of self-
governance via a democratic system’.109 In Mortensen v Peters, the court said: 
In this Court we have nothing to do with the question of whether 
the legislature has or has not done what foreign powers may 
consider a usurpation in a question with them. Neither are we a 
tribunal sitting to decide whether an act of the legislature is ultra 
vires as in contravention of generally acknowledged principles of 
international law. For us, an Act of Parliament duly passed by 
Lords and Commons and assented to by the King, is supreme, and 
we are bound to give effect to its terms.110  
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i. Treaties 
The dualist approach is clear for international laws that are in the form of treaties. 
It is firmly established in the UK that treaties are not parts of, and have no direct 
effect within, the domestic regime unless and until they have been transformed 
into UK law by Acts of Parliament.111  
ii. Customary International Law 
In respect of customary international law, courts in the UK have long adopted the 
incorporation doctrine, meaning that the rules of customary international law are 
parts of its law without any further process.112 However, the dualist view has 
created limitations to this principle. Customary international law can apply only 
in cases where it does not contradict with a statute.113 Moreover, in ascertaining 
the substance and scope of customary international law, courts usually refer to 
their own previous decisions rather than recognise new ones accepted in the 
international community.114  
There is a case that may support the arguments for a limited role of the CIL. In R 
v Jones (Margaret), Lord Bingham observed: 
I would for my part hesitate, at any rate without much fuller 
argument, to accept this proposition in quite the unqualified terms 
in which it has often been stated. There seems to be truth … that 
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international law is not a part, but is one of the sources, of English 
law.115 
He then held that the customary international law cannot establish a criminal 
offence in national courts because English courts may apply customary 
international law only when permitted to do so by the Constitution.116 Although 
what the Constitution permits for other issues is not yet clear, 117  it can be 
concluded that the direct effect of customary international law seems to be 
severely limited in the UK. 
iii. Interpretive Influence of International and Foreign Law 
The dualist concept and principle of no direct effect discussed above does not 
mean that unincorporated international law has no role at all in domestic courts. 
In fact, courts have adopted the ‘presumption of compatibility’ as a tool for 
developing common law and construing a statute in a way compatible with the 
country’s international obligations. 118  In relation to the common law, the 
presumption of compatibility applies on the basis of a court-made legal policy 
that domestic law should conform to international law. In relation to statute, the 
principle is based on the presumption that Parliament could not have intended to 
violate international obligations.119  
Apart from international treaties which enjoy the presumption of compatibility, it 
is well-established that jurisprudences of international courts, and laws and 
jurisprudences of other countries, are relevant in cases where courts have to 
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ascertain international law or interpret statutes that were enacted in order to 
implement international obligations.120 Furthermore, UK courts generally seek 
guidance or inspiration from international and foreign laws in cases where 
domestic authority provides no clear answer or points towards an unjust 
solution.121 These kinds of materials not only can offer a variety of solutions for 
domestic courts to consider, but may also serve to ensure that a solution the 
courts wish to adopt is not likely to cause harm in their own system.122 In the 
case of problems that spread beyond national borders, international and foreign 
jurisprudences also ‘prompt anxious review of the decision in question’.123  
The interpretive influence of international and foreign law will be discussed 
further, in the context of international human rights, in section IV below. 
B. The Impact of European Union Law on the UK’s Dualist Approach 
Despite the dualist view held by the UK, it is now undeniable that European 
Union (EU) law, previously European Community (EC) law, has penetrated into 
the legal system and has even superseded contradictory domestic law.124 The 
impact this causes on the recognition of international and foreign law in the UK 
courts is worth discussing here.  
Upon accession to what was then the EC, Parliament enacted the European 
Communities Act 1972. Sections 2(1) and (4) of the ECA 1972 give legal effect 
to ‘enforceable community rights’ and instruct courts to construe legislations 
 
                                                 
120 Tom Bingham, Widening Horizons: The Influence of Comparative Law and International Law 
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122 ibid Chapter 1. 
123 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services Ltd [2002] UKHL 22 [32] (Lord Bingham). 
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‘passed or to be passed’ in accordance with such rights.125 Further, section 3(1) 
of the same Act provides that any question as to the meaning or effect of 
community law shall be treated as a question of law and be determined in 
accordance with principles laid down by the European Court of Justice.126 
Although UK courts did not accept the direct effect and supremacy of the EU law 
immediately, they interpreted statutes so as to be compatible with it. 127  The 
presumption of compatibility discussed above was used without the condition 
that the statutes in question were ambiguous.128 The direct effect and supremacy 
of EU law were eventually accepted in Factortame (No 2), held in 1991, where 
the House of Lords effectively suspended the application of the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1988 which was alleged to violate the ‘free movement of goods 
and people’ protected by EU law. 129 This case attracted widespread criticism, for 
it seemed to be inconsistent with the Parliamentary sovereignty doctrine, 
especially its negative aspect.130However, Lord Bridge submitted that Parliament, 
in enacting the ECA 1972, ‘voluntarily’ limited its own sovereignty.131  
The UK courts have also been influenced by the principle of ‘indirect effect’ 
introduced by the ECJ. The principle holds that ‘national courts are required to 
interpret their national law in the light of the wording and the purpose of the [EU 
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law that does not have direct effect] in order to achieve the result referred to in 
Article 189(3) EEC’,132 ‘in so far as they are given discretion to do so under 
national law’. 133  At first, the House of Lords applied this principle of 
construction with the condition that the statutes in question had been passed in 
order to implement the relevant Directives.134 However, the Court later admitted, 
in Webb v EMO Air Cargo (UK), that it had a duty to ‘accord with the 
interpretation of the Directive as laid down by the European Court of Justice’ no 
matter whether ‘the domestic legislation came after or, as in this case, preceded 
the Directive’. 135  
Given that EU law has asserted a strong influence on the UK legal system and 
judicial reasoning and that Parliamentary sovereignty, which is the underlying 
concept of the dualist, has declined, the important question here is whether courts 
will allow other international treaties to have more effect in the UK legal system. 
The answer may depend on which of the justifications provided by scholars 
correctly explain the courts’ practice in cases relating to EU law. If the view that 
courts’ decisions derived their authorities only from the ECA 1972136 is accepted, 
it is unlikely that international norms beyond EU law will enjoy the same status. 
However, if it is accepted that courts have been developing common law 
principles in order to recognise the normative force of EU law,137 the other kinds 
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of unincorporated international norms may stand a chance of being upheld by the 
courts, on a case-by-case basis dependent on their normative force. 
The fact that courts did not grant direct effect and supremacy to the then 
Community law immediately after the ECA 1972 entered into force, but rather 
developed case law gradually to accommodate it, may support the latter opinion. 
However, there is another way of looking at this phenomenon. It may be argued 
that even with guidance from Parliament, the courts were still attached to the 
dualist view and thus reluctant to grant direct effect and supremacy to such a 
regime of law. Hence, international norms that do not have support from statutes 
are likely to be strictly subject to the traditional dualist principles. Alternatively 
and perhaps more reasonably, it could also be argued that UK courts gave special 
treatment to EU law because of the combination of the ECA and its normative 
force. Therefore, the dualist concept still applies generally.  
It is noted, however, that the tide of the EU law has opened the door for judges in 
the UK to experience a set of norms beyond the national borders. Such 
international sources have influenced not only the substance of domestic law but 
also the application of traditional constitutional principles and methods of 
interpretation. Thus, although the dualist concept still prevails, it is likely that 
courts will be inspired to look at the international and foreign norms as 
persuasive sources in judicial reasoning more often than before. 
IV. International Human Rights Norms in the UK 
A. Legal Status of International Human Rights Norms and Their Effect 
on the Legal System 
The UK has ratified several human rights agreements covering a wide range of 
rights: the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
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Discrimination, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the 
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, and, most importantly, the European 
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). 138 
So far, the ECHR has been given effect by the Human Rights Act 1998. The 
ICCPR and Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment have been given effect, in part, by the Criminal Justice 
Act 1988. The Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data has been given effect by the Data 
Protection Act 1998. International human rights norms in these instruments 
become parts of UK law in so far as they have been incorporated.  
For unincorporated instruments, they simply do not have direct effect in the UK 
legal system. Lord Bridge ruled in Brind on the status of the (then) 
unincorporated ECHR:  
It is accepted, of course, by the applicants that, like any other 
treaty obligations which have not been embodied in the law by 
statute, the Convention is not part of the domestic law, that the 
courts accordingly have no power to enforce Convention rights 
directly and that, if domestic legislation conflicts with the 
Convention, the courts must nevertheless enforce it.139 
More recently, in Re McKerr, although Lord Steyn did observe that, in the 
context of human rights treaties, the principle that international law is not part of 
domestic law should be re-examined, the House of Lords held that that the 
ECHR was not part of domestic law except in so far as it was incorporated into 
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the Human Rights Act 1998, and it was not appropriate for the court to impose 
positive human rights obligations, especially in an area regulated by 
legislation.140 Consistently with the latter, Sales and Clement provide arguments 
against special treatment for international human rights treaties: the Crown has 
no authority to change domestic law by ratifying treaties; implementing 
international human rights imposes a burden on society and creates cost, which 
only Parliament can do; and enforcing unincorporated human rights treaties 
would be illegitimate judicial law making.141  
B. Interpretive Influence of the International Human Rights Norms in 
the UK 
Courts in the UK have made use of international human rights norms from 
several sources, including not only international human rights treaties but also 
human rights jurisprudences of other countries. However, this research devotes 
substantial attention to the interpretive influence of the ECHR and addresses the 
interpretive influence of other sources only briefly. This is because, among all 
sources of international human rights norms, the ECHR, which was established 
by the Council of Europe and provides for basic rights such as rights to life, fair 
hearing, privacy and freedom of expression, has been the most influential 
international human rights instrument in the UK to date. Moreover, the influence 
of the ECHR has not just emerged after the enforcement of the HRA 1998 which 
gives effect to most of the rights under the Convention. It has gradually asserted 
influence over the jurisprudence of the UK courts since the ratification of the 
Convention in 1951. The gap between the time of ratification of the ECHR and 
that of the enforcement of the HRA gives a unique opportunity for the research to 
compare the courts’ approaches to the same set of international human rights 
norms in two different periods. This assists the research, not only in identifying a 
variety of approaches towards international human rights norms in the UK courts, 
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but also in evaluating how and to what extent the legislative approval affects the 
courts’ approaches towards international human rights norms. 
i. The Courts’ Use of Unincorporated ECHR 
The ECHR had had a legitimate indirect role in judicial reasoning in the UK 
through the use of the principle of compatibility, discussed above in section III A 
iii. In R v Lyons, Lord Bingham observed:  
Even before the Human Rights Act 1998 the Convention exerted a 
persuasive and pervasive influence on judicial decision-making in 
this country, affecting the interpretation of ambiguous statutory 
provisions, guiding the exercise of discretions, bearing on the 
development of the common law.142 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the interpretive role of the 
unincorporated ECHR had developed slowly. Hunt submitted that since the 
ratification until 1972, there were only 2 cases where UK courts mentioned the 
ECHR. 143  One was in 1964 relating to the immunity of the officers of the 
European Commission of Human Rights.144 The other was in 1972, when the 
Convention was briefly mentioned in interpreting common law.145 The first case 
in which UK courts actually used the ECHR as an interpretive tool was R v Miah 
in 1973.146 However, Starmer and Klug found 316 cases between 1975 and 1996 
that courts referred to the Convention, more than half of which were decided 
after 1991.147 The sharp increase in the numbers of cases was likely to result 
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from several judgments of the ECtHR which found the UK to be in breach of the 
Convention.148 It was reported that by 1999 there were around fifty negative 
judgments against the UK involving almost all areas of rights.149  
In order to gain insights into the issue, the following subsections discuss the 
development of the courts’ approach to the use of the ECHR in relation to 
statutory interpretation, common law development, judicial discretion and 
legitimate expectations, and then address the controversies around it. 
a. Statutory Interpretation 
One of the earliest cases in which UK courts referred explicitly to the ECHR was 
Birdi v Secretary of State for Home Affairs, where Lord Denning stated that 
courts ‘could and should take the Convention into account in interpreting a 
statute. An Act of Parliament should be construed so as to conform to the 
Convention’. 150 No requirement that the statute in question had to be ambiguous 
was mentioned in this case. Moreover, Lord Denning claimed that ‘[i]f an Act of 
Parliament did not conform to the Convention, I might be inclined to hold it 
invalid’. 151  This would make the ECHR different from other unincorporated 
international treaties and would, in effect, deny the Parliamentary sovereignty 
discussed in the previous sections.  
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However, the effect of the ECHR according to this case was later limited by 
Salamat Bibi.152 Lord Denning recognised the ambiguity requirement:  
The position as I understand it is that if there is any ambiguity in 
our statutes, or uncertainty in our law, then these courts can look 
to the Convention as an aid to clear up the ambiguity and 
uncertainty, seeking always to bring them into harmony with it. 153 
The approach was confirmed in Brind, held in 1991. The case is of interest, as it 
stated the House of Lords’ perception of the Convention not long before the 
Human Rights Act came into force. One of the issues in Brind was whether, in 
relation to the exercising of the power under the Broadcasting Act, the Secretary 
of State’s discretion was presumed to be limited by the Convention. It was held: 
When confronted with a simple choice between two possible 
interpretations of some specific statutory provision, the 
presumption whereby the courts prefer that which avoids conflict 
between our domestic legislation and our international treaty 
obligations is a mere canon of construction which involves no 
importation of international law into the domestic field. But where 
Parliament has conferred on the executive an administrative 
discretion without indicating the precise limits within which it 
must be exercised, to presume that it must be exercised within 
Convention limits would be to go far beyond the resolution of an 
ambiguity. 154 (emphasis added) 
The court went on to give detailed reasons based on the constitutional 
arrangement: 
It would be to impute to Parliament an intention not only that the 
executive should exercise the discretion in conformity with the 
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Convention, but also that the domestic courts should enforce that 
conformity by the importation into domestic administrative law of 
the text of the Convention and the jurisprudence of the European 
Court of Human Rights in the interpretation and application of 
it … When Parliament has been content for so long to leave those 
who complain that their Convention rights have been infringed to 
seek their remedy in Strasbourg, it would be surprising suddenly 
to find that the judiciary had, without Parliament’s aid, the means 
to incorporate the Convention into such an important area of 
domestic law and I cannot escape the conclusion that this would 
be a judicial usurpation of the legislative function.155 
The requirement that executive actions be limited by terms of the Convention 
was seen as incorporating the Convention into domestic legal regime by the 
‘back door’.156 
It can be said that the unincorporated ECHR had interpretive effect on the UK 
statutes subject to the condition that the statutes had to be ambiguous. Notably, 
ambiguity in the sense that language in statutes may be flexible was not 
sufficient to allow courts to seek guidance from the Convention; a provision in a 
statute itself must be manifestly ambiguous. 157  The reason for limitations 
stemmed obviously from the concern over Parliamentary sovereignty and 
separation of powers. 
b. Common Law Development 
In just the same ways as they influenced statutory interpretation, the ECHR and 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR had a role in common law development. In A-G v 
Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2), Lord Goff held, on the issue of common law 
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on freedom of expression: ‘I conceive it to be my duty, when I am free to do so, 
to interpret the law in accordance with the obligations of the Crown under this 
treaty.’158  
However, the influence of the Convention on common law development tended 
to be limited to circumstances in which the common law was uncertain.159 Where 
the law was certain, most of the cases from the House of Lords held that referring 
to the ECHR was not necessary and sometimes not appropriate. In DPP v Jones, 
Lord Slynn held: 
Reference was also made to the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms … as 
indicating what our law should now be. It is desirable to look at 
the Convention for guidance even at the present time, but this is 
not a case in my opinion where there is any statutory ambiguity to 
be resolved or any doubt as to what the common law is. 160  
(emphasis added) 
Nevertheless, there were exceptional cases. In Choudhury, although it seemed to 
be accepted that the common law of blasphemy was certain, the Divisional Court 
stated that it was ‘necessary … in the context of this case, to attempt to satisfy us 
that the United Kingdom is not in any event in breach of the Convention’. 161 
This approach was endorsed by Balcombe LJ in Derbyshire County Council v 
Times Newspapers, where the issue was whether public authorities were entitled 
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to sue for libel in order to protect their reputation according to the common law. 
Balcombe stated that ‘[e]ven if the common law is certain the courts will still, 
when appropriate, consider whether the United Kingdom is in breach of Article 
10’.162 
In any case, the House of Lords seemed to develop a further approach towards 
the ECHR. Instead of considering the certainty or uncertainty of the common law, 
the Court simply claimed that principles laid down in the Convention and 
common law were identical. In A-G v Guardian Newspapers Ltd (No 2), Lord 
Goff held: 
The exercise of the right to freedom of expression under article 10 
may be subject to restrictions (as are prescribed by law and are 
necessary in a democratic society) in relation to certain prescribed 
matters, which include ‘the interests of national security’ and 
‘preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence’. 
It is established in the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights that the word ‘necessary’ in this context implies 
the existence of a pressing social need, and that interference with 
freedom of expression should be no more than is proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued. I have no reason to believe that 
English law, as applied in the courts, leads to any different 
conclusion.163 
Hunt argued that the consistency between common law and the ECHR and the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence in this area was actually in doubt. 164  Therefore, he 
believed that, by asserting common law and the ECHR to be identical, courts had 
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found the way to develop common law using principles laid down in the 
Convention without answering the question about its status in domestic law.165  
The approach was used again in Derbyshire, where the House of Lords and the 
Court of Appeal agreed that common law and Article 10 of the ECHR were 
identical on the point that public authorities did not have rights to sue for 
defamation. However, there was a crucial difference in the approaches of the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords towards the ECHR. On the one hand, 
Balcombe LJ suggested: 
So Article 10 does not establish any novel proposition under 
English law. Nevertheless, since it states the right to freedom of 
expression and the qualifications to that right in precise terms, it 
will be convenient to consider the question by reference to article 
10 alone.166  
On the other, Lord Keith noted:  
My Lords, I have reached my conclusion upon the common law of 
England without finding any need to rely upon the European 
Convention. My noble and learned friend, Lord Goff of Chieveley, 
in Attorney-General v. Guardian Newspapers Ltd. (No. 2) 
expressed the opinion that in the field of freedom of speech there 
was no difference in principle between English law on the subject 
and article 10 of the Convention. I agree, and can only add that I 
find it satisfactory to be able to conclude that the common law of 
England is consistent with the obligations assumed by the Crown 
under the Treaty in this particular field. 167  (internal citation 
omitted) 
It can be seen that although both of the judges reached the same conclusion, they 
valued the ECHR differently. Balcombe LJ saw the Convention as an instrument 
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describing rights in precise terms and was willing to refer to it instead of the 
common law. Lord Keith, on the other hand, saw the Convention as an 
international obligation. He was happy to see that common law was consistent 
with the Convention, but did not find it necessary to consider the Convention 
when deciding the case. 
Of course, Hunt’s observation that courts were simply developing common law 
from the Convention without admitting it in order to avoid criticism may be used 
to explain Lord Keith’s approach. From such a viewpoint, the ECHR seemed to 
play an important role in developing common law. However, Starmer and Klug 
argued that ‘the claim that the common law and the Convention “march arm in 
arm” is usually a prelude to ignoring the latter, or, at best, paying lip service to 
it’.168 They referred to Bannett, where Lord Keith’s dictum above was used to 
conclude that ‘[i]t follows, in my opinion, that a decision against the defendants 
in this case … if in accordance with English law does not infringe Article 10 in 
any way’.169 
In any case, the role of the ECHR in common law development was limited. The 
unincorporated ECHR could not be used to establish a new right that common 
law did not provide.170 Neither could it be used to develop common law to the 
extent of having the same effect as it would have had were it  to have been 
incorporated.171 In Derbyshire and Guardian Newspapers above, it was clear that 
the right to freedom of speech had some roots in English common law. Where 
there were no existing rights in common law, courts refused to recognise a new 
one according to the Convention. In Malone v Commissioner of Police of the 
Metropolis (No 2), on the issue as to whether the ECHR and the judgment by the 
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ECtHR could assist the court in determining the right to privacy in domestic law 
the court held the following:  
It seems to me that where Parliament has abstained from 
legislating on a point that is plainly suitable for legislation, it is 
indeed difficult for the court to lay down new rules of common 
law or equity that will array out the Crown’s treaty obligations, or 
to discover for the first time that such rules have always 
existed.172 
A limited exception to this principle can be found in the case of Wilson. The 
ECtHR had held that a prisoner had the right to see the report on himself which 
the Parole Board had considered. Existing common law protection did not cover 
the case, but the Court of Appeal extended the common law to include such a 
situation because Parliament had passed a statute to follow the said ECtHR’s 
judgment, although at the time of the case such provision was yet to be 
enforced.173 
In fact, it is observed that after the HRA had been passed in 1998 but before it 
came into force in 2000, the House of Lords tended to acknowledge a more 
prominent role of the unincorporated ECHR in developing common law. Lord 
Cooke, in Reynolds v Times Newspapers, expressed the following view: 
International human rights law, whenever relevant, should have an 
important part to play in developments of the common law. For 
United Kingdom courts, particular importance must attach to the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, bearing in mind that by section 6(1) of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 it is unlawful for a public authority to 
act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right … 
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The Act is not yet in force, but naturally the appeal was argued on 
the footing that regard should be had to it.174 
The attitude of the elected branches toward the Convention, although short of 
enforceable legislation, certainly affected the courts’ approach. 
c.  Judicial Discretion  
The use of the ECHR in relation to statutory interpretation and common law 
development was settled, but with limitations as discussed above. However, 
courts tended to be more willing to refer to the Convention when the statute or 
common law involved the exercise of inherent judicial discretion 175  such as 
considering whether to grant interlocutory injunctions176 and whether to allow 
publication of the case to the detriment of a child’s confidential interest.177 In R v 
Central Independent Television, the case concerning a restraining injunction 
against broadcasting pictures of a convicted paedophile without obscuring his 
face, which could lead to identification of his child, Lord Hoffmann held that 
in order to enable us to meet our international obligations under 
the Convention … it is necessary that any exceptions should 
satisfy the tests laid down in article 10(2) [of the ECHR]. They 
must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ and fall within certain 
permissible categories …178 (internal citation omitted) 
It can be seen that the test from the ECHR was directly applied to the case. Also, 
in the matter relating to the courts’ power to review ‘excessive’ jury awards 
under the Courts and Legal Services Act, it was held in Rantzen v Mirror Group 
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Newspapers Ltd that the power had to be construed in a manner that was not 
inconsistent with Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the ECHR.179  
In fact, the House of Lords took into consideration not only the ECHR itself but 
also jurisprudence of the ECtHR. This can be seen most obviously in R v Sultan 
Khan. The Court took into consideration Articles 6 and 8 of the ECHR (the right 
to a fair trial and the right to privacy) in exercising its discretion as to whether to 
exclude evidence in criminal cases according to the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984. Furthermore, when holding that evidence obtained illegally 
was nevertheless admissible according to UK law, it took into account 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR which suggested that breach of a right of privacy did 
not necessarily render a criminal trial unfair.180  
The reason courts treated the ECHR and the ECtHR’s jurisprudence more 
favourably in cases concerning inherent judicial discretion had never been made 
clear by case law, but academics offered some explanations. Mountfield and 
Beloff submitted that courts were free to consider all relevant sources when 
deciding the principles for their own discretion.181 Hunt suggested that, within 
their power, courts had a responsibility as government authorities to ensure that 
international obligations are respected in the domestic legal system. 182  Most 
importantly, it is likely that constitutional constraints that applied when the 
courts’ decision could interfere with functions of the other two branches did not 
apply here.  
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d. Judicial Review of Executive Acts 
The influence of the ECHR in the interpretation of statutes and the developing of 
common law raised the question as to whether it could also influence the grounds 
and the standards of judicial review of executive acts. 
As regards the grounds of review, the traditional view, which results from the 
dualist conception, held that there was no legitimate expectation arising against 
the executive to exercise its power according to the unincorporated treaties.183 
Although Lord Denning held, in Bhajan Singh in 1976, relating to the 
Immigration Act, that officers acting under this Act must consider principles in 
the Convention, 184 he amended his position in the same year in Bibi, stating: ‘I 
think that would be asking too much of the immigration officers. They cannot be 
expected to know or to apply the Convention.’185  
Nevertheless, in Ahmed the Court of Appeal accepted that ratification of the 
treaty could create a legitimate expectation that the agency would act in 
accordance with the international obligation, unless the executive agency had 
expressed a policy to the contrary. 186 The approach was followed in Adimi.187 
However, both cases were strongly criticised for attempting to incorporate the 
ECHR by the ‘back door’ inconsistently with Parliamentary sovereignty and the 
separation of powers.188  
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As to the standard or the intensity of review, it is arguable that the ECHR was 
responsible for the change in the traditional Wednesbury standard.189 The House 
of Lords tended to depart from such a standard when it came to issues of rights. 
Lord Bridge stated in Bugdaycay, a case concerning immigration and the 
individual’s right to life, that the court had to ‘be entitled to subject an 
administrative decision to the more rigorous examination, to ensure that it is in 
no way flawed, according to the gravity of the issue which the decision 
determines’.190 Then in Brind, although the House of Lords upheld the Secretary 
of State’s directive prohibiting broadcasters from broadcasting ‘any matter’ 
consisting of direct speech made by representatives of terrorist organisations 
where such speech supported or invited support for such organisations, in the 
process of consideration it stated:  
… this surely does not mean that … we are not perfectly entitled 
to start from the premise that any restriction of the right to 
freedom of expression requires to be justified and that nothing less 
than an important competing public interest will be sufficient to 
justify it.191 
So, the judgment implied that courts were able to review not only whether 
government agencies had taken human rights issues into account, but also 
whether the public interest in question was important enough.192 Bugdacay and 
Brind were considered by Sir Thomas Bingham MR to be the basis for the more 
intensive review on the ground of irrationality, offered by the counsel and 
accepted by the Court of Appeal in Smith, that 
 
                                                
… in judging whether the decision-maker has exceeded this 
margin of appreciation the human rights context is important. The 
more substantial the interference with human rights, the more the 
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But even after using the test mentioned above, the court dismissed the claim of 
applicants who had been dismissed from the armed forces, on the basis of the 
government’s policy that ‘homosexuality was incompatible with service in the 
armed forces’.194 Simon Brown LJ expressed his concern on the human rights 
issue, but found that the action ‘cannot be properly held unlawful’ and that ‘the 
decision upon the future of this policy must still properly rest with others, 
notably the government and Parliament’. 195 
The case was later referred to the ECtHR, which held that the doctrine of 
irrationality in British courts was so ‘high that it effectively excluded any 
consideration by the domestic courts of the question of whether the interference 
with the applicants’ rights answered a pressing social need or was proportionate 
to the national security and public order aims pursued’.196 Nevertheless, Poole 
pointed out that the decision in Smith was based on ‘constitutional balance’.197 
The fact that the policy had been supported by both Houses of Parliament was a 
relevant issue. Although the court acknowledged that fundamental rights were 
interfered with in a significant way, the policy was upheld, simply because 
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judges were concerned as to whether they were in a position to declare it 
unlawful.198  
Another case supporting Poole’s viewpoint was B. The case was raised by an 
applicant who had been denied treatment for leukaemia by the authority. In the 
Divisional Court, Laws J employed rights-based theory in holding that the 
authority had failed to take into account the family’s perception of B’s best 
interest, which was an indispensable consideration. The Court of Appeal 
disagreed. While recognising the very high value of human life, it went on to say 
that ‘[d]ifficult and agonising judgments have to be made as to how a limited 
budget is best allocated to the maximum advantage of the maximum number of 
patients. This is not a judgment which the court can make.’199 
It can be argued that the UK courts had been aware of the moral force of 
international obligations and fundamental rights stemming from the ECHR and 
had attempted to develop principles of construction and principles of judicial 
review in order to uphold such rights. But in doing so, they were careful not to 
interfere with functions of the other branches of government. Although the 
ECHR could influence the grounds and standards of review, such influence was 
limited by the dualist view and the principle of Parliamentary sovereignty.200 
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e. Arguments for a More Important Interpretive Role for the 
Unincorporated ECHR 
From the discussion above, it can be said that the unincorporated ECHR 
significantly promoted awareness of human rights in the UK.201 However, courts 
were careful not to let the ECHR change the balance of power between the 
judiciary and the other two branches. Moreover, Starmer and Klug submitted that 
only in sixteen out of 316 cases occurring between 1975 and 1996 might the 
judgments have been different if the courts had not taken the Convention into 
account.202  
A number of commentators attempted to propose a theory for a more important 
role for the ECHR. Sir John Laws submitted that in developing the common law 
of fundamental rights, there was nothing wrong in courts looking openly at the 
unincorporated Convention. He proposed three judicial review principles. The 
first was the proportionality principle, meaning that public authorities had to 
consider and give priority to fundamental rights, unless they could provide 
‘substantial, objective, public justification’ for derogating from such rights.203 
Second, public authorities needed to give the reasons on which their decisions 
were based. And third, the Padfield rule, that statutory power must be exercised 
according to the purpose for which it was enacted, needed to apply concurrently 
with the rule of construction that Parliament did not intend to interfere with 
fundamental rights.204 Laws then suggested that the contents of the Convention 
and jurisprudence of the ECtHR could be used as a guideline in considering 
cases according to the said principles. He distinguished between two propositions:  
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… (1) the E.C.H.R., as a legal instrument, is not part of the law of 
England; and (2) the contents of the E.C.H.R., as a series of 
propositions, largely represent legal norms or values which are 
either already inherent in our law, or, so far as they are not, may 
be integrated into it by the judges.205 (emphasis added) 
He submitted that courts had long been developing common law according to the 
demands of a changing society, and that while they had been doing so their 
thinking had frequently been illuminated by foreign legal texts, decisions of 
foreign courts and academic work. Therefore, courts could take into account the 
ECHR and decisions of the ECtHR in the same way. This was supported by the 
fact that many provisions of the Convention were simply statements reflecting 
norms already accepted in democratic countries.206 Finally, he insisted that this 
would be conceptually nothing more than what courts had been doing in 
‘evolving standards of administrative conduct within the four corners of 
conventional judicial review’.207  
Jowell and Lester suggested that British courts could adopt the practice of the 
ECJ by referring to the ECHR as a general principle of law. 208  They also 
suggested that courts should adopt a presumption ‘that nothing may be done by a 
public body which infringes the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the European 
Convention’.209 
While the above approaches seemed to argue that using ECHR as ‘principles’ did 
not violate the dualist principle, some academics went further, to suggest that 
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judges should depart from the strict dualist view. Hunt submitted that the 
Parliamentary sovereignty doctrine and dualism could no longer explain the 
existing status of international human rights law in domestic courts – better than 
other kinds of treaties but not fully incorporated.210 Therefore, the courts, via 
common law powers, were supposed to do their best to interpret legislation in a 
way that was compatible with international human rights norms, including those 
stated in the ECHR, without concerns over ambiguity or uncertainty in law. 211  
 
                                                
Beyleveld had a more radical proposal, that the ECHR was already part of 
English law by ‘implied incorporation’ and that English judges could apply it as 
a direct source of law.212 His proposal was based on the argument that since ‘a 
human right is one possessed simply by virtue of being human’, 213 human rights 
treaties were not supposed to be subject to the dualist theory. The Crown, in 
ratifying human rights treaties, did not impose duties on people; rather, it 
imposed duties on itself.214 And since the Crown usually informed Parliament in 
advance of signing treaties, if Parliament failed to object to such treaties it could 
be assumed that Parliament had given implied assent to them. Assent in the form 
of legislation, he argued, was not necessary.215 Therefore, it was a responsibility 
of the court to review both legislative and executive actions in accordance with 
the ECHR. Beyleveld also maintained that his proposal was not inconsistent with 
the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty in its ultimate sense, because the 
country could still choose to withdraw from the ECHR at any time.216 In any 
case, it is noted that this argument, especially the part maintaining that human 
rights treaties should not be subject to dualist theory because they are rights that 
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ssess.  
                                                
an individual possesses simply because he or she is a human, is difficult to 
sustain. There is no guarantee that all rights according to the ECHR are those 
human rights that every human being should po
Other arguments supporting the practice of courts in using the unincorporated 
ECHR in the domestic sphere by other scholars included the claim that such 
principles had already become part of the domestic law of the UK by way of 
customary international law. 217  However, as discussed above, CIL, though 
theoretically accepted as part of UK law, plays only a limited role in practice as it 
can be used only to the extent that it does not contradict existing domestic law.218 
Moreover, these suggestions could entail a problem concerning identification of 
which norms in the Convention enjoy the status of customary international 
law.219  
It is observed that all the proposals for a more important role for the 
unincorporated ECHR tended to give more power to the judiciary against the 
elected branches without the help of legislation. Nevertheless, the UK 
government later chose to give effect to the ECHR via the HRA 1998 instead of 
letting the courts develop further interpretive approaches regarding the 
unincorporated ECHR. 
ii. The Courts’ Use of the ECHR and Jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
after the Human Rights Act 1998 
The ECHR has been given more force in the courts by the Human Rights Act, 
passed in 1998, and enforced since October 2000. Some scholars maintain that 
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the Act serves as a British Bill of Rights in the sense that it gives certain rights a 
special status, binding governments, and provides redress for violations of such 
rights. 220  However, the Act does not give courts the power to strike down 
legislation. The ultimate decision as to whether a provision in a statute is 
consistent with the ECHR and whether it should be revoked still belong to 
Parliament. 221  Therefore, Hiebert interestingly observes that the Act can be 
classified as a ‘Parliamentary Bill of Rights’ as distinct from the American Bill 
of Rights. The new model accommodates the concerns raised by rights sceptics 
and court sceptics,222 and lets all three branches of government work together to 
protect fundamental rights.223  
Focusing on the effect of international human rights norms on the UK legal 
system, the HRA neither gives the ECHR ‘direct effect’ comparable to European 
Union law nor gives the ECtHR’s judgments self-executing status.224 Rather, the 
Act gives effect to the ECHR by imposing that ‘it is unlawful for a public 
authority to act in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right’.225  
Standard of judicial review has also changed. Instead of Wednesbury, the House 
of Lords applied a ‘proportionality’ test in considering whether the interference 
with a non-absolute right of a prisoner to keep his privileged legal 
correspondence confidential would be ‘justified as a necessary and proper 
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response to the acknowledged need to maintain security, order and discipline in 
prisons and to prevent crime’.226  
More importantly for this research, which concerns the interpretive effect of 
international human rights norms, the HRA requires courts to interpret domestic 
legislation to be consistent with the Convention rights227 and to take into account 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR.228  The following subsections discuss how these 
requirements have affected the court’s approach relative to the approach it took 
prior to the HRA, discussed above. 
a. The Courts’ Use of Convention Rights 
Section 3(1) of the HRA provides:  
So far as it is possible to do so, primary legislation and 
subordinate legislation must be read and given effect in a way 
which is compatible with the Convention rights.229 
This requirement applies to all legislation, whenever enacted.230 The ambiguity 
requirement has been dispensed with since the Act has entered into force. Courts 
must now always consider whether a provision in question is compatible with 
rights specified in the Convention. The House of Lords in Re S admitted that 
such interpretational power is ‘a powerful tool whose use is obligatory. It is not 
an optional canon of construction’.231 
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Nevertheless, limitations on the extent to which the ECHR may influence the 
interpretation of domestic legislation can be found in the Act itself. Section 3 
requires courts to interpret legislation in favour of the Convention only ‘so far as 
it is possible to do so’.232 In the case of such interpretation not being possible, 
section 4 provides that the courts may issue a ‘declaration of incompatibility’ 
which does not affect the validity and enforceability of the provision in question, 
but which may prompt a fast-track amendment of legislation by the executive, 
which will consider whether it is necessary to amend legislation.233 Therefore, 
these sections attempt to balance giving effect to the ECHR (which equates with 
giving more interpretive power to the courts) and preserving the sovereignty of 
Parliament. The latter is preserved, as it is still Parliament that has the exclusive 
power to legislate and invalidate legislation.  
While it seems to be accepted that section 3 ‘does not entitle the judges to 
legislate’, 234  the precise division between legitimate interpretation (which 
includes judicial law-making) and illegitimate legislation remains contestable.235 
Those who believe that the HRA is a Bill of Rights tend to argue for a more 
important role of courts in interpreting laws to be compatible with the ECHR 
through section 3. It can be seen that the Convention can have a more immediate 
effect in the UK in cases where the courts exercise their creativity intensely in 
order to interpret a statute in favour of a Convention right than in cases where a 
declaration of incompatibility is made. In the latter, the parties to the case are still 
bound by the incompatible statute, and the elected branches may fail to proceed 
in a manner that is necessary to implement the ECHR. However, some argue that 
the Act provides a ‘principle proposing dialogue’ and that the courts’ task is to 
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propose the resolution on the rights issue to the elected branches through section 
4.236 
The approach taken by the courts has fluctuated. Soon after the enforcement of 
the HRA in 2000, it seemed as if the House of Lords was prepared to use section 
3 in an extremely creative way in order to avoid making a declaration of 
compatibility.237 In R v A (No 2), the case concerning a statute which seemed to 
be in conflict with the fair trial requirement under Article 6 of the ECHR because 
it excluded almost all evidence relating to the prior sexual behaviour of the 
complainant, Lord Steyn expressed the view that ‘[t]he techniques to be used will 
not only involve the reading down of express language in a statute but also the 
implication of provisions’. 238  Moreover, he seemed to prefer section 3 over 
section 4, saying that ‘[a] declaration of incompatibility is a measure of last 
resort. It must be avoided unless it is plainly impossible to do so.’239 The only 
limitation on interpretive power recognised in this case seemed to be when the 
statute expressed the incompatibility ‘in terms’.240 The Lords then laid down a 
new test of admissibility to be that trial judges may allow the evidence in 
question if they consider it to be so relevant that excluding it would affect the 
fairness of the trial under Article 6 of the ECHR.241 However, this holding has 
proved to be controversial. In the same case, Lord Hope expressed the opinion 
that the statute did not allow the court to read in a more relaxing standard of 
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admission of evidence.242 Moreover, the attitude that section 4 should be the last 
resort raises concerns over the issue of illegitimate judicial activism.  
The Law Lords seemed to be more restrained in using section 3 in subsequent 
cases. In Re S, the case where the Court of Appeal read in a new procedure 
which allowed the court to supervise the implementation of a Parliament Act by 
the executive, the House of Lords held that ‘a meaning which departs 
substantially from a fundamental feature of an Act of Parliament is likely to have 
crossed the boundary between interpretation and amendment’. 243  Also, in 
Anderson, where Parliament conferred on the Secretary of State the power to fix 
the minimum sentencing tariff which should be exercised exclusively by courts, 
the Lords found that it was impossible to read the provision in any other way. 
Lord Hutton said that to do so would amount to the amendment of the statute 
transferring power from the Home Secretary to the judiciary.244 Lord Bingham 
also stated that it would be ‘judicial vandalism’ since it would give the provision 
an effect very different from what Parliament intended.245 Lord Steyn agreed, 
and expressed the opinion that ‘section 3(1) is not available where the suggested 
interpretation is contrary to express statutory words or is by implication 
necessarily contradicted by the statute’. 246  Moreover, in Bellinger, the case 
concerning a statute which provided that parties to a marriage had to be 
‘respectively male and female’, the Court held that it could not interpret the term 
‘female’ to include a male-to-female transsexual even though the term itself may 
be open to such interpretation. Lord Nicholls provided reasons for not 
interpreting so that ‘[t]he recognition of gender reassignment for the purposes of 
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marriage is part of a wider problem which should be considered as a whole and 
not dealt with in a piecemeal fashion’.247 
These cases led Nicol to argue that judicial creativity in such cases has correctly 
been restricted in order to give more space to section 4’s declaration.248 However, 
Kavanagh disagrees, arguing that S, Anderson and Bellinger merely pointed out 
that section 3 may not be suitable in a context involving radical reform of the 
legal issue where Parliament is the more suitable institution to decide. These 
cases did not rule out the strained interpretation possible under section 3 as 
adopted by R v A (No 2) when the context is different.249  
The latter view seemed to be confirmed in Ghaidan. In this case the House of 
Lords held that, in the light of the Convention rights, it was possible to read a 
provision in the Rent Act which provided for the succession rights of surviving 
spouses and those who lived together as husband and wife as though it covered 
homosexual couples living together. Importantly, some Law Lords openly 
admitted that the language of the legislation and the intention of Parliament in 
enacting such legislation are not always a limitation on the possibility of 
interpretation according to section 3(1).250 Courts might ‘read in words which 
change the meaning of the enacted legislation’.251 However, this reasoning has 
 
                                                 
247 Bellinger v Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21, [2003] 2 AC 467 [45]. 
248 Danny Nicol, ‘Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights after Anderson’ [2004] PL 274, 
281–83. See also A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56, [2005] 2 AC 
68 (discriminatory detention of foreign terrorist suspects according to Anti-Terrorism, Crime and 
Security Act 2001). 
249  Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Statutory Interpretation and Human Rights after Anderson: A More 
Contexual Approach’ [2004] PL 537, 545. 
250 Ghaidan v Godin-Mendaza [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 AC 557 [29]–[32] (Lord Nicholls); 
[40]–[41], [45] (Lord Steyn); [110], [123]–[124] (Lord Rodger) cf [72] (Lord Millett). 
251 ibid [32] (Lord Nicholls). 
 
Chapter Three   156 
 
been subject to wide discussion and criticism based on the proper role of the 
judiciary.252 
From the cases above, it can be concluded that UK courts have allowed 
Convention Rights to have substantially more interpretive effect in their judicial 
reasoning since the enforcement of the HRA. Still, it is apparent that the extent to 
which courts may give effect to the Convention rights by means of interpretation 
can prove controversial. The root of the controversy is obviously the question 
regarding the proper role of courts vis-à-vis Parliament in deciding the issue of 
rights253 – a question which is not unfamiliar in the UK constitutional system and 
not resolved by the enactment of the HRA 1998. 
b. The Courts’ Use of the Jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
Apart from giving effect to the ECHR by interpretive instruction in section 3, the 
HRA 1998 also makes the opinions of certain Strasbourg bodies relevant to 
domestic cases concerning Convention rights. Most important among these 
sources is the ‘judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the 
ECtHR’, which section 2(1) requires courts to ‘take into account’ when 
‘determining a question which has arisen in connection with a Convention right’.  
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This section gives much stronger effect to ECtHR jurisprudence on judicial 
reasoning in the UK than it had previously.254 Although section 2(1) does not 
give direct effect to the ECtHR judgments, the point is, as Buxton LJ stated, that 
the jurisprudence will be taken into account ‘whether we determine the case in 
accordance with it, or on the other hand decline, on a reasoned basis, to apply 
that jurisprudence’. 255  It is also observed that section 2(1) gives judges 
significant discretion not only as to whether a Strasbourg jurisprudence is 
relevant, but also as to how much weight they should accord to such 
jurisprudence. Courts may apply the ECtHR jurisprudences directly, consider 
them as part of their reasoning or totally disregard them.256 Not surprisingly, its 
application is subject to wide debate. Masterman submits that while adhering to 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence would benefit legal certainty and reduce 
accusations of judicial activism, the ability to depart from such international 
jurisprudence allows judges to develop an indigenous rights jurisprudence in the 
domestic regime.257  
The controversy now is not about whether the jurisprudence of the ECtHR 
should influence judicial decisions in domestic courts, but about how influential 
it should be. Consistently with the purpose of section 2, the House of Lords did 
not consider the jurisprudence of the ECtHR to be binding. There have been 
cases in which the Court emphasised that the Strasbourg jurisprudence played a 
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role in domestic cases as ‘principles’ rather than compelling authority. 258  
Nevertheless, UK courts have tended to follow Strasbourg jurisprudence very 
closely, adopting the so-called ‘mirror principle’.259 In Alconbury, Lord Slynn 
held that ‘[i]n the absence of some special circumstances it seems to me that the 
court should follow any clear and constant jurisprudence of the European Court 
of Human Rights’. 260  Lord Bingham agreed and provided further reasons in 
Ullah: 
… the Convention is an international instrument, the correct 
interpretation of which can be authoritatively expounded only by 
the Strasbourg court. From this it follows that a national court 
subject to a duty such as that imposed by section 2 should not 
without strong reason dilute or weaken the effect of the 
Strasbourg case law. 261  
Moreover, he remarked that ‘the meaning of the Convention should be uniform 
throughout the states party to it’; therefore national courts have the duty under 
section 6 of the HRA to ‘keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it 
evolves over time: no more, but certainly no less’.262  
However, the courts’ approach has been criticised. Many scholars convincingly 
submit that the domestic judiciary should be able to play a more creative role and 
develop indigenous jurisprudence of human rights.263 It is argued that section 2 
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was drafted with the words ‘take into account’ with the intention of leaving to 
domestic courts discretion as to the weight of the Strasbourg jurisprudence, 
because the legislature recognised special conditions in the UK and intended to 
allow the development of human rights law within the UK itself.264 Further, the 
same position is said to be difficult to reconcile with the aim of the ECHR, which 
envisages states as main players in realising the rights specified in the 
Convention.265  
In fact, that domestic courts should be able to depart from the Strasbourg 
jurisprudence can be implied from Lord Hoffman statement in Re McKerr:  
Although people sometimes speak of the Convention having been 
incorporated into domestic law, that is a misleading metaphor. 
What the Act has done is to create domestic rights expressed in 
the same terms as those contained in the Convention. But they are 
domestic rights, not international rights. Their source is the statute, 
not the Convention … their meaning and application is a matter 
for domestic courts, not the court in Strasbourg.266  
Nevertheless, the tendency to attach to the ECtHR closely was confirmed in 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v AF. Lord Hoffmann expressed the 
view that 
the United Kingdom is bound by the Convention, as a matter of 
international law, to accept the decisions of the ECtHR on its 
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interpretation. To reject such a decision would almost certainly 
put this country in breach of the international obligation which it 
accepted when it acceded to the Convention. I can see no 
advantage in your Lordships doing so.267 (emphasis added) 
Lord Carswell also stated in the same case, regarding the requirement of section 
2(1), that ‘[w]hatever latitude this formulation may permit, the authority of a 
considered statement of the Grand Chamber is such that our courts have no 
option but to accept and apply it’. 268  Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
unanimously held in R v Horncastle that it may depart from Strasbourg 
jurisprudence in circumstances where it ‘has concerns as to whether a decision of 
the Strasbourg Court sufficiently appreciates or accommodates particular aspects 
of our domestic process’.269 
It may be sufficient for the purpose of this research to observe that courts in the 
UK have now allowed a significantly more important role for the jurisprudence 
of the ECtHR in their reasoning than the role they allowed before the 
enforcement of the HRA.270 It is argued, however, that the ‘mirror principle’ is 
not necessarily the result of section 2(1) of the HRA, but rather of the courts’ 
own initiative which develops from the (mistaken) belief that Convention rights 
according to the HRA are still international rights and that departing from 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR would amount to the UK breaching its international 
obligation.271 
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c. The ECHR and Jurisprudence of the ECtHR as a Standard for 
the Principle of Legality 
Leaving the debate over the scope of sections 3 and 2 aside, it can be seen that 
the HRA has provided an effect similar to the well-established ‘principle of 
legality’ discussed in section II.272  
The HRA resembles the principle of legality inasmuch as it instructs courts to 
read legislation in a way that does not override certain rights, unless Parliament 
expresses its intention of limiting those rights in clear language.273 In the case of 
the principle of legality those rights can be found in common law, but in the case 
of the HRA 1998 the rights applicable are the Convention rights. Therefore, as 
Lord Hoffman put it in Wilkinson, the Convention rights ‘form a significant part 
of the background against which all statutes … had to be interpreted’.274 The 
Convention rights as interpreted by the ECtHR have become standards which 
Parliament, though still supreme, is presumed to respect when legislating.  
The difference between the two is that under the principle of legality, courts 
attempt to interpret legislation so as to not override common law rights, because 
they are careful not to presume that Parliament intends to violate or limit 
established rights when the language is not clear. 275  Thus, in using such a 
principle, courts still refer to Parliament’s intention. The HRA, on the other hand, 
instructs courts to give effect to the Convention rights and take account of the 
Strasbourg jurisprudence to the extent that the intention of Parliament as 
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expressed in a statute may be overridden to some degree.276 The role of the 
courts has shifted from finding what Parliament intends to finding which possible 
meanings of the text are most compatible with the Convention rights. 277  Of 
course, it is arguable that in the case of the HRA, the courts follow the intent of 
the Parliament in enacting the HRA instead of the intent in the statutes in 
question. By section 3(1), however, the intent of the HRA always prevails over 
the intent of statutes to be interpreted, no matter whether those statutes were 
enacted before or after the HRA.278 This is not consistent with the doctrine of 
implied repeal, which derives from the positive aspect of Parliamentary 
sovereignty discussed in the first section of this Chapter. 
Further, the instruction provided by the HRA gives a stronger effect to the 
Convention rights than the principle of legality gives to common law rights. The 
courts’ interpretive approaches aimed at interpreting UK law in a way which is 
compatible with the ECHR include not only the reading down of the statute, 
which they normally do in applying the principle of legality, but also the reading 
in of additional words to a statute.279  
In fact, it is argued that the HRA 1998 has become a constitutional statute,280 
which Laws LJ defined in Thoburn as ‘one which (a) conditions the legal 
relationship between citizen and state in some general, overarching manner, or (b) 
enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now regard as fundamental 
constitutional rights’. 281  The effect of the constitutional statutes is that they 
cannot be impliedly repealed by later Acts of Parliament.282 Lord Rodger seemed 
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to accept this in Wilson when he expressed the view that Convention rights ‘are 
clearly of a higher order than the rights which people enjoy at common law or 
under most other statutes’.283 
iii. The Courts’ Use of Non-ECHR Norms 
In addition to the norms from the ECHR, UK courts have also been influenced 
by other international human rights instruments and the jurisprudences of foreign 
countries. 
This is most apparent in cases relating to refugees. The 1951 Geneva Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, which the UK has 
ratified but has not enacted an implementing statute in relation to, have an 
important role in helping the UK courts determine who can be protected as 
refugees. 284  Moreover, since there is no international tribunal in charge of 
interpreting the Convention, the UK courts have also sought non-determinative 
guidance from the interpretation of the Convention by the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the European Union 285  and other 
states. 286  It can be said that the courts have attempted to ensure that their 
jurisprudence in this field is in line with international instruments and 
international consensus.  
In relation to the HRA, the mirror principle discussed above287 provides a reason 
for UK courts not to utilise international human rights norms beyond the ECHR 
and Strasbourg jurisprudence, especially in the definition of rights. It is feared 
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that the use of these materials may result in the UK jurisprudence being 
inconsistent with that of the ECtHR. Lord Bingham, one of the main proponents 
of the use of international and foreign sources himself, expressed concern about 
the use of commonwealth cases in the issue relating to the HRA since ‘the United 
Kingdom courts must take their lead from Strasbourg’. 288  However, many 
scholars, particularly those who support indigenous rights jurisprudence in the 
UK, forcefully argue that since section 2(1) of the HRA does not require 
domestic courts to follow the jurisprudence of the ECtHR strictly, it not only 
allows but also encourages the consideration of non-ECHR norms. 289  The 
relevance and usefulness of the jurisprudence of foreign countries, especially 
those in common law jurisdictions, have been emphasised. 290  Moreover, 
Baroness Hale criticises the comment made by Lord Bingham, saying that the 
HRA does not prevent the use of jurisprudence from foreign courts that have 
comparable human rights instruments, ‘especially on subjects where Strasbourg 
has not recently spoken’. 291 
                                                 
288 Sheldrake v DPP [2005] 1 AC 264 [33] (HL). See also his hesitation to follow Canadian cases 
in R (Gillan) v Commission of Police for the Metropolis [2006] 2 AC 307 [23]. 
289 Francesca Klug, ‘The Human Rights Act 1998, Pepper v. Hart and All That’ [1999] PL 246, 
251, 266–267; Masterman, ‘Section 2(1)’ (n 263) 726; Rabinder Singh, ‘Interpreting Bill of 
Rights’ 29 Statute Law Review’ 82, 98. See also Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of 
Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20 OJLS 
499, 503–05 submitting that the use of foreign jurisprudence depends partly on whether the 
courts see the rights in the HRA as stating ‘universal’ rights, ‘European’ rights or ‘domestic’ 
rights. 
290 David Feldman, ‘Standards of Review and Human Rights in English Law’ in David Feldman 
(ed), English Public Law (OUP 2004) 397; Keir Starmer, European Human Rights Law: The 
Human Rights Act 1998 and the European Convention on Human Rights (Legal Action Group 
1999) 27; Lord Irvine of Lairg, ‘Activism and Restraint: Human Rights and the Interpretative 
Process’ (1999) 4 European Human Rights Law Review 350, 355. It is also submitted that the 
ECtHR considers a variety of international materials, many of which do not have binding force 
even in the international sphere. Thus, if courts in the UK take into account the judgment of the 
ECtHR, they may also be influenced by those materials. Fatima, Using International Law in 
Domestic Courts (n 98) 263–65; Feldman (n 290) 395–96. 
291 Baroness Hale of Richmond, Law Lords at the Margin: Who Defines Convention Rights? 
(JUSTICE Tom Sargant memorial annual lecture 2008, 15 October 2008) 4. 
 
 
Chapter Three   165 
 
In fact, it is submitted by Singh that the nature of the HRA itself has required UK 
courts to grapple with the questions of international law where not only 
principles of public international law but also decisions of foreign courts have 
been useful.292 References to non-ECHR materials can consistently be found in 
several cases arising under the HRA. In Brown v Stott,293 on the issue of the right 
not to incriminate oneself, references were made by Lord Bingham and Lord 
Hope to decisions of the Canadian courts. At the same time a relevant decision of 
the ECtHR was given little weight since its reasoning was ‘unsatisfactory and 
less than clear’294 and ‘unconvincing’. 295 In Lambert,296 a judgment of the South 
African Constitutional Court was referred to in order to demonstrate the 
significance of the presumption of innocence, and reasoning from a decision of 
the Canadian Supreme Court was adopted in relation to the conclusion that a 
provision of law which required the defendant to establish that he did not 
knowingly possess illegal substances was inconsistent with the presumption of 
innocence. 297  Then, jurisprudence from the two jurisdictions was used to 
reinforce ‘the view that a reverse legal burden is a disproportionate means of 
addressing the legislative goal of easing the task of the prosecution’.298  
In R v A (No 2), rape shield provisions in Scotland and in other countries such as 
the USA, Australia and Canada served as an ‘assistance’ in finding the answer as 
to whether the balance between the protection of the complainant and the 
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accused’s right to a fair trial had been rightly struck.299 Moreover, the Court of 
Appeal in Campbell v MGN Ltd considered a decision of the Australian High 
Court, a decision which, as Phillipson submits, ‘appears to have had far more 
influence on the development of confidence as a privacy remedy than any 
principles derived from Article 8’.300  
The interpretive influence of international and foreign human rights norms is 
particularly apparent in cases relating to the Government’s measures against 
terrorism which affect rights to liberty and fair trial according to the HRA.301 For 
example, in A,302 where the House of Lords held that the indefinite detention of 
foreign prisoners in Belmarsh without trial under section 23 of the Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 was incompatible with the ECHR Crime and 
Security Act 2001, Lord Bingham discussed the UDHR, ICCPR, Resolutions of 
the Security Council of the UN, Resolutions of the General Commission for 
Human Rights, Resolutions of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
Europe and, lastly, the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Racial Discrimination. 303  Lords Bingham, Hope, Rodger and Walker also 
referred to judgments from Canada and the USA in order to support their 
positions in issues relating to the role of courts in terrorist cases, proportionality 
and prohibition of discrimination against aliens.304 A number of references to 
foreign decisions were made by both majority and minority opinions in A and 
                                                 
299 [2002] 1 AC 45, 83–85 (Lord Hope). 
300 Gavin Phillipson, ‘Transforming Breach of Confidence? Towards a Common Law Right of 
Privacy under the Human Rights Act’ (2003) 66 MLR 726, 731. It is noted that the ECtHR had 
not provided clear jurisprudence on the issue.  
301 The cases discussed here have been identified in Ian Cram ‘Resort to Foreign Constitutional 
Norms in Domestic Human Rights Jurisprudence with Reference to Terrorism Cases’ 68 CLJ 
2009. 
302 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] 2 AC 68. 
303 ibid [58]–[63.] 
304 ibid [30], [39], [46], [70] (Lord Bingham), [134] (Lord Hope), [178] (Lord Rodger), [214] 
(Lord Walker). 
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Others (No. 2),305 which concerns the admissibility of evidence obtained by the 
torture of a third-party witness. More importantly, in holding that it was the 
responsibility of the detainees to establish that the third-party witness had been 
tortured, Lords Hope and Rodger cited only a decision of the Hamburg Regional 
Court of Appeals as support.306  
Other cases in which the UK courts tended to follow foreign jurisprudences 
include MB and AF concerning the limited disclosure of information to the 
defendants, 307  and Abassi in the Court of Appeal concerning the legitimate 
expectation of a citizen who had been detained without charge at Guantanamo 
Bay that the executive would initiate diplomatic assistance according to a ratified 
treaty and the Government’s own statements.308  
In conclusion, it is observed that non-ECHR norms of several kinds have had 
interpretive influence in UK judicial reasoning. Most of the time, they serve as 
additional supports for the courts’ decisions. Nevertheless, from time to time 
they play an important role in shaping the courts’ reasoning. In relation to the 
HRA, their role seems to be less important where relevant jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR exists and more important where there is no clear jurisprudence from the 
ECtHR or where such is deemed inappropriate for the UK. While norms from 
international human rights instruments enjoy presumption of compatibility just 
like that enjoyed by the unincorporated ECHR, foreign law and jurisprudence do 
not. The question of how persuasive those norms should be is answered by the 
courts on a case-by-case basis. Neither is there a consistent principle in choosing 
 
                                                 
305 A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2006] 2 AC 221. 
306  Lord Bingham criticised the majority on this. However, his criticism focused on the 
persuasiveness of the decision itself, not on the fact that the majority followed ‘foreign’ 
jurisprudence. ibid [60]. 
307  Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB; Secretary of State for the Home 
Department v AF [2007] 3 WLR 681 [30] (Lord Bingham) [65] (Baroness Hale).  
308 R (on the application of Abbasi) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
[2003] UKHRR 76 [86], [98], [102]–[106]. 
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sources of norms,309 even though it is observed that cases from commonwealth 
countries tend to be cited more often than those from other jurisdictions.310 
V. Conclusion 
International human rights norms from a wide variety of sources have had an 
indirect but important role in the interpretation of statutes and the development of 
common law, even though they have not been incorporated into the legal system. 
The unincorporated ECHR enjoyed the presumption of compatibility and served 
as guidance for UK courts in adjudicating domestic cases concerning rights. The 
influence was most obvious in situations where the courts had wide discretion, 
and less obvious where courts were limited by statutes, existing common law, or 
an obligation to defer to the decisions of public authorities. Other international 
conventions and jurisprudence of foreign countries also help to support and 
shape the reasoning of the courts, although to a more limited extent. It is argued 
that while the effect of these norms reflects relaxation of an absolute dualist 
concept, the conditions of ambiguity and uncertainty regarding the use, and the 
limitations on the influence, of these norms reflect restraint on the courts’ part in 
order to show respect for dualism and for Parliamentary sovereignty. 
The Convention rights, together with the interpretation by the ECtHR, have an 
even more important influence, in a substantive sense,311 on judicial decisions 
following the enactment of the Human Rights Act. It can be seen that with the 
authorisation of Parliament, judges are more comfortable about considering the 
 
                                                 
309 Bingham (n 120) chapter 3. This is surprising since the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council is well acquainted with the use of international and comparative human rights law in 
relation to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights of independent Commonwealth countries and 
the UK’s overseas territories. Andrew Harding, ‘Comparative Case Law in Human Rights Cases 
in the Commonwealth: The Emerging Common Law of Human Rights’ in Esin Örücü (ed), 
Judicial Comparativism in Human Rights Cases (United Kingdom National Committee of 
Comparative Law 2003) 187. 
310 See McCrudden (n 289) 517–18 submitting that it is natural for judges to cite the sources from 
jurisdictions that are more or less similar to their own. 
311 This is according to Larsen’s typologies. Chapter One, text to n 18. 
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Convention and the ECtHR jurisprudence as one of the relevant factors and are 
actually required to do this. The consequence of this has been dramatic. 
Convention rights have become more or less constitutional rights for the UK, and 
jurisprudence of the ECtHR has been followed very closely. Nevertheless, there 
are still controversial debates over the extent to which these sources can be 
influential. Of course, the controversies, again, concern the perceived role of the 
judiciary vis-à-vis the executive and legislative branches. 
  
Chapter Four: The United States       
of America 
The main purposes of this Chapter are to investigate whether the US Supreme 
Court has made use of international human rights norms in its judicial reasoning, 
and if so to what extent, and also to understand the forms such usage takes and 
the arguments for and against it. In order to achieve these purposes, the Chapter 
follows the same structure as Chapters Two and Three. An overview of the 
political and constitutional system is presented first so as to give a general idea of 
US constitutionalism. Then, the research focuses on the role of the judiciary in 
US polity, especially in relation to the protection of constitutional rights, which 
depends on the judiciary’s power of judicial review and interpretive approaches. 
The research then moves on to address the legal status and interpretive influence 
of general international and foreign law in the USA before focusing on the same 
issues in relation to international human rights norms. The research addresses 
Americans’ perception of international human rights norms and their legal status 
first, then attempts to evaluate the practice of the US Supreme Court. Finally, the 
research engages with the debates for and against the use of international human 
rights norms in the US courts. 
I. Overview of the Political and Constitutional System 
The political system of the United States of America is based on its written 
Constitution – adopted in 1789 – which has proven to have durability and 
stability.1 From its first promulgation, there have been only 27 amendments, the 
                                                 
1 Edward Ashbee and Nigel Ashford, US Politics Today (Manchester University Press 1999) 42; 
Lawrence M Friedman, American Law in the Twentieth Century (Yale University Press 2002) 15. 
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first ten of which were adopted not long after the Constitution itself and are 
regarded as ‘a part of the original constitution’.2  
The Constitution established the federal system of government whereby the 
national (federal) government enjoys enumerated powers in the Constitution, 
such as those related to foreign affairs, defence and inter-state commerce, while 
individual states retain all the rest.3 Federal law is the supreme law of the land, 
binding all states, and has supremacy over state law.4 The federal government 
consists of three branches, which, ranked according to greatest popular input first, 
are the legislative, the executive and the judicial branches. 5  The legislative 
branch, Congress, consists of a House of Representatives and a Senate elected by 
the people and state legislators.6 The executive branch is led by the President, 
who is elected via an electoral college whose members are elected by voters from 
all the states. The judicial power is vested in the Courts. The Constitution does 
not elaborate the details of the judiciary’s structure as it does those of the other 
two branches. It only established the Supreme Court, and left other details to be 
worked out by Congress and the executive.7 The results are that the number of 
justices of the Supreme Courts is determined by a statute, lower courts are 
established by Congress, and judges of both the Supreme Courts and lower 
federal courts are nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate.8  
 
                                                 
2 Ashbee and Ashford (n 1) 42; Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of the United States of America: 
A Contextual Analysis (Hart 2009) 1. 
3 Ashbee and Ashford (n 1) 38. 
4 US Const art VI.  
5 Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography (Random House 2005) 208. 
6 US Const art I.  
7 US Const art III. 
8  Mark Tushnet, ‘The United States: Eclecticism in the Service of Pragmatism’ in Jeffery 
Goldsworthy (ed) Interpreting Constitution : A Comparative Study (OUP 2006) 14. 
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Congress may also remove federal judges using an impeachment process, control 
the budget of the judiciary, and in some circumstances limit its jurisdiction.9  
Importantly, the separation of powers in the USA is not absolute. It includes a 
system of checks and balances to ensure that no one branch can abuse its 
powers.10 For example, the legislative branch may pass laws that regulate actions 
of executive officials. It may also impeach the President.11 At the same time, the 
President may veto bills passed by Congress, although Congress may override 
the veto by a two-thirds majority in each house.12 The executive and legislative 
exercise checks on the judiciary through the setting up of the latter’s structure 
and personnel, as stated above. However, the judiciary may subject both 
executive and legislative actions to constitutional judicial review.13  
With the aspiration to create ‘a more perfect union’, 14  the most important 
concept behind the Constitution is the concept of government under law or 
limited government.15 The constitutional guarantee of individual rights against 
interference by both federal and state governments has been one of the most 
prominent characteristics of the US Constitution. The first ten Amendments to 
the Constitution adopted in the late 18th century,16 later known as the Bill of 
 
                                                 
9 ibid 15. 
10 Ashbee and Ashford (n1) 38; A W Heringa and Philipp Kiiver, Constitutional Compared: An 
Introduction to Comparative Constitutional Law (2nd edn, Intersenta 2009) 146. 
11 US Const art II , s 4. 
12 US Const art I, s 7.  
13 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 343 US 579 (1952) and Marbury v Madison, 5 US 
(1 Cranch) 137 (1803) discussed further in text to n 28 and n 33. 
14 US Const pmbl.  
15 Stephen M Griffin, American Constitutionalism: From Theory to Politics (Princeton University 
Press 1996) 13; Lord Reed, ‘Internationalism and Tradition – Some Thoughts on Incorporating 
Human Rights Law’ (2000) 51 NILQ 365, 366–67.  
16The National Archives and Records Administration, ‘Constitution of the United States: A 
History’ <http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/charters/constitution_history.html> accessed 20 April 
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Rights, offer protections of certain rights of individuals,17 such as freedom of 
expression,18 the right to bear arms,19 the right to be free from unreasonable 
search and seizure20 and the right to due process of criminal procedure.21 The 
abolition of slavery and guarantee of equal protection were added in the 
Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments after the Civil War. 22  
Women’s and minors’ rights to vote were added by the Nineteenth and Twenty-
fifth Amendments in the 20th century. Importantly, the Ninth Amendment 
emphasises that the enumeration of rights in other amendments does not mean 
that other rights retained by the people are denied. These provisions have long 
served as an important platform for people in the USA to reinforce their 
individual rights against the government.23 
II. The Judiciary and the Protection of Rights 
The role of the judiciary in the protection of rights is exercised through its 
interpretation of constitutional provisions and the judicial review of executive 
and legislative acts. It is acknowledged that state and federal courts have 
concurrent jurisdiction in interpreting and exercising power of judicial review of 
the state’s executive and legislative acts according to the federal Constitution, but 
 
                                                                                                                                    
2010; The National Archives and Records Administration, ‘Bill of Rights’ <http://www. 
archives.gov/exhibits/charters/bill_of_rights.html> accessed 20 April 2010. 
17 It should be noted that many of rights contained in the bill of rights derived from the general 
principle of common law. Graham Hughes, ‘Common Law System’ in Alan B Morrison (ed) 
Fundamentals of American law (OUP 1996) 12. 
18US Const Amend I. 
19 US Const Amend II. 
20 US Const Amend IV.  
21 US Const Amend V, VI. 
22 Burt Neuborne, ‘An Overview of the Bill of Rights’ in Alan B Morrison (ed) Fundamental of 
American Law (OUP 1996) 83. 
23 Ashbee and Ashford (n 1) 21.  
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this research will focus on the federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court of 
the USA, which has the final word in interpreting the federal Constitution.24 
A. Power of Judicial Review  
While it was considered the weakest branch of the three at the beginning of the 
Republic,25 the judiciary has been accepted as having the power to review the 
actions of the executive and the legislative branches. The following was stated in 
Baker v Carr: 
Deciding whether a matter has in any measure been committed by 
the Constitution to another branch of government, or whether the 
action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been 
committed, is itself a delicate exercise in constitutional 
interpretation, and is a responsibility of the Court as ultimate 
interpreter of the Constitution.26 (emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
24 See Cooper v Aaron, 358 US 1, 18 (1958); US v Morrison, 529 US 598, 616 (2000); Miller v 
Johnson, 515 US 900, 922 (1995) holding that federal courts were supreme in exposition of the 
US Constitution. 
25 Alexander Hamilton stated in The Federalist No 78 that  
the judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least 
dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a 
capacity to annoy or injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, 
but holds the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the 
purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of every citizen 
are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary, has no influence over either 
the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of 
the society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to 
have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately 
depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments. 
Alexander Hamilton, ‘The Federalist # 78: The Judiciary Department’ The Federalist Papers 
<http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa78.htm> accessed 4 June 2010 para 7. 
26 369 US 186, 211 (1962). The issue of whether the reappointment statute fell into the ‘political 
question’ doctrine and hence non-justiciability.  
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It has been widely accepted that the executive’s power is limited by the law, and 
it is the courts’ duty to ensure that the executive branch does not act beyond its 
power.27 The seminal case is that of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v Sawyer, 
when the Court held that, in the absence of enumerated authority from the 
Constitution or from statute, the President has no power to seize private plants, 
even during war time.28 
The more problematic issue is judicial review of the legislative acts. In fact, the 
Framers disagreed on the issue of whether the judiciary should have power to 
review and invalidate legislative acts. Madison was in favour of majoritarian 
democracy. However, Hamilton argued that the will of the people should not be 
totally replaced by the will of its representatives and that courts could serve as an 
intermediary between them in order to assure that the representatives did not 
exceed the limits of their authority. 29  Hamilton explained in the Federalist 
Papers that, in the system of limited government where the Constitution, a 
document reflecting the will of the people, was the supreme law, one of the 
courts’ duties was ‘to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the 
constitution void’. 30 He also emphasised that ‘[w]ithout this, all the reservations 
of particular rights or privileges would amount to nothing’.31  
The Constitution simply confers on the judiciary the power to hear all cases 
‘arising under this constitution’, without mentioning the power to invalidate or 
disapply legislation.32 However, the judicial power of review of legislative acts 
 
                                                 
27 Jeremy Waldron, ‘The Core of the Case against Judicial Review’ (2006) 115 Yale LJ 1346, 
1354. 
28 343 US 579, 595 (1952) 
29 See in Gordon Wood, ‘Comment’ in Amy Gutmann (ed) A Matter of Interpretation: Federal 
Courts and the Law : An Essay by Antonin Scalia (Princeton University Press 1997) 54. 
30 Hamilton (n 25) para 9. 
31 ibid para 9. 
32 US Const art III. 
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has been accepted since the Supreme Court claimed such a power on the basis of 
the necessity to implement the concepts of limited government and supremacy of 
the Constitution in the landmark decision Marbury v Madison in 1803.33  
Although for some time after Marbury courts were still inclined to defer to their 
political counterparts when exercising the power of judicial review,34 the rate of 
the judicial invalidation of federal statutes increased after 1860 when the powers 
of the national state started to expand.35 Then, during the period from 1890 to 
1937, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional several states’ statutes aiming to 
initiate social and economic reform or establish labour unions and struck down 
several federal laws, especially those under the New Deal economic programme 
during 1935–37.36 The ideology behind these decisions was actually the idea of 
limited government in the strict sense that government should not interfere with 
the people’s rights to make and enforce contracts and to property for any purpose 
and the laissez-faire thinking that judges were not concerned whether the law 
was good or bad.37 
Decisions in this era created tensions between the judiciary and the political 
branches, and prompted President Roosevelt to initiate the ‘Court-packing’ 
 
                                                 
33 5 US (1 Cranch) 137, 176–77 (1803).  
34 Amar (n 5) 212–16. Since Marbury until 1860, there was only one Supreme Court decision that 
a federal statute was invalidated and this case was the infamous Dred Scott v Sandford, 60 US 
393 (1856).  
35 Griffin (n 15) 97. 
36 This period is also known as Lochner era after Lochner v New York, 198 US 45 (1905). 
Though the Court in this era seems to be very aggressive, Griffin argues that the Court was 
simply strictly ‘scrutinizing legislation that appeared to benefit a particular class of citizens’, 
which was the standard recognised by the political philosophy accepted in the 18th century. ibid 
99–101. It is reported that in such an era, 170 states’ and federal statutes relating to labour issues 
were invalidated. Waldron (n 27) 1348. Waldron bases his calculation of the number of the cases 
on lists given in William E Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement apps 
A, C, at 177–92, 199–203 (1991).  
37  As the court obstructed the political agenda using such ideologies, the era was labelled 
‘conservative activism’. ibid 16–18, 24. 
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project in order to have more judicial supporters for the New Deal.38 Although 
the project was not successful, the Supreme Court responded by restructuring its 
role, relaxing its strictures for the review of economic and regulatory legislation, 
and focusing on the protection of rights.39  
In 1938, the Court declared in the famous footnote four of US v Carolene 
Products Co40 that, while economic legislation was presumed to be constitutional, 
certain kinds of laws, namely those related to the Bill of Rights, those restricting 
political process, and those directed at minorities, were to be subjected to a more 
rigorous scrutiny. The Court stated: 
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within 
a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first 
ten Amendments, which are deemed equally specific when held to 
be embraced within the Fourteenth … It is unnecessary to 
consider now whether legislation which restricts those political 
processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal 
of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting 
judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment than are most other types of legislation. … Nor need 
we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of 
statutes directed at particular religious, or racial minorities. 41  
(internal citation omitted) 
Starting from this point, courts in the USA have portrayed themselves as 
protectors of rights and exercise their powers of judicial review extensively.42 
 
                                                 
38 Griffin (n 15) 106. 
39 ibid 105. 
40 304 US 144 (1938). 
41 ibid 153. 
42 Martin Shapiro, ‘The United States’ in Neal Tate and Torbjorn Vallinder (eds) The Global 
Expansion of Judicial Power: Part II: Western Common Law Democracies (New York 
University Press 1995) 46; Griffin (n 15)105. 
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Chief Justice Earl Warren, holding office from 1953 to 1969, delivered several 
landmark decisions affecting, inter alia, racial segregation in schools,43 rights to 
attorney,44 rights of suspects upon arrest,45 and religion and the state.46 After that, 
Chief Justice Warren Burger, holding office from 1969 to 1986, continued the 
liberal civil rights movement, 47 making landmark decisions regarding 
desegregation between races48 and women’s right to an abortion.49  
The exercise of judicial review, especially by the Supreme Court, has 
significantly affected the legal and political environment, 50  and has been 
extremely controversial. 51  The Liberals welcomed the results, but the 
Conservatives believed that the Court ‘converted constitutional law into ordinary 
politics’.52 Adding to the controversy is the fact that the Court’s decisions are 
generally durable; they can be reversed only through the onerous process of 
constitutional amendment. 53  Therefore, although it is generally accepted that 
 
43 Brown v Board of Education, 347 US 483 (1954). 
44 Gideon v Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
45 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436 (1966) 
46 Engel v Vitale, 370 US 421 (1962); Abington Township School District v 
Schempp (consolidated with Murray v Curlett), 374 US 203 (1963). 
47 Ashbee and Ashford (n 1) 56. 
48 See, for example, Swann v Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 US 1 (1971); 
Regents of the University of California v Allan Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
49 Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973). It is said that the people’s attitudes towards abortion were 
diverse, but the Supreme Court in this case impose the same standard for the whole nation. 
Edward Ashbee, US politics today (2nd edn, Manchester University Press 2004) 74 providing 
statistic.  
50 Lawrence G Sager, ‘The Sources and Limits of Legal Authority’ in Alan B Morrison (ed) 
Fundamentals of American law (OUP 1996) 54. 
51 Ashbee and Ashford (n 1) 56. 
52 Mark Tushnet, ‘Constitutional Interpretation, Character and Experience’ (1992) 72 B U L Rev 
747, 759. 
53 Sager (n 50) 54; Tushnet, The Constitution of the United States of America (n 2) 1; Ashbee and 
Ashford (n 1) 60. 
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Congress cannot serve as a fair judge of its own power54 and that the judiciary is 
the institution best equipped to declare and protect certain values with which 
Congress cannot interfere,55 the power of judicial review has been seen by many 
as problematic. Arguments based on what democracy entails, like those of 
Madison, have consistently been raised.  
Bickel famously observed that ‘[t]he root difficulty is that judicial review is a 
counter-majoritarian force’.56 According to Bickel, when the Supreme Court, 
whose constituents are not elected and may hold their office given good 
behaviour, declares that a legislative act is unconstitutional, ‘it thwarts the will of 
representatives of the actual people of here and now’.57 More recently, Waldron 
submits that judicial review is inappropriate ‘as a mode of final decision-making 
in a free and democratic society’. 58  Comparing the sources of powers and 
processes of decision-making of the legislative and the judicial branches, he 
argues firstly that the legislature comes from elections where people are treated 
equally in deciding who should be their representatives. Judges, on the other 
hand, are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The President 
and the Senate are elected, but because the people do not directly have a say in 
the appointment of judges, the judiciary’s source of power is inferior to that of 
the legislature in terms of democratic values. Secondly, the quality of the 
decisions made by the majority of legislators can be defended on the basis of 
well-known arguments about fairness, which do not apply in the case of a 
 
                                                 
54  Henry Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme Court and the Process of 
Adjudication (Yale University Press 1990) 24 referring to opinion of Hamilton in Hamilton (n 25) 
and Black in C Black, The People and the Court: Judicial Review in a Democracy (Macmillan 
1977). 
55 Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: the Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics 
(Bobbs-Merrill 1962) 24. 
56 ibid 16. 
57 ibid 16–17. 
58 Waldron (n 27) 1348 (emphasis added). 
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majority vote of the judges. This is because judges are not ‘persons who have a 
moral claim to insist on being regarded as equals’ in the decision-process.59  
However, Bickel himself suggests that judicial review, counter-majoritarian as it 
may be, can be justified because it helps ensure the legitimacy of the government 
by enforcing principles in the Constitution – the principles which the legislative 
branches may neglect in favour of expediency.60 The premise is that good society 
would endeavour to maintain both the ‘immediate needs of the greatest number’ 
and ‘enduring general values’. 61  The Court is ‘an institution which stands 
altogether aside from the current clash of interests and which, insofar as is 
humanly possible, is concerned only with principle’.62 Moreover, the principles 
are evolving according to novel circumstances, and while the executive and 
legislative branches have to deal with abstract problems, the judiciary can 
consider concrete cases. 63  However, John Hart Ely criticises this approach, 
arguing that the judicial review is justified only when exercised to ensure that the 
democratic processes are open and fair.64 
There are also arguments that judicial review is not necessarily counter-
majoritarian. Bruce Ackerman distinguishes between ‘ordinary politics’ and 
‘higher lawmaking politics’. He points out that ordinary people are not involved 
much in ‘ordinary politics’, which is actually dominated by self-interested 
politicians and special interest groups, and that the Court’s exercise of power of 
 
                                                 
59 ibid 1387–92. The quotation is in 1392. 
60 Bickel (n 55) 23–28. See also Kenneth Ward, ‘Alexander Bickel’s Theory of Judicial Review 
Reconsidered’ (1996) 28 Ariz St L J 893. 
61 Bickel (n 55) 27. 
62 ibid 25. 
63 ibid 25–26. 
64 John Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Harvard University Press 
1980) 117. 
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judicial review in ordinary politics serves to enforce the result of the higher 
lawmaking politics.65  
Moreover, it is arguable that courts do limit the review to justiciable issues and 
abstain from issues where they lack capacity or expertise to judge. The ‘political 
question’ doctrine provides one area in which the Supreme Court has shown 
restraint. Also, after the self-restructuring in response to the Court-Packing 
scheme discussed above, the Supreme Court has applied a moderately weak 
standard of judicial review to social and economic legislation.66  
As to the area of rights, concerning which courts have exercised robust judicial 
review, it has been argued that the tyranny of the majority is not democracy, and 
that judicial review is necessary to protect the interests of ‘discrete and insular 
minorities’ against the majority. 67  The Court thus serves as an enforcement 
institution making sure that limits on the majority are respected.68 The protection 
of fundamental rights is perceived as part of democracy itself. 69  The 
contractarian theory of constitutional adjudication supports this argument, saying 
that the underlying principles of the constitution are the principles of justice 
which the majority cannot contradict.70 It is also submitted that judicial review 
provides a ‘good decision’ and that its processes ensure that rights are considered 
steadily and seriously.71  
 
                                                 
65 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundation (Harvard University Press 1991). 
66 David A J Richards, The Moral Criticism of Law (Dickenson 1977) 40–41.  
67 Heringa and Kiiver (n 10). See also Griffin (n 15) 105–06. 
68 Griffin (n 15) 109. 
69 ibid 111. 
70 Richards (n 66) 50–51. 
71  Ronald Dworkin, A Matter of Principle (Harvard University Press 1985) 9–32. This is 
comparable to the argument made in the UK that the HRA 1998 provides for a dialogue between 
three branches of government. See Chapter Three, IV B ii a, text to n 236. 
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In any case, it is noted that those who are sceptical about the legitimacy of 
judicial review do not consider the matter of rights to be special. Waldron argues 
that judicial review on the subject of rights is not distinguishable from judicial 
review on other subjects, as they all are constitutional reviews.72 The core issue 
of judicial review, he argues, is the structural role of courts in upholding 
constitutional rules. This applies equally to the issues of federalism, separation of 
powers and rights. 73  Therefore, following the same line of argument against 
judicial review in general, he argues that disagreement about rights should be 
settled by the legislators rather than the courts.74 
B. Interpretive Approaches 
Prior to the establishment of the nation, America as a colony of England had 
adopted English common law as its legal system. It has since become an 
important part of American legal culture. Until now, its contents and methods 
have continued to influence litigation, interpretation and decision-making 
techniques at both federal and state levels.75 The most prominent characteristic 
of the American legal system is that judges play an important role in developing 
law.76 They exercise great power in setting principles and then revising them as 
appropriate. 77  However, the role of the common law judges is subject to 
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constraints. This is especially so with regard to constitutional interpretation, 
which, being part of the judicial review process, is politically sensitive.78  
Those who believe that judicial review is anti-democratic in nature attempt to 
limit and control judicial discretion in interpreting the Constitution. There have 
been arguments that courts should interpret constitutional provisions according to 
the ‘original intent’ – the intent of the Framers – and ‘original meaning’ – the 
ordinary meaning of the text at the time of drafting.79 This is to prevent judges 
from utilising their own subjective values against the majority through the 
process of judicial review. 80 Bork, one of the leading contemporary proponents 
of originalism, who argues for original intent, submits that 
if we are to have judicial review, and if the Constitution is to be 
law, so that the judge does not freely impose his or her own values, 
then the only way to do that is to root that law in the intentions of 
the founders. There is no other source of legitimacy. There is no 
other way that we can say at least in extreme cases that the judge 
has gone off the reservation.81 
At the same time, Justice Scalia submits that the proper way to interpret the 
Constitution is therefore to ‘try to understand what it meant, what [it] was 
understood by the society to mean when it was adopted’.82 In any case, both 
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original intent and original meaning theories see the courts strictly as interpreters 
which have no authority to change the meaning of the Constitution.83 
Apart from the text and structure of the Constitution, for the originalist, the 
history relating to the adoption of a provision, the speeches of the Framers, and 
other materials that may help illuminate the original intent and original meaning 
may be considered. By contrast, considerations that are not related to original 
intent or original meaning – such as the contemporary social situation and 
general principles of justice – are considered to be illegitimate and obstructive to 
the democratic will of the people as expressed in the Constitution. 84  The 
consequences of this theory being applied to international human rights norms 
will be discussed in detail below,85 but it is noted here that, according to the 
originalists, international human rights norms that were not relevant in the 
drafting of the Constitution are not relevant to the task of its interpretation. 
Originalism insists that the meaning of the Constitution is not to be changed from 
the time of drafting. Justice Scalia contends that the very purpose of having a 
written constitution is to preserve certain values against interfererence by the 
government not only at times of drafting but also in the future. If the meaning of 
such values is not fixed, there is nothing to be preserved.86 
Theories about original intent and original meaning dominated American 
constitutional interpretation until the mid-20th century.87  They still influence 
current interpretive approaches,88 but are now subject to strong criticism. Many 
critics emphasise the difficulties associated with finding the original intent and 
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original meaning. It is argued that historical records are frequently inaccurate and 
incomplete. 89  Even presuming that the records are reliable, it should not be 
forgotten that current interpreters do not have the same outlook as those who 
lived two hundred years ago. The meaning and intent of the Framers could easily 
be misunderstood.90 Furthermore, they are known to have been a group of people 
with diverse opinions and may have had different intentions regarding the 
Constitution. Whose intentions should count in interpreting the Constitution?91  
More importantly, there are arguments that original intent and original meaning 
fail to provide determinative standards for interpreting vague constitutional 
texts.92 It is pointed out that constitutional texts, especially those in the Bill of 
Rights, are, in Ely’s phrase, ‘open-ended’. Ely argues that they are ‘difficult to 
read responsibly as anything other than quite broad invitations to import into the 
constitutional decision process considerations that will not be found in the 
language of the amendment or the debates that led up to it’.93 Terms such as ‘due 
process’, ‘equal protection’ and ‘freedom of speech’ are ‘open to competing 
understandings at the deepest level’.94 Hence, most of the time, courts cannot 
apply constitutional provisions mechanically. Judges have to give meaning to 
such terms, and they are often forced to choose between several plausible 
interpretations.95 Although the originalist argues that courts should refrain from 
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making law, it is difficult to avoid because judges must render judgment in each 
concrete case.96  
For this reason, Dworkin argues that courts should consider moral theory in 
constitutional interpretation. He points out that the Constitution endorsed certain 
moral rights and that judges have to make moral judgments in interpreting the 
Constitution and applying it to concrete issues.97 However, the moral theory as a 
source of interpretation has been criticised as inviting judges to impose their own 
subjective view on the meaning of the Constitution. Ely, though not an originalist, 
is one of the hardest critics of this theory. According to him, ‘[o]ne might be 
tempted to suppose that there will be no systematic bias in the judges’ rendition 
of “correct moral reasoning” aside from whatever derives from the philosophical 
axioms from which they begin’.98 However, he does not believe that there is a 
settled moral theory to which judges may refer.99 
Disagreements over interpretive approaches appear most prominently with regard 
to the Supreme Court’s recognition of ‘substantive due process’ under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, since it tends to show that the Court has recognised 
moral rights which are not enumerated in the Constitution as constitutional 
rights.100 For example, in the controversial Roe v Wade, the Supreme Court held 
that ‘the Fourteenth Amendment’s concept of personal liberty and restriction 
upon state action … is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether 
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or not to terminate her pregnancy’.101 More recently, in Lawrence v Texas, it was 
held that intimate consensual sexual conduct was part of the liberty protected by 
substantive due process.102 Also, the Court has recognised the rights of parents to 
direct the upbringing and education of children, 103  to marry a person of a 
different race,104 and to be free from the law which in its application ‘shock[s] 
the conscience’. 105  These all were based on the doctrine of substantive due 
process. Not surprisingly, concerns over judicial discretion have been raised in 
relation to the doctrine. Justice Scalia called it a ‘judicial usurpation’,106 while 
Justice Holmes stated: 
Of course the words ‘due process of law’ if taken in their literal 
meaning have no application to this case; and while it is too late to 
deny that they have been given a much more extended and 
artificial signification, still we ought to remember the great 
caution shown by the Constitution in limiting the power of the 
States, and should be slow to construe the clause in the Fourteenth 
Amendment as committing to the Court, with no guide but the 
Court’s own discretion, the validity of whatever laws the States 
may pass.107 
In this matter, there is an argument that liberties protected under the doctrine of 
substantive due process should be limited to those ‘deeply rooted in [the] 
Nation’s history and tradition’.108 On the other hand, however, it has also been 
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argued that ‘[h]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases the 
ending point of the substantive due process inquiry’.109  
In relation to the last point, the argument has been raised against originalism that 
values from 200 years ago may not be able to deal with contemporary moral 
dilemmas. 110  Many scholars and judges subscribe to the idea of the ‘living 
constitution’, arguing that the meaning and application of constitutional 
provisions should be adapted to suit current situations. It is the province of 
judges to figure out the needs of a changing society and interpret constitutional 
provisions in the light of such change. Contemporary philosophy and values in 
society should be taken into account.111 As a result, international human rights 
norms may be considered relevant in the task of constitutional interpretation even 
if such norms were not considered (or even existed) at the time of drafting. 
While the living Constitution is in direct conflict with the idea of original 
meaning such as that adopted by Justice Scalia, Dworkin argues, on the basis of 
the original intent theory, that it is unthinkable that the Framers intended to 
freeze the meaning of constitutional text so that it always meant the same as at 
the time of drafting.112 By enacting abstract principles, the Framers must have 
expected that ‘judges do their best collectively to construct, reinspect, and revise, 
generation by generation’ such principles.113 Justice Holmes expressed the view 
in Missouri v Holland in 1920 that even the most gifted drafters could not have 
foreseen developments after the time of drafting, and argued that the case ‘must 
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be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what 
was said a hundred years ago’.114  
In a consistent line of cases, the Supreme Court has endorsed the concept of a 
living Constitution in interpreting the Eighth Amendment, holding that the 
phrase ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ should be interpreted in the light of ‘the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’.115 
Richard Posner comments that ‘[w]e find it reassuring to think that the courts 
stand between us and legislative tyranny even if a particular form of tyranny was 
not foreseen and expressly forbidden by framers of the Constitution’.116 
In fact, a measure of judicial evolution is implied in the common law concept.117 
Courts have to decide not only whether to make, modify or reverse rules but also 
in which directions the law should be developed. Considerations adopted by 
courts in the USA include, but are not limited to, changes of circumstance, and 
increasing knowledge and experience.118 
Nevertheless, it is also arguable that this interpretive approach allows too wide a 
discretion to the courts. Hogg submits that it is ‘the course of judicial 
activism’.119 Huscroft submits that if he had to make the choice between the 
forward-looking interpretation and frozen rights, the former may be preferable. 
However, he argues that the more important question is to what extent judges are 
allowed to be involved in constitutional evolution. He also argues that ‘living 
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tree’ interpretation allows very wide discretion to judges and may cause 
uncertainty in the legal system.120  
In fact, the proponents of the idea of the living Constitution do not suggest 
unconstrained evolution. Dworkin submits that judges must observe ‘integrity’ in 
interpreting the Constitution. They have duties not only to ensure that the 
judgments are consistent with structure of the Constitution as a whole and in line 
with precedents, but also to ‘defer to general, settled understanding about the 
character of the power the Constitution assigns them’.121 Kavanagh suggests that 
judges are naturally constrained by duty to give reasons; they need to explain the 
reason if the result of their interpretation is the changing of law.122 However, 
Huscroft, among others, seems to be dissatisfied with these constraints, 
suggesting that they are too vague and dependent on the judges themselves.123 
The debates over the methods of interpretation outlined above reflect clearly the 
tension between the majoritarian democracy and the courts’ role in protecting 
rights against the majority’s will coupled with necessities imposed by text and 
changing circumstances. There is no consensus on which method of 
interpretation is the correct one. It can be said that the practice of courts in the 
USA is a ‘pluralist’ or ‘eclectic’ approach. Usual considerations for 
constitutional interpretation include text, intent, constitutional structure, history, 
precedent, values and pragmatic consequences. 124  While some submit that 
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legislative intent plays the most important role in constitutional interpretation,125 
a majority of scholars tend to believe that courts have used many interpretive 
tools in constitutional interpretation without giving priority to any specific 
method.126 In any case, it is emphasised that because courts normally use many 
of these considerations at the same time, each consideration serves as a limitation 
on judicial discretion, as well as the sources of interpretation.127 For example, 
value judgments have to be considered together with text, intent and other 
considerations. Thus, judges have to balance all relevant considerations and are 
not free to decide according to their own subjective values.  
III. International and Foreign Law in the USA 
A. Legal Status of International Human Rights Norms in the Legal 
System and Their Effect upon It 
The USA generally adopts a dualist approach towards international law. The 
approach originates from a fear that national laws deriving from the democratic 
process might be undermined as a result of allowing international law to have an 
effect within the national regime. National laws have been highly valued because 
they derive from open and deliberative processes where different views are 
considered and discussed by elected representatives of the people. This process is 
said to be the core of democracy because it ensures that people can participate in 
decisions that affect their rights and responsibilities.128 
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By contrast, treaties are created without much involvement on the part of the 
representatives of the people apart from the President and the Senate.129 ‘The 
people’ have even less part in creating CIL and foreign norms.130 Institutions 
involved in making international norms are not accountable to the American 
electorate, neither is the process of international norm-making transparent to the 
people of the USA. 131  What is more, international norms are made by the 
international community, consisting not only of democratic but also of 
authoritarian countries, ‘agreeing on a lowest common denominator’. 132  The 
same objections apply with greater force to foreign laws. Therefore, some 
scholars have argued that strict dualism is appropriate since international and 
foreign norms have a ‘lower quality’ than domestic laws.133 
i. Treaties 
According to the Constitution, treaties are to be concluded by the President with 
the advice and consent of the Senate134 and they form a part of the supreme law 
of the land.135 Before 1828, courts generally followed the plain meaning of the 
Constitution holding that all treaties made can become parts of the law in the 
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USA automatically. 136  However, in Foster & Elam v Neilson, Chief Justice 
Marshall introduced another way to read the Constitution. He stated: 
… when the terms of the stipulation import a contract, when either 
of the parties engages to perform a particular act, the treaty 
addresses itself to the political, not the judicial department; and 
the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a 
rule for the court.137 
Since then, it has been accepted that there are two kinds of treaties. The first is 
the self-executing treaty which can be applied directly in domestic courts 
according to Article VI of the Constitution. 138 They have as high a status as 
federal statutes but rank lower than the Constitution.139 In cases where conflicts 
between federal laws and treaties arise, the ‘last in time’ rule applies.140 The 
second kind is the non-self-executing treaty, which does not have any effect in 
the domestic sphere unless and until it is incorporated into domestic law by 
Congress.141  
 
                                                
To determine whether a treaty is self-executing or non-self-executing, courts 
consider the intention of the treaty, the related Senate and Congress resolutions, 
the substance of the treaty and whether implementing legislation is 
 
136 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introdution to International Law (7th edn, Routledge 
1997) 66–67; George Slyz, ‘International Law in National Court’ (1995–1996) 28 NYU J Int’l L 
& Pol 65, 79. 
137 27 US (2 Pet) 253, 314 (1829). 
138  R B Bilder, ‘Integrating International Human Rights law into Domestic Law – U.S. 
Experiences’ (1981) 4 Hous J Int’l L 1, 1–3. This division made by courts is unique, as noting in 
the Constitution signals the different between self-executing and non-self-executing, and it is not 
arguable that the Framers ever consider the division. Slyz (n 136) 78. Paust even argues that this 
judicial invention ‘distorts’ constitutional text. Jordan Paust, ‘Self-Executing Treaties’ (1988) 82 
Am J Int Law 760, 766–67.  
139 See Justice Black’s statement in Reid v Covert 354 US 1, 17 (1957). 
140 See The Head Money Cases, 112 US 580, 597–99 (1884); Whitney v Robertson, 124 US 190, 
194 (1888); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 US 581, 600–03 (1889). 
141 Bilder (n 138) 1–3. 
 
Chapter Four                                                                                                       194 
 
constitutionally required.142 Treaties affecting issues on which Congress is likely 
to enact the law are mostly non-self-executing.143 This is because the executive 
and Senate, which have the power to make treaties, do not have the same power 
as Congress in making law.  
ii. Customary International Law 
The Constitution does not mention the relationship between CIL and national law. 
However, more than one hundred years ago, the Supreme Court stated in Paquete 
Habana: 
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and 
administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as 
often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented 
for their determination. For this purpose, where there is no treaty, 
and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, 
resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations; 
and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and 
commentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, 
have made themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the 
subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to by judicial 
tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what 
the law ought to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law 
really is.144  
The Court in this case, in fact, held that the seizure of Spanish fishing vessels 
during the Spanish–American War was unlawful because ‘an ancient usage 
among civilised nations, beginning centuries ago, and gradually ripening into a 
rule of international law’ prohibited the capture of a fishing vessel as a prize of 
war. 145  Justice Blackmun commented extra-judicially on the result of the 
 
                                                 
142 The Restatement (third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States. 
143 Slyz (n 136) 79–80.  
144 175 US 677, 700 (1900). 
145 ibid 686.  
 
Chapter Four                                                                                                       195 
 
Paquete Habana that ‘[c]ustomary international law informs the construction of 
domestic law, and, at least in the absence of any superseding positive law, is 
controlling’.146 However, it is noted that the adoption of CIL as part of the US 
law in the majority opinion above was objected to by a dissenter, Justice Fuller. 
He declared that he could not find ‘adequate foundation for imputing to this 
country the adoption of any other than the English rule’.147 He also commented 
on the works of writers on international law that they might be persuasive but not 
authoritative.148  
Following the Paquete Habana, CIL had been used by courts as ‘general 
common law’.149 Although it was later held in Erie Railroad v Tompkins that 
‘[t]here is no federal general common law’, 150  the Supreme Court has still 
allowed a limited set of federal common laws, and many scholars, including 
those writing the Restatement of the Law, have argued that CIL can be 
considered as post-Erie federal common law.151 The status of CIL as federal 
common law was also confirmed in the case of Filartica v Pena-Irala in 1980.152  
Nevertheless, it is submitted that since the 20th century the courts have become 
more concerned about the issues of separation of powers and judicial competence 
not only in dealing with international issues but also in making law.153 Thus, 
although CIL is theoretically accepted as a source of law154 and as having the 
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status of federal law,155 its direct use in the courts is rare.156 CIL has not really 
been incorporated in the legal systems by the courts.157  
Moreover, the role of CIL is limited only when ‘there is no treaty, and no 
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision’. 158  The Court of 
Appeal recently confirmed this limitation of CIL in US v Fawaz Yunis, holding:  
Statutes inconsistent with principles of customary international 
law may well lead to international law violations. But within the 
domestic legal realm, that inconsistent statute simply modifies or 
supersedes customary international law to the extent of the 
inconsistency.159 
It can be concluded that CIL would not be used directly as enforceable laws and 
can rarely be asserted in the USA.  
iii. Interpretive Role of International and Foreign Law 
Despite the dualist influence, international and foreign law with no direct effect 
may have an interpretive influence on the domestic legal system, either by 
mandates from provisions of domestic law or by courts’ own initiations to resort 
to international and foreign norms.160 
Generally, the former way of using international and foreign norms is not much 
in dispute, because in such cases it is domestic law that instructs courts to look at 
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non-domestic sources.161 For example, Article I of the Constitution confers on 
Congress the power to ‘define and punish … offenses against the laws of 
nations’162 and the Alien Tort Claim Act confers jurisdiction on federal courts to 
adjudicate ‘any civil law action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation 
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States’.163  It is submitted by 
Calabresi and Zimdahl that, in order to discover the substance of the law of 
nations, the Supreme Court, especially at the beginning of the republic, 
considered ‘first, the laws and practices of other nations, especially those on the 
European continent; second, the views of foreign scholars, including writers on 
the civil law; and third, the decisions of English judges in cases arising after 
American independence in 1776’.164 
The landmark case was Filartiga v Pena-Irala 165  where the Court held the 
defendant guilty because torture against an individual by state officials was 
against the law of nations. The Court referred to the Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture, the UN Declaration 
of Human Rights, the American Convention on Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in order to discern the 
substance of the CIL.166  
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attempts to limit the scope of the law of nations according to Article I of the Constitution and the 
Alien Tort Claim Act to those existing at the time of the adoption of the statute in order to limit 
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A more problematic use of international human rights norms occurs when there 
are no domestic laws explicitly authorising their use. For statutory interpretation, 
it is stated in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States that ‘[w]here fairly possible, a United States statute is to be construed so 
as not to conflict with international law or with an international agreement of 
the United States’.167 This statement reflects the canon of interpretation adopted 
by the Supreme Court of the USA since 1804 in Murray v Schooner Charming 
Betsy.168 According to the canon, even though the international law in question is 
not enforceable in the domestic legal system, courts are obliged to look at them 
and attempt to interpret domestic statutes in a way that involves no violation of 
international law.169  
Courts in the USA have also referred to international and foreign norms in 
constitutional interpretation. Nevertheless, the Charming Betsy canon does not 
apply. This issue is at the heart of this research and will be discussed in the next 
section. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
the effect of international norms in the domestic legal system. See Calabresi and Zimdahl (n 161) 
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IV. International Human Rights Norms in the USA 
A. Legal Status of International Human Rights Norms in the Legal 
System and Their Effect upon It 
International human rights norms rarely have legal status and direct effect in the 
USA. This is partly because international human rights treaties are normally 
categorised as non-self-executing,170 and partly because the country has been 
notorious for not ratifying many international human rights treaties or ratifying 
them with reservations, understandings, and declarations (RUD) in order to limit 
their domestic effects.171  
So far, the USA has ratified, with the declaration that they are non-self-executing 
treaties: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) (with a 
reservation on the provision prohibiting the execution of juveniles); 172  the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (with a reservation on the point that the freedom of expression 
protected by the US Constitution will not be affected by the Convention’s 
provisions);173 and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (with several reservations and 
understandings).174  
The reason for this could be what Spiro calls ‘the new sovereigntists’. On the 
basis of ideas of anti-internationalism and American exceptionalism, this notion 
holds that the USA as a sovereign nation ‘can pick and choose the international 
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conventions and laws that serve its purpose and reject those that do not’.175 For 
human rights treaties, it is argued that the USA should not adopt them because, 
firstly, the obligations specified in this kind of treaty are so amorphous that the 
nation would not really know what it is signing into.176 For example, Goldsmith 
questions a provision in the ICCPR providing protection against discrimination 
on any ground: would it ‘extend to discrimination on the basis of homosexuality? 
Age? Weight? Beauty? Intelligence?’?177 Secondly, it is argued that a human 
rights agreement is inconsistent with federalism. The US government, as a 
federal government, does not have any authority to bind each state, which still 
retains certain sovereign power over its citizens.178 And lastly, it is argued that 
the formulation of international law lacks democratic accountability.179  
B. Interpretive Influence of International Human Rights Norms 
i. The Practice 
As mentioned in the previous section, notwithstanding the dualist approach, 
international and foreign law may have an indirect role in judicial reasoning 
through the Charming Betsy canon that ‘statute is to be construed so as not to 
conflict with international law or with an international agreement of the United 
States’.180 An example of cases where courts used the canon to interpret statute is 
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Rodriguez-Fernandez v Wilkinson. 181  In the process of determining that the 
Immigration and Nationality Act does not permit indefinite detention, the Court 
of Appeal stated that ‘[i]t seems proper then to consider international law 
principles for notions of fairness as to propriety of holding aliens in detention’.182 
It cited the UDHR and the signed but not ratified American Convention on 
Human Rights. More recently, in Cabrera-Alvarez v Gonzales, the Court utilised 
the canon in assessing whether an immigration statute was consistent with 
children’s rights according to international customary law, although it was noted 
that the canon did not require the Court to distort the statute.183  
There has been some academic discussion on the issue of whether the 
presumption discussed above should be used to construe constitutional 
provisions to be consistent with international human rights law either in the form 
of CIL or treaties, but it has not become the courts’ practice so far.184 
Nevertheless, in contrast to common allegations that the use of international and 
foreign norms is an unprecedented approach for constitutional interpretation, the 
Supreme Court has relied on international human rights norms in deciding 
constitutional issues throughout its history.185 The number of cases that the Court 
referred to such sources also accelerated greatly after 1940.186 Examples of early 
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183 423 F 3d 1006, 1109–13 (2005). See also Melissa A Waters, ‘Creeping Monism: The Judicial 
Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties’ (2007) 107 Colum L Rev 
628 providing statistics for the cases where courts in the USA and other common law countries 
use international law according to the Charming Betsy canon. 
184 Yuval Shany, ‘How Supreme is the Supreme Law of the Land? Comparative Analysis of the 
Influence of International Human Rights Treaties Upon the Interpretation of Constitutional Text 
by Domestic Court’ (2006) 31 Brook J Int’l L 341, 364. cf Cunard S.S. Co. v Mellon, 262 US 100, 
132–33 (1923) (Sutherland J, dissenting) (arguing that the Eight Amendment should be 
interpreted in the light of the Charming Betsy canon). 
185 Calabresi and Zimdahl (n 161) 755.  
186 ibid 838. 
 
Chapter Four                                                                                                       202 
 
decisions referring to international human rights norms include the well-known 
Dred Scott,187 Reynolds188 and Miranda.189  
The use of international human rights norms has continued until today. 
International human rights norms of various kinds, including unincorporated 
treaties, treaties that the USA is not a party to, UN documents, decisions of 
international courts, opinions of the world community, international and foreign 
practices – all of which share the same status that they do not form part of and do 
not have direct effect in the United States legal system – have played some role 
in the Court’s jurisprudence. 
As will be seen below, the interpretive role of international human rights is most 
notable in areas where constitutional provisions are broad enough, such as the 
prohibition of ‘excessive’ or ‘cruel and unusual’ punishments in the Eighth 
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Amendment, 190 the due process requirement of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments, 191  and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.192  
a. The Eighth Amendment 
In its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has referred to 
international human rights norms in order to ascertain the standard specified in 
the Constitution, namely what constitutes a prohibited ‘cruel and unusual’ 
punishment. 193  This is the use of international human rights norms for a 
substantive purpose according to Larsen’s typology.194 The Court implied that 
the legal system of the USA was in this respect comparable to those of other 
countries, and argued that, if many other countries found that a punishment was 
unacceptable, it was likely that such a punishment was unacceptable in the USA 
as well. 
The starting point was the plurality opinion written by Chief Justice Warren in 
1958, Trop v Dulles, 195 which is the first case in which the Supreme Court 
referred to international human rights norms in the course of striking down a 
statute. 196  The question for the Court was whether punishing a person by 
revoking his citizenship was ‘a cruel and unusual punishment’. The Court 
established that the basic concept underlying the provision was the ‘dignity of 
 
                                                 
II. 
190 US Const Amend VIII. 
191 US Const Amend V. The Fourteenth Amendment has similar language: ‘… nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.’ US Const Amend 
XIV. 
192 US Const Amend XIV. 
193  It is provided that ‘[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted’. US Const Amend VI
194 See Chapter One, text to n 18. 
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man’, and that what punishment was ‘cruel and unusual’ needed to be interpreted 
according to the ‘evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a 
maturing society’. 197  It found that denationalisation would amount to the 
revocation of a person’s right to have rights and inflict an ever-increasing fear 
and distress in violation of the Eighth Amendment. To support the statement on 
the effects of denationalisation, it referred to a report called ‘Study on 
Statelessness’ provided by the UN which showed that statelessness was a 
grievance for civilised people and that ‘statelessness is not to be imposed as 
punishment for crime’ by civilised nations.198 The dissenting opinion by Justice 
Frankfurter also referred to a UN report on ‘Laws Concerning Nationality’ and 
the Philippine Commonwealth Act 1936 in order to show that many civilised 
nations used the loss of citizenship as a penalty in cases of desertion or even less 
serious illegal actions.199  
The trend continued during the period 1977–88. In Coker v Georgia the Court 
held that the death penalty for the crime of rape violated the Eighth Amendment. 
Citing a report on Capital Punishment provided by the Department of Economic 
and Social Affairs of the United Nations, Justice White noted that ‘[i]t is thus not 
irrelevant here that out of 60 major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 
three retained the death penalty for rape where death did not ensue’200 and that 
‘in the light of the legislative decisions in almost all of the States and in most of 
the countries around the world, it would be difficult to support a claim that the 
death penalty for rape is an indispensable part of States’ criminal justice 
system’.201  
 
                                                 
197 356 US 86, 100–01 (1958). 
198 ibid 102. 
199 ibid 125–26.  
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Enmund v Florida carried on the reference to international human rights norms in 
holding that the death punishment for a defendant who aided and abetted felony 
in the course of which murder was committed by others, but who did not himself 
kill, violated the Eighth Amendment. The waning status of the doctrine of felony 
in England, India, Canada, other Commonwealth countries and Europe was 
discussed. It was stated that ‘the climate of international opinion … is an 
additional consideration which is not irrelevant’. 202 
Thirty years after Trop, the Supreme Court was asked to consider the ‘cruel and 
unusual punishment’ clause again in Thompson v Oklahoma. 203  This time it 
involved the death penalty imposed on a 15-year-old. The Court reviewed 
relevant states’ legislation and concluded that executing a person under the age 
of sixteen was against the evolving standard of decency.204 It then added that 
such a conclusion was consistent with the views expressed by ‘other nations that 
share our Anglo-American heritage, and by the leading members of the Western 
European community’.205 The Court discussed the practice of several nations206 
and cited international human rights treaties which contain provisions prohibiting 
juvenile death penalties in certain circumstances.207  
However, the reference to international human rights norms was objected to in 
the dissenting opinion written by Justice Scalia, with whom Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justice White joined. Justice Scalia argued that ‘the views of other 
nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, 
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cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution’.208 This dissent 
was subsequently adopted in Stanford v Kentucky.209 Justice Scalia wrote, for 
this plurality court holding, that the capital punishment for a 16- to 17-year-old 
juvenile was not ‘cruel and unusual punishment’ under the Eighth 
Amendment.210 He repeated his view in Thompson that while the practices of 
other democracies could be used to ascertain that a domestic practice was 
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’ they cannot be used to ensure that the 
same practice is also accepted in the USA.211  
The beginning of the 21st century has seen more support for the use of 
international human rights norms in the Supreme Court. In 1999, Justice Breyer 
argued in his dissenting opinion in Knight v Florida212 that the Court should 
grant certiorari on the issue of whether the Eighth Amendment prohibited 
prolonged delay of execution. This was because, among other factors, there 
existed decisions of courts outside the United States holding the prolonged delay 
of execution inhuman. 213  Decisions of the Privy Council for Jamaica, the 
Supreme Court of India, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the ECtHR, the 
Supreme Court of Canada and the United Nations Human Rights committee were 
cited.214 Then in Foster v Florida,215 while Justices Thomas and Stevens held 
that constitutional jurisprudence had not changed since the previous case and 
denied certiorari,216 Justice Breyer argued in his dissenting opinion that a long 
delay was arguably cruel. He cited the same foreign courts’ decisions as he cited 
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in Knight, adding a recent decision from the Supreme Court of Canada, which 
made it relevant to consider prolonged delay in determining whether to extradite 
a person to the USA.217  
The trend of using international human rights norms continues in the most recent 
cases, Atkins v Virginia218 and Roper v Simmons,219 which were decided in 2002 
and 2005 respectively. In Atkins, the Supreme Court held that the death penalty 
for a person with an intellectual disability violated the Eighth Amendment, as it 
was deemed to be cruel and unusual punishment. Justice Stevens, with whom 
Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer joined, delivered the 
opinion of the majority Court. The majority found a national consensus against a 
death penalty for persons with intellectual disabilities, on the grounds that several 
states had adopted the law prohibiting such punishment,220 and that even in the 
states allowing the punishment such practice was uncommon.221 It then went on 
to add that there was additional evidence showing that the ‘legislative judgment 
reflects a much broader social and professional consensus’.222 Such additional 
evidence included the opinions of professional organisations, religious 
communities, polling data, and the world community. As to the last, the Court 
found that ‘the imposition of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally 
retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved’.223 The Court then went on to 
say: 
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Although these factors are by no means dispositive, their 
consistency with the legislative evidence lends further support to 
our conclusion that there is a consensus among those who have 
addressed the issue.224 (emphasis added) 
Finally, in Roper, the most recent in this line of cases, the Supreme Court held 
that capital punishment for people under the age of eighteen was inconsistent 
with the Eighth Amendment. 225 It did so after considering the consistency of 
direction towards national consensus, the justification for the punishment on the 
grounds of culpability of juveniles, and the potential for retribution and the 
deterrence of crime.226 To support this holding, the Court turned to international 
and foreign materials, including the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (which every country in the world except the USA and Somalia 
ratified), the ICCPR (ratified with reservation on death penalty provision), the 
American Convention on Human Right: Pact of San Jose Costa Rica (signed but 
not ratified), and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.227 
Practices of other nations were also consulted. The Court found that since 1990, 
only seven countries other than the USA had executed juveniles. The 
abandonment of such punishment in the UK was of particular interest as the two 
countries had historic ties and the Eighth Amendment’s language was borrowed 
from the English Bill of Rights of 1688.228 These had led the Court to say that 
‘the United States now stands alone in a world that has turned its face against the 
juvenile death penalty’.229  
 
                                                
Nevertheless, in both Atkins and Roper, dissenting opinions strongly attack the 
legitimacy of the reference to international human rights norms. The majorities in 
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both cases were accused of using ‘irrelevant’ international and foreign opinion to 
fabricate a national consensus and to replace American values with other 
values.230 This point will be discussed further in the next section.  
b.  Due Process Clauses 
The Court has used international human rights norms in ascertaining 
constitutional standards not only in the Eighth Amendment, but also in the 
interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, which require that ‘no 
person shall be … deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law’.231  
The practice emerged at least as early as 1884 in the case of Hurtado v 
California, where Justice Matthew stated:  
The constitution of the United States was ordained, it is true, by 
descendants of Englishmen, who inherited the traditions of the 
English law and history; but it was made for an undefined and 
expanding future, and for a people gathered, and to be gathered 
from many nations and of many tongues; and while we take just 
pride in the principles and institutions of the common law, we are 
not to forget that in lands where other systems of jurisprudence 
prevail, the ideas and processes of civil justice are also not 
unknown. Due process of law, in spite of the absolutism of 
continental governments is not alien to that code which survived 
the Roman empire as the foundation of modern civilization in 
Europe, and which has given us that fundamental maxim of 
distributive justice, suum cuique tribuere. There is nothing in 
Magna Charta, rightly construed as a broad charter of public 
rights and law, which ought to exclude the best ideas of all 
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systems and of every age; and as it was the characteristic 
principle of the common law to draw its inspiration from every 
fountain of justice, we are not to assume that the sources of its 
supply have been exhausted.232 (emphasis added) 
The Court later held that an indictment by a grand jury was not always essential 
according to the requirement of the due process of law. This decision came partly 
from the fact that in other countries where the concept of due process of law also 
existed there were no rights to indictment by a grand jury.233  
Importantly for the purpose of this research, the above statement reflects at least 
four crucial points. First, it is evident that the early Supreme Court looked at the 
Constitution as a timeless document whose interpretation should take into 
account not only traditions and history but also changes of circumstance. Second, 
the Constitution has an international aspect. It intends to embrace many people 
from many nations and of many tongues. Third, the statement highlights the fact 
that the USA’s legal system is by no means divorced from other legal systems: 
several legal concepts recognised by the USA are also recognised by other 
countries, particularly those in Europe. And lastly, it expressly asserts that 
according to the common law methods, inspiration can be drawn from every 
fountain of justice. Therefore, international and foreign human rights norms, to 
the extent that they are relevant to the issue in hand, can be used as an aid in 
interpreting the Bill of Rights. 
A comparable issue was raised in Palko v Connecticut where the Supreme Court 
held that the law of Connecticut giving the State the right of appeal in criminal 
cases was not unconstitutional in depriving the accused of life without ‘due 
process of law’. In this case, the Court discussed, obiter, immunity from 
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compulsory self-incrimination as something that ‘might be lost, and justice still 
be done’.234 To support its statement it went on to say that ‘[i]ndeed, today as in 
the past there are students of our penal system who look upon the immunity as a 
mischief rather than a benefit, and who would limit its scope, or destroy it 
altogether’. 235  And in a footnote, it cited foreign books and stated that 
‘[c]ompulsory self-incrimination is part of the established procedure in the law of 
Continental Europe’.236  
Justice Frankfurter is famous for consistently using the standard of decency and 
fairness adopted by English-speaking peoples in considering the issues of due 
process in criminal procedure. In Malinski v New York, the Justice expressed the 
opinion that courts have to ascertain whether the procedures in question ‘offend 
those canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of 
English-speaking peoples even toward those charged with the most heinous 
offenses’.237  
Such reference was repeated in Adamson v California,238 Rochin v California,239 
and Wolf v Colorado.240 In the latest, Justice Frankfurter included in his opinion 
extensive citation of foreign cases. The issue was whether the due process clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment forbade the admission of evidence obtained by an 
unreasonable search and seizure in a prosecution in a state court for a state crime. 
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The Justice started by saying that the provision ‘exacts from the States for the 
lowliest and the most outcast all that is implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty’.241 He then explained that the security of one’s privacy against arbitrary 
intrusion by the police according to the Fourth Amendment was held to apply to 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment because it was basic to a free 
society.242 He stated: 
… the search without authority of law but solely on the authority 
of the police, did not need the commentary of recent history to be 
condemned as inconsistent with the conception of human rights 
enshrined in the history and the basic constitutional documents of 
English-speaking peoples.243 (emphasis added) 
However, he later held that protection against intrusion did not demand the 
exclusion of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure. One of the 
reasons was that the protection was not regarded by most of the English-speaking 
world as vital.244 
It is quite clear that Justice Frankfurter took into account the opinions of peoples 
in most of the English-speaking world rather than just those of the Americans in 
determining rights according to the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
More recently, in Zadvydas v Davis, 245  the issue was the interpretation of a 
provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which authorised the 
Attorney General to detain a removable alien after a 90-day removal period in 
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cases where such an alien was determined to be a risk to the community or 
unlikely to comply with the order of removal. In arguing that the detention 
incidental to removal was not a punishment, Justice Kennedy stated in his 
dissenting opinion that this argument ‘accords with international views on 
detention of refugees and asylum seekers’.246 International human rights norms 
served as part of the bigger argument that the detention according to the statute in 
question was not inconsistent with the due process requirement. 
Apart from the issues of criminal procedure, international human rights norms 
play a role in judicial reasoning regarding rights to privacy. Poe v Ullman 
involved the Connecticut statutes prohibiting the use of contraceptives, which the 
plaintiffs alleged violated the Fourteenth Amendment in that they deprived life, 
liberty or property without due process. Although the case was dismissed on the 
grounds that plaintiffs could not show that the statutes would be enforced against 
them, in his dissenting opinion Justice Harlan stated:  
This enactment involves what, by common understanding 
throughout the English-speaking world, must be granted to be a 
most fundamental aspect of ‘liberty,’ the privacy of the home in 
its most basic sense, and it is this which requires that the statute be 
subjected to ‘strict scrutiny.’247 (emphasis added) 
Opinion of the wider society, namely the English-speaking world, was cited in 
order to support the use of the strict scrutiny test. 
 
                                                
Later, in 1986, the Supreme Court in Bowers v Hardwick had to decide the issue 
of whether Georgia’s statute criminalising consensual sodomy in a private place 
violated the fundamental rights protected by the Constitution. The majority 
considered first the issue of whether the Constitution protected homosexuals’ 
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rights to engage in sodomy.248 It found no precedent that supported such a right 
and also refused to recognise it as an unenumerated right under the due process 
clause.249 The majority laid down, as criteria for recognising the unenumerated 
rights, that they must be rights that were ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty’250 or ‘deeply rooted in this nation’s history and tradition’.251 It claimed 
that since there had been practices prohibiting sodomy since ancient times and 
such practices were still reflected in the statutes of many states, the homosexual 
right did not meet such criteria.252 Concurring with the above decision, Chief 
Justice Burger referred to ‘the history of Western Civilization’, ‘Judaeo-Christian 
moral and ethical standards’, ‘Roman law’, ‘English statute’, and ‘the common 
law of England’ in order to show that sodomy had been prohibited for a long 
time and was therefore far from being protected as fundamental right.253  
Bowers was recently reversed by Lawrence v Texas in 2003. 254 In invalidating a 
Texas statute criminalising sexual conduct between same sex partners, the 
majority opinion written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Justices Stevens, 
Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer held that Bowers was wrongly decided. The 
majority found that the Bowers’ Court overlooked the claim of liberty, that there 
was actually no historical ground prohibiting sodomy, and that at the time 
Bowers was decided there was ‘an emerging awareness that liberty gives 
substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private 
lives in matters pertaining to sex’.255 For the last point, Justice Kennedy also 
argued that the reference to the history of Western civilisation in Bowers failed to 
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take into account the ECtHR decision in Dudgeon v UK 256 holding that the law 
prohibiting consensual homosexual conduct put the UK in breach of Article 8 of 
the ECHR.257 
The majority also found that subsequent cases were against Bower. Again, it 
referred to decisions of the ECtHR and foreign countries: 
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider 
civilization, it should be noted that the reasoning and holding in 
Bowers have been rejected elsewhere. The European Court of 
Human Rights has followed not Bowers but its own decision in 
Dudgeon v United Kingdom; Modinos v Cyprus; Norris v Ireland. 
Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an 
affirmation of the protected rights of homosexual adults to engage 
in intimate, consensual conduct.258 (internal citation omitted) 
More importantly, after rejecting Bowers the majority continued the reference to 
international human rights norms. It said: 
The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an 
integral part of human freedom in many other countries. There 
has been no showing that in this country the government interest 
in circumscribing personal choice is somehow more legitimate or 
urgent.259 (emphasis added) 
Gerald Neuman has noted that the Lawrence court’s use of the Dudgeon decision 
of the European Court of Human Rights ‘was primarily normative’ and intended 
to reinforce the Supreme Court’s ‘own reasons for affording constitutional 
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protection’.260 The idea here is that if another impartial body had reached the 
same conclusion, this supports the conclusion the Court was reaching and adds to 
the Court’s sense of security for its own decision. However, Lawrence raises 
contemporary debates over the legitimacy of using international human rights 
norms in interpreting the Bill of Rights. This will be discussed further in the next 
section. 
Here, it is observed that not only in this case, but also in others relating to the due 
process clauses, courts have regularly used international human rights norms on 
the basis of the argument that the concept exists not only in the USA, but also in 
many other countries. Thus, if a particular right is not recognised in other 
countries, such a right is not likely to be indispensable in the USA. On the other 
hand, if a right is widely recognised in other countries, it is an indicator that the 
right is ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’.261 This is, in Larsen’s terms, a 
substantive use of international human rights norms.262 
In any case, international human rights norms had also been used for empirical 
purposes. In Roe v Wade,263 Justice Bluckmun delivered the opinion of the Court 
that insight from history was desirable. Among other sources, he referred at 
length to English statutes and the development of such law by English courts 
during the period 1803–1967. 264  Such information supported the Court’s 
judgment that the right of privacy, either by the Fourteenth Amendment or the 
Ninth Amendment, was broad enough to encompass the non-absolute right to an 
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abortion.265 Further, the Court referred to medical data from England, Wales, 
Japan, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in order to show that the concern about a 
woman’s health during abortion was no longer warranted. 266  International 
sources obviously served as factual supports for the Court’s argument. 
More recently, in Washington v Gluckberg,267 the Supreme Court held that the 
right to assistance in committing suicide was not a fundamental liberty protected 
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Remarkably, the 
majority opinion written by Chief Justices Rehnquist, and joined by Justices 
Scalia and Thomas, who usually objected to the use of international and foreign 
norms, discussed in detail international sources.  
The Chief Justice announced that the Court would examine ‘our Nation’s history, 
legal traditions, and practices’. 268  However, immediately afterwards, he also 
stated that ‘[i]n almost every State – indeed, in almost every western 
democracy – it is a crime to assist a suicide’.269 Then in a footnote accompanying 
this statement, the Chief Justice cited a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada 
which discussed related laws of Austria, Spain, Italy, the UK, the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Switzerland and France, and concluded that it was the norm among 
Western democracies to have a blanket prohibition on assisted suicide.270  
Moreover, on the issue of whether a state had a reasonable concern that assisted 
suicide might lead to voluntary and involuntary euthanasia, the majority referred 
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to the practice of the Netherlands, where physician-assisted suicide and voluntary 
euthanasia had been legalised. Upon finding that in the Netherlands euthanasia 
‘has not been limited to competent, terminally ill adults who are enduring 
physical suffering, and that regulation of the practice may not have prevented 
abuses in cases involving vulnerable persons’,271 it was held that ‘Washington’s 
ban on assisted suicide is at least reasonably related to their promotion’ and 
protection and thus did not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.272 
It should also be noted that the experiences of the Netherlands were discussed 
further in the concurring opinion of Justice Souter, who said that the Netherlands 
was ‘the only place where experience with physician-assisted suicide and 
euthanasia has yielded empirical evidence about how such regulation might 
affect actual practice’.273 
c. Equal Protection Clause 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that ‘no state shall … deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law’. 274  Recourse to 
international human rights norms in interpreting this clause is relatively new 
compared to the same recourse in the Eighth Amendment and due process as 
discussed above, but there are signs that it may be developed in the future.275  
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In 2003, the Supreme Court held in Grutter v Bollinger that the policy of the 
University of Michigan Law School in seeking to enrol a ‘critical mass’ of 
students belonging to racial and ethnic groups which had been discriminated 
against in the past was narrowly tailored to serve its interest and did not violate 
the Equal Protection Clause.276 Filing a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg, 
with whom Justice Breyer joined, added an international flavour to the case. She 
stated that ‘[t]he Court’s observation that race-conscious programs “must have a 
logical end point” accords with the international understanding of the office of 
affirmative action’.277 To elaborate, Justice Ginsburg referred to the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ratified) 
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women (signed but not ratified). Essentially, these two instruments supported 
affirmative treatment of certain groups in order to ensure that these groups would 
be able to enjoy equal protection, provided that the treatment was discontinued 
after the objectives had been reached. She then investigated the practice relating 
to race in the USA and submitted that since unequal opportunities were still 
apparent, the affirmative action was justified.278  
 
                                                
Gratz v Bollinger279 is another case relating to admissions policy encouraging 
diversity among students decided on the same day as Grutter. The majority’s 
opinion written by Chief Justice Rehnquist held that the policy which 
automatically gave 20 per cent of the points needed for admission to applicants 
who in terms of race belonged to underrepresented minority groups was not 
individual-sensitive, as that in Grutter had been, and was not narrowly tailored to 
achieve its interest. 280  Justice Ginsburg, with whom Justice Souter joined, 
dissented. Her opinion was based mainly on the domestic grounds that since 
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large disparities arising from racial discrimination from the past still continued, 
the use of race in order to reach equality might be appropriate. Nevertheless, she 
referred to international instruments in order to make clearer where to draw the 
line between such different uses.281 She explained: 
To avoid conflict with the equal protection clause, a classification 
that denies a benefit, causes harm, or imposes a burden must not 
be based on race. In that sense, the Constitution is color blind. But 
the Constitution is color conscious to prevent discrimination being 
perpetuated and to undo the effects of past discrimination … 
Contemporary human rights documents draw just this line; they 
distinguish between policies of oppression and measures designed 
to accelerate de facto equality.282 (emphasis added) 
The same international human rights conventions to which Justice Ginsburg 
referred in Grutter were again cited in this case. While in Grutter Justice 
Ginsburg referred to international norms relating to the use of affirmative action 
in order to support the majority opinion in the sense that its judgment was in line 
with international understanding, in Grutz, she used international norms to make 
clearer the proper line between strict equal protection and affirmative action. 
Both cases represent the use of international human rights norms for a 
substantive purpose according to Larsen’s typology.283 
ii. Controversies over the Interpretive Influence of International 
Human Rights Norms  
From the cases discussed in the previous section, it is clear that international 
human rights norms do have an interpretive influence on the Supreme Court’s 
judicial reasoning, especially for a substantive purpose, which is more 
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controversial than the empirical and expository purposes.284 Although the norms 
have never been a sole consideration determining the outcome of a case, they 
serve as relevant materials that help determine the existence, scope and 
application of domestic constitutional rights, which are expressed in broad 
language.  
However, the use of international human rights norms in the Supreme Court 
seems to depend also on the interpretive philosophy held by each Justice. Some 
of them have argued that it is illegitimate and inappropriate for the judiciary to 
refer to international human rights norms that have no legal effect in the US legal 
system. Indeed, as soon as the use of international human rights norms emerged, 
criticism of it followed. In a very early case, Dred Scott, while six justices used 
international human rights norms in their opinions, Chief Justice Taney expressly 
stated that the Court should not have regard to opinions of other nations.285 The 
criticism has persisted and started to be more obvious in the dissenting opinion in 
Thompson and in the main opinion in Stanford, where Justice Scalia stated that 
reliance on international standards was not appropriate to the task of expounding 
the American Constitution.286 It became even stronger at the beginning of the 
21st century when Knight, Atkins, Lawrence and Roper were decided with 
explicit reference to international human rights norms.287  
In Atkins, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote separately in order to argue that the use 
of foreign law and other sources of information was not supported by precedent 
and was inconsistent with federalism, which provided that the ‘permanent 
prohibition’ upon democratic government must be specified in legislation 
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approved by the people.288 According to the Chief Justice, American standards of 
decency should be ascertained on the basis of domestic legislation and jury 
determinations alone. This would be consistent with the role of judges in a 
democratic system. 289  For him, referring to international opinions was 
unacceptable even as a ‘further support’ for the Court’s conclusion.290 
Justice Scalia also filed a dissenting opinion in Atkins. He objected to the use of 
international human rights norms mainly for the reason that he could not find a 
national consensus which international and foreign norms could support,291 and 
therefore was convinced that the international materials were adduced for the 
purpose of supporting the majority’s own subjective judgment rather than any 
national consensus.292 The Justice went on to emphasise that international human 
rights norms were irrelevant in expounding the US Constitution. 293  Then in 
Roper, he started by arguing that, to be consistent with the concept of democracy, 
the evolving standard must be found only in the practice of the American people 
and not in the Court’s own opinion.294 He pointed out that the fact that the USA 
had not ratified international instruments referred to by the majority 
demonstrated the people’s view in favour of the death penalty.295 Moreover, he 
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firmly submitted that foreign authorities were not relevant to the issue,296 not 
even as a confirming source. He stated: 
To begin with, I do not believe that approval by ‘other nations and 
peoples’ should buttress our commitment to American principles 
any more than (what should logically follow) disapproval by 
‘other nations and peoples’ should weaken that commitment.297 
The criticism has arisen not only in regard to the Eighth Amendment, but also in 
regard to the due process clause of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. In 
Lawrence, the majority’s reference to the ECtHR’s jurisprudence was criticised 
by Justice Scalia on the grounds that a constitutional entitlement was not 
established just because several states stopped criminalising some behavior, and 
‘[m]uch less do they spring into existence, as the Court seems to believe, because 
foreign nations decriminalize conduct’.298 
It is interesting to note that the disagreement among the Justices over the use of 
international and foreign norms can be seen as a ‘culture war’ between the 
conservative justices, who believe that the Court should limit sources of 
constitutional interpretation, and the more liberal justices, who prefer not to limit 
themselves only to certain sources.299 The late Chief Justice Rehnquist, Chief 
Justice Roberts, and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito, all nominated by 
Republican Presidents, 300  seem to be in the former group. The first three 
consistently objected to the use of international and foreign norms in their 
judgments. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito have not said anything on the 
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issue in their judicial opinions, but expressed the opinion against the use of non-
US materials in their confirmation hearings before the Senate.301 On the other 
side are Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer and Ginsburg, 
who have used, and have expressed their approval for the use of, international 
human rights norms either in their judgments or in extra-judicial speeches.302 
The first four were nominated by Republican Presidents. The last two were 
nominated by a Democrat President.303 
This debate has not been confined to the Justices. Since the controversial cases of 
Atkins and Lawrence, decided in 2002 and 2003 respectively, the debate has 
extended to involve legal scholars, politicians and the wider public, and has 
become a hot issue in the USA, although the focus has been on the use of 
international and foreign norms in general rather than international human rights 
norms.  
In 2003, the House of Representatives issued the ‘Constitutional Preservation 
Resolution’, which stated that ‘the Supreme Court should base its decisions on 
the Constitution and Laws of the United States, and not on the law of any foreign 
country or any international law or agreement not made under the authority of 
the United States’.304 Another two resolutions to the same were passed in 2004 
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and 2007. 305  The Senate passed the same resolution in 2005. 306  These 
resolutions do not bind the courts, but they certainly generate political and 
 
societal pressure.  
fluence the outcome of a legal decision interpreting the 
constitution’. 307  
es serious concerns 
about the legitimacy and appropriateness of such practice.309 
Moreover, in the recent process of confirming the new Supreme Court Justice, 
Sonia Sotomayor, in 2009, Republican senators made it very clear that the 
Justice’s philosophy regarding the use of international and foreign law would 
affect the confirmation process. Justice Sotomayor’s previous speech, which 
suggested that ideas from international and foreign laws can be useful in judicial 
reasoning, was questioned repeatedly. The senators also asked the Justice many 
times to confirm that ‘[f]oreign law cannot be used as a holding or a precedent or 
to bind or to in
In academic circles, one group of scholars supports the use of international and 
foreign materials on the basis of concepts such as transnational legal process, 
globalisation, transnational judicial dialogue, and respect for the opinion of 
mankind.308 On the other hand, another group of scholars rais
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The controversy over the use of international human rights norms is usually 
concerned with the allegation that the Supreme Court has imposed foreign law on 
the American people. However, it is the view of the present thesis that this 
objection oversimplifies the matter and is based on some questionable reasoning. 
In the following subsections, an attempt will be made to disentangle important 
arguments, and to identify the underlying reasons for the objections to the use of 
international human rights norms and evaluate their credibility. 
a. American Exceptionalism and Unilateralism 
One of the underlying reasons for the use of international and foreign laws in the 
Supreme Court being subject to wide criticism is the idea of American 
exceptionalism – the belief that the USA is essentially different from other 
countries.310 This is reflected clearly in the dissenting opinion of Justice Scalia in 
Atkins:  
Equally irrelevant are the practices of the ‘world community’, 
whose notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our 
people. We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the 
United States of America that we are expounding …311  
It is reflected also in this statement by Justice Alito:  
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I think the framers would be stunned by the idea that the Bill of 
Rights is to be interpreted by taking a poll of the countries of the 
world. The purpose of the Bill of Rights was to give Americans 
rights that were recognized practically nowhere else in the world 
at the time. The framers did not want Americans to have the rights 
of people in France or the rights of people in Russia or any of the 
other countries on the continent of Europe at the time. They 
wanted them to have the rights of Americans …312  (emphasis 
added) 
Rubenfeld submits that this exceptionalism has emerged since the founding of 
the nation and has been reinforced since the end of the World War II.313 While 
European countries perceived their victory as the victory of democracy over 
absolute nationalism, the USA looked at it as a victory resulting from its own 
unique character.314  This belief is said to pervade the general public and all 
branches of the American government, regardless of their liberal or conservative 
stands.315 
The Constitution, for Americans, is the document that creates the nation and 
gives its people an understanding of their roles as political beings. 316  
Consequently, if the Constitution is to be interpreted or developed, it should be in 
the way that continues to give expression to perceived national characteristics.317 
The use of international and foreign sources is perceived as something that 
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1
                                                
‘deprecates the nation’s uniqueness’ 318  or dissolves ‘the affections that 
Americans have for their own Constitution’. 3 9  Therefore, while 
constitutionalism in the European countries can be called ‘international 
constitutionalism’, allowing international norms or universal values to limit 
domestic governments, constitutionalism in the USA is ‘national 
constitutionalism’, focusing only on domestic values. 320 
The fact that the USA is now the world’s leading superpower both politically and 
economically reinforces the attitude against international and foreign norms.321 
The USA has been involved in making international law and in developing the 
constitutions of other countries since the beginning of the Republic, and now the 
American-style Constitution has spread all over the world. 322 The decisions of 
the Supreme Court are also studied and respected in many other countries. 323 
The people and the courts get used of being leaders and thus develop a reticence 
to learn from their ‘constitutional offspring’. 324  For human rights issues in 
particular, Henkin submits that while the USA is eager to be involved with, and 
even to interfere with, human rights development in other countries, it has been 
reluctant to accept standards from other countries ‘even if they were borrowed 
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from [itself] and reflect [its] own value’.325 Some scholars call this phenomenon 
anti-internationalism.326 It has been the concept that dominates American polity, 
and is one of the reasons the USA refuses to join most international human rights 
treaties.327  
Nevertheless, counter-arguments suggest that American values actually consist 
not only of what the nation contributes to the world, but also of a respect for 
diversity and an appreciation of what the world contributes to the nation.328  
Some scholars refer to the statement in the Declaration of Independence that it is 
proper for the USA to pay ‘decent respect to the opinion of mankind’.329 Some 
also add that external sources can help Americans to recognise and shape their 
own values.330 It is also arguable that the Bill of Rights, by enacting general 
principles, incorporates universal norms into the US Constitution. 331  Lastly, 
taking globalisation into account, it has been argued that the USA, as one of the 
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members of the world community, cannot resist international influence for 
long.332 
In fact, these counter-arguments were presented in certain Supreme Court 
judgments that referred to international human rights norms. For example, in 
Roper, Justice Kennedy stated: 
It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its 
origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain 
fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply 
underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own 
heritage of freedom.333  
In the same case, Justice O’Connor also explained:  
… this Nation’s evolving understanding of human dignity 
certainly is neither wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds 
with, the values prevailing in other countries. On the contrary, we 
should not be surprised to find congruence between domestic and 
international values, especially where the international community 
has reached clear agreement – expressed in international law or in 
the domestic laws of individual countries – that a particular form 
of punishment is inconsistent with fundamental human rights. At 
least, the existence of an international consensus of this nature can 
serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine 
American consensus.334 
b. Concerns over Democracy  
Following the suspicions of many Americans towards the international 
community, there are many opponents of the Court’s reference to international 
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and foreign norms who base their arguments on the democratic concept of 
governance and the separation of powers between three branches of government. 
The arguments can be divided into two headings. The first concerns the 
undemocratic nature of international human rights norms, and the second 
concerns the way the Court refers to such norms.  
i) Undemocratic Nature of International and Foreign Norms  
The objection against international and foreign norms, including international 
human rights norms, is founded on the premise that the USA has adopted a 
dualist approach which clearly distinguishes international law from domestic law 
and holds that, because international law lacks democratic value, it does not have 
legal effect in the domestic legal system unless and until it has been incorporated 
by the legislative branch.335 This objection is reflected in the resolution issued by 
the House of Representatives, which has expressed the view that international 
and foreign norms should not be used in US courts because ‘laws of foreign 
countries, and international laws and agreements not made under the authority 
of the United States, have no legal standing under the United States legal 
system’. 336  The same applies to international and foreign jurisprudence. 
According to Chief Justice Robert in his confirmation hearing: 
The first has to do with democratic theory. Judicial decisions in 
this country – judges of course are not accountable to the people, 
but we are appointed through a process that allows for 
participation of the electorate, the President who nominates judges 
is obviously accountable to the people. The senators who confirm 
judges are accountable to the people. In that way the role of the 
judge is consistent with the democratic theory. If we’re relying on 
a decision from a German judge about what our Constitution 
means, no President accountable to the people appointed that 
judge, and no Senate accountable to the people confirmed that 
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judge; and yet he’s playing a role in shaping a law that binds the 
people in this country.337 (emphasis added) 
Posner and Alford express similar opinion.338 Anderson puts it another way by 
saying that the Supreme Court’s use of international and foreign sources was 
undemocratic because the norms lack the ‘consent’ of the governed.339  
However, dualism and democratic arguments can support the argument against 
international and foreign norms only up to the point of maintaining that the 
external norms should not be used as ‘laws’ or ‘compelling authority’, or with a 
presumption that domestic law should comply with them, as is required by the 
Charming Betsy Canon.340 Nothing in the dualist concept prohibits courts from 
using international and foreign norms for the purpose of interpretation in so far 
as such norms are useful and appropriate according to the Court’s accepted 
interpretive approaches. In the end, it is in any case the domestic judges who will 
consider their relevance and persuasiveness and determine the extent to which 
they may influence cases.  
It is also arguable that American courts have always referred to sources that do 
not originate from the democratic process. Kumm submits that modern national 
laws are not always created by the legislative branch, given that the executive 
and the judicial branches have started to play a more important role in creating 
laws. Therefore ‘the absence of electorally accountable institutions on the 
international level is insufficient to ground claims that the international legal 
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process is deficient procedurally’.341 Moreover, it can be argued, as Tushnet does, 
that  
the decision by the Justices to refer to non-U.S. law gives that law 
‘indirect’ democratic provenance – or, at least, makes that 
reference indistinguishable from the indirect provenance of 
whatever sources the Justices refer to when they interpret the 
Constitution …342  
These arguments are convincing considering that common law, precedents, 
policies, factual data and academic writings are all accepted as legitimate sources 
of constitutional interpretation.343  Why is reference to these sources allowed 
while reference to international and foreign norms is not? In the case of 
international human rights norms that are customary international law in 
particular, it can also be argued that the norms are universal and have become 
part of the domestic law, and should be used for the task of interpretation as far 
as they are not in conflict with it. 
It is important to re-emphasise here that the Supreme Court has not used 
international human rights norms as ‘law’ or ‘compelling authority’. Neither has 
the Court used international and foreign norms with the presumption that 
domestic law should be interpreted to be compliant with them. The Court has 
simply used such norms in order to help interpret open or ambiguous provisions 
whose terms allow it to look at comparable circumstances or related opinions 
abroad. The norms have influenced the Court’s decisions, but only on a case-by-
case basis. 
In fact, in recent cases, the Justices have been more cautious and have often put 
international points in a footnote with explicit statements that international norms 
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were not used as compelling authority. Justice Breyer stated in Knight that 
foreign authorities were not binding on the Court.344 In Atkins, Justice Stevens 
declared, regarding the use of international and foreign norms, that they were ‘by 
no means dispositive’, 345  and in Roper, Justice Kennedy confirmed that the 
opinion of the world community did not control the outcome of the case.346 
ii) Democratic Objections to the Uses of International and 
Foreign Norms 
Apart from the nature of international and foreign norms themselves, democratic 
objections against the use of these norms are related to the controversial role of 
the judiciary in the USA. 
As was discussed above, judicial review of legislation has been seen by many as 
a counter-majoritarian force in US politics. There are also arguments that courts 
should faithfully interpret the Constitution without inputting values that are not 
reflected in the text or that do not exist at the time of drafting.347 Although this 
so-called originalist approach to interpretation is only one of many available 
interpretive approaches, it has become one of the core bases for the rejection of 
the interpretive influences of international and foreign norms. This is reflected 
clearly in the resolutions passed by the House of Representatives stipulating that 
using foreign materials in interpreting US law is inappropriate unless such 
materials ‘inform an understanding of the original meaning of the law of the 
United States’.348 The resolutions also stated that the courts’ role is to ‘faithfully 
interpret the expression of the popular will through laws enacted by duly elected 
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representatives of the American people and [the USA’s] system of checks and 
balances’.349 
Justice Scalia, the main opponent of the use of international and foreign law, also 
bases his objection on the originalist theory of interpretation. He argues that most 
constitutional issues involve moral questions to which there are no right or wrong 
answers, but judges are not to make this kind of determination.350 They should 
‘say what the Constitution provided, even if what it provided is not the best 
answer’.351 
Easterbrook further points out that judges have power of judicial review even 
though the Constitution does not expressly confer it, because they enforce the 
supreme law of the Constitution. Norms from international and foreign sources, 
on the other hand, are not ‘law’ and should not be enforced against the people, 
especially when it comes to the issue of balancing interests.352 
In any case, it is noted that originalists do not argue that reference to 
international materials should be categorically prohibited. Only those that did not 
exist at the time of enactment or those that the drafters did not take into account 
are considered irrelevant to the task of interpretation. Justice Scalia explained 
that the legal and moral framework in the USA is different from that of other 
states, emphasising the fact that the Framers of the Constitution refused to follow 
frameworks from other countries, particularly those in Europe.353 Accordingly, 
‘foreign law is irrelevant with one exception: Old English law, because phrases 
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like “due process”, the “right of confrontation” and things of that sort were all 
taken from English law’.354  
Arguing from the premise that international and foreign norms are irrelevant, 
opponents of the use of international norms go on to say that judges refer to such 
irrelevant norms in order to support their own value judgments using 
international norms as masks. This accusation is not exclusively made by the 
originalist. It has been argued that even for evidence of the ‘evolving 
constitution’, judges should not look at their own standard or foreign standards, 
but should look to contemporary ‘American’ standards.355 This accusation has 
been raised especially in decisions relating to socially controversial issues.356 
The death penalty cases are good examples. In Atkins, although the majority 
explicitly said that international norms were used simply to support their 
conclusion about the contemporary standard of decency, 357  the dissenters 
disagreed. The latter interpreted the trend of states’ legislation differently and 
believed that the majority used international and foreign norms in order to give 
more weight to the majority’s own subjective opinion about the standard of 
decency.358 The same opinion is also reflected in views expressed in the House 
of the Representatives. Immediately after Roper was decided, certain members of 
the House of Representatives raised concerns. One of them states: 
This is a clear cut example of policy-making from the bench. The 
majority in this case make little attempt to hide that personal 
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judgments and international opinion form the basis of this badly 
reasoned decision. Clearly, the death penalty and its applicability 
to violent minors is an issue that should be decided by the people 
through their elected representatives.359 
Opponents of the use of international and foreign sources further support their 
argument by pointing out that such sources are so wide and varied that judges 
may pick the ones that support and disregard others that contradict or discredit 
their opinions. Chief Justice Roberts expressed this view in his confirmation 
hearing: 
… relying on foreign precedent doesn’t confine judges … in 
foreign law you can find anything you want. If you don’t find it in 
the decisions of France or Italy, it’s in the decisions of Somalia or 
Japan or Indonesia or wherever … And that actually expands the 
discretion of the judges. It allows the judge to incorporate his or 
her own personal preferences, cloak them with the authority of 
precedent …360 
This argument was also reflected in Justice Scalia’s opinion in Roper when he 
said: ‘To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it 
otherwise, is not reasoned decision-making, but sophistry.’361 This might be so 
even without intention on the judges’ side. Tripathi submits that because foreign 
materials are not binding, a judge ‘is absolutely free to reject [them] unless [they 
appeal] to his reason. Appeal to one’s reason, more often than not, amounts to a 
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confirmation and a strengthening of one’s own opinion rather than a shaping of 
that opinion.’362 
Moreover, when references were made to cases where the Supreme Court struck 
down legislation, the criticism extends to the point of saying that by using 
international and foreign norms, courts are imposing such norms on the American 
people against their will. For example, in Lawrence, Justice Scalia, whose 
dissenting opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, 
argued that the majority recognised rights relating to homosexual conduct in 
private places because of the practices of other nations and not because of the 
practice of the USA.363 
Similarly, in Roper, Justice Scalia believed that the Court’s decision resulted in 
setting aside the American view. 364  This view is supported by Young, who 
forcefully argues that the Court used foreign opinions in an authoritative way in 
order to make the domestic opinion supporting the abolition of death penalty for 
juveniles become the consensus and set aside equivalent and competing opposite 
domestic opinion, which supported the maintenance of the death penalty for 
juveniles.365  
Some scholars call this an ‘international countermajoritarian’ deficiency and 
consider it to be even worse than the traditional countermajoritarian deficiency as 
it combines the anti-democratic tendencies of judicial review with another 
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counter-majoritarian difficulty derived from imposing international and foreign 
values on American society.366  
However, this line of objections against the interpretive influence of international 
and foreign norms has several weak points. Judicial enforcement of 
constitutional provisions concerning individual rights is necessarily non-
majoritarian.367 But, it can be argued that the fundamental rights provisions, far 
from being undemocratic, have secured their place in the Constitution by 
democratic process, and that this constraint on raw majority helps ensure an 
effective democratic regime.368 This has been discussed previously in section II 
A. Moreover, in the immediately foregoing subsection it has also been suggested 
that international human rights norms, undemocratic as they may be, have not 
been used as law or compelling authority in defiance of the dualist concept. The 
fact is simply that courts referred to such norms in order to interpret the 
Constitution.  
As to the methods of constitutional interpretation, originalism is one of many 
available ideologies, and is accepted by some but rejected by others. Moreover, it 
may be argued that some constitutional provisions have been intended, since the 
time of the adoption, to allow the use of contemporary international and foreign 
materials by courts.369 This can be seen in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence 
which held that the Eighth Amendment requires courts to use an ‘evolving 
standard of decency’.370 More obviously, in Hurtado, the Court held that the 
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Constitution ‘was made for an undefined and expanding future, and for a people 
gathered, and to be gathered from many nations and of many tongues’.371 
It is also arguable that the originalist approach is especially inconsistent when 
applied to international and foreign norms. If the value of originalism rests on its 
efficiency in limiting the normative role of judges, the fact that it allows 
reference to international and foreign norms actually involved in the drafting 
process diminishes such value. Consistently with the idea of originalism, the 
Supreme Court has referred to the Anglo-American tradition, the history of 
Western civilisation, Roman law, the common law of England, and so on, 
because these were involved in the establishment of the US law.372 However, it 
can be seen that these terms are broad and vague, allowing the Court to exercise 
normative judgment on the substance of the terms. 
The accusation that judges used international norms as a disguise for their own 
subjective values is also subject to counter-arguments. It is argued that the 
presumption that there are precedents for all points of view available in 
international and foreign sources is unproved. 373 Moreover, in citing sources 
beyond their own jurisdictions, the burden is on judges to explain why such 
sources are appropriate. 374  Furthermore, it is submitted by McCrudden that 
judges now cite not only foreign sources that match their opinions, but also those 
that contradict their opinions, with reasons why such sources are inapplicable to 
the case in hand.375 Additionally, Tushnet notes that the idea that foreign sources 
are so varied that they include everything a judge may be looking for actually 
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comes from Judge Harold Leventhal, who describes the use of history in 
interpretation as ‘looking over a crowd and picking out your friends’.376 The 
criticism of reference to history has faded away.377 Last but not least, it should be 
recalled that courts use several sources of interpretation at the same time. The 
interpretive influence of international and foreign norms is subject to other 
sources of interpretation, such as text, intent, structure, precedent, and other 
relevant considerations.378  Judges are by no means free to impose their own 
value preferences.379 
Therefore, it is submitted that the allegations that international human rights 
norms are irrelevant to the task of interpretation and have been used to conceal 
judges’ personal views or to subvert the American people’s opinion are not 
justified. On the contrary, such allegations can be seen to be the result of 
disagreement about domestic law and fact. This has been most obviously so in 
cases relating to the death penalty. The majority found a national consensus 
against such punishment for juveniles. It held such punishment unconstitutional 
and used foreign practices to confirm its view. The dissenters did not find such a 
national consensus, and thus believed that the majority used foreign law to 
fabricate the consensus. However, judges and people in society often have 
different opinions on issues of law and fact; it is incorrect to conclude that the 
differences always come from illegitimate personal judgments. 
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c.   Concerns over Interference in the Executive’s Handling of 
Foreign Affairs 
The use of international human rights norms has also raised concerns about the 
separation of powers, for it is argued that that the Court is not an appropriate 
institution to deal with foreign affairs, and that the Supreme Court’s adoption of 
international norms might be in conflict with what the executive would like to do 
in its international human rights policies.380  Young submits that the practice 
‘circumvents the institutional mechanisms by which the political branches 
ordinarily control the interaction between the domestic and the foreign’.381 The 
importance of speaking in ‘one voice’ has also been emphasised by opponents of 
the Court’s practice.382  
The point has been made with particular reference to the death penalty. Bradley 
submits that the courts should defer to the political branch as the USA has no 
international obligations regarding the death penalty, not even in the form of the 
CIL, as the country has consistently opted out of this custom.383 Justice Scalia 
criticised the majority in Roper for referring to international norms reflected in 
international agreements relating to the abolition and limitation of the death 
penalty despite the fact that the USA had not ratified such agreements or had 
done so with reservations.384  Anderson also argues that on this occasion the 
Court treated non-binding international norms as binding and thus interfered with 
the duty of the political branches.385 
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In fact, some of the Supreme Court justices express the view that referring to 
international and foreign materials may cause other nations to have a better 
attitude towards the USA. For example, Justice Breyer has asked: 
Why don’t we cite them occasionally? They will then go to some 
of their legislators and others and say, ‘See, the Supreme Court of 
the United States cites us.’ That might give them a leg up, even if 
we just say it’s an interesting example. So, you see, it shows we 
read their opinions. That’s important.386 
Nevertheless, this foreign policy consideration has not been a main reason for the 
Supreme Court to cite international and foreign laws. In addition, it should be 
remembered that courts’ interpretations do not result in the USA having 
international obligations, and therefore the courts do not interfere in foreign 
affairs through the use of international and foreign law.  
More importantly, the argument that the Court interfered in foreign affairs is 
beside the point and is based on the premise that the Court used international and 
foreign norms as binding law. It is to be remembered that the Court has not used 
international human rights norms of any form as binding law; neither has it made 
any unbinding instrument to become binding on the country. The Court simply 
used international and foreign norms as aids in interpreting constitutional 
provisions whose language is broad. It is within the Court’s power to interpret 
the Constitution and uphold the rights of the people according to the Constitution, 
even though such rights are not totally consistent with what the executive 
commits in international and foreign affairs.  
d. Legal Coherence  
A further objection against the interpretive influence of international and foreign 
norms in the US courts is based on the fact that each country has different 
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notions of justice, social structures, legal techniques and methods of balancing 
competing social interests. According to Anderson, to use international and 
foreign norms in US courts ‘is to deracinate the judicial texts of other legal 
systems, to strip them out of the particular social settings that animate them’.387 
It is also argued that because of such differences, norms or solutions provided by 
judges in one country are not relevant to another country’s problems.388 Even if, 
on the surface, two jurisdictions share similar legal concepts, there is ‘no 
guarantee, or even likelihood that the concept will mean the same thing to our 
courts that it does to its originators’.389 The functions and results of the same 
doctrine may be different in different contexts. 390  Therefore, to use external 
norms is just to ignore the differences and may result in inaccurate analyses of 
the case at hand.391 
However, it is argued that the US Supreme Court has not adopted international 
and foreign norms that are totally alien to the US legal system. Moreover, it has 
not used such norms without considering the US context. Rather, the US 
Supreme Court has usually referred to systems that have a close jurisprudential 
relationship with the USA and are governed by democratic means.392 References 
to ‘English laws’, ‘countries of Anglo-American heritage’, ‘leading members of 
the western European community’, ‘opinion of former commonwealth nations’, 
and ‘civilised people’ can be found in several cases discussed above. 
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In fact, scholars have attempted to formulate a framework for selecting sources 
of foreign norms on the basis of some kinds of commonality of the systems in 
order to ensure legal coherence. Dixon requires that source countries should have 
a general constitutional level highly similar to that of the USA and ‘share 
relevant topic-specific constitutional commitments’. 393  Moreover, the source 
country should have a rich history of democratic constitutionalism and have 
experienced substantial litigation issues.394 Glensy is less specific. He submits 
that courts in the USA should look at ‘western-style democracies’ because they 
have political regimes and societal characters close to those of the USA. He 
insists that the source countries should have ‘common normative value’ which 
could be inferred from shared history, otherwise the use of international and 
foreign sources risks imposing unrecognisable values on the US legal system.395 
Samar argues for the least specific and least rigid version of commonality. He 
proposes that there should be 
a common normative language capable of equating established 
meanings of settled American constitutional law with newly 
developing understandings of various conventions of international 
human rights by both the domestic courts of other nations and the 
International Court of Human Rights.396 
By the words ‘common normative language’, Samar does not mean identical text, 
but rather common underlying values expressed in comparable words. He later 
finds that international human rights norms in the UDHR do have enough 
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commonality with rights in the US Constitution, and therefore they may 
appropriately be used as interpretive tools.397  
This research agrees that the commonality between the enlightening systems and 
the USA can help mitigate the concern over legal coherence. At the same time, 
however, it is argued that this concern should not place much weight against the 
use of international human rights norms in judicial reasoning, at least not as 
regards the way the US Supreme Court has used them.  
 
es as 
                                                
It is important to point out that the argument against international human rights 
norms based on legal coherence is a classic argument against the idea of legal 
transplants; 398  however, the Supreme Court’s practice in referring to 
international and foreign norms is not based on such an idea. It has been 
discussed previously that the Supreme Court used such norms not as a ‘law’ or 
‘rule’, but as an ‘opinion’ or ‘idea’ which could support domestic sources. There 
is no expectation that the rule from abroad will apply directly to domestic issues, 
nor that the result of applying such norms would be the same in different 
countries. Rather, the use of international and foreign norms is better called 
cross-fertilisation, which Bell defin
a different, more indirect process. It implies that an external 
stimulus promotes an evolution within the receiving legal system. 
The evolution involves an internal adaptation by the receiving 
legal system in its own way. The new development is a distinctive 
but organic product of that system rather than a bolt-on.399 
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When international and foreign laws are used in this way, therefore, concern as 
to whether the receiver system can take new rules is mitigated.400 In the same 
vein, it is further argued that in the case of transcendent constitutional norms, the 
differences between countries in social and other conditions are not a fatal 
obstacle, for judges may look at such norms for inspiration or knowledge then 
make adjustments according to the peculiar condition of their own 
jurisdictions.401 This is particularly so in the case of international human rights 
norms, which may be considered to reflect values not unique to the USA.402 
e.   Methodology Concerns: Haphazard and Selective Uses of 
International Human Rights Norms 
The last set of objections is based on the practical concern that it is difficult for 
judges to use international norms efficiently and correctly.  
It is argued that international human rights norms, especially those from foreign 
courts’ decisions, are not easy to access and understand. Posner submits that 
foreign decisions ‘emerge from a complex socio-historic-politico-institutional 
background of which our judges … are almost entirely ignorant’.403 National 
judges are normally not experts in international and foreign norms. 404  The 
subjects of international law and comparative law have not gained much 
attention in law schools in the USA. In fact, many of the law schools have not 
offered any courses on these topics in their curricula until recently.405 Moreover, 
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only a small percentage of foreign decisions are available in English.406 Even if 
necessary materials are gathered and translated, it is almost impossible to 
understand and evaluate these materials thoroughly.407 
Because of this, it is argued, when referring to such norms it is likely that judges 
just haphazardly choose the ones that are conveniently available to them without 
having any consistent standard to judge which materials are relevant and 
reliable.408 A comprehensive examination of all relevant international sources 
has not been made.409 Further, there is also a concern that the Court might focus 
on the norms from European countries and overlook those from other countries, 
in Asia, the Middle East, Africa and Latin America.410 Gonzales, the Attorney 
General, considers that ‘[i]t may be impossible for even the most conscientious 
judge or lawyer to avoid being selective, or at least arbitrary, in the use of foreign 
law’.411 Therefore, it is argued, international and foreign material could never be 
used properly.412 This flaw can be seen, for example, in Lawrence, where the 
Court pointed out that while the Court in Bowers took into account the history of 
Western civilisation, it failed to look at other available authorities, such as the 
decision of the ECtHR on the same issue.413 
Moreover, the Court has usually consulted international and foreign norms 
provided by international legal experts in the case. It is likely that such experts 
chose norms that promoted particular results.414 The majority in Lawrence itself 
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relied on an amicus brief filed by human rights organisations to say that the 
sodomy law had been invalidated in many other countries.415 However, Alford 
submits that the human rights organisations in such cases did have the opposite 
information relating to homosexual discrimination in the world, but did not 
include it in the brief to the Court.416  
Admittedly, these are reasonable concerns about the use of international and 
foreign norms, including international human rights norms. Nevertheless, it is 
submitted that comparative and international laws are now of interest to more 
and more people. Research and symposia on such subjects are increasing.417  
Although these may not eliminate all problems, they should help to mitigate 
them.  
More importantly, some scholars argue that the comprehensive examination of 
all related international norms is not always necessary.418 It is reasonable for 
judges to choose only international norms from the jurisdictions that share 
similar values to the USA.419 For example, in Knight, Justice Breyer stated that 
the foreign norms he cited ‘reflect a legal tradition that also underlies our 
own’.420 In several due process decisions, the courts looked abroad to find what 
is ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’.421 Waldron argues that in searching 
for Ius Gentium in the sense of principles which have been accepted widely,422 
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judges may limit the search to ‘civilized’ or ‘freedom-loving’ nations.423 This is 
selective, but not arbitrary.424 It is rather a matter of selecting materials which 
might be deemed relevant. Besides, better techniques to distinguish appropriate 
materials are expected to be developed as the practice continues.425 
Next, there is a concern that judges might be willing to use international 
materials only if they can enhance the protection of rights and only for selected 
rights.426 For example, the Court is not likely to curtail the extent of freedom of 
speech, because the USA is ‘alone among the major common-law jurisdictions in 
its complete tolerance of [hate] speech’.427 The same applies to issues such as 
rights to abortion or to bear arms, which the USA has recognised to a broader 
extent than other countries do. At the same time, in some areas of rights where 
the USA offers less protection than other countries, the Court may not look at 
international norms anyway. For example, the Court is not likely to enhance 
protection against regulatory taking to the level specified in NAFTA, as there is 
recognised government interest in protecting the environment. Nor is it likely to 
change the prohibition against the establishment of religions by referring to 
international recognition of the co-operation of church and state.428 Because of 
this, some scholars argue that the use of international norms has been selective 
and thus unpersuasive. According to Alford and Ramsey, if one advocates the 
use of comparative jurisprudence, one should accept its results whether liberal or 
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conservative, sweet or bitter. 429  Consequently, if one expects only the more 
liberal result, one should reconsider the use of international norms. 430 
Nevertheless, this concern against international norms is not based on an accurate 
evaluation of the Court’s approach. As for the view that the Court would look 
only for more liberal norms, it is not consistent with the actual practice of the 
Court. It can be seen from the previous section that the Supreme Court has 
sometimes used international human rights norms in supporting its decision that 
certain rights did not exist. This is especially so in the case of rights relating to 
criminal process.431 Alternatively and more importantly, it has been argued by 
Samar that a preferable policy might be to look at international human norms 
only when they can help to improve rights protection. This is without incurring 
inconsistency in the courts’ practice.432 This issue will be discussed in Chapter 
Six.  
As to the argument that the Court might look at international norms only in 
respect of selected rights and not others, although it is likely to be true, this is not 
necessarily because of an inconsistency in the Court’s approach. In fact, it is 
reasonable that courts do not use international norms to suppress clear national 
jurisprudence.  
V. Conclusion  
This Chapter has laid down background of the US legal system that relates to the 
use of international human rights norms by courts. It has discussed the power of 
the US Supreme Court as the ultimate interpreter of the US Constitution, the 
tension between the Court and the other two branches, and the competing 
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interpretive approaches towards constitutional interpretation which have resulted 
from the controversies regarding the role of the Supreme Court. It has then 
considered the exceptionalist approach the USA has adopted towards 
international and foreign laws in general and those relating to human rights in 
particular. Lastly, it has shown that the Supreme Court of the USA has 
continuously allowed the interpretive influence of international human rights 
norms, although the legitimacy and aptness of the practice have recently been 
subject to strong criticism. As regards the legitimacy concerns, it has been argued 
here that these can be seen as an overreaction deriving from peculiar aspects of 
American culture, namely exceptionalism, the attachment to popular democracy, 
and speculation about the role of courts. As to practical concerns, particularly 
regarding legal coherence and methodology for the use of international human 
rights norms, they are real obstacles to their efficient and accurate use, but they 
can be mitigated and do not render the practice inappropriate. 
Chapter Five: Comparative Analysis  
The previous three Chapters have explored the interpretive influence of 
international human rights norms, and have provided an understanding of legal 
principles underlying their influence, in Thailand, the UK and USA. This 
Chapter starts with an analysis of the differences and similarities between the 
three systems. On the basis of this analysis, it then discusses the following 
questions: why Thai courts have not used international human rights in their 
judicial reasoning; whether it is desirable for Thailand to allow interpretive 
influence of international human rights norms; and if so, whether the Thai legal 
system permits such influence.  
I. Comparing the UK, the USA and Thailand 
A. The Political and Constitutional Systems  
i. Constitutionalism 
The differences between governmental systems and approaches to 
constitutionalism in the UK and USA are straightforward. The UK has been 
governed by its unwritten constitution. Since the Glorious Revolution in 1688 up 
until now, the leading constitutional principle has been the doctrine of 
Parliamentary sovereignty. Separation of powers has inspired recent 
constitutional development, but is not at the core of the constitution.1 As regards 
the USA, the written constitution is the foundational document for the nation’s 
system of government. The crux of the constitutionalism in the USA is the 
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checks-and-balances system; no one branch has absolute power.2 Despite the 
differences, it can be said that both countries are stable democracies, and in each 
the rule of law is well-respected. The unwritten constitution of the UK has 
operated relatively smoothly without drastic change except for certain 
constitutional reforms in the 20th century.3 The written constitution of the USA 
has stayed in place for more than 200 years and has rarely been amended.4 
Thailand exhibits both similarities to, and differences from, the two countries 
discussed above. It has been governed by a written constitution since 1932. It has 
adopted the Parliamentary system of government like that of the UK, but did not 
accept the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty. Three branches of government 
in Thailand are able to check each other, although not to the same extent as in the 
USA, since the executive and the legislative branches in Thailand are fused.5  
The most important factor distinguishing Thailand from the other two countries 
is that democracy in Thailand has been tenuous and still lacks stability. Thailand 
adopted a constitutional monarchy in 1932, a lot later than the Glorious 
Revolution in the UK in 1688 and the establishment of the Constitution of the 
USA in 1787. The Thai political system remains volatile and respect for the rule 
of law is in doubt. Some would maintain that the actual system of governance 
has changed from absolute monarchy to bureaucracy, and then plutocracy, with 
frequent interventions by the military.6 The vicious cycle of coup d’état, new 
constitution, election, and coup d’état has repeated itself many times, and still 
can happen in the future.7 As a result, the written Constitutions of Thailand have 
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been far from durable. It has been said that Thai Constitutions have served as 
tools in legitimising the exercise of power by those who have possessed it,8  
rather than as founding documents that may endure over time.  
ii. Protection of Rights 
The protection of rights is also different in the three countries. In the UK, 
Parliament may pass whatever laws, including laws that are in violation of civil 
liberties. However, it has been constrained by political pressure and the courts 
will not interpret a statute to limit fundamental common law rights unless it is 
obvious that Parliament intends this. Moreover, the HRA 1998 has made it 
politically more difficult for legislators to enact a statute against fundamental 
rights, especially those specified in the ECHR.9 In the USA, there has been a 
strong rights tradition ever since its foundation, resulting from its founders’ 
aspiration to create a more perfect union, one distinct from that of the old 
England where people had no rights against the King. The Bill of Rights, which 
provides for the guarantee of fundamental rights, is supreme over all branches of 
government.10 It is observed that some see the HRA as the Bill of Rights of the 
UK comparable to that of the USA. However, there are others who argue that the 
HRA provides for ‘dialogue’ between the three branches of government rather 
than accommodating the idea of rights supremacy enforced by judges.11  
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In this respect, Thai Constitutions have adopted a judicial-enforced Bill of Rights 
like that in the USA. However, the protection of rights in Thailand fluctuates 
according to the degree of political instability. The levels of rights protection as 
prescribed by the Constitutions were higher when the country was governed by 
parliamentary-model Constitutions, and lower when it was governed by 
authoritarian ones. Furthermore, while the USA has a strong rights tradition and 
the UK has long recognised civil liberties, the same idea of individual liberties 
has never taken root in Thailand. The revolution in 1932 which took away 
absolute power from the King did not give power to the people, but rather to 
groups of elites. Therefore, it did not raise awareness of rights among the public. 
People started to become more aware of their rights only after the constitutional 
reforms of 1997. Moreover, human rights abuses are still widespread.12 
B. The Judiciary and the Protection of Rights 
i. Power of Judicial Review 
The political and constitutional environment dictates the roles of the judiciary in 
protecting rights. It is accepted, in both the UK and the USA, that the executive 
cannot act beyond the power conferred by the law and the Constitution. As to the 
check on legislative acts, Parliamentary sovereignty has prevented UK courts 
from second-guessing the validity and quality of legislation.13 Therefore, the UK 
adopted the system of ‘weak judicial review’.14 The USA, by contrast, adopts a 
system of ‘strong judicial review’, where courts may decline to apply a statute 
which is inconsistent with the Constitution.15  The latter reflects a distrust of 
absolute power, even when such power is exercised by representatives of the 
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people. The democratic majority is constrained, especially on issues relating to 
individual rights.  
The judiciary in the USA seems to have a more aggressive power in relation to 
defining and enforcing rights against the elected branches. Starting with the case 
of Carolene Product Co16 in 1938 and reaching a peak during the time of Chief 
Justices Warren and Burger in 1953–86, the Supreme Court has used its power of 
judicial review extensively, defining the meaning and scope of constitutional 
rights with which government may not interfere. The Supreme Court’s decisions 
have involved controversial issues which have dramatically affected the legal, 
political and social situation in the USA. In many circumstances, its decisions 
have provoked strong public disagreement, but they are practically final. 17  
Nevertheless, courts in the UK have used the interpretation and application of 
laws as tools to define and enforce rights. Comprehensive jurisprudence which 
effectively protects the important fundamental rights of individuals from being 
interfered with by legislation has been developed.18 In fact, Lord Hoffmann has 
even asserted that courts in the UK ‘apply principles of constitutionality little 
different from those which exist in countries where the power of the legislature is 
expressly limited by a constitutional document’.19 Such similarity has become 
more apparent after the enforcement of the HRA, which gives the list of rights in 
the ECHR special status in the UK.20 Furthermore, it should be noted that while 
courts in the USA have enjoyed power to invalidate statutes, they have done so 
with the caution that their actions are ‘counter-majoritarian’,21 the concept which 
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also underlies the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty and prevents courts in 
the UK from engaging in a strong form of judicial review.  
Like the UK and USA, Thailand has had an established system of judicial review 
of executive acts. This task was carried out by the Courts of Justice up until 2001, 
when the Administrative Courts were established to take charge of the review of 
executive acts in all areas except those relating to labour law and tax law. As 
regards review of legislative acts, the Supreme Court of Justice has claimed such 
power since the beginning of the constitutional monarchy regime early in the 
20th century. 22  The elected branch responded by amending the Constitution 
establishing the Constitutional Tribunal under the control of the executive to be 
the final tribunal on constitutional issues, but the Courts of Justice still retain 
significant jurisdiction over constitutional issues. Finally, after the constitutional 
reform of 1997, the independent Constitutional Court was established with 
explicit power to review acts of the legislative branch against the Constitution.23 
On the one hand, the system reflects the idea that ordinary courts should not be 
able to overrule the majority, comparable to the system in the UK. On the other, 
it reflects the strong distrust of the majority, as in the USA.  
It can be seen that the Thai legal system provides a form of judicial review 
comparable to, or stronger than, that found in the USA. The current 2007 
Constitution gives substantial power to all three courts in Thailand in not only 
regulating political process, but also protecting rights. However, these courts 
have yet to show a prominent role in handling constitutional rights cases. This is 
especially true of the Constitutional Court, which is expected to serve as a 
leading institution in defining and enforcing constitutional rights. The cases 
concerning constitutional rights represent only a small percentage of the Court’s 
caseload.24 More importantly, unlike courts in the UK and the USA, neither the 
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newly established Thai Constitutional Court nor other courts have established 
consistent jurisprudence regarding the proper scope of their roles in protecting 
rights.25  
ii. Interpretive Approaches  
Because of Parliamentary sovereignty, UK courts used to adhere to the literal 
rule of interpretation under which extra-textual sources are deemed irrelevant. 
However, the trend has shifted towards purposive methods of interpretation, as a 
result of the impracticality of the literal rule itself and influences from 
international sources of law – European Union law and the European Convention 
of Human Rights. It has now been accepted that extra-textual materials may be 
used as aids for the task of interpretation, and that laws – especially those having 
constitutional status – may be interpreted as living instruments.26 The constraints, 
however, are that judges should not exercise interpretive power so robustly that it 
could be considered as legislating, which is the task of Parliament, and that they 
should give proper weight to the decisions of the legislative and executive 
branches on those issues which require specialisation or pure judgment on their 
part. With regard to national security in particular, judicial deference towards the 
executive has been a strong trend.27 
The development of the interpretive approach has been different in the USA. 
Since the crux of US constitutionalism is the separation of powers, the judiciary 
has been seen as the protector of fundamental rights and the ‘ultimate interpreter 
of the Constitution’.28 Nevertheless, attempts have long been made to limit the 
judicial power of interpretation. The originalist school of interpretation contends 
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that judicial constitutional interpretation should be based only on the text and 
original intent of a provision. 29 However, the originalist school has been subject 
to strong criticism. It has been pointed out by the non-originalists that the 
indeterminate language of the Constitution requires judicial evaluation according 
to contemporary circumstances. Interpretation is the process which standards and 
moral values from different sources may facilitate. 30 The Supreme Court of the 
USA appears to accept the non-originalist approach, especially in its 
jurisprudence relating to the Eighth Amendment and substantive due process. 
Nevertheless, both schools of thought have influenced constitutional 
interpretation in the USA, and the Supreme Court’s practice has been eclectic, 
depending, at least in part, on the philosophies of individual judges.31  
As regards the interpretive approach in Thailand, the strict literal rule of 
interpretation, resulting from the mix between the traditional civil law concept 
that judges do not make law and the English literal rule of interpretation, 
reinforced by the idea of state positivism, has dominated the legal system since 
the modernisation of law in the 19th century. However, over the last three 
decades, a movement for change has been instigated by academics as a reaction 
against the judiciary’s extreme formalist attitude. Thai courts are now moving 
towards purposive interpretation where extra-textual factors such as historical 
background, the intention of the law and its drafters, the current social context, 
the consequences of the interpretation, and the idea of natural justice are all 
considered relevant. The constitutional reform that has taken place since 1997 
further encourages the more important role of the judiciary in checking against 
the executive and legislative branches and in interpreting laws. The law-making 
function of courts in Thailand is perhaps most obvious in the newly established 
Constitutional Court. Its power to interpret vague constitutional provisions has 
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rendered it impossible for it to not make law. In fact, decisions of the 
Constitutional Court may be considered as having the same force as the 
Constitution itself. 32 Nevertheless, the legal system has suffered from 
conservative inertia. The civil law cliché that judges should not make law, and 
the formalist approach, still exert an important influence.33 
Importantly, Thailand has adopted a written style of Constitution like that in the 
USA. 34  However, unlike in the USA, where several competing theories of 
interpretation have specifically been offered in respect of the Constitution, in 
Thailand there exists only the (underdeveloped) statutory interpretive approach, 
and so courts apply this to the Constitution. Discussion of constitutional 
interpretation is difficult to find, even in academic circles. 
C. International and Foreign Law in the Legal Systems  
It can be said that all three systems adopt the dualist approach towards 
international and foreign law. While treaties in all three jurisdictions are deemed 
to have no legal effect unless and until they have been incorporated into the legal 
system by legislation, there are minor differences between the systems regarding 
the adoption of the customary international law (CIL). In the UK and USA, 
although the CIL is theoretically deemed to be a part of the legal system, the 
practice of the courts limits its effect substantially. 35  The Thai legal system 
seems to be more open towards the CIL, since it has been accepted as part of 
Thai law, and the Constitutional Court has actually confirmed this in recent cases. 
Nevertheless, the recent uses of the CIL have mostly involved the law regulating 
foreign affairs such as the law of treaties rather than that relating to international 
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human rights. Further, it should be noted that the use of CIL is subject to the 
condition that it must not be in conflict with existing Thai law.36 
The underlying reasons for the adoption of this approach in the UK, the USA and 
Thailand are comparable. For the UK, the driving factor is its core constitutional 
principle, Parliamentary sovereignty.37 Similarly, the US courts adopt the dualist 
approach because of the argument that international law which has not passed 
through a domestic law-making process is undemocratic and because of the 
constitutional implication of the separation of powers that the task of making law 
rests with Congress, not with courts or the President and the Senate.38 For the 
USA, however, an additional reason for the dualist approach is American 
exceptionalism, a concept that applies strongly in the USA but not in the UK, at 
least following World War II and the UK’s accession to the European Union.39  
In the case of Thailand, it is submitted that the Constitution provides for the 
dualist approach because of concerns over the separation of powers as well.40 
Nevertheless, ideas of sovereignty and exceptionalism underlying the dualist 
approach against international and foreign law, such as those in the UK and USA, 
are not as strong and deeply rooted in Thailand. This is because the country was 
bound by the treaties of friendship to apply international and foreign law when it 
first experienced international agreements, and several Western countries played 
an important role in the reformation of the Thai legal system. Moreover, the 
current situation is that the Thai legal system still needs further development 
where the experience of a more developed country may assist.41  
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In any case, although Thailand seems to have a more open attitude towards 
international and foreign law, when it comes to the interpretive influence of it the 
UK and USA seem to be more open than Thailand after 1957 when dualism was 
firmly established.42 While courts in the UK have developed a presumption of 
compatibility43 and courts in the USA have developed the Charming Betsy canon 
for statutory interpretation44 in order to allow international and foreign influence, 
Thai courts are still attached to the sharp division between national and 
international law. There have been only a handful of cases that Thai courts have 
referred to materials outside the country, and there have been no consistent 
principles for this practice.45 
D. International Human Rights Norms in the Legal Systems  
i. Legal Status of International Human Rights Norms in the Legal 
Systems and Their Effect upon It 
The dualist concept applies to international human rights treaties in the same way 
as to other kind of treaties. Therefore, the legal status and effect of international 
human rights norms in the UK, USA and Thailand depend largely on whether 
there is legislation implementing the treaties. 
The UK has ratified several key international human rights treaties and has 
incorporated some of them into its legal system. The most important international 
human rights treaty in the UK has been the ECHR, which has been given effect 
in the UK legal system by the Human Rights Act 1998 and has become the main 
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sources of rights for the people in the jurisdiction.46 By contrast, the USA has 
adopted an isolationist approach and rarely accedes to international human rights 
treaties. Therefore, international human rights norms play only a very small 
direct role, if any, in the legal system.47 
Thailand is different from the UK and the USA in this respect. Unlike the USA, 
it has ratified almost all the key UN international human rights treaties. It has 
also incorporated several norms from those treaties into its Bill of Rights. 
However, unlike in the UK, where the ECHR has been specified and given effect 
through the HRA, the Thai Constitution does not mention any specific treaty. 
Therefore, although it can be said that the substance of international human 
rights norms has a significant influence on the Thai Bill of Rights, that is where 
the inspiration ends. These international human rights norms are deemed to be 
Thai law rather than international law that has effect in Thailand. As for 
international human rights norms that have not inspired the Bill of Rights or have 
not been incorporated by legislation, they do not have any legal effect. Although 
the current Thai Constitution of 2007 mentions international human rights 
treaties explicitly and instructs, as a directive principle, that the state should 
comply with its international human rights obligations, it does not give any 
special legal status to such norms in the legal system.48 
ii. Interpretive Influence of International Human Rights Norms 
a. The UK vs. the USA 
Courts in both the UK and the USA have developed interpretive principles in 
order to allow the interpretive influence of international human rights norms. 
 
                                                 
46 See Chapter Three, IV A. 
47 See Chapter Four, IV A. 
48 See Chapter Two, IV A. 
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However, there are similarities and differences between the practices of the two 
countries which should be addressed. 
Sources of International Human Rights Norms 
In the case of the UK, the main source of international human rights norms has 
been the ECHR, to which the UK is a party. Non-ECHR norms have played a 
less apparent role, and after the enforcement of the HRA have served mostly as 
additional sources to the Strasbourg jurisprudence. 49  In the USA, the US 
Supreme Court has referred to international human rights norms from varied 
sources such as treaties, UN reports, decisions of international and foreign courts, 
and opinions and practices of the world community. There has been no specific 
international human rights source that influences courts in the USA in the way 
that the ECHR influences courts in the UK.50 
In any case, it should be noted that the approaches towards choosing sources of 
foreign norms in the USA and the UK (in relation to the non-ECHR norms) are 
comparable. Both courts tend to refer to the legal systems that share their cultures 
or that have a close jurisprudential relationship. The US Supreme Court often 
refers to English law or law deriving from legal systems that share Anglo-
American heritage. By the same token, law and jurisprudence deriving from the 
commonwealth countries, the USA and Canada are cited more frequently than 
others in UK courts. Nevertheless, both courts also refer to broader jurisdiction, 
such as ‘the world community’ or ‘civilised nations’, when issues are more 
transcendent.51 
Purposes Behind the Use of International Human Rights Norms 
 
                                                 
49 See Chapter Three, IV B iii. 
50 See Chapter Four, IV B. 
51 See Chapter Three, IV B iii and Chapter IV B ii. 
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In terms of Larsen’s typologies – expository, empirical and substantive uses52 – 
most of the references to the ECHR by the UK courts have concerned the 
substantive purpose. It is found that before the HRA, courts had used the 
unincorporated ECHR as a persuasive source in statutory interpretation, common 
law development, the exercise of judicial discretion, and judicial review of 
executive acts.53 Following the HRA, courts in the UK have also been required 
to use norms from the ECHR in this way – to interpret statutes and to develop 
common law in ways that are consistent with international human rights.54 Most 
of the uses of non-ECHR norms have also concerned substantive purposes.55 
Similarly, the US Supreme Court has referred to international human rights 
norms mostly in a substantive way in determining the existence and scope of 
constitutional rights especially in relation to the Eight Amendment,56 the due 
process clauses57 and the equal protection clause.58  
That international human rights norms have been used mostly for substantive 
purposes can be explained as being a result of the nature of domestic rights 
provisions. These provisions not only describe rights in abstract terms (and so 
require substantive input), but also contain what Neuman calls the ‘moral aspect’ 
of rights, which is less tied to a specific country than ‘consensual’ and 
‘institutional’ aspects.59 Therefore, courts may find international human rights 
norms helpful in the task of interpreting the moral aspect of the rights in question.  
 
                                                 
52 See Chapter One, text to n 15. 
53 See Chapter Three, IV B i. 
54 See Chapter Three, IV B ii. 
55 See Chapter Three, IV B iii. 
56 See Chapter Four, IV B i a. 
57 See Chapter Four, IV B i b. 
58 See Chapter Four, IV B i c. 
59 Gerald Neuman, ‘The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation’ in ‘Agora: 
The United States Constitution and International Law’ (2004) 98 Am J Int Law 82, 87. See also 
Gerald Neuman, ‘Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance’ (2003) 55 
Stan L Rev 1863, 1866–72. 
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Techniques for Using, and Weight Given to, International Human Rights 
Norms 
 
ts.  
                                                
In the UK, before the HRA, the use of the ECHR was under the presumption that 
English law should have been interpreted in a way that was compatible with the 
country’s international obligations.60 However, the presumption was rebuttable 
and applied only when there was ambiguity or uncertainty in domestic law. Then, 
through the enforcement of the HRA 1998, the ECHR has enjoyed more force as 
Parliament orders statutory interpretation in favour of the Convention rights61 
and the consideration of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR62 from the cour
As regards the non-ECHR norms, those taking the form of international treaties 
which the UK has accepted have enjoyed the same presumption of compatibility 
as that enjoyed by the unincorporated ECHR, while those taking the form of 
foreign laws and jurisprudence have served only as relevant materials. The 
latter’s persuasiveness depends on the courts’ consideration on a case-by-case 
basis. As with the unincorporated ECHR, courts tend to refer to non-ECHR 
norms of both kinds only when domestic law is uncertain or leads to undesirable 
results.63  
In the USA, although there is an established principle that domestic law should 
be interpreted to be consistent with international law, the presumption does not 
apply to constitutional interpretation. The degree of reliance the Court has placed 
on international human rights norms has been that it considered them as 
constituting one of the relevant considerations, or, more frequently, as offering 
additional support to opinions which have already been made on other grounds. 
 
60 See Chapter Three, IV B i. 
61 Human Rights Act 1998, s 3 (1). 
62 HRA, s 2 (1). 
63 See Chapter Three, IV B iii. 
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The main justifications for the uses are relevance and the usefulness of the norms 
themselves.64 
It is interesting to observe that while the UK’s rights jurisprudence has 
eventually been adopted from international law sources – not only the ECHR 
itself, but also the Strasbourg jurisprudence, which includes not only decisions 
but also the method of balancing between rights, namely the proportionality 
principle – the USA’s has been home-grown, and international human rights are 
used simply – and at best – as aids to interpretation.  
Perceptions of, and Criticisms of the Use of, International Human Rights 
Norms 
The use of international human rights norms is perceived in both countries as 
being something that increases the power of the judiciary against the other two 
branches of government. Therefore, the main criticism of the use of international 
human rights law in both countries is based on the concept of popular democracy; 
in the UK it comes in the form of the doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty, and 
in the USA it comes in the form of the argument that the Supreme Court’s use of 
international law is undemocratic. Both are reinforced by the separation of 
powers doctrine in the sense that courts should not interfere with the function of 
the elected branches.  
In any case, the criticism of the use of international human rights norms tends to 
be more robust in the USA than in the UK. Although both countries share the 
same concerns over democracy and judicial power, the elected branches in the 
UK later passed the HRA in order to facilitate the interpretive influence of the 
ECHR, while those in the USA continue to object strongly to the practice of the 
US Supreme Court in referring to international and foreign norms.  
 
                                                 
64 See Chapter Four, IV B i. 
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Furthermore, it should be pointed out that in the USA, criticisms have been 
voiced regarding potential problems relating to the legal coherence between 
international or foreign law and American law, and the courts’ methodologies in 
choosing, understanding and making use of international and foreign sources of 
law.65 These issues have not been widely debated in the UK, except for that 
relating to the extent to which courts should follow the jurisprudence from 
Strasbourg, where some argue that courts should not always follow the ECtHR 
jurisprudence as it may not always be consistent with the UK legal system.66 
In any case, such differences can be explained by the peculiar factors of each 
jurisdiction. The USA has adopted an isolationist approach towards international 
law, especially international human rights, while the UK has for a long time been 
influenced by international law emanating from the European Union. Moreover, 
the interpretation of rights in the USA involves the interpretation of the 
Constitution. The originalist theory of interpretation may have an impact on the 
courts’ practice. The UK, on the other hand, has accepted the concept of dynamic 
interpretation from the common law, which is more open to contemporary 
international human rights norms. Political integration in Europe and the use of 
comparative laws by international tribunals have made the use of comparative 
law common among members.67 The ECHR is a local human rights treaty for the 
UK. Moreover, by ratifying the ECHR and enacting the HRA 1998, the 
executive and legislative branches of the country have shown approval, to some 
extent, of the norms from the Convention. This may mitigate the concern that 
courts impose international norms on the people. 
 
                                                 
65 See Chapter Four, IV B ii d and e. 
66 See Chapter Three, IV B ii b. 
67  Christopher McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial 
Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ (2000) 20 OJLS 499, 521–22. See also discussion in 
Chapter Three, III B regarding the effect of EU law on the UK legal system. 
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b. The UK and the USA vs. Thailand 
The interpretive influence of international human rights norms is totally different 
in UK and US courts, on the one hand, and Thai courts on the other. Although 
the Thai Constitutions, and some statutes, have been inspired by international 
human rights norms – especially those in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and in international human rights treaties to which Thailand is a party68 – 
courts usually treat those provisions like other ordinary provisions and rarely 
seek to look at the original international human rights obligations for further 
influence in interpreting them. As to international human rights norms that have 
not been transformed into the legal systems, they have rarely received any 
attention from the courts.69  
Although there have recently begun to be some references to international human 
norms in Thai judicial reasoning, such references have been somewhat 
opportunistic and have lacked adequate justification. Some dicta have even 
reflected a lack of comprehensive knowledge of the principles of interpretation 
and the substance of international human rights norms.70 Academic literature in 
this area is also very scarce. No one has proposed an interpretive theory on the 
basis of which Thai courts may use international human rights norms in their 
judicial reasoning.71 
 
                                                 
68 For the influence of international human rights norms on the drafting of the Thai Bill of Rights, 
see Chapter Two, I B particularly text to n 77. 
69 See Chapter Two, IV B. 
70 ibid. 
71 The only article mentioning the use of international human rights norms in judicial reasoning is 
Banjerd Singhaneti, ‘Constitutional Review of the Legislation that Affects Human Rights’ (2010) 
39(1) Thammasat Law Journal 33. The article is a part of the research on ‘The Constitutionality 
of the Laws that Affect Human Rights’ submitted to the Office of the Constitutional Court in 
January 2010. Singhanethi simply submits that the Constitutional Court may consider 
international human rights in reviewing the legislation, but, if such rights are not recognised by 
the Constitution, the Court may not use them as a standard for judging the validity of the law.  
 
Chapter Five             271 
 
II. Lessons from the UK and USA 
A. Why Thai Courts Have Not Used International Human Rights 
Norms in Their Judicial Reasoning  
After comparing the UK, the USA and Thailand, it is now possible to discern 
certain important key points which affect the use of international human rights 
norms in judicial reasoning. It is submitted that the courts’ interpretative 
approaches and the principles regulating the relationship between international 
and domestic law play an important role with regard to this issue. The more 
purposive, flexible and forward-looking the interpretive methods courts adopt, 
the greater the chance for international human rights norms to be one of the 
considerations. Approval from the legislature and the familiarity of judges and 
societies with international legal regimes also encourage courts to look at norms 
beyond their own jurisdictions. On the other hand, the attachment to democracy, 
especially popular democracy, results in a dualist tendency and in restrained roles 
for the judiciary in reviewing the acts of the other two branches and interpreting 
law. The degree to which the countries perceive themselves as exceptional vis-à-
vis others in the world community also plays an important role in opposing 
international and foreign sources of interpretation.  
Differences between systems of government (i.e. presidential and parliamentary 
systems), styles of constitution (i.e. written or unwritten), and the extent of 
powers of judicial review against legislative acts (i.e. strong and weak judicial 
review) are not of great significance in relation to the practice in question.  
The reasons why the interpretive influence of international human rights norms 
has not been recognised in Thailand could stem from many factors which 
distinguish it from the UK and USA. Extremely unstable politics and 
constitutional systems may affect, to some extent, the independence of the 
judiciary, and may create uncertainty regarding its roles vis-à-vis the other two 
branches. The Thai judiciary, having experienced long-term authoritarian 
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governments and frequent military interventions, had been rather passive, and 
would act against the other two branches only in exceptional circumstances. It 
started to play a more aggressive role shortly before the military seizure of 
political power in 2006, but such a role did not arise in the context of rights.  
Closely related to this is the old formalist tradition in applying and interpreting 
law, which still has influence in the minds of judges, lawyers and some 
academics, resulting in the text of the Constitution or a statute being interpreted 
strictly without extra-textual materials being taken into account. A provision of 
the Constitution which implies a dualist approach towards international law also 
encourages total ignorance of international and foreign sources.  
Most importantly, Thai courts have yet to develop an interpretive theory 
comparable to the presumption of compatibility in the UK or the Charming Betsy 
canon in the USA. This is true even in cases where such international law plays 
an important role in inspiring the provisions of domestic laws. The interpretive 
values of international and foreign law in general have been neglected, and as a 
result interpretive influence of international human rights norms in particular has 
not been recognised. 
B. Whether It Is Desirable for Thailand to Allow Interpretive 
Influence of International Human Rights Norms  
Courts in the UK and USA have long benefited from the values of international 
human rights norms, despite the fact that their rights jurisprudences are highly 
developed. International human rights norms can provide useful insights, 72  
showing how others have considered and resolved the ambiguities associated 
 
                                                 
72 Neuman ‘The Uses of International Law’ (n 59) 87. See also the statement of Chief Justice 
Dickson of Canada in Alberta Union of Provincial Employees v Attorney General of Alberta, 
[1987] S C R 313, 348. 
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with analogous provisions. 73  Also, norms from international community are 
dynamic, which means that they may serve as ‘contemporary sources for a 
constitution’s practical and moral force’, 74  helping national jurisprudence to 
develop according to a changing world.75 As Levinson argues, no country should 
‘regard its own instantiated commitment to social justice or human rights as 
absolutely pristine’.76 
The neglect of the Thai courts regarding international human rights norms is 
greatly undesirable when the country is in need of development in all areas, 
including protection of rights. Constitutional provisions are normally open-ended, 
and international human rights norms can be of great assistance in giving 
meaning to such provisions.  
 
                                                
The interpretive influence of international human rights norms may also be 
considered desirable for policy reasons. International human rights norms may 
help enhance rights protection in a jurisdiction. Newman submits that ‘[f]or new 
constitutions in fledgling democracies, anchoring constitutional rights in the 
jurisprudence of more established systems supplies a body of precedent and 
decreases the likelihood of repressive interpretation’.77 This could be applied to 
Thailand, where democracy has suffered from frequent military interventions and 
the protection of rights has fluctuated from Constitution to Constitution. 
Furthermore, since the constitutional provisions on rights are directly inspired by 
 
73 Vincent J Samar, ‘Justifying the Use of International Human Rights Principles in American 
Constitutional Law’ (2005–2006) 37 Colum Hum Rts L Rev 1, 34. See also a decision from 
South Africa expressing a similar opinion, S v Makwanane, 1995 (3) SA 391, 413 (CC). 
74 A Barak, ‘A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy’ (2002) 116 
Harv L Rev 16, 69.  
75 Tamela Hughlett, ‘International Law: The Use of International Law as a Guide to Interpretation 
of the United States Constitution’ (1992) 45 Okla L Rev 169, 180. 
76  Sanford Levinson, ‘Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some 
Reflections’ (2004) 39 Tex Int’l LJ 353, 355. 
77 Neuman ‘The Uses of International Law’ (n 59) 85. See also Andrew Moravcsik, ‘The Origins 
of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe’ (2000) 54 International 
Organisation 217, 228.  
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international human rights norms, and since the country has been significantly 
affected in all its aspects (which include but are not limited to law, economics 
and culture) by globalisation, it is foreseeable that the Thai people will expect 
their constitutional rights to be protected according to international standards.  
International human rights norms may help boost the credibility of the courts’ 
judicial reasoning.78 This is especially so in cases where the provisions of law 
invite moral or normative judgments. Instead of asserting their own normative 
view or natural law, courts may refer to international human rights norms and 
gain more credibility since international human rights can be seen as 
‘universal’79 and ‘objective’ standards.80  
Last but not least, use of international human rights norms can help harmonise 
domestic law with international law. This is because, although Thai 
constitutional provisions have been made coherent with international human 
rights norms, the actual protection of rights in the country has not been up to the 
same standard.81 In cases where the international human rights norms are those 
that bind the country, the use of such norms can ensure that the country does not 
 
                                                 
78 Vicki C Jackson, ‘Transnational Discourse, Relational Authority, and the U.S. Court: Gender 
Equality’ (2003) 37 Loy L A L Rev 271, 281. 
79 It is generally accepted that international human rights are universal. See for example, UN 
General Assembly ‘Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat’ 
(12 July 1993) UN Doc A/CONF.157/23, para 1 stating, regarding ‘all human rights and 
fundamental freedoms for all in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, other 
instruments relating to human rights, and international law’, that ‘[t]he universal nature of these 
rights and freedoms is beyond question’. Cf the preparatory document, the ‘Bangkok 
Declaration’ in ‘Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human 
Rights’ (7 April 1993) UN Doc A/CONF.157/23 para 8, where the Asian states put forward a 
more relativistic position that ‘while human rights are universal in nature, they must be 
considered in the context of a dynamic and evolving process of international norm-setting, 
bearing in mind the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, 
cultural and religious backgrounds’. 
80  Lloyd G Barnett, ‘International Human Rights Norms and Their Domestic Application: 
Judicial Methods and Mechanisms’ (1999) 29 Revista IIDA 11, 20. 
81 See Chapter Two, I B. 
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unnecessarily breach its obligations. Furthermore, it is argued that judicial uses 
of international human rights norms can help demonstrate to the world 
community the country’s commitment to rights, avoid international friction,82 
and reaffirm the status of the country as among the democracies of the world.83  
C. Whether the Thai Legal System Permits Interpretive Influence of 
International Human Rights Norms 
Given the premise that the interpretive influence of international human rights 
norms is desirable in Thailand, the next question that has to be answered is 
whether the Thai legal system permits such influence. Although several factors, 
such as politics, the lack of a rights tradition, the formalist approach to 
interpretation and adherence to dualism, have prevented the interpretive 
influence of international human rights norms in Thailand to date, there have 
been some developments that point towards a system which better accommodates 
international human rights norms.  
Although further development is needed, interpretive approaches in Thailand 
have started to depart from a strict literalist approach in favour of a more 
purposive approach. Extra-textual factors such as historical background, 
intention of the law and its drafters, current social context and natural justice are 
all considered relevant.84  
Next, Thailand has historically been more open to international and foreign laws, 
and is likely to be subject to more international pressure, than the UK and the 
USA. This means that exceptionalism is not as strongly rooted in Thailand as in 
 
                                                 
82 Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Use of International Sources in Constitutional Opinion’ (2004) 32 Ga J 
Int’l & Comp L 421, 427. 
83 Sujit Choudhry, ‘Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation’ (1999) 74 Ind LJ 819, 888–89; Margaret A Burnham, ‘Cultivating a 
Seedling Charter: South Africa’s Court Grows Its Constitution Symposium: Constitution-Making 
in South Africa’ (1997) 3 Mich J Race & L 29, 44. 
84 See Chapter Two, II B ii. 
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its counterparts’ territories, especially the USA’s. As regards the issue of human 
rights in particular, certain international human rights norms, especially those 
stemming from UN Conventions, have inspired the drafting of rights provisions 
in many Thai Constitutions, including the current one.85 Thai courts have very 
good reason to look at international human rights norms as aids to interpretation. 
Constitutional reforms since 1997 have also changed the Thai legal landscape, 
especially regarding the roles of courts and protection of rights. The current 
Constitution even instructs all courts in Thailand to interpret the law in the light 
of constitutional rights. Since constitutional terms are usually vague and surely 
require elaboration, the Constitution implicitly allows judicial creativity on the 
part of the courts. Moreover, in the case of the Constitutional Court, the 
Constitution expressly gives it a power to define the meaning and scope of 
constitutional rights, which all branches are bounded to respect.86 It can exercise 
power to the same extent as the US Supreme Court in defining constitutional 
rights, and there is no theory that limits the sources of interpretation in Thailand 
corresponding to the originalist theory in the USA.87 Therefore, there is nothing 
relating to interpretive approaches that prevents Thai courts from referring to 
international human rights norms as interpretive aids.  
 
                                                
Further, the current Constitution appears to support the influence of international 
human rights norms. Section 82 of the current Constitution directs that ‘[t]he 
state shall … comply with human rights conventions in which Thailand is a party 
thereto’. 88  The judiciary, as one of the state’s organs, is supposed to act in 
accordance with this constitutional directive. Moreover, since the executive and 
the legislative branches are supposed to act according to the principle, it is 
natural for courts to presume that they do not wish to violate international human 
 
85 See Chapter Two, IV A i. 
86 Constitution 2007, s 27. 
87 Chapter Two, II B iii. 
88 Constitution 2007, s 82. The importance of this section on the ‘legal status’ of the international 
human rights treaties in Thailand has been discussed in Chapter Two, IV A i. 
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rights conventions to which Thailand is a party and to interpret the law taking 
into account those conventions.  
In fact, a comparable provision appears in the Constitution of India. It is stated in 
Article 51c that ‘the state shall endeavour to … foster respect for international 
law and treaty obligations in the dealing of organized people with one another’.89 
Article 37 of the Constitution of India explicitly provides that the provision 
contained in this part shall not be enforceable by courts. Nevertheless, it is the 
duty of the state to apply the principle in making law. Thus, the Indian 
Constitutional Court used such provisions to state that domestic courts have a 
duty ‘to give due regard to International Conventions and Norms for construing 
domestic laws’.90 Most obviously, in Vishaka v State of Rajasthan, the Court 
stated that ‘[a]ny international convention not inconsistent with the fundamental 
rights [of the Indian Constitution] and in harmony with its spirit must be read 
into these provisions to enlarge the meaning and content thereof, to promote the 
object of the constitutional guarantee’.91 
It is arguable that the implication for the Thai Constitution regarding 
international human rights is even stronger than it is for the Indian Constitution. 
Apart from the directive principle contained in section 82, the Thai Constitution 
also posits, in section 257 (1), that the National Human Rights Commission has 
the power to examine and report the commission or omission of acts which 
violate human rights or which do not comply with obligations under international 
 
                                                 
89 The Constitution of India, art 51c found in Martha I Morgan, ‘The Roles of International 
Human Rights Norms in Comparative Constitutional Jurisprudence: CEDAW-Based Examples’ 
(IALS Conference on Constitutional Law) 3. 
90 Apparel Export Promotion Council v AK Chopra, [1999] All India Reporter (SC) 625, [2000] 1 
Law Reports of the Commonwealth 563 [28]. See also Githa Hariharan v Reserve Bank of India, 
[1999] 1 Law Reports of India 151. Found in Morgan (n 89) 3. 
91 3 BHRC 261, 264 (1997). Found in Jackson (n 78) 293. See also Hariharan v Reserve Bank of 
India, 1 LRI 353 (1999) *8; Shri DK Basu v State of West Bengal (1996) SCC 416. 
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treaties to which Thailand is a party.92 Although the violation of international 
human rights treaties is not directly justiciable in courts, this provision reflects 
the strong will of the Constitution to have the country managed in a way that is 
consistent with the international human rights norms to which Thailand has 
acceded. 
Also, Singhaneti asserts that there are some human rights principles that are not 
mentioned explicitly in the Constitution, but are underlying principles of the 
Constitution. These may be considered as ‘rule-of-law principles’ and could be 
used in the task of carrying out judicial review against the legislative and the 
executive branches according to section 3 para 2 of the Constitution, which 
provides that ‘[t]he performance of duties of the National Assembly, the Council 
of Ministers, the Courts, the Constitutional organisations and State agencies shall 
be in accordance with the rule of law’.93 Accepting this argument, it could be 
argued that section 3 para 2 provides further justification for the use of 
international human rights norms that can be considered rule-of-law principles. 
Last but not least, it is also arguable that democratically based criticisms directed 
against judicial reasoning influenced by international human rights norms are not 
as strong in Thailand as in the UK and USA. In the latter two countries, the 
arguments against norms outside their own legal systems are based partly on the 
reasoning that laws passed by the legislature and actions performed by the 
executive should be highly valued because they reflect people’s opinions. As is 
argued in Chapters Three and Four, this argument does not necessarily prevent 
the indirect use of international human rights norms in judicial reasoning.94  
 
                                                 
92 Constitution 2007, s 257(1). Detailed discussion on the effect of this section can be found in 
Chapter Two, IV A i. 
93 Singhaneti (n 71) 55. It is noted that Singhaneti addresses human rights principles in general 
rather than international human rights. He does not articulate further the meaning of the ‘rule of 
law’ principles in the constitutional provision.  
94 See Chapters Three, IV and Four, IV. 
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In the setting of Thai politics, the argument faces another difficulty. This is 
because the validation of the argument depends largely on the efficiency of a 
political system in providing opportunities for people to be involved in politics 
and express their opinions through their representatives.95 The political systems 
in the UK and USA may satisfy such criteria. But in Thailand, where elections 
are believed to be significantly abused, whether the laws and the executive 
actions reflect the people’s opinions and are made for the people’s benefit is in 
doubt. In fact, the recently expressed attitude of Thai people towards politics has 
been very negative. It is believed that in this plutocracy, where money has been 
used extensively to buy representatives of the people and votes, the nation’s 
policies are controlled by the personal business interests of rulers rather than by 
other principles.96 This negative feeling is also strong towards political parties, 
which are supposed to serve as the people’s means of communicating with the 
Government and the Government’s means of communicating with the people. 
Research published in 2004 by the ASIAN Barometer showed that Thais regard 
political parties as ‘the source of corrupt and inefficient government’.97 
This is actually why Constitutions since the constitutional reform of 1997 have 
established the Constitutional Court, Administrative Courts and other 
independent organs: to invigilate closely the legislative and executive acts. Thus, 
Thai courts have a further justification for exercising the power of judicial review 
robustly in order to make sure that the political branches do not act beyond their 
powers. International human rights norms which are ‘neutral standards’, in the 
sense that they are beyond the manipulations of politicians, may be used to help 
protect the rights of individuals. 
 
                                                 
95 See Waldron (n 14) discussing good, working democratic institutions and perception of rights 
among citizens as conditions for the arguments against judicial review. 
96 Dhiravegin (n 6) 385–86. 
97  Robert B Albritton and Tahwilwadee Bureekul, ‘Developing Democracy under a New 
Constitution in Thailand’ (2004) Working Paper Series: No. 28 ASIAN Barometer: A 
Comparative Survey of Democracy, Governance and Development (Asian Barometer Project 
Office, National Taiwan University and Academia Sinica) 18.  
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III. Conclusion 
In short, it is desirable and appropriate for Thailand to allow the interpretive 
influence of international human rights norms in judicial reasoning. However, 
such norms have played almost no role in Thai courts to date because of the 
underdevelopment of legal jurisprudence in respect of the roles of the courts, 
interpretive approaches, and the relationship between international and national 
laws. Thus, the comprehensive framework for the development of rights 
jurisprudence using international human rights norms as a tool which will be 
proposed in the next Chapter will greatly benefit the legal system and the 
protection of rights in Thailand. 
 
 
Chapter Six: Conceptualising the Use 
of International Human Rights 
Norms in Thai Courts 
If the argument that international human rights norms should have interpretive 
influence in Thai courts is convincing, the next stage is to develop a framework 
that helps the courts to decide when and how to use such norms. Without an 
adequate framework, usage is likely to be opportunistic and inconsistent. On the 
basis of the experiences of the UK and USA and comparative analysis from the 
previous Chapters, this Chapter proposes a framework for the consistent and 
legitimate use of international human rights norms in Thai courts. It also 
discusses the potential challenges for the use of international human rights norms 
according to the framework proposed, and suggests adjustments for a more 
developed legal system which can accommodate international human rights 
norms. 
I. Framework for the Consistent and Legitimate Use of International 
Human Rights Norms in Thailand  
Several scholars in the UK and USA have attempted to offer justifications for 
using international human rights norms in domestic courts. Some also propose a 
methodology for their use. The suggestions are varied, not only in terms of the 
kinds of international norms to be used and the techniques for using them, but 
also in the degree to which such norms can have influence.1 Nevertheless, these 
                                                 
1 See Sarah H Cleveland, ‘Our International Constitution’ (2006) 31 Yale J Int’l L 1; Murray 
Hunt, Using Human Rights Law in English Courts (Hart 1998); Michael Kirby, ‘International 
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suggestions have been made in consideration of the UK or US contexts, and 
cannot be applied directly to the Thai legal system. Moreover, no-one has offered 
a full framework for the use of international human rights norms which this 
research attempts to provide. 
The proposed framework below seeks to discuss and answer the questions: (1) 
what kinds of domestic laws are to be interpreted taking into account 
international human rights norms?; (2) which courts have the power and 
responsibility to do this?; (3) for what purposes may courts use international 
human rights norms?; (4) should the use of international human rights norms be 
dependent on the ambiguity or uncertainty of domestic law?; (5) what kinds of 
international human rights norms should be considered and what are the rules for 
selecting the most appropriate norms?; (6) what levels of authority or 
persuasiveness should international human rights norms of each kind have in 
Thai judicial reasoning?; (7) what are the constraints and conditions on the use of 
international human rights norms?; and lastly, (8) what are the justifications for 
using international human rights norms as proposed?  
This framework focuses on the use of international human rights norms, but 
some preliminary suggestions on general principles of interpretation are also 
offered, when necessary. This is because the Thai legal system has yet to develop 
 
                                                                                                                                    
Law – The Impact on National Constitution’ (2006) 21 Am U Int’l L Rev 327; Karen Knop, 
‘Here and There: International Law in Domestic Courts’ (2000) 32 NYU J Int’l L & Pol 501; 
Harold Hongju Koh, ‘International Law as Part of Our Law in ‘Agora: The United States 
Constitution and International Law’ (2004) 98 Am J Int Law 43; John Laws, ‘Is the High Court 
the Guardian of Fundamental Constitutional Rights’ [1993] PL 59; Christopher McCrudden, ‘A 
Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights’ 
(2000) 20 OJLS 499; Christopher McCrudden, ‘Judicial Comparativism and Human Rights’ in 
Esin Örücü and David Nelken (eds) Comparative Law: A Handbook (Hart 2007); Gerald Neuman, 
‘The Uses of International Law in Constitutional Interpretation’ in ‘Agora: The United States 
Constitution and International Law’ (2004) 98 Am J Int Law 82; Jeremy Waldron, ‘Foreign Law 
and the Modern Ius Gentium’ (2005) 119 Harv L Rev 129; Melissa A Waters, ‘Creeping Monism: 
The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties’ (2007) 107 
Colum L Rev 628. 
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a consistent theory of interpretation, which is important as a foundation before 
international human rights norms are used. 
A. What Kinds of Domestic Laws Are to Be Interpreted Taking into 
Account International Human Rights Norms? 
The protection of rights in the Thai legal system is based mainly on Thailand’s 
written Constitution. The current Constitution, promulgated in 2007, contains a 
lengthy list of the rights and liberties of the Thai people. 2  As is usual for 
constitutional provisions, these rights and liberties are described in abstract terms 
and come with exceptions that are equally undetermined. Therefore, 
constitutional texts will be the main objects of the interpretation taking into 
account international human rights norms. 
It is noted that the result of constitutional rights being interpreted taking into 
account international human rights norms is that statutory interpretation should 
also take into account international human rights norms as well. In order to 
appreciate this argument, it is important to recall the proposal made in Chapter 
Two that the Constitution, by section 27, requires a rights-based interpretation of 
the law in which at least two requirements are involved. Firstly, courts must not 
positively violate constitutional rights by means of interpretation and 
adjudication. Secondly, they must consider the issue of constitutional rights when 
reviewing acts of the executive and the legislature to make sure that the latter two 
branches do not violate the rights.3 From the experience of the UK, it is further 
suggested here that in interpreting legislation according to the requirements 
above, Thai courts should also adopt a ‘principle of legality’ such as that used by 
UK courts.4 According to section 27, constitutional rights are binding on both the 
legislative branch and the judiciary; therefore, courts should assume that the 
 
                                                 
2 For the detail on rights protected, see Chapter Two, I B. 
3 See Chapter Two, II B iii. 
4 See Chapter Three, II B ii. 
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legislature does not wish to enact the law in a way that contradicts constitutional 
rights and should, as far as possible, read and give effect to legislation in a way 
which is compatible with the constitutional rights. This will reduce unintended 
limitations of constitutional rights by the legislative branch and render justice to 
parties in a particular case. Statutes that may affect rights and must be judged 
against the Constitution should be interpreted in this way. Those relating to 
criminal procedure are the most obvious examples. It is noted, however, that 
unlike with the principle of legality in the UK, where clear and intended violation 
of rights by Parliament will be accepted by courts, in Thailand, the law has to be 
declared invalid by the Constitutional Court. 
If the arguments for the rights-based interpretation of statutory law above are 
accepted, it is further suggested that courts should take into account international 
human rights norms in such interpretation. This is for the sake of consistency in 
the courts’ interpretive approach. Since the constitutional rights are interpreted 
taking into account international human rights norms, statutory interpretation that 
takes into account constitutional rights should take into account international 
human rights norms as well. However, international human rights norms that can 
influence statutory interpretation must not be inconsistent with the Constitution. 
B. Which Courts Have the Power and Responsibility To Do This? 
It is suggested that the Constitutional Court should play a leading role in 
constructing rights jurisprudence in Thailand given that it has the powers to 
define the meaning and scope of constitutional rights, and to render the decision 
as to whether a parliamentary Act is inconsistent with recognised constitutional 
rights and thus unenforceable. In fact, section 27 of the Constitution discussed 
above even implies that rights and liberties recognised by decisions of the 
Constitutional Court through constitutional interpretation are equal to rights 
expressly recognised by the Constitution. 5  Although cases concerning the 
 
                                                 
5 See Chapter Two, II B iii. 
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interpretation of rights have not arisen in the Constitutional Court frequently over 
the past 15 years,6 it is envisaged that this could change as Thai citizens become 
more aware of their rights and constitutional mechanisms for enforcing rights 
improve.7 
It is also the duty of the Courts of Justice and the Administrative Courts to 
interpret domestic law taking into account international human rights norms. 
This is because they are responsible for interpreting all laws and judging the 
actions of public authorities in the light of constitutional rights.8 Moreover, in the 
application of law to any case, if the Courts of Justice or the Administrative 
Courts are of the opinion that the law to be applied is unconstitutional they may 
refer such an issue to the Constitutional Court. They can do so even in cases 
where parties to the cases do not raise the issue.9  
C. For What Purposes May Courts Use International Human Rights 
Norms? 
This framework suggests that Thai courts should be able to use international 
human rights norms for all purposes – expository, empirical and substantive.10 
However, it is pointed out that the substantive use will be most beneficial, and 
Thai courts should concentrate on this use.11 This is because many constitutional 
rights are needing to be defined, and Thai courts have yet to develop their rights 
jurisprudence. The supra-national nature of the moral aspect of the 
 
                                                 
6 Chapter Two, II A ii a.  
7 See Chapter Two, I B on discussion of the new constitutional scheme for rights protection. 
8 See Chapter Two, II A ii b and B iii b on the role of the Administrative Courts and the Courts of 
Justice on judicial review and interpretation of laws concerning rights. 
9 Constitution 2007, ss 6, 27, 211. 
10 The typologies are provided by Larsen. This has been discussed earlier in Chapter One, text to 
n 15. 
11 Most of the time, courts in the UK and USA use international human rights norms for the 
substantive purpose. See Chapter Three, IV B and Four IV B. 
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Constitution, 12  and the fact that Thai constitutional texts are inspired by 
international human rights documents such as the UDHR and other international 
human rights treaties which are also adopted by other countries, especially those 
having modern constitutions,13 hint that human rights norms from international 
and foreign sources may help ‘illuminate’ or ‘inform’ the meaning and scope of 
the Thai constitutional provisions.14 In other words, international human rights 
norms may provide ‘normative insight’ for interpretation at the domestic level.15  
However, unlike with the expository and empirical uses, there should be a greater 
caution with regard to the substantive use of international human rights norms. In 
cases where international norms are to be found in decisions of international or 
foreign courts, Larsen submits that substantive use of them could be made either 
by looking at the reasons provided by such courts (reason-borrowing) or by 
looking at rules adopted by the courts (moral fact-finding).16 Regarding the latter, 
Larsen argues that this is unjustified because the content of domestic law, 
especially the Constitution, should not be defined in a certain way simply 
because other nations adopt such rules.17  
Although Larsen’s argument is convincing to the extent that courts’ 
investigations into the details of other legal systems provide further justification 
for their reliance on international and foreign sources, the caution against ‘moral 
 
                                                 
12 See discussion in Chapter Five, I D ii a. 
13 The Honourable Claire L’Heureux-Dube, ‘The Importance of Dialogue: Globalisation and the 
International Impact of the Renhquist Court’ (1998) 34 Tulsa L J 15, 24; McCrudden, ‘A 
Common Law of Human Rights?’ (n 1) 501. 
14 Vicki C Jackson, ‘Constitutional Comparisons’: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement’ (2005) 
119 Harv L Rev 109, 118; G A Christenson, ‘Using Human Rights Law to Inform Due Process 
and Equal Protection Analysis’ (1983) 52 U Cin L Rev 3, 3. 
15 Neuman, ‘The Uses of International Law’ (n 1) 87.  
16 Joan L Larsen, ‘Importing Constitutional Norms from a “Wider Civilization”: Lawrence and 
the Rehnquist Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in Domestic Constitutional 
Interpretation’ (2004) 65 Ohio St LJ 1284, 1291.  
17 ibid 1326. 
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fact-finding’ should not be exaggerated. Many international human rights norms 
are perceived as being ‘universal’ and applicable to any state, whatever its legal 
system. These are especially the rights specified in the UDHR. 18  More 
importantly, as is discussed above, the Constitution needs a moral input. 
International human rights norms which are widely accepted by the international 
community are good sources for the interpretation of the Constitution because, to 
use the logic adopted by the US Supreme Court, they indicate what rights are 
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty’.19 Besides, widely accepted norms are 
preferable to the personal opinion of judges. The concern should be mitigated by 
the fact that according to this framework, in no circumstance do courts use 
international and foreign norms as exclusive means for determining the outcomes 
of the decisions. Such norms will have to be considered alongside other related 
factors.20 
D. Should the Use of International Human Rights Norms Be 
Dependent on the Ambiguity or Uncertainty of Domestic Law? 
Section 4 of the Civil and Commercial Code – which provides general rules for 
the application and interpretation of law in Thailand21 – provides that courts may 
refer to ‘general legal principles’ in cases where no provisions of law, no local 
customs and no analogous provisions are applicable. 22  Section 7 of the 
Constitution also provides that ‘[w]henever no provision under this Constitution 
is applicable to any case, it shall be decided in accordance with the constitutional 
 
                                                 
18 See text to nn 34–39 for the discussion of the UDHR. 
19 This phrase has been used regularly since Palko v Connecticut, 302 US 319, 325 (1937). The 
issue has been discussed in Chapter Four, IV B i b. 
20 Further justifications are discussed in section H. 
21 It has been accepted in Thailand that the principle provided by section 4, though located in the 
Civil and Commercial Code, can be applied to the interpretation and application of Thai laws in 
general, including criminal and public laws, but with some adjustments. Kittisak Prokati, 
‘General Principles on Application and Interpretation of Laws’ in Application and Interpretation 
of Law (Chitti Tingsabadh Fund, Faculty of Law, Thammasat University 2009) 41. 
22 See discussion in Chapter Two, II B ii and III B.  
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conventions of the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of 
State’. Therefore, it is arguable that international human rights norms that can be 
considered as ‘general legal principles’, or as ‘constitutional conventions’ of 
regimes comparable to that of Thailand, are expressly allowed in Thai courts as a 
source of law when no other sources are available.  
However, even in cases where there are provisions of law that can be applied 
either directly or analogously, or where local customs are available, international 
human rights norms can still influence the application and interpretation of 
provisions and customs. The US Supreme Court has referred to international 
materials in cases where the constitutional terms were open to be interpreted.23 
The courts in the UK before the HRA 1998 also looked at the ECHR when there 
was ambiguity in statutory provisions or uncertainty in common law.24 Given 
that provisions providing protections of rights in Thailand are constitutional 
provisions which are presented in an open-ended language and are inherently 
ambiguous and uncertain, and that Thai courts have yet to develop their own 
rights jurisprudence based on these provisions, Thai courts can also benefit from 
international human rights norms in the same way that UK and US courts do.  
Nevertheless, this framework argues that the ambiguity or uncertainty of laws 
and customs should not be a precondition of Thai courts looking at international 
human rights norms. It cannot be said that all related constitutional and statutory 
provisions that have the potential to benefit from international human rights are 
ambiguous or uncertain. This is especially so considering the fact that there are 
provisions that by themselves do not look ambiguous or uncertain, but may 
become ambiguous and uncertain when considered with international human 
rights norms.  
 
                                                 
23 Chapter Four, IV B. 
24 Chapter Three, IV B i. 
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The experience of the UK courts before the HRA 1998 is relevant here. Although 
UK courts held that reference to the ECHR was not appropriate in cases where 
the statute was not ambiguous and common law was certain, there were several 
arguments for the more extensive use of norms from the ECHR. In particular, 
there were arguments based on the common law power of the courts that judges 
were able to interpret domestic laws to be consistent with the ECHR even though 
such laws were not ambiguous or uncertain, 25  and that they were able to 
‘integrate’ into the legal system norms and values according to the ECHR in 
order to meet the changing demands of society. 26  These arguments can be 
applied to Thailand, where courts also assume power to interpret the law 
according to changing circumstances, taking into account all relevant materials. 
 
w. 
                                                
In fact, the provisions concerning rights in the Thai Constitution are actually 
inspired by international human rights norms, especially those in the UDHR and 
the other UN-based Conventions that Thailand has ratified. 27  It has been 
accepted in the Thai legal system that historical development relating to the 
adoption of positive laws may serve as aids in interpretation so that laws are 
interpreted according to their purposes and their drafters’ intention.28 There are 
no reasons to reject international human rights norms that serve as an inspiration 
to the provisions in issue simply because there is no ambiguity or uncertainty in 
the domestic la
Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that UK courts, before the HRA, used the 
ECHR in order to comply with their international obligations rather than to 
enhance the protection of rights in the country. Thai courts, on the other hand, 
have to consider not only their international obligations but also the 
Constitution’s aspiration to enhance the protection of rights in the country so that 
 
25 Hunt (n 1) 297–324 discussed in Chapter Three, IV B i e. 
26 Laws (n 1) 75–76 discussed in Chapter Three, IV B i, e. 
27 See Chapter Two, I B and IV A. 
28 See Chapter Two, II B ii–iii. 
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it is up to international standards.29 International human rights norms can be a 
guideline in cases where there is a need for law to be modernised, or when the 
issues spread far beyond national borders and harmonised responses are 
desirable.30 
Therefore, it is argued that Thai courts should always consider international 
human rights norms in interpreting and applying constitutional and statutory laws 
relating to rights. Of course, in cases where the provisions are ambiguous or laws 
are uncertain, or no provisions of laws or customs are applicable to the case, 
there will be stronger reason for courts to look at international human rights 
norms.  
E. What Kinds of International Human Rights Norms Should Be 
Considered and What Are the Rules for Selecting the Most 
Appropriate Norms? 
It is recognised that international human rights norms come in different forms: 
CIL, treaties, laws and practices of foreign nations. They have different 
authorities and levels of connection to the country, but all of them can be useful 
in the task of interpretation because they may be able to offer expository, 
empirical or substantive information. It is submitted by Knop that, since 
‘relevance is not based on bindingness’, the ‘status of international and foreign 
law becomes similar’.31 Hoffmann also expresses the view that, in terms of their 
use as an interpretive tool, the difference between different kinds of international 
and human rights norms is simply a matter of degree. 32  Therefore, this 
 
                                                 
29 Discussed previously in Chapter Five, II B.  
30 B Markesinis and J Fedtke, ‘The Judge as Comparatist’ (2005) 80 Tul L Rev 11, 76–96. 
31 Knop (n 1) 520. 
32 Paul Hoffman, ‘The Application of International Human Rights Law in State Courts: A View 
from California’ (1984) 18 Int’L L 61, 61. Cf Tamela Hughlett, ‘International Law: The Use of 
International Law as a Guide to Interpretation of the United States Constitution’ (1992) 45 Okla 
L Rev 169, 185 arguing that courts should refer only to ‘international law’ since sources that are 
too wide cannot restrain judges.  
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framework suggests that all kinds of international human rights norms can be 
considered by Thai courts in interpreting and applying Thai law, but they should 
be given different priorities depending on their levels of connection with the 
country.  
The framework proposed that international human rights norms can be divided 
into three categories: (1) international human rights norms with which Thailand 
has an international obligation to comply; (2) interpretation of international 
human rights norms in the first categories by relevant treaty bodies; and (3) 
international human rights norms with which Thailand has no obligation to 
comply.  
i.  International Human Rights Norms with which Thailand has 
an International Obligation to Comply  
International human rights obligations may come in the form of CIL or ratified 
treaties. CIL binds every country that has not persistently objected to it. 
Traditionally, the principle for recognising a practice of nations as having CIL 
status was laid down by the International Court of Justice as the following:  
Not only must the acts concerned amount to a settled practice, but 
they must also be such, or be carried out in such a way, as to be 
evidence of a belief that this practice is rendered obligatory by the 
existence of a rule of law requiring it.33  
Generally, it is not a straightforward process to identify CIL. Nevertheless, in the 
areas of international human rights, it is widely accepted that customary 
international human rights norms can be found in the UDHR, an unbinding 
resolution of the United Nations General Assembly of which Thailand voted in 
favour.34  Therefore, there has been an argument, with which this framework 
 
                                                 
33 North Sea Continental Shelf (FRG v Den, FRG v Neth), 1969 ICJ 3, 44 (Feb 20). 
34 Lillich, ‘Invoking International Human Rights Law in Domestic Courts’ (1985–1986) 54 U Chi 
L Rev 367, 393–394; John P Humphrey, ‘The International Bill of Rights: Scope and 
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agrees, that the UDHR should be one of the main documents national courts 
consult when interpreting domestic laws.35  
It should be noted, however, that not all rights that are listed in the UDHR can be 
considered as CIL. While it is generally accepted that the provisions relating to 
genocide, slavery, torture, cruel punishment, arbitrary detention and racial 
discrimination constitute CIL, those relating to economic, social and cultural 
rights are not likely to be accepted as having the same status.36 It is also noted 
that UDHR is not necessarily an exclusive source of customary international 
human rights norms. Other rights-related CIL could also come within the 
definition. An example is humanitarian law, which is inspired by the concept of 
human rights.37 Therefore, courts are still required to evaluate each norm on a 
case-by-case basis taking into account practices of the international community 
and judgments of international tribunals.38  
 
                                                                                                                                   
In any case, most widely accepted customary international human rights norms, 
including those specified in the UDHR, have been replicated in the form of 
international treaties.39 Thailand is, to date, a party to: the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); the 
 
Implementation’ (1976) 17 Wm & Mary L Rev 527, 529; Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘The United Nations Human Rights Treaty System: 
An Introduction to the Core Human Rights Treaties and the Treaty Bodies’ Fact Sheet No 30 , 9. 
35 Hurst Hannum, ‘The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and 
International Law’ (1995–1996) 25 GA J Int’l & Comp L 287, 353–54.  
36 ibid 340–51.  
37  For the relationship between human rights and humanitarian law see Dietrich Schindler, 
‘Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’ (1981–1982) 31 Am U L Rev 935. The main source of 
humanitarian law is the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in the 
Time of War 1949.  
38  It is noted that this research does not give priority to unwritten international customary 
international human rights norms. Theoretically, they are international obligations and can be 
considered as part of Thai law. Practically, however, it is difficult to identify which norms have 
the status of CIL and what the meaning and scope of such norms are. This may lead to the 
accusation that judges simply present their own subjective opinion as CIL.  
39 OHCHR (n 34) 12–21. 
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Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC); the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD); the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (CAT); and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with 
Disabilities (CRDP).40  
It is submitted that these international human rights conventions should be 
primary sources of international human rights norms that Thai courts should use 
in interpreting Thai law. This is not only because they put CIL in written terms, 
but also because the executive branch has specifically expressed its willingness 
to commit to such norms, and the Constitution aspires to follow international 
human rights obligations. By choosing international human rights norms from 
these sources, courts are able to not only avoid allegations of being selective in 
choosing the sources, but also to reduce criticisms that international human rights 
norms are used as a cover for judges’ own subjective opinions.41 
ii. Interpretation of International Human Rights Obligations by 
Relevant Treaty Bodies  
The invigilation of members’ compliance with their obligations contain in UN 
human rights treaties is carried out on the basis of the mandatory periodic reports 
that the members have to submit to relevant treaty bodies. After considering the 
report and discussing the compliance issues with the states, treaty bodies usually 
issue ‘Concluding Observations’ acknowledging positive aspects of the states’ 
 
                                                 
40  Information taken from Office of the National Human Rights Commission of Thailand, 
‘International Human Rights Instruments’ <http://www.nhrc.or.th/menu_content.php?doc_id= 
179> accessed 15 February 2010. 
41 See Hughlett (n 32) 181–82 also arguing, in the context of the USA, that international law 
reduces the courts’ subjectivity in constitutional interpretation and may even improve efficiency, 
as international law puts natural law and values that are shared among all countries into writing, 
making it easier for courts to ascertain the country’s own constitutional standards. 
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performances and giving concrete and practical recommendations that will help 
states to give full effect to treaty provisions.42 It is generally accepted that the 
concluding observations of the treaty bodies do not have binding effect, but it is 
also generally accepted that they have notable authority, especially when they 
interpret treaty obligations or declare certain acts of the states inconsistent with 
treaty obligations.43  
Sometimes, treaty bodies also publish ‘General Comments’ on the specific issues 
in order to give a comprehensive interpretation of substantive provisions or 
further clarify certain obligations according to the Convention.44 For example, 
the CESCR gives a ‘General Comment’ on ‘The Rights to Adequate Housing 
(Art 11.1): Forced Evictions’.45 Just as with the concluding observations, it is 
uncertain what legal status these have.46  
Also, in some treaties, namely the ICCPR, CAT, CEDAW and ICERD, there are 
also optional protocols that allow individuals to file complaints in cases where 
their rights have been violated by a state party. The committees in these cases act 
in a quasi-judicial manner. 47  The views of the treaty bodies are not legally 
 
                                                 
42 OHCHR (n 34) 31–32. 
43 Michael O’Flaherty, ‘The Concluding Observations of United Nations Human Rights Treaty 
Bodies’ (2006) 6 Hum Rts L Rev 27, 32–37. 
44 OHCHR (n 34) 37. 
45  UNCESCR ‘General Comment 7’ in ‘Note by the Secretariat, Compilation of General 
Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ (12 May 
2004) UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7. 
46 See Philip Alston, ‘The Historical Origins of the Concept of “General Comments” in Human 
Rights Law’ in L Boisson de Charzournes and V Gowland Debbas (eds) The International Legal 
System in Quest of Equity and Universality: Liber amicorum Georges Abi-Saab (Martinus 
Nijhoff 2001). 
47 OHCHR (n 34) 33–34. 
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binding, but they serve to provide strong pressure on the states.48 It is noted, 
however, that Thailand has not accepted any of the optional protocols.  
Although these official recommendations, comments and views of the treaty 
bodies about the instruments do not bind the country legally, they can be used in 
Thai judicial reasoning as they can help explain the terms of the international 
human rights obligations with which Thailand has to comply.49 In fact, these 
kinds of international human rights norms can be very useful as both customary 
international human rights norms and international human rights treaties will 
only give Thai courts broad guidelines to follow, rather than examples of how 
such norms should be applied to concrete cases. For example, in the UDHR, 
broad statements such as ‘[e]veryone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person’ 50  and ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his 
privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and 
reputation’ are used.51 Several treaties that have been created under the auspices 
of the UN in order to put norms in the UDHR in legally binding terms also 
describe rights in rather general terms. On the one hand, this gives Thailand a 
wide margin of appreciation regarding how to interpret and implement its 
obligations in its own territory. On the other, when it comes to judicial reasoning 
that treats international norms as persuasive authorities, such norms do not give 
precise directions to the courts.  
 
                                                 
48 See J S Davidson, ‘Intention and Effect: The Legal Status of the Final Views of the Human 
Rights Committee’ (2001) NZL Rev 125 discussing the legal status of the final ‘view’ of the 
HRC under the optional protocol to the ICCPR suggesting that the HRC attempts to assert that its 
view has some legal status in relation to states that accede to the protocol. Although such an 
assertion is not likely to succeed, Davidson submits that it may be politically unwise for states to 
argue that the views are actually not legally binding.  
49 Michael Wells, ‘International Norms in Constitutional Law’ (2004) 32 Ga J of Int’l & Comp L 
429, 432. 
50 UDHR, art 3. 
51 UDHR, art 12. 
 
Chapter Six  296 
 
This framework suggests that interpretation of international human rights 
obligations by relevant treaty bodies should be considered in Thai courts along 
with the international human rights norms from ratified treaties discussed in the 
previous section. 
iii.  International Human Rights Norms with which Thailand 
Does Not Have an International Obligation to Comply  
International human rights norms in this category include but are not limited to 
unratified treaties, decisions of international courts according to international 
instruments which Thailand does not ratify (e.g. decisions of the ECtHR 
according to the ECHR), laws and practices of foreign nations, decisions of 
foreign courts, and academic and social writings.  
Obviously, these sources of international human rights norms have less 
connection with the country than those in the first and second categories in term 
of international obligation. At the same time, however, it is unwise to disregard 
them totally simply because they are not binding on the country. 52  Waters 
convincingly argues that well-reasoned arguments relating to a norm from many 
sources ‘can serve as an important reality check for courts in developing sound 
jurisprudential approaches to respond to the era of human rights 
internationalism’.53 Further, since many modern constitutions following World 
War II are inspired by the UDHR, it is very likely that courts around the world 
are interpreting the same principle of human rights.54 At a time when the CIL 
and international treaties do not provide determinative guidelines applicable to 
concrete cases, these foreign jurisprudences can be very helpful. 
 
                                                 
52 Sanford Levinson, ‘Looking Abroad When Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: Some 
Reflections’ (2004) 39 Tex Int’l LJ 353, 355. 
53 Waters (n 1) 652. 
54 McCrudden, ‘A Common Law of Human Rights?’ (n 1) 501. 
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Courts in the UK have made used of foreign laws and jurisprudence especially 
where the ECHR and ECtHR’s jurisprudence cannot give clear or desirable 
answers.55 The US Supreme Court has also realised this benefit, and has used the 
views of international communities to assist its judicial reasoning. It has been 
reasoned that development of domestic rights protection is ‘neither wholly 
isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the values prevailing in other 
countries’, 56  and that laws and jurisprudence abroad may serve as ‘common 
denominators of basic fairness governing relationships between the governors 
and the governed’.57 
In any case, one of the strongest objections in the USA against this kind of use of 
international human rights norms is that the selection of sources of international 
human rights norms to be used as an interpretive tool has been totally 
unprincipled. Courts simply picked the ones that they preferred or that were 
conveniently available to them without considering the appropriateness of such 
norms. Some even go further to say that courts used only norms that helped 
support their opinions and ignored those that contradicted such. It has been 
discussed in Chapter Four that the latter argument is unproven, 58  but the 
concerns about the haphazard selection of international human rights norms are 
valid, although they cannot render the use of international human rights norms 
illegitimate or inappropriate per se.59 Therefore, if Thai courts are contemplating 
the use of international human rights norms, there should be some principles 
 
                                                 
55 Chapter Three, IV B iii. 
56 Roper v Simmons, 543 US 551, 605 (2005) (Justice O’Connor).  
57 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, ‘“A Decent Respect to The Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a 
Comparative in Constitutional Adjudication’ (2005) 64 CLJ 575, 582 quoting Justice Wald’s 
phase. 
58 See Chapter Four, IV B ii b ii. There is no comparable objection against the practice of the 
courts in the UK. This is despite the fact that UK courts have no consistent theory in choosing the 
jurisdiction either. This has been discussed in Chapter Three, IV B iii. 
59 See Chapter Four, IV B ii e. 
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guiding the process of selection in order to ensure that there is no judicial 
arbitrariness.60 
This framework generally agrees with practices in the UK and the USA, and with 
the theories submitted by scholars discussing the US context that the greater the 
commonality in political and societal respects between the sources and the 
enlightened country, the more assurance there will be that courts will not impose 
on their own system something that does not belong to it. However, it is argued 
that, in many circumstances, this kind of general commonality may not be 
necessary.  
In relation to the comparative method adopted for this research, it was argued in 
Chapter One that comparison can be approached on the basis of the functions of 
the objects being compared. 61  Such a functionality principle might also be 
adopted by Thai courts in relation to the selection of jurisprudence. 
Notwithstanding the commonality of the system, as long as the situations or 
issues abroad were comparable to those at hand, international human rights 
norms from such jurisdictions might be useful. In fact, the US Supreme Court 
has already used this principle. For example, in Miranda, Chief Justice Warren 
discussed foreign experience from England, Scotland, India and Ceylon because 
‘[c]onditions of law enforcement in our country are sufficiently similar to permit 
reference’ to those countries. 62 In Knight, where decisions of courts in India, 
Zimbabwe and Canada were cited, Justice Breyer stated that ‘this Court has long 
considered as relevant and informative the way in which foreign courts have 
                                                 
60 The principle offered here is comparable to the one offered by Waters which argues that 
domestic courts should give weight to the treaties according to their ‘domestic values’ and to that 
offered by Cleveland which focuses on the ‘Constitution’s receptiveness’ to the international 
norms in question. Waters, ‘Creeping Monism’ (n 1); Cleveland (n 1). 
61 See Chapter One, II. 
62 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 489 (1966). 
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applied standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional standard in 
roughly comparable circumstances’.63  
Furthermore, it should be noted that, when focusing on the purpose of the use, 
commonality of systems plays a less important role when international human 
rights norms are used for expository and empirical purposes than it does when 
they are used for substantive purposes. As regards the expository use, selection 
of sources depends on which countries possess relevant and useful information or 
legal points that may help home courts to understand their own system. The legal 
systems do not have to be common. In fact, they can even be opposite, as long as 
the norms from those legal systems can be used to contrast and explain the 
targeted system. As regards the empirical use, this also depends on which 
countries have relevant information or practice which courts in the targeted 
system may observe in order to estimate whether a proposed solution would be 
likely to work, or whether fear of a particular solution is warranted. For example, 
in Washington, the US Supreme Court referred to the law and practice of the 
Netherlands not because the systems were common, but because the Netherlands 
was the only place that legalised assisted suicide.64  
The commonality of the systems is also less important in cases where the 
problems transcend political and societal borders. In Fairchild, a case concerning 
the liability of employers to employees who had been exposed to asbestos dust 
during periods of employment, Lord Bingham expressed the following opinion:  
If, however, a decision is given in this country which offends 
one’s basic sense of justice, and if consideration of international 
sources suggests that a different and more acceptable decision 
would be given in most other jurisdictions, whatever their legal 
tradition, this must prompt anxious review of the decision in 
question. In a shrinking world (in which the employees of asbestos 
 
                                                 
63 Knight v Florida, 120 S Ct 459, 463 (1999). 
64 Washington v Gluckberg, 521 US 702 (1997) discussed previously in Chapter Four, IV B i b, n 
266. 
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companies may work for those companies in any one or more of 
several countries) there must be some virtue in uniformity of 
outcome whatever the diversity of approach in reaching that 
outcome.65 
Similarly, the US Supreme Court sometimes referred generally to ‘the world 
community’ or to ‘international opinion’ in cases where political and societal 
differences were not perceived to be relevant.66 
In relation to this point, it should also be remembered that many international 
human rights norms contain values that are universal. Therefore, the 
commonality of the sources and the home legal systems may not play an 
important role in determining suitable sources of international human rights 
norms. Instead, the threshold turns out to be how universal that particular norm 
is.67 
Finally, in the case of Thailand, where the use of international human rights 
norms is supposed to help improve the protection of rights and develop a better 
democracy, 68  the requirements of political and societal commonality may 
become obstacles. In most circumstances, it may be more desirable to look to the 
established or stable democracies69 than to be influenced by countries with the 
same level of democracy.  
In short, the selection paradigm has to be flexible and sensitive to particular cases, 
yet far from unprincipled.70 Courts should consider and balance many factors. 
 
                                                 
65 Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Service, [2002] UKHL 22, [32].  
66 See Chapter Four, IV B ii d. 
67 Cleveland (n 1) 113–14. 
68 Discussed in Chapter Five, II B.  
69 Waldron (n 1) 145. 
70 Rex D Glensy, ‘Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign 
Persuasive Authority’ (2005) 45 Va J Int’l L 357, 404. It is noted that the selection of historical 
sources is also of the same kind, but those who argue that the use of international and foreign 
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The commonality between the political, societal and legal systems, the 
compatibility and relevance of the issues/situations, the universality of norms and 
the purposes for which such international norms are to be used are all involved. 
The accessibility of the norms, and the accuracy of the statistics and contents of 
norms reflected in documents, may also be considered. The most important point 
is that courts must explain the reasons why international human rights norms 
from specific sources are being selected using one or more of the principles 
provided above. The explanation does not have to be lengthy, but it should 
adequately justify the selection or, if appropriate, non-selection of the sources.71 
This requirement will mitigate the core concern of the selection process, which is 
the courts’ arbitrariness in selecting sources of international human rights 
norms.72  Of course, even with this requirement judges do have opportunities 
wilfully to distort all kinds of sources of interpretation, not only international 
human rights but also others such as the intent of drafters, the purpose of the law, 
history, and general principles. However, it should not be assumed that judges 
discharge their duty dishonestly.73 
F. What Levels of Authority or Persuasiveness Should International 
Human Rights Norms of Each Kind Have in Thai Judicial 
Reasoning? 
Not only should different kinds of norms have different priorities, they should 
also have different authorities and levels of persuasiveness in Thai judicial 
reasoning. 
 
                                                                                                                                    
sources are selective seem to accept the use of history. Rebecca R Zubaty, ‘Foreign Law and the 
U.S. Constitution: Delimiting the Range of Persuasive Authority’ (2007) 54 UCLA L Rev 1413, 
1434. 
71 Glensy (n 70) 440. 
72 See Aileen Kavanagh, ‘The Idea of a Living Constitution’ (2003) 16 Canadian Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence 55 suggesting that, in a context where the interpretation results in changing the 
law, judges are naturally constrained by the duty to give reasons. 
73 Kirby (n 1) 356. 
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i. International Human Rights Norms with which Thailand Has an 
International Obligation to Comply: A Presumption of Compatibility 
It is argued that courts should consider international human rights norms that 
come in the form of customary international law, or that are contained in 
international treaties with a rebuttable presumption that domestic laws should 
comply with such norms.  
The presumption of compatibility used in the UK and the Charming Betsy canon 
used in the USA contribute to this argument.74 Just as is the case for those two 
countries, it is in the interests of Thailand to enforce compliance with its 
international obligations, including those relating to human rights. 75 It is 
emphasised, however, that, unlike in the USA, the presumption that Thai laws 
should not be interpreted to violate international obligations if any other possible 
interpretations remain applies to constitutional as well as to statutory 
interpretation. This proposal is based on the premise that the Thai Constitution 
explicitly confers the power to enforce rights against violation by the executive 
and legislative branches on the Court, and that the amendment of constitutional 
provisions in Thailand is not as difficult as in the USA. More importantly, 
Thailand does not have any theory of constitutional interpretation that prohibits 
the use of international human rights norms. By contrast, the constitutional 
provisions themselves are inspired by international human rights norms, and the 
Thai Constitution provides the direction that the country should comply with its 
international human rights obligations.76 
It is also proposed that, in applying the presumption of compatibility, Thai courts 
may use interpretive techniques used by UK courts after the HRA, such as the 
reading down of, or the reading of some words into, written provisions. 
 
                                                 
74 See Chapter Three, III A iii and Four, III A iii. 
75 See discussion in Chapter Five, II B. 
76 Constitution 2007, s 82. 
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Language of the Constitution or statutes may also be strained.77 However, these 
techniques all operate on the condition that it is possible to interpret using them 
considering all relevant factors, including but not limited to the text, structure, 
the intention of the drafters, underlying values, domestic context, and the 
institutional role of the courts vis-à-vis the other two branches.78 Thai courts 
need not and must not distort the language and purposes of domestic laws in 
order to comply with such norms. In the case of constitutional interpretation, 
Thai courts must keep in mind that Thailand has its own list of constitutional 
rights. International human rights obligations can give scope and meaning and 
can influence the evolution of constitutional rights, but cannot add new rights not 
consistent with, 79  or remove those that are protected according to, the 
Constitution. If a constitutional provision cannot be consistent with an 
international human rights obligation, courts must uphold the Constitution. Also, 
in the case of statutory interpretation, international human rights norms may 
influence the interpretation only through, and as far as they are consistent with, 
the Thai Constitution. 
ii. Interpretation of International Human Rights Obligations by 
Treaty Bodies: A Presumption of Compatibility with Cautions 
It can be seen from the above discussion that, most of the time, the comments on 
or interpretations of the treaties by treaty bodies are not legally binding for 
Thailand. However, since they are explanations of the international human rights 
obligation by institutions that are neutral and specially charged with the duty to 
 
                                                 
77 In fact, the Constitutional Court of Thailand has already started to use these techniques of 
interpretation, although they are not yet used in the area of rights and are not yet well-developed. 
See the Joint Communiqué case in Chapter Two, II B iii a.. 
78 See discussion on the limit of section 3 of the HRA in Chapter Three, IV B i.  
79 It is important to note that this framework does not intend to prevent the recognition of new 
rights that can be implied from the constitutional text even though the ‘plain meaning’ of the text 
may not cover such new rights. To use the experience of the USA as an example, this framework 
will not argue against actions of the courts in interpreting the due process clause to include 
‘substantive due processes’. See discussion in Chapter Four, II B and IV B i b. 
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promote and enforce international human rights conventions, this framework 
proposes that Thai courts consider them with a presumption of compatibility just 
as they consider CIL and treaties, though with greater caution. Specifically, in 
cases where treaty bodies deliver comments or decisions relating to the 
performance of other members of the treaties, Thai courts should be careful in 
analysing whether such comments or decisions are applicable to situations in 
Thailand. Of course, those recommendations, comments and views that are 
directed to Thailand in particular are more persuasive than those that address 
other countries or that apply generally.  
A contrast should be drawn with the practice of the UK courts. Despite strong 
criticism in the UK, courts tend to follow the jurisprudence of the ECtHR closely. 
This could be because they perceive the rights specified in the HRA as being 
international rights which should be interpreted consistently among all parties to 
the Convention rather than as being the UK’s own constitutional rights,80  or 
because the approach benefits legal certainty and shields UK judges from the 
accusation of judicial activism.81 But the circumstances are different in Thailand. 
While judgments of the ECtHR legally bind the UK internationally, in Thailand, 
observations, comments and views of UN treaty bodies serve only as 
recommendations. More importantly, there is no constitutional provision in 
Thailand that expressly gives effect to any international human rights convention 
comparable with sections 3 and 6 of the HRA which give effect to rights 
specified in the ECHR. Neither does Thailand have a provision comparable with 
section 2(1) of the HRA which explicitly instructs UK courts to take into account 
judgments of the ECtHR. Therefore, while Thai courts should observe 
concluding observations, general comments, and final views of treaty bodies, and 
give presumption that Thai laws should comply with them because they explain 
 
                                                 
80 Discussed previously in Chapter III, IV B ii b. 
81 Roger Masterman, ‘Aspiration or Foundation? The Status of the Strasbourg Jurisprudence and 
the “Convention Rights” in Domestic Law’ in Helen Fenwick, Gavin Phillipson and Roger 
Masterman (eds) Judicial Reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act (CUP 2007) 60. 
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international obligations according to the treaties, they need not and should not 
adopt the so-called ‘mirror principle’ as the UK courts do.82  
iii. International Human Rights Norms with which Thailand Does 
Not Have an International Obligation to Comply: An 
Engagement Model 
In the case of international human rights norms with which Thailand does not 
have international obligations to comply, Thai courts should not be obligated to 
take them into account in interpreting Thai law, and it is unreasonable to presume 
that the legislative and executive branches wish to follow them. 
Among others scholars who propose principles for using international and 
foreign norms, 83  Vicki Jackson argues for the ‘engagement model’, where 
international and foreign norms are not to be excluded per se, but at the same 
time neither shall they be treated as binding, nor as something that it is presumed 
will be followed. Jackson submits that such norms should be seen as 
‘interlocutors, offering a way of testing understanding of one’s own traditions 
and possibilities by examining them in the reflection of others’.84 This model is 
suitable for Thai courts in dealing with non-binding international human rights 
norms, since it means that Thai courts will not have to always bend towards them 
more than the rule of acceptance of international law allows, but at the same time 
they are able to consider ‘relevant information’ for the purpose of interpreting 
domestic laws. Thai courts may follow or not follow these international human 
rights norms as they deem appropriate, on a case-by-case basis. In any case, it is 
 
                                                 
82 See J Lewis, ‘The European Ceiling on Human Rights’ [2007] PL 720.  
83 See the list in n 1. 
84 Jackson (n 14) 114. See also Sujit Choudhry, ‘Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward 
a Theory of Comparative Constitutional Interpretation’ (1999) 74 Ind LJ 819, 835–38 discussing 
‘dialogue interpretation’, which is close to what Jackson argues here.  
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noted that the more universal the norms are, the more persuasive power they 
could have.85  
In fact, this model is consistent with the practice of courts in the UK86 and the 
USA. 87  Although recent decisions of the US Supreme Court have tended to 
emphasise that non-binding international human rights norms were used solely as 
confirmation of or additional supports to decisions made on other grounds,88 it is 
important to note here that the Court has not limited the use of international 
human rights norms to these uses. From the beginning of the Republic until 
recently, the Supreme Court has used the norms not only as confirmation, but 
also as one of the reasons determining the existence and scope of rights.89 Thus, 
it is suggested that Thai courts may well utilise non-binding international human 
rights norms to the full without being limited to the use of such norms only as 
confirmation of the decisions made on domestic grounds. In fact, Cleveland 
convincingly suggests that considering the norms as one element in the test, or 
even using them to provide the rule of decision, does not raise concerns about 
popular democracy, because it is within the power of domestic judges to decide 
issues by consulting any relevant materials.90 
In any case, it is noted that courts should be very cautious in dealing with these 
materials. Although the paramount principles are the same, different countries 
may apply them in different ways depending on their own legal systems, laws 
and cultures. This deviation always happens, even with regard to the principles 
 
                                                 
85 Cleveland (n 1) 113–14. 
86 Chapter Three, IV B iii. 
87 Chapter Four, IV B. 
88 See Knight v Florida, 120 S Ct 459 (1999) 463–64; Atkins v Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) 316 
fn 21; Roper v Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) 575. Discussed previously in Chapter Four, IV A. 
89 Discussed in Chapter Four, IV A.  
90 Cleveland (n 1) 104. 
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that gain universal acceptance.91 While international human rights instruments 
are based on a presumption of universality, most accept some local modulation – 
most clearly embodied in the recognition by the ECtHR that Contracting Parties 
to the ECHR possess a ‘margin of appreciation’. 92  However, this does not 
contradict the universal value of the rights and does not make the reference to 
international human rights norms in domestic courts inappropriate. 
G. What Are the Constraints and Conditions on the Use of 
International Human Rights Norms?  
It is emphasised that, in order to be legitimate and appropriate, this research 
proposes that the use of international human rights norms in Thai judicial 
reasoning has to be subject to certain constraints and conditions.  
Firstly, the interpretive influence of international human rights law must be 
subject to the rules of interpretation in general. Due respect has to be given to the 
text, structure, the intention of the drafters, underlying values, precedent, and 
domestic context. International human rights norms can have influence only 
when the Thai legal system as a whole, and the language of a specific provision, 
allows.93 The proposal regarding the authority and levels of persuasiveness of 
international human rights norms in section F has already implied this. Even 
norms that Thailand has an obligation to comply with may influence Thai 
 
                                                 
91 Lord Hoffmann, 'Universality of Human Rights' (2009) 125 LQR 416, 419–20. In other words, 
universality is not the same as uniformity. James A Sweeney, ‘Margins of Appreciation: Cultural 
Relativity and the European Court of Human Rights in the Post-Cold War Era’ (2005) 54 ICLQ 
459, 469.  
92 See Sweeney (n 91).  
93 See Steven Greer, ‘“Balancing” and the European Court of Human Rights: A Contribution to 
the Habermas-Alexy Debate’ (2004) 63 CLJ 412, 424; Vicki C Jackson, ‘Transnational 
Discourse, Relational Authority, and the U.S. Court: Gender Equality’ (2003) 37 Loy L A L Rev 
271, 305. 
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judicial reasoning only to the extent that it is possible according to the Thai 
Constitution.94 
The consequence of the use of norms from CIL with this constraint is that Thai 
courts are to have their own rights jurisprudence rather than jurisprudence that 
always attaches to international human rights norms. This is consistent with what 
the Constitution intends, since it may be implied that the Thai Constitution uses 
wording from several international human rights instruments without mentioning 
the sources because it assumes that the constitutional rights of the country should 
take into account the country’s own culture and should not always be tied to 
certain international sources.  
Secondly, the institutional constraints regarding issues that should be left for the 
other two branches to decide should also be considered.95 Dworkin’s theory is 
useful here. He submits that judges must observe ‘integrity’ in interpreting the 
Constitution. They have duties not only to ensure that the moral judgment they 
are about to use is consistent with the structure of the Constitution as a whole and 
in line with precedents, but also to ‘defer to general, settled understanding about 
the character of the power the Constitution assigns them’.96  
This issue is of importance especially when courts need to strike a balance 
between constitutional rights and legitimate limitation on rights imposed by the 
legislature or the executive, which is very likely to happen, since most Thai 
constitutional rights are not absolute. 97  There is yet to be any academic 
discussion of this issue in Thailand and it is not the purpose of this research to 
 
                                                 
94 Section F i, text to n 78.  
95 See Jackson, ‘Constitutional Comparisons’ (n 14) 116; Vincent J Samar, ‘Justifying the Use of 
International Human Rights Principles in American Constitutional Law’ (2005–2006) 37 Colum 
Hum Rts L Rev 1, 87–90. 
96 Ronald Dworkin, Freedom’s Law: the Moral Reading of the American Constitution (OUP 1996) 
10–11. 
97 See Chapter Two, I B.  
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offer a full analysis on this point; nevertheless, it might be suggested that an 
approach like that of the UK courts should be considered by Thai courts. 98   
Courts should exercise proportionality judgment. 99  As a part of this, greater 
deference should be accorded to executive or legislative decisions on issues, such 
as national security and social and economic issues, which fall within the 
constitutional responsibility of, or require the expertise and judgment of, the 
elected branches.100 If the principles above are accepted, it is further argued that 
in using international human rights norms, courts could have more freedom when 
the issues to be determined involve the question of law or judicial discretion and 
should be more restrained when the issues involve judgments of the executive 
and legislature.101 
 
                                                
Moving on to another point, it is proposed as a matter of policy that courts should 
limit the use of international human rights norms to cases where such norms can 
 
98 It is noted that although the Thai Constitution intends to vest great power in courts in enforcing 
constitutional rights, the power of the Thai courts is still subject to provisions of the Constitution 
which, on many occasions, provide for exemption to constitutionals rights. Therefore, 
proportionality judgment and a principle of deference, similar to those in the UK, could be useful. 
99  In fact, this is required in relation to the review of legislation according to s 29 of the 
Constitution discussed in Chapter Two, text to n 104. Nevertheless, it is argued that 
proportionality judgment is to be exercised in the review of administrative actions as well. It is 
also observed that Thai courts have started to be interested in the proportionality analysis. For 
example, see the Constitutional Court decision no 59/2545 (2003) on the scope of the right of the 
owner to use land below ground level; the Central Administrative Court decision no 1605/2551 
(2008) holding that the Government’s measure in dispersing a protest during October 2008 was 
beyond necessity. See also Constitutional Court decisions 30/2548 (2003) and 11/2549 (2004). 
However, there has yet to be a developed principle for this, and Thai courts tend to mention the 
principle but defer to decisions of the legislative and executive branches without much 
investigation. For example, see Constitutional Court decision no 48/2542 (1999) deferring, 
without any inquiry, to a public authority on the issue of whether a measure which limited a right 
to occupation was necessary in order to maintain the national economy.  
100 See discussion in Chapter Three, II A, pp 112–114. See also brief discussion of the political 
question doctrine in Chapter Four, II A, text to n 66. It is noted that this framework does not 
intend to argue that courts should show restraint in deciding cases relating to national security or 
economic and social problems in a blanket fashion. 
101 See Chapter Three, II A and the influence of the unincorporated ECHR, which tended to be 
more on the areas where judges had discretion than on those in which the other two branches 
were involved in IV B i. 
 
Chapter Six  310 
 
help strengthen and not weaken existing domestic rights. This proposal is 
inspired by that of Samar.102 In the USA, there is an argument that if the use of 
non-US materials in judicial reasoning is to be accepted as consistent and non-
arbitrary, the courts should accept such influence for all rights and accept the 
results of such influence no matter whether they are ‘sweet’ or ‘bitter’. 103  
Nevertheless, such methods would raise concerns that international human rights 
may weaken some rights that are better protected in the national jurisprudence. 
Samar tries to solve this dilemma, proposing the normative constraint that 
international human rights norms should not be used to the extent that existing 
domestic rights are devalued. He bases his argument on the assumption that both 
international human rights (particularly the UDHR) and the Constitution of the 
USA have a common end, which is the ‘self-fulfillment’. The Constitution 
should be interpreted towards such an end, and international human rights, 
because they have the same end, should be used to support rather than obstruct 
such an interpretation.104  
Although it cannot be said that Thailand at the present time has some rights that 
are protected better than international standards, this argument may be adopted 
for future use, and for preventing a derogation of rights protection from the 
influence of the laws and practices of nations that have less protection of rights 
than applies in Thailand. In fact, it is argued above that Thai courts have to 
consider and balance all relevant domestic factors, including the existing rights 
protection in the country. There is no reason to follow international human rights 
norms to the extent that rights protection in the country is weakened. As regards 
those norms that are in international human rights conventions to which Thailand 
is a party, this should not always be considered as violating the obligation. After 
 
                                                 
102 Samar (n 95). 
103 Michael D Ramsey, ‘International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and 
Lawrence’ in ‘Agora: The United States Constitution and International Law’ (2004) 98 Am J Int 
Law 69, 76–77; Roger P Alford, ‘Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution’ in 
‘Agora: The United States Constitution and International Law’ (2004) 98 Am J Int Law 57, 69. 
104 Samar (n 95) 49–50. 
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all, international human rights conventions can be viewed as serving as platforms 
or minimum standards of protection rather than as a strict set of standards which 
the country must follow.  
Last but not least, the framework requires that with every step of using 
international human rights norms according to this framework, courts have to 
give reasons for the use. Questions such as why a certain provision is open to 
international human rights norms, for what purpose such norms are used, why a 
chosen international human rights norm is relevant, why courts give a particular 
weight to the norms, and so on, have to be answered in judicial reasoning and are 
subject to criticism. This duty to give reasons will not only serve as a final 
constraint in ensuring that the courts use international human rights norms 
legitimately and appropriately, but will also help improve the quality of judicial 
reasoning based on international human rights norms.105 
H. What Are the Justifications for Using International Human Rights 
Norms as Proposed? 
One of the results of the use of international human rights norms according to the 
framework is that such norms will not only inform the courts’ interpretation of 
law but also influence the way the executive and legislative branches perform 
their duties. Because the executive and legislative branches have a constitutional 
duty to observe constitutional rights, they will also have a duty to observe 
international human rights norms that courts use in interpreting constitutional 
rights. This is highly beneficial for the improvement of rights protection in 
Thailand. However, the courts will, consequently, have great power vis-à-vis the 
elected branches, and this is one of the main causes of the controversies over the 
use of international human rights norms in the UK and the USA. Therefore, it is 
 
                                                 
105 Although this suggestion may look obvious for those in the UK and USA, it is not for 
Thailand, where judicial reasoning has been characterised by a lack of reason. This will be 
discussed further in section II of this Chapter. 
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necessary to re-emphasise here that Thai courts are justified in using 
international human rights norms according to the framework proposed.106  
Three important points need to be made here. First, the Constitution implicitly 
supports the influence of international human rights norms, especially those that 
Thailand has accepted, in the Thai legal system and expects all branches of 
Government to follow such norms.107 The Constitution also supports the strong 
role of the courts in upholding constitutional rights.108 
A second and related point is that the use of international human rights norms 
according to this framework does not go beyond the courts’ proper role in 
interpretation. Thai courts are allowed to make law when there is no law 
applicable and to give normative value to the constitutional and statutory 
provisions when the provisions are open for such. 109 Moreover, they are allowed 
to refer to all relevant materials in the task of interpretation.110 Therefore, if 
international human rights norms are relevant and able to illuminate the issues, 
judges should be able to use them as well as other materials. This is especially so 
regarding the interpretation of the Constitution, where international human rights 
norms have played a very important role in inspiring its content. It can be said 
that there are ‘genealogical links’ between Thai constitutional rights and 
 
                                                 
106 Certain justifications have already been provided in Chapter II C and in the suggestions in 
sections A-G of this Chapter. Therefore, this section merely re-emphasises the most important 
justifications underlying the use of international human rights norms according to this framework. 
107 Constitution 2007, ss 82, 257(1). This has been discussed in full in Chapter Five, II C. 
108 Constitution 2007, s 27 discussed in Chapter Two, II B iii and section A of this Chapter. See 
also the power of the courts in reviewing legislation and administrative actions in Chapter Two, 
II A ii a & b. 
109 Constitution 2007, ss 3, 7 and 27; Civil and Commercial Code, s 4. These have been discussed 
previously in section D of this Chapter. See also discussion in Chapter Two, II B ii and iii; 
Chapter Five II C. 
110 Chapter Two, II B ii; Chapter Five, II C. 
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international human rights law,111 and it is normal for courts to look at these in 
attempting to make a consistent interpretation.112  
Lastly, the framework proposed does not suggest that Thai courts impose 
international human rights norms on the legal system against the dualist 
principle113 or against legal coherence114 in Thailand. Rather, it simply suggests 
courts should consider international human rights norms as interpretive aids. 
Expository and empirical uses are obviously far from the use of international 
human rights norms as compelling authorities. Substantive use may allow the 
influence of international human rights values over Thai law, but it has done so 
because of the persuasiveness of such norms and not because of the authority of 
them as law.115 The presumption that domestic laws should be interpreted so as 
to be consistent with international human rights norms with which the country 
has international obligations to comply is rebuttable. As for the international 
human rights norms to which the country has not committed, the engagement 
model does not impose any presumption in favour of international human rights 
norms on the courts’ interpretative approach. In relation to legal coherence, it 
should also be recalled that the main source of international human rights norms 
to be applied by Thai courts is the international human rights treaties to which 
 
                                                 
111  See The Honourable Claire L’Heureux-Dube (n 13) 24 discussing the link between the 
Canadian Charter and international human rights treaties. 
112 Markesinis and Fedtke (n 30) 106–108. See also the statement of a Justice of the South 
African Constitutional Court that ‘where a provision in our Constitution is manifestly modeled on 
a particular provision in another country’s constitution, it would be folly not to ascertain how the 
jurists of that country have interpreted their precedential provisions’ Bernstein v Bester, 1996 (4) 
BCLR 449 (CC) at 133 (S Afr) quoted in ibid 106–107. 
113 In fact, some scholars tend to suggest that a departure from dualism is justified. See, for 
example, Waters, ‘Creeping Monism’ (n 1) 695 suggesting that international human rights may 
justify some degree of erosion of strict dualism. Also, Hunt (n 1) submits in the UK context that 
Parliamentary sovereignty, which is the underlying principle for dualism, has declined and thus 
courts may exercise common law power in using international human rights law. 
114 See Chapter Four, IV B ii d. 
115 See a comment of Law LJ in Chapter Three, IV B i e, text to n 115 distinguishing between the 
contents of the ECHR as ‘propositions’ and the ‘law’. 
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Thailand is a party, the concepts of which it has put into its Constitution. For this 
reason, inconsistency in the legal system is not likely to occur.116 
II. Challenges for Thai Courts  
The task of creating a rights jurisprudence is quite challenging for Thai courts, 
which have not had either consistent interpretive jurisprudence or rights 
jurisprudence before. International human rights norms can be of great assistance, 
but some legal cultures have to change in order to accommodate the development 
of a rights jurisprudence in general and the use of international human rights 
norms in particular. 
The greatest challenge, perhaps, is the way in which Thai courts deliver opinions. 
Harding and Leyland criticise the judicial reasoning of the Thai Constitutional 
Court on the following grounds: 
Judgments tend to be formulistic … they do not engage with the 
arguments presented or those referred to by other judges or in 
other cases dealing with similar issues, especially those with 
which the judge presumably disagrees; they fail in general terms 
to justify the decisions taken; holdings are binding but not the 
reasoning.117 
In fact, this has been the style of reasoning adopted in Thai courts even before 
the establishment of the Constitutional Court. The Thai Constitution actually 
recognises this problem, and expressly requires for Constitutional Court 
decisions that they include at least ‘the background of the allegation concerned, a 
 
                                                 
116 It is noted that since Thailand has had no rights tradition, inconsistency may arise between the 
existing legal culture and the international human rights norms as adopted by the Constitution. 
Nevertheless, the transplant is by the Constitution and not by the courts using international 
human rights norms. The issues of legal transplants have been discussed in Chapters One, II and 
Four, IV ii d. The potential conflict between Thai tradition and constitutional rights is discussed 
in Chapter Seven as a potential subject for future research. 
117 Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland, ‘The Constitutional Courts of Thailand and Indonesia: 
Two Case Studies From South East Asia’ (2008) 3 JCL 118, 130. 
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summary of facts obtained from hearings, reasons for the decision on questions 
of fact and questions of law and the provisions of the Constitution and the law 
invoked and resorted to’.118 It also encourages reason-based arguments among 
judges by requiring each of them to submit individual opinions.119 The Court’s 
judgments do follow the formula provided, since each of the judgments tends to 
have headings similar to those listed in the Constitution, but, consistently with 
Harding and Leyland’s submission, judges have failed to relate the headings to 
each other and provide adequate reasons.  
This facet of the judicial practice must be improved. Judge Coffin suggests that 
the ‘dangerous trend of broad, bright-line pronouncements should be replaced by 
cautious, incremental decision-making, reached by detailed, careful, open 
balancing’.120 Not only the Constitutional Court, but also all other courts should 
be encouraged to provide adequate reasons for their decisions. This is a 
requirement not only for the use of international human rights norms according 
to the framework proposed, whose legitimacy depends partly on the courts’ 
explanation of the reasons for the use of international human rights norms in 
particular, but also for the improvement of judicial reasoning in general. The 
practice of judges in the UK and the USA can be used as a model.121  
 
                                                
Another challenge for Thai courts in using international human rights norms is 
that Thai judges at the present time may not have comprehensive knowledge of 
the international human rights norms from CIL, from international human rights 
 
118 The Constitution 2007, s 216.  
119 Harding and Leyland (n 117) 130. 
120 Frank M Coffin, ‘Judicial Balancing: The Protean Scales of Justice’ (1988) 63 NYU L Rev 16, 
16. 
121 To stress the importance of the improvement of judicial reasoning, it is observed that the 
judiciary in the USA started to play a more important role in the constitutional system, partly 
because, during the 1810s, the method of delivering reasons was changed at Marshall’s 
instigation from oral to timely published written statements, and from the totally separate 
opinions of each Justice to the courts’ opinions. These practices improved the judicial branch’s 
ability to communicate with people. Akhil Reed Amar, America’s Constitution: A Biography 
(Random House 2005) 214–17. 
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conventions or from the jurisprudences of other countries. This is reflected by the 
scarcity of references to international human rights norms in the courts’ 
jurisprudence and by the inaccuracy of some of these rare references.122 This 
lack of comprehensive knowledge may have different causes, which include but 
are not limited to the availability of the information, differences in terms of 
backgrounds and languages which may prevent understanding of international 
and human rights materials, or simply the ignorance of the judges.123 
However, this difficulty can be lessened by more research, not only on the 
judges’ side but also on the parties’. The UDHR and human rights treaties to 
which Thailand is a party are not difficult to access and understand, since there is 
only a limited amount of them and they have been translated into the Thai 
language. Some other kinds of international human rights texts, such as those 
arising from the jurisprudence of foreign countries, have not been translated into 
Thai and so offer more linguistic difficulties. Those that are in a language other 
than English will present more difficulties still. However, the adversarial system, 
where parties find the materials that best support their cases, may be able to 
provide help in this regard.124 Using expert witnesses is also a good option.125  
Sometimes, the secondary documents which assemble the practices of several 
countries on a certain issue together may facilitate the courts’ consideration of 
international human rights norms. The United Nations and other non-
governmental organisations such as Human Rights Watch seem to provide many 
reports of this kind, and the Supreme Court of the USA has made use of them in 
 
                                                 
122 These cases have been discussed in Chapter Two, IV B. It is noted that the scarcity of the 
references to international human rights norms may also result from the fact that only a small 
amount of cases related to the interpretation of rights have arisen in the courts, especially the 
Constitutional Court. See Chapter Two, II A ii a. 
123 See Ginsburg (n 57) 580; Markesinis and Fedtke (n 30) 113. 
124 Markesinis and Fedtke (n 30) 119. 
125 ibid 113, 131. 
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identifying world opinion or international consensus.126  While some scholars 
reasonably suggest that the more detail is available on the source countries’ legal 
system the more accurate and useful the insights that courts can obtain,127 it is 
argued here that the detail may not always be indispensable. Given proper 
caution as discussed in the framework proposed above, the use of the secondary 
document is beneficial for Thai courts.  
In the long run, more courses relating to international human rights law in law 
schools, and more promotion of international human rights awareness among the 
public by governmental and non-governmental organisations, can be useful. 
In any case, the challenges should not discourage the interpretive influence of 
international human rights norms. The use of comparative law, which includes 
international human rights norms, seems to be inevitable in today’s world.128 
Justice O’Connor of the Supreme Court of the USA expresses the view that 
‘[i]nternational law is no longer a specialty … it is vital if judges are to faithfully 
discharge their duties’.129 Similarly, Lord Bingham of the UK states:  
Times have changed. To an extent almost unimaginable even 
thirty years ago, national courts in this and other countries are 
called upon to consider and resolve issues turning on the correct 
understanding and application of international law, not on an 
occasional basis, now and then, but routinely, and often in cases 
of great importance. This calls for special, and in many cases new, 
 
                                                 
126 For examples see Trop v Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958) 102; Stanford v Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 
(1989). However, see Alford (n 103) 65–66 and Ramsey (n 103) rejecting the use of proxies such 
as UN reports to derive foreign practice arguing that they are often inaccurate. Discussed in 
Chapter Four, IV B ii e. 
127 Markesinis and Fedtke (n 30) 116–18, 128–31; Larsen (n 16) 1326. 
128 Jackson, ‘Constitutional Comparisons’ (n 14) 119. 
129 Associated Press, ‘O’Connor Extols Role of International Law’ ABC News <http://abcnews. 
go.com/Politics/print?id=202974> accessed 18 January 2010. 
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skills on the part of advocates who present cases and judges who 
decide them.130  
Thailand, as a developing country seeking recognition from the international 
community, will be forced to accept the influence of international human rights 
norms, and at the same time will benefit from them. Thai courts should attempt 
to broaden their perspective, and develop more coherent interpretive techniques 
and reason-providing styles to be able to cope with this international tide. 
 
130 The statement is found in the Foreword of Shaheed Fatima, Using International Law in 
Domestic Courts (Hart 2005). 
Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
The research has studied the interpretive influence of international human rights 
norms in Thailand, the UK and USA. It has found that the Constitution of 
Thailand has been influenced greatly by international human rights norms. But 
Thai courts have yet to develop a consistent method of interpretation in order to 
allow the interpretive influence of such norms, which is in contrast to what their 
counterparts in the UK and USA have done.  
The UK had been influenced by the ECHR since before the enactment of the 
HRA 1998. The Convention rights, as well as the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, 
have become even more important for the courts’ reasoning following the 
implementation of the Act.  Non-ECHR norms have played a supplemental role 
in the UK courts. The Supreme Court of the USA, on the other hand, has made 
use of international human rights norms from less specific sources including, but 
not limited to, treaties and practices of foreign nations. Nevertheless, there are 
controversial issues relating to the use of international human rights norms in 
both the UK and the USA. The research has discussed the practices of the two 
countries in detail and has related such practices to their political and 
constitutional systems, the roles of the judiciary in protecting rights, including 
the power of judicial review and interpretive approaches, and the perceived 
relationship between international and domestic law. It has also disentangled the 
arguments against the use of international human rights norms in each country, 
submitting that these arguments exaggerate valid concerns over democracy, 
separation of powers and nationalism.  
Next, the research compared the three jurisdictions. It found that, despite certain 
differences, the UK and USA are similar in many respects. This is particularly so 
with regard to the relatively stable political and constitutional system, the 
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common law approach, and the attachment to a dualist view of international and 
domestic laws. Most importantly, the main issues that have been raised against 
the courts’ practices in both countries are based on the dualist concept of the 
relationship between international and domestic law and what is perceived to be 
a proper role for the judiciary in these countries’ polities, both of which bases 
emerge from the concepts of democracy and the sovereignty of the legislative 
branch in making law. 
The Thai legal system should have been more receptive to the interpretive 
influence of international human rights norms than those of the UK and USA. 
This is not only because the country is less attached to dualism, but also because 
the new Constitution has been inspired by international human rights norms and 
has required, as a directive principle, that Thailand shall comply with its 
international human rights obligations. However, the practice of using 
international human rights norms has not been developed in Thai courts. This is 
not because it is inappropriate for the legal system, but mainly because of its 
unstable political and constitutional setting, the absence of a rights tradition, and 
the lack of developed concepts in judicial review and judicial interpretation.  
Therefore, on the basis of the lessons learnt from the UK and USA, and with 
adjustments to suit the Thai legal system, the research proposes a framework by 
means of which Thai courts may legitimately and appropriately make use of 
international human rights norms in interpreting Thai laws and developing Thai 
rights jurisprudence. The main principles included in the framework are as 
follows: 
• Both the Constitution and statutes should be interpreted taking into 
account international human rights norms. 
 
• All courts in Thailand have a responsibility to take into account 
international human rights norms in interpreting and applying laws, 
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but the Constitutional Court will be the leader in defining the meaning 
and scope of constitutional rights. 
 
• International human rights norms may be used for expository, 
empirical and substantive purposes, although it is observed that the 
last of these purposes will be the most useful for Thai courts. 
 
• Courts should always consider international human rights norms 
whenever they are relevant and helpful. In circumstances where Thai 
laws are ambiguous or uncertain or when no laws are applicable, there 
is further justification for courts to seek guidance from international 
human rights norms. 
 
• Courts may consider all kinds of international human rights 
norms.International human rights treaties to which Thailand is a party 
should be the main sources of the norms that Thai courts use. 
However, the interpretation of those treaties by relevant treaty bodies 
should also be considered, and the other non-binding sources of 
international human rights norms, such as the jurisprudence of a 
foreign country, should not be disregarded. In the case of the last 
category of norms, the commonality between the legal systems, the 
universality of the norms and the purpose of using them should be 
considered in order to identify the most appropriate norms to be used. 
 
• Different weights shall be attached to different kinds of norms. A 
rebuttable presumption of compatibility should be given to norms 
with which Thailand has an international obligation to comply, and 
also to the interpretation of such norms by relevant treaty bodies. As 
for other kinds of international human rights norms, they shall be 
deemed a ‘relevant’ consideration, but courts shall not presume that 
Thai laws should be interpreted to be consistent with them. 
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• The use of international human rights norms according to the 
framework shall be within the courts’ power of interpretation. 
Balances have to be struck between international human rights norms 
and other interpretive considerations, including but not limited to text, 
structure, the intention of the drafters, underlying value and other 
domestic contexts. Moreover, in reviewing the constitutionality of 
executive or legislative acts, courts ought to give proper weight to the 
judgments of the executive and legislative branches. 
 
• The courts should try to use international human rights norms in a 
way that enhances rights protection rather than weakens it. 
 
• The courts shall provide reasons for their use of international human 
rights norms, including but not limited to an explanation of why 
certain norms are relevant, and why a particular weight is given to 
such norms.  
This framework encourages Thai courts to develop their own indigenous rights 
jurisprudence with guidance from international human rights norms, without 
suggesting that Thai constitutional rights should be strictly tied to international 
human rights normsof any form. The proposal is consistent with what are 
considered to be the proper roles of the courts in Thailand, and with the 
Constitution. 
The research has submitted that it is inevitable that Thai courts have to be 
prepared for a larger volume of cases concerning rights and for the influence of 
international human rights norms. At the same time, it has also identified certain 
factors that could present challenges for Thai courts in using international human 
rights norms according to the framework. It has suggested that Thai courts need 
to develop their interpretive approaches away from a strict literal interpretation 
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and improve their judicial reasoning so that it involves more development and 
articulation of reasoning. It is also suggested that legal education relating to 
comparative studies should be improved, so that not only the courts but also the 
other parties involved have accurate information and understandings regarding 
international human rights norms. In short, the research has sought not only to 
achieve a better understanding of the interpretive influence of international 
human rights norms in the UK and USA, but also to provide a valuable 
framework with which Thai courts may fully utilise the norms in their judicial 
reasoning in order to improve the quality of their rights jurisprudence so as to 
bring it up to international standards and people’s increasing expectation. 
Of course, there are many important issues relating to the use of international 
human rights norms in judicial reasoning which the research has not covered and 
which should be discussed further in future work. Firstly, this research has 
focused more on the issue of democratic objections against such norms than on 
the problems of legal coherence and issues of methodology, regarding which the 
research has offered a quite broad paradigm. This is because the former is the 
most immediate issue in terms of whether it is legitimate for the courts to allow 
interpretive influence of international human rights norms. If it is accepted, as the 
research proposes, that interpretive influence of international human rights norms 
is legitimate, research on the methodological issues can be developed further.  
Next, this research has offered a general framework for the use by Thai courts of 
international human rights norms. Further research could be done by applying 
this framework to specific rights such as freedom of speech or due process. This 
kind of research will not only test the validity and applicability of the framework, 
but will also give courts more specific guidance as regards how to use 
international human rights norms in a specific area. 
It is further suggested that, for Thailand in particular, attention should be given to 
the potential clash between constitutional rights which are inspired by, and thus 
should be interpreted to be consistent with, international human rights and local 
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perceptions of rights and morals.The issue of freedom of expression vis-à-vis the 
Lèse majesté law is perhaps the most outstanding example of this.1It would be 
rewarding to study how Thai courts should balance the two sources of norms.  
Last but not least, in addition to research that focuses on the domestic level, 
research on the impact at an international level of domestic judicial reasoning 
that refers to international human rights norms⎯an area which has started to 
attract the attention of several scholars⎯could also build on this research.  
 
1See Andrew Harding and Peter Leyland, The Constitutional System of Thailand: A Contextual 
Analysis (Hart 2011) 242–47 suggesting potential conflicts. 
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